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PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY.

1917-1918.

I.—THE INTERACTION OF MIND AND BODY.

By H. WILDON CARR.

I AM very sensible of the honour which the Aristotelian Society has conferred on me in assigning to me the duty for the third time in succession of opening its Session with a Presidential Address. I have decided that the best response I can make is to offer a continuation of the studies on the special problem of philosophy,—the problem of mind and body,—which has formed the basis of the two previous addresses, the first which I entitled "The Moment of Experience," and the second, "The Problem of Recognition." To-night I propose to try to come to close quarters with the problem itself and discuss the nature of the interaction of mind and body.

We have acquired in the last two or three decades an enormous amount of new knowledge about the living body, and also about the mind or soul. The present war, with its hideous tale of injuries to the minds and bodies of men in the full prime of life, is adding every day something new to the growing sciences of physiology and psychology. Is there anything in this new knowledge which throws light on the old problem of the nature of the relation of soul and body? Can we now do what it has baffled philosophers for three centuries to do, offer an account of that relation which is not either inherently absurd or so extravagant as to be incredible? I think we can.

To ordinary observation there appears to be constant and continuous interaction between mind and body, but the great obstacle to the formulation of a scientific theory of interaction

is the inconceivability of a causal chain in which ideal or psychical facts are interlinked with mechanical or physical facts. Psycho-physical interaction cannot be merely an extension of the sphere of physical causation. Ideas will not do work like the expanding gas in the cylinder of a heat engine. The propagation of a movement cannot be the interchange of energy between corporeal and spiritual things. If there is a spiritual energy, if the term denotes an actual energy of mental things and is not simply a metaphor derived from a concept of physical science, this spiritual energy is not convertible into physical energy. It is confined to a spiritual chain, just as physical energy is confined to a corporeal chain. The incompatibility between mechanical forces and spiritual forces has been the stumbling-block in the path of all interaction theories and has driven philosophers and psychologists to take refuge in theories of parallelism.

The important factor in framing a new theory of interaction is the fact, which I hold to be now established beyond any question, that some disorders of the psycho-physical organism are primarily due to mental lesions, to what is called a mental trauma. What is now known technically as "functional" disease is, at least in some cases, purely psychological in its origin, whatever physiological derangements may be its accompaniment. This was unknown and unimagined by the older theorists. The recognition of it completely alters our conception of the nature of the individual mind or soul. It is impossible any longer to regard the mind as the concomitant of certain neurological processes in the body. The mind has a structure of its own. It is an integration of co-ordinated psychical elements or processes—personal memories, tendencies, desires, wishes, and the like,—which mutually repress or inhibit one another; or, as the case may be, interplay with and evoke one another. This psychical matter has an organisation as complete, and a unity of living process as perfect, as the physiological matter of the body. The mind is not an inter-

mittent consciousness lighting up with awareness certain states of the organism and dependent on particular physiological processes. It is a structure which can suffer injury, derangement or disorder, independently of the physical derangement of the body. If, then, there be interaction between soul and body, it by no means follows that parts or constituents of the soul must interact with parts or constituents of the body; it may be that the whole soul, or the soul as an individual, interacts with the whole body as a self-controlled unity of co-ordinated mechanisms. I wish to discuss whether such interaction is conceivable; and, if it be, in what manner it is possible to represent it.

Let me give an example in order to make my meaning unambiguous. I will quote Mr. McDougall's instance of the telegram in *Body and Mind* (p. 268), for illustration only, and without any reference to the author's purpose in the context. "A man receives from a friend a telegram saying 'Your son is dead.' The physical agent to which the man reacts is a series of black marks on a piece of paper. The reaction outwardly considered as a series of bodily processes consists, perhaps, in a sudden, total, and final cessation of all those activities that constitute the outward signs of life; or in complete change of the whole course of the man's behaviour throughout the rest of his life." A causal interaction theory would schematise this occurrence somewhat as follows:—(1) Physical stimulus (the black marks on the paper), (2) excitement of the neurones of the visual area of the cortex, (3) vision, (4) excitement of the neurones of the perceptive area of the cortex, (5) perception of physical sign, (6) excitement of the neurones in the association centres of the cortex, (7) perception of the significance of the sign, (8) evocation of memories and projection of memories in the form of imagination, (9) excitement of vaso-motor centres of the cortex, (10) emotions, (11) expression of emotion in glandular activity and skeletal movements, and so on.

In this scheme interaction is conceived as a continuous interplay of physical and psychical factors. The single event, the reading of the telegram, is conceived as a series of separate and independent events in causal connexion. These are stages of a process, and each of the stages might itself in its turn be resolved into a series of independent events. The words, for example, might be considered as preceding the sentence and the letters as preceding the words, and each stage we might choose to mark off in the process would then prove to be neither wholly physical nor wholly psychical, but a series of events some physical and some psychical.

The interaction of mind and body is, in my view, of an entirely different nature. It is always the adaptation of an attitude of the body to a disposition of the mind. It is, therefore, the interaction of one system with another system, where both co-operate in a common end. I should schematise the occurrence in this way:—

(1) An existent attitude of body adapted to a disposition of mind, determined by a long history, modified by new experience. (The reception of the telegram.)

(2) Profound change in the mind.

(3) Change in the attitude of the body adapting itself to the change in the disposition of the mind.

The difference between my scheme and the scheme just mentioned is that the reading of the telegram is not two events, first a purely physical action, giving rise to, second, a purely psychical experience. It is one single indivisible event which affects and modifies at one and the same time, though in completely different ways, two systems. Interaction is always an action of the whole mind on the whole body, or an action of the whole bodily system on the mind. Not only in great shock experiences but in ordinary and insignificant experience there is the same process. Every new experience modifies the whole mind, and the modification

of the whole mind entails an altered attitude of the whole body.

The principle can be illustrated equally well if the initiation of the experience be an action instead of a passive stimulation. Suppose I am the sender of the telegram. The execution of the action involves bodily movements of inexhaustible complexity, but the action is simple and indivisible. The state of my mind also while I am performing the action may resolve itself on analysis into an inexhaustible complexity of feelings, thoughts and wishes. But the physical action and the mental purpose are not composite, and the composite parts do not interplay with one another in the causal chain. The whole body or the body as a whole mechanism is at the disposal of the whole undivided and indivisible mind.

What then are the two systems? The mind consists of those factors or constituents or characters of the psychophysical organism which form its personality. The researches of modern psychologists who have specialised in abnormal psychology—Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Morton Prince, and many others—have revealed to us that personality is a complex organisation of psychical or spiritual constituents or factors, of a different order from physical or corporeal matter, and dynamic in their nature. Also this personality or spiritual unity may suffer dissociation, and then we have the phenomenon of a divided or of a multiple personality. Such dissociations are due to a derangement or re-arrangement of psychical matter such as memory, or to a failure or deficiency or deflection of will power. In any case personality can only be expressed in psychical terms, and the psychical constituents to which these terms apply are totally different from, and possess an existence of another order than, that which we express in the concepts of physical matter and energy.

On the other hand, the investigations of the physiologists—Professor Sherrington, Dr. J. S. Haldane, Dr. Mott, Dr. Cannon and Dr. Crile, to mention only a very few of the best-known

names—reveal to us that the body is a perfect machine, the life of which consists in constant and continuous action and reaction to physical stimuli, brought about by the integration of innumerable co-ordinated muscular actions by means of a perfected system of neural communications. The physiological processes are cycles of physical and chemical changes, and the whole mechanism is resolvable into material constituents and physiological processes, a system of interchange of energy. The initiation of the working and its direction is performed by the mind; the carrying out into action by the body. The corporeal cycle is a closed system: it receives its energy from the physical world and returns the exact equivalent in work and heat.

Physiologists are not agreed as to whether the life of the body can be expressed in the mechanical terms of the particular vital processes. The life belongs to the whole of the processes as a centrally controlled, centrally co-ordinated whole. But the life is not the mind, and there is a life of the mind as there is a life of the body. Whatever be the nature of the vital principle it is included in our concept of body when we distinguish body from mind. It is not the corpse but the living body which we distinguish from the mind when we consider the interaction of mind and body. In the actual psycho-physical organism there is a living unity of physiological process, and a living unity of psychical experience.

It is important to keep clear the problem of the relation of life and matter and that of the relation of mind and body; or rather to distinguish the life which we oppose to matter from the mind which we oppose to body. When I speak of body in this relation I always mean living body and not its physical constituents in contrast to its life. The two problems resemble one another, inas-much as both life and mind stand for a unity which confers concrete individuality on the manifold particular processes it co-ordinates. The difference is that life gives individuality to a group of material constituents undergoing a

cycle of physiological processes, while mind gives individuality to the experience, that is, to the conscious or attentive processes of the living organism. The narrower problem may lead up to and depend upon the more general, but for our present purpose we are concerned only with the particular problem of mind and body.

We may, then, state the problem of interaction as the reconciliation of the two following propositions:—

(1) The constituent elements of the mind and the constituent elements of the body are absolutely heterogeneous, and there is no common factor in psychical and physiological process.

(2) There is a continuous adaptation of mind and body, so that a change in the disposition of the one entails a change in the disposition of the other.

It may be thought that the first of these propositions of itself negatives the theory of interaction and compels us to adopt the alternative theory of parallelism. There seems to me a simple reply to this contention. We can point to two facts which themselves are facts of interaction. Interaction is, therefore, not a theory to account for facts but a fact to be reconciled with other facts. The two facts are, first, that all changes in the mind are mediated by the living body: and, second, that all actions of the living body carry out the purposes of the mind. To go back to the illustration of the telegram,—the mind is absolutely dependent on the body for the recipient which makes the purely spiritual change: and the body bears in all its subsequent actions the direction and characteristic expression which the mind has imposed. The body is the avenue to the mind of the experience which changes it, and the body is the outlet to the mind of the action which expresses that change. There is no parallelism here but interaction, whatever be the nature of the interaction. In neither case is the physical fact parallel with the psychical. In the first the psychical fact is responsive to the physical fact: in the second the physical fact is responsive to the psychical fact.

Let us, then, inquire, what is the nature of soul or mind as it is revealed to us in the objective study of psychological phenomena? Also what is the nature of living body as it is revealed by experimental physiology? And then what is the nature of the synthesis or union of these two natures?

I. *The Nature of Mind or Soul.*

It is useful to retain both the terms, "mind" and "soul," even though we mean to indicate by them an identical reality. When we use the term "mind" we seem to throw emphasis on the intellectual side, while when we use the term "soul" we seem rather to emphasise the sentient and emotional side of our spiritual nature. We are not in the first instance conscious of the mind as an object distinct from the body. We apprehend the mind rather as a distinct kind of quality which some objects have and others have not. We are accustomed to use the term "mind" simply to indicate mental qualities, and the term "soul" to indicate the individual character of the whole of these qualities. Then again we use the term "soul" to comprehend the psychological as distinct from the physical qualities of every material object which is living, and we further distinguish the rational soul from the animal soul and the animal soul from the plant soul. The soul or mind which I am now opposing to the living body is the rational soul. It seems to consist in and depend upon the possession by a living creature of two faculties, one passive, a faculty of being conscious or aware, the other active, a faculty of desiring or willing. The first is a specific knowledge of the body and its environment, the second a specific tendency to responsive action by the body. In each case a mental quality seems to characterise a sensible object, and the soul seems to be the common term for these mental qualities. In other words, it seems as though the soul may be the phenomenon of consciousness or awareness, exhibited by certain living material objects, possessing a definite kind of organic structure,

together with the power of purposive action which such endowment brings with it. When we consider the nature of this consciousness, however, it becomes evident, and can be clearly and directly proved, that consciousness is not the quality of a sensible object but the manifestation of an individual, spiritual, *i.e.* immaterial, object. This definite immaterial object is the soul. What is the proof of this? And why, if true, is it not immediately evident?

The reason why, if it be true, it is not immediately evident is clear when we consider the conditions in which our own individual consciousness arises. The world presents itself to our mind in the first instance as an aggregate or congeries of distinguishable spatial objects, each having a nature of its own. We are each of us one among these juxtaposed and displaceable objects. The object I call "me" possesses a special quality of consciousness or awareness. Other objects also seem to possess this quality, but not all. The vast majority, indeed, seem by their pure passivity to be without it. What, then, does this quality of consciousness appear as? It seems at first extremely simple. Consciousness is my awareness that I am an object among other objects. This seems to be passive enjoyment in so far as it is an affection of the object "me": and active contemplation in so far as it relates me to other objects which are not me. If I assume *the existence* of the world of objects, then this is one way of imagining what consciousness or awareness is in such a world. Knowledge will seem to depend on the togetherness of distinct objects and to be the quality of one of the objects to be aware of the presence and nature of the others. My knowledge will seem to depend on a faculty in me to contemplate and enjoy *what exists* to be contemplated and enjoyed.

When, however, I look more closely at the nature of this knowledge, *and make no assumption about existence*, I see that it is not and cannot be contemplation. That is to say, knowledge may include contemplation, but cannot itself simply be

contemplation. It is of a different and altogether more complex character than contemplation; it is recognition. The immediate contemplation by one object of another object or of other objects, granting there may be such a thing, would not be what we call knowledge nor even consciousness or awareness. To be conscious or aware of an object is not to contemplate it but to recognise it. Recognition implies precognition, whereas contemplation purports to be simple and immediate, and of itself implies no previous experience. Recognition presupposes memory and also constructive imagination, without which memory would only be recollection of the past, not knowledge of the present. Remembering and imagining are not qualities of sensible objects. We are forced in order to give meaning to the terms to oppose mind to matter. Memory and imagination are qualities of an intelligible object, the mind, and not of a sensible object, the body. Their nature is spiritual and not material.

There have, indeed, been many attempts to show that memory may be a material fact. It has been suggested, for example, that it is one in kind with the trace which every material thing, however great its resilience, even flint or steel, seems to retain of every force which has acted upon it. But this is wholly to misunderstand the nature of the fact, and is due, no doubt, to an ambiguity in our use of the term memory. We use it to designate two wholly distinct conscious phenomena, namely, first the pure record of our past experience which we retain and recall at need, and also second the disposition or habit of repeating past experience which is either innate and part of our nature, or else an acquired disposition. This habit-memory, the memory which repeats, is a motor disposition, and therefore dependent on the setting up of mechanical contrivances in the psycho-physical organism. Pure memory, on the other hand, is unintelligible as a material fact. If there be any one thing which we can point to and say, this is spiritual, mental, psychical, and in no sense

material, it is memory. It is not the smallest of the debts we owe to Bergson that he has made clear this fundamental distinction between matter and memory.

It may still be objected, however, that this only proves that memory cannot be considered as the quality of a sensible object in so far as that object is purely spatial. But, it will be said, every spatial object is also in a time relation, the living body is spatio-temporal. May not memory and imagination then be temporal qualities of sensible objects, that is, qualities of living bodies enduring through the continuity of a changing process? The reply is that memory is not static and mechanical. We do not remember indifferently what has happened to us, and the vividness of our memory is not proportionate to the strength or weakness of the original sense stimulus. We remember only what has interested us and what to some extent consciously or unconsciously has engaged our attention. It is the direction of this interest, and not the actual mechanical modification of the sense organs, which determines what shall and what shall not form a record. How can such a record be mechanical? Our body contains various and innumerable reflex mechanisms, continually giving immediate and automatic responses to definite stimuli, but no imaginable complexity of such reflexes would yield memory or imagination. Memory represents the past, imagination the future, not according to a scale of sense impressions or of physical stimuli, but according to the organisation of a special interest.

This leads to the main consideration. Memory and imagination do not pertain to the continuity of physiological process in the body, but to the unity and continuity of conscious experience which we term the personal self. The continuity of living process in the body and the continuity of conscious process in the mind are not one and the same continuity. The two continuities are in relation, for there is neither affection nor action of the mind save by means of the body. But

the mind is a continuity of conscious experience quite distinct from the continuity of living process, and quite different in its nature. The two continuities do not even present a point-to-point correspondence. There are breaks in the bodily condition of consciousness; normal breaks in sleep, abnormal breaks in certain diseases and on the occasion of injuries or of being poisoned, and these breaks are of varying duration. Yet, however long the interval between the states of consciousness, there is no break whatever in the continuity of the consciousness. When we awake from sleep or when consciousness returns after long coma, we are one and the same person in everything which concerns the conscious continuity. No external stimulus nor internal cerebration which may take place during periods of unconsciousness enters into or goes to constitute the continuity of memory which is the personal self. It is true we may dream and may remember the dream, and the mind may be affected by it after waking, but it is the dream we are conscious of having had when we have awakened from sleep, not the actual dream consciousness itself as it occurred in sleep, which enters into the personal memory record. On the other hand, there may be breaks in the continuity of the personal self-consciousness when there is no break whatever in the continuity of its bodily condition. In such case we have a wholly different kind of derangement. The break may take the form of an amnesia, and according to its extent and severity there will be a disruption of psychical unity. Or it may take the form of complete dissociation and give rise to the condition of double or multiple personality. It is evident, therefore, that there is a unity and continuity of mental process, distinct from, and other than, the unity and continuity of physiological process. whatever be their mutual relation.

It is, however, when we consider the conative rather than the contemplative function of the mind, when we consider desire, volition, action, rather than perception, memory, imagination, that we are made aware of a definite mental

structure. Our psychical nature is based on innate instinctive impulses which are for the most part unconscious. Up to quite recent times these psychical dispositions were regarded in a general way as the necessary accompaniment of the natural functions of the bodily organism. More especially the biological necessity of sexual reproduction, which in the higher animals involves the union of individuals organically distinct but complementary to one another for the reproductive function, was supposed to have given rise to the sexual instincts. The sexual instincts were supposed to have undergone further modification in evolution, and to have called forth auxiliary instincts with appropriate emotions, such as parental affection, tender emotion, gregarious instincts, and so forth. These again were supposed to be the basis of our social and political institutions. Our unconsciousness of this instinctive nature was simply taken to be evidence that it belonged to our brute bodily organisation, constituted our animality, and was wholly irrational. In the light of modern investigation we have had to revise the whole concept of this unconscious nature, and to replace it with the concept of unconscious mind.

To the older psychology the unconscious mind seemed a contradiction in terms, for mind was generally a synonym of consciousness, and the unconscious was therefore the negation of mind. No one now quarrels with the term, though there are many theories and acute controversies concerning the fact. These I shall avoid as irrelevant to my present purpose. I will confine myself to indicating a few now generally accepted facts which clearly imply a definite mental structure analogous to the bodily structure, and a definite unity and continuity of psychical process analogous to the co-ordinated unity and continuity of the physiological process.

The first of these facts is that which psychologists and alienists term repression. There are certain instinctive tendencies to actions which we habitually repress. Such repression is specific and is part of our nature. It is automatic

and unconscious. For example, the whole mental and moral development of human nature, that is to say, the particular and definite form it has assumed in civilisation, is dependent on the control of the reproductive instinct. This is a psychical not a physical control; for it is the expression of the instinct, not the instinct, which is repressed. Repression is effected by the holding back and suppressing of the "wish" or imaginative form in which conation asserts itself, so that it is kept from emergence into consciousness. There is a repression exercised by consciousness itself. This is very common experience and of everyday occurrence. But there is a repression of which we are altogether unconscious, and this is proved by abnormal psychology and also confirmed by many delicate experiments on normal subjects.

The second fact which seems to be established is that there are planes of unconsciousness. If we take as the plane of consciousness not merely what at any moment is within the central zone of attention but what is within call of the mind in memory, then there is below this a whole range of definite psychical content which cannot of itself reach consciousness and which is only revealed under special circumstances, normal or abnormal. We may, for example, under hypnotic conditions bring back memories or re-live conations which in ordinary conditions are unrecoverable. There is evidence of deeper and deeper planes. According to the well-known theory of dream interpretation of Sigmund Freud, it is from deep and ordinarily inaccessible regions of our mind that the substantial material of the dream life comes. However that may be, we may regard it, I think, as established that whole regions of psychical matter lie beneath the manifest mental activity of attentive consciousness.

The third fact is that this unconscious mind is not inert but active, not dead but living. Its constituents, like the cells of the living body, have their own individual life. In normal healthy life the deeper strata are inhibited and controlled. The inhibiting and controlling power is exercised by the mind, and

the character and variety of the inhibition constitute the individuality and personality of the mind. Personality may however, become disordered, deranged, or, to borrow the analogous term in the pathology of the organism, diseased. Then the repressed and inhibited constituents break away from control and run riot, and give rise to the familiar symptoms of hysteria, or, it may be, to the more serious symptoms of dissociation, or to final and irreparable ruin in dementia.

We are entitled to say of these facts, apart from anything in regard to them which is hypothetical or mere theory, that they point to the existence of mental structure. Memory, imagination, desire, conation, tendency, wish, are psychical matter, and they are organised to form an acting unity, and this unity is the personal mind. The constituents of it are of a different order of reality to that of the protoplasmic movements, cell physiology, metabolism, muscular contractibility, glandular secretion, nervous co-ordination, and the like, which constitute the living body.

Is it not possible, however, it may yet be urged, that the mind is identical with and a development of the principle of life? Whatever be the origin of life and whatever the nature of the principle which has determined the direction of the energy of the changes of carbon compounds and evolved specialised vegetable and animal forms, is there not, it may be asked, an uninterrupted progress in this direction until we reach the rational soul? The reply I offer to this contention, so far as my present purpose is concerned, is that whether or not the problem of life be ultimately one and identical with the problem of mind, the actual fact before us is the problem of two distinct orders, an order of living body and an order of thinking mind. The interaction of mind and body is not the problem as to what life itself is, but the problem as to in what way a mind, being an organisation of spiritual experience, can act in and through a living body constituted of material elements and mechanical movements. Every man whose mind

is normal recognises, as soon as he understands the proposition, that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, and every man whose body is normal maintains from birth to death a blood temperature of 37° C. The two facts belong to different orders, and it is inconceivable that the two facts can interact in such a way that one might be the cause or the effect of the other. Yet the two orders do in some way interact, for they are essential to one personality.

II. *The Nature of the Body.*

The body is, what the mind is not, a sensible object. It is one among the objects or things which constitute the sensible world. It is presented by means of sensations, and is in spatial and temporal relations with the other objects of the sensible world. The term "sensible" implies a relation to mind, for object sensed implies subject sensing. There is no escape from this relation. On the other hand, there would be no advantage in escape, were escape possible, for the whole problem of knowledge and existence is the problem of presenting reality to the mind in a form which is self-consistent. The relation of object to subject expressed in the words "sensible object," the relation of object to subject in knowing of every kind and order, is not, however, the relation between the body and the mind which I am now seeking to make explicit, because in this meaning the mind as well as the body is an object to a subject. The body is a sensible object to a sensing subject, the mind is an intelligible object to a thinking, that is, an imagining and reflecting, subject.

The body, like other objects in the sensible world, is spatial: it excludes other objects, and is juxtaposed with them. It is changeable, for it occupies different relative positions at different moments. It is changing, for it alters internally continuously and according to a principle or law. It is temporal, for its state at any moment is determined by its state at the previous moment. As an object it can be classified

according to any order or arrangement to which physical objects conform.

To each individual, however, his body is a privileged object. It is the constant centre of all objects, and the changes in all other objects are primarily for him changes in the relation of other objects to the body. But it is also privileged in a still more special sense. It is the means and the only means by which all objects, itself included, are known, and the only means by which desires and wishes are realised. Also it is a privileged object in the sense that it alone among all objects is known not only by sensations but also by affections or feelings. We know our body, not only in the way we know all sensible objects, by the sensations we have of it, but also in the feelings by which the sensations of itself and of other objects are accompanied. So it is that some knowledge of our own body appears to be a necessary accompaniment of any knowledge of any sensible object. For example, when by touch I am made aware of an external object I am also at the same time aware of my own body as the surface touched, and this even if the object touching is also part of my own body. Nevertheless, although the body as an object has these privileges over other objects, we find no difficulty in abstracting from them and considering the body purely as belonging to the general class of external material objects. Indeed, it is only by doing so that we have come to know anything of importance about the body. Its special privileges give us no insight into its nature and function. We know absolutely nothing of the internal structure and of the physiological processes of the body by reason of the fact that the mind dwells within it and is dependent upon it for all it knows and does. In fact, our individual mind, notwithstanding its specially privileged position in regard to one object, is not thereby endowed with special knowledge of the nature of that object, nor equipped with special means of becoming acquainted with its living processes. Knowledge of physiological process cannot be

gained by introspection but only by external observation. It is gained by means of sensations, perceptions and judgments, not by feelings.

The living body is a cycle of physiological processes, performed by means of mutually adapted structures, automatically co-ordinated and controlled. The great majority of these processes are involuntary and unconscious in the absolute degree, and in those processes or parts of processes in which there is consciousness and volition the consciousness and volition seem independent of the efficiency of the actual process. If the consciousness take the form of sentience, pain or pleasure, it appears as merely an accompaniment of the process, not as an essential constituent of it. If it take the form of reflective consciousness or awareness, it then appears, though accompanying the process, to be altogether detached from it. We can and we do conceive the living body as complete in itself without the accompaniment of consciousness, either in the form of simple sentience or in the form of apperception. And yet this accompaniment of consciousness, whether it be simple sentience or cognition, always seems to fulfil some manifest biological purpose. Also unconsciousness, in those neural processes from which consciousness is absent, is not merely negative, its absence fulfils a biological purpose. Unconsciousness may be simply an absence, or it may be positively acquired, the automatism of habitual action. In either case we may find its ground in a biological utility.

Yet, although the physiological processes of the living body seem independent of the particular form of consciousness or unconsciousness which may accompany them, this conscious accompaniment is conditioned by special structures and special processes in the living body. Part of our organisation has for sole function sentience and responsive volitional action. Such structures are: the sense-organs which consist of specialised nerve-endings disposed in varying groups over the periphery, enabling a minute discrimination of external physical stimuli to

be experienced; the special nerve-endings beneath the skin or in its deeper layers which give rise when stimulated to pain-sensations; special nerve-endings sensitive to muscular, glandular or vascular fatigue which give rise to vague feelings of general comfort or discomfort; the richly innervated organs of the special senses, the retina, the organ of Corti, the semi-circular canals, the organs of taste and smell, which enable us to discriminate definite ranges or distinct classes of physical stimuli. Then there is the great central organ itself, the brain and spinal cord, to which every single sentient end-organ communicates directly its particular fibre and whence special fibres descend with the volitional impulses to every muscle under volitional control.

There is an important character of the structure and function of neurons which recent researches have disclosed. I refer to the individuality or rather the specificity of each constituent cell with its fibres. The older theory of specific nervous energy merely affirmed the general specificity of groups of sensory and motor neurones, particularly those associated with the special senses. It now seems probable that this specificity belongs to every constituent unit of a group and not merely to the group as distinguished from other groups. All action mediated by neurones takes place on the all-or-nothing principle and the function of one neurone cannot be performed by any other. At least it seems to me that all the direct experiments, such particularly as the well-known experiment of Dr. Head on the innervation of his own forearm, tend to confirm this generalisation. The living principle, whatever it is and however we name it,—entelechy, *élan vital*, life-force,—manifests itself in the co-ordination of multifarious specific processes of constituent cells. This function of co-ordination is not exercised by any specific structure. At any rate, no such structure is known and there is no reason to suppose it exists undiscovered. The function is exercised indifferently whether the constituent elements be many or few, and the number of cell-constituents

varies enormously between individuals of different species of the same generic type. The mechanism by which co-ordination is effected can be located in the cerebral cortex, the function of which has been likened to that of the switchboard in a telephonic exchange. The ultimate nature of the living body seems therefore to be the co-ordination on an enduring principle of an immense numerical aggregate of independent specific units.

III. *The Heterogeneity of the Two Natures.*

When I speak of the heterogeneity of mind and body and point to the absolute disparity between mental and physical (including physiological) process, I do not mean that we can form class concepts of minds and of bodies as unrelated realities. It is easy to see in the case of the mind that the possibility of presenting it as image or as concept depends on its relation to the body. We can only define what anything is by what it does ; what does nothing is nothing ; and whatever the mind does it does by means of the body. We may abstract the mind from its relation to any particular body, but we cannot give expression to the thought of a mind without imagining for it some embodiment. This has been the favourite criticism of animistic theories ancient and modern. It is impossible even in thought to present the idea of pure unembodied spirit. The converse is also true in so far as the concept of one's own living body is concerned, but it is not so immediately obvious, and would at least require the support of argument to bring conviction. It is really impossible for me to think that my body without my mind is still my body. I may place myself in thought as a spectator at my own cremation, but only by the artifice of a new imagined embodiment which enables me to present my body to my mind as no longer my body. Or, again, consider a case like that most pathetic picture drawn for us by Nietzsche's sister of the last years of her brother, truly a picture of living death. There is the living body surviving the dead mind. In presenting that living body to our mind as still

Nietzsche's body, we are, in fact, employing the artifice of a new impersonation. We must place Nietzsche's mind within his body in imagination in order to conceive its absence in fact. The problem of heterogeneity is not the problem whether a dissociation of mind and body is or is not conceivable.

If then mind and body are neither existentially nor conceptually separate as well as disparate, does the heterogeneity consist in the double aspect which psycho-physical action assumes? Is mind the aspect of that action when regarded as purpose, body its aspect when regarded as mechanism? The specific character of mental process is the representation in idea of the end to be attained; the specific character of physical process is the determination of counteracting forces in a resultant. Every action or process, whether we class it as material or vital, as conscious or unconscious, presents to the observer this double aspect, the resultant can be viewed either as determined by a final cause or by an efficient cause. The resultant is one and the same, however viewed. A process of crystallisation or a process of organic metabolism can be read purposively or mechanically, but it is the same set of facts, whichever way they are viewed, and whatever kind of interpretation the external observer seeks. There is, however, in a system or body in which mind is immanent, the emergence of a phenomenon which is not found in any merely mechanical system of interacting forces. This is conscious or purposive adaptation. It manifests itself as a direction of physical forces, already existing, toward the attainment of an ideal which it presents as an end. In this we have the distinguishing characteristic of mind, that which raises it, so to speak, to a higher plane than that of mere natural fact. Yet this is not the characteristic which seems to me to constitute the fact of heterogeneity; rather I should say it is the heterogeneity of mind and body which is the ground or condition of this characteristic.

This heterogeneity is based on a certain fact which we

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directly experience and also may indirectly observe. It is that every new experience from the instant of its historical apparition enters into, submits to, is incorporated within, two disparate systems. Each system has its own kind of order, its own specific nature, and its own peculiar function. The union between the two systems consists in a relation of mutual interdependence, but it is the systems which are interdependent. It is not a point-to-point union, nor a point-to-point correspondence of the constituent parts of one system with those of the other. Thought and action, though mutually dependent, form each a system; the one is the psychical organisation we term the mind, the other the co-ordination of mechanical contrivances we term the body. We cannot call into activity a part of the mind without calling into activity the whole mind. We cannot exercise a particular mechanism of the body without affecting the whole disposition of the body.

When I feel, perceive, think and will, what is it in me that performs these acts of feeling, perceiving, thinking and willing? Why do I attribute these acts to my mind and not to my body? Why do I divide myself into these two parts or attribute to myself this dual nature? What is the difficulty in assigning all my psychical acts to the brain, and in supposing that my brain thinks? Many contemporary philosophers are inclined to consider this a possible hypothesis, and the new theory of "behaviourism" seems an attempt to give it philosophical expression. I find no inherent difficulty in the notion. It does not seem to me absurd, nor antecedently impossible, nor even antecedently improbable. The theory that the brain thinks or that the mind is the brain is not the same as the well known and often quoted remark that the brain secretes mind as the liver secretes gall. Such a concept rests on a false analogy. It would have been a truer analogy to have said, as the ovary secretes the ovum which becomes the embryo, but then the absurdity would have been manifest. I see no incongruity in attributing to the brain,

because it is ultimately resolvable into a constellation of physical atoms, a psychical function. My reason for rejecting the simple statement that the brain thinks is that it seems to me untrue in fact. I can imagine that the brain might think and feel and will, but what I cannot imagine is how thoughts and feelings and volitions, if they were acts of the brain, could form the mind. They would in a certain way hang together, no doubt, and they would have the unity which comes from being owned, but could they of themselves form an organic individual system such as the mind is? I find it, then, impossible to believe that, as a fact, the brain thinks, because I find that, as a fact, the brain is not the mind. If there be two things, the mind and the body, and the brain is part of the body, then it seems to me it must be the mind and not the brain which thinks. But what is the proof of it? It seems to me clear that, were it the brain which directly exercises the psychical function, then acts of feeling, thinking, etc., would be disconnected, detached, and detachable, or combined, if they were combined, on an altogether different principle from that which I find. As a fact, I can never detach one psychical act from other acts, or attach a psychical act purely and simply to a physiological process, it is always one and indivisible with the whole psychical organisation I call mind. It belongs to the system of my psychical experience, and to present it as belonging to the system of mechanical contrivances which I call my body and to the particular co-ordinating connexions of these which are the part of my body I call my brain, is to me a pure incongruity. Even the simplest, most elementary psychical act is the act of a mind. Its character, its tone, its subordination to purpose, emanate directly from the organisation of an individual whole of psychical acts. Thoughts, ideas, meanings, desires, wishes, imaginations, feelings, sensations, are not a chaos, a disconnected manifold. They do not float loosely, and they are not indifferent to the principle of their combination. They are owned not by the brain, but by the

personality which they themselves constitute, the mind. Test it in the simplest case of mere sentience. Suppose the stimulation of a pain nerve-ending. The pain which follows may seem instantaneous, and may be followed by an automatic muscular response, but it is not a pure reflex. For it is only if I experience pain that it is pain, which means that to be pain it must be a state of my mind. It must modify my whole personality. If my mind exclude it, it is absolutely ineffectual, practically and actually non-existent, even though the stimulation remain in the form of physical injury, and the neural course be unimpeded. There is no way of detaching the pain as a psychical element from the mind, and attaching it and confining it to a particular neural process; and it is the whole mind, not a detached psychical factor of it, which intervenes to bring about the new bodily disposition.

We find another and yet more striking instance of the heterogeneity of mind and body in the general phenomenon of the animal mind. The mental equipment of different animal species seems always proportioned to the conditions of the animal's life, and never and in no respect proportionate to neural matter, or to the complexity and quantity of specific contrivances. There are large mammals which possess at least fifteen thousand times as many neurons as the smallest mammals. Does anyone, therefore, credit them with fifteen thousand times the sentient or intellectual capacity? But why not, if the brain thinks? Leaving aside the problem of magnitude, when we compare one animal with another, we are struck with the remarkable difference between one species and another in the extent to which mind serves it in its activity. A rat, for example, shows more cunning than a rabbit, or a sheep, or a horse, but it is not better equipped neurologically for its special activities than they are for theirs. It is clearly a case in which intelligence has been developed because it serves the species in the peculiar routine of life to which it is adapted. A striking illustration was afforded a few years ago at the Zoo-

logical Gardens in the case of a Polar bear, a creature which, judging by its structure and position in the animal scale, might be expected to exhibit a high degree of common intelligence. When placed in new quarters on the Mappin Terraces, it fell over the parapet into the surrounding foss. Obvious and perfectly simple means of return were offered it, but instead of availing itself of them it displayed for several days an amazing amount of what appeared as sheer stupidity. The explanation zoologists offered was that its mental equipment was adequate to the conditions of its life, the routine of which in its native seas, where no natural enemies are laying snares for it, seldom presents a complex situation, or one that calls for the exercise of cunning.

The acquirement of skill affords another illustration of what I mean by the heterogeneity of mind and body. The skill of the musician, the mechanic, the professional scientific practitioner, is acquired by an activity orientated in the inverse direction to that which we associate with the growing, widening, and developing mind. It even depends for success on a certain inhibition of pure mentality. Skill may almost be defined as the power of performing complicated actions without thinking. Reflective or discursive thought, which is the essence of mind, interrupts the work of skill. Yet the acquirement of skill is not independent of nor indifferent to the brain. Not only does it involve a development of neural process, but almost certainly a development of the higher cerebral centres—those which we imagine to be most immediately concerned with rational processes. Skill supposes an enormous work of co-ordination, and the cerebral hemispheres are generally conceived to be the seat of this co-ordination. Here, therefore, we have a case in which brain development is quite disparate from mind development. On the other hand, the cases are almost proverbial of the want of skill in the ordinary affairs of life displayed by men of vast intellectual attainments. Mental giants sometimes act as children in matters of daily life. It

may be, of course, that the intellectual development is due to other and different nervous co-ordinations or to other kinds of nervous contrivance, but whether this be so or not, it is clear that in the case of skill the brain hypothesis is largely explanatory, in the other case it is not. The reason is important. Muscles are involved in the case of skill, and muscles are wholly controlled by nerves. In the case of mind, thoughts, ideas and meanings are concerned, and their direct relation to nerve is purely hypothetical. Nerves are the channels or pathway between the mind and the world external to the body, but that they cause or control or originate the mind there is no evidence.

IV. *The Solidarity of the Two Natures.*

At this point it may seem that the animistic hypothesis offers the easiest solution of our problem. It is the most ancient and the most venerable, and this of itself may incline one to suspect that it may be true after all. May we not schematise the relation of mind and body on the analogy of the charioteer who with the reins in his hands guides and controls the living horses, making them subserve and fulfil his purposes? May not the relation of the soul to the living body, though infinitely more complex, be yet ultimately as simple as this? Should we adopt this view we might then suppose that each sensation was a demand on the attention of the soul, a call to it to take account of the situation and direct the response. And this the soul might do either by leaving the response to the automatic reactions or by co-ordinating new ones. In any case we should represent the soul as distinct in its nature and function from the living body, able, perhaps, like the charioteer to step down from the chariot and at need to mount another. The analogy is tempting and up to a point it agrees with the facts. It is, therefore, very important to indicate clearly the exact point at which it fails, and also the completeness of the failure. It fails to explain the fact that

the mind is psychical experience and not something which *has* psychical experience. The problem of mind and body arises in the fact that psychical experience organises itself into mind, and then stands as an organic or systematic whole over against the bodily system.

It seems to me certain that the forces, whatever they are, which are moulding the body and adapting it to the specific activity of the living creature, are the identical forces which are forming the mind and organising it into the personal unity. I say it seems to me certain, not because I think the contrary inconceivable, but because all the facts when considered without prejudice support this view, and because I can think of no reason why I should suppose there are unknown facts which would invalidate such a conclusion. Moreover, there is one fact which seems positively to clinch it. Every individual has an ancestry and proximately arises from two parents. In the simple form of the fertilised ovum, potential mind and potential body part from the parental stock and enter on individual existence. I find it impossible to believe that the mind is generated by some separate process or arises independently of the force which generates the body.

I will now state my own theory, and I will do so by first of all presenting its metaphysical basis in abstract terms, afterwards trying to show how it is exemplified in the common and acknowledged facts of experience.

The ultimate reality I find I can best indicate to myself by the term "life." "Life" is a very general term and more often used as an adjective than as a substantive. I mean by "life" existence as I immediately experience it in living. I mean therefore what some philosophers term conscious experience, or simply experience. It seems to me to be what Descartes meant when he said "*Je pense donc je suis.*" It is the ultimate fact behind which even thought cannot get. I think this immediate knowing of life in living is a pure intuition, by which I mean that in it we have a form of knowing which is non-intellectual,

but this raises a controversial question which is irrelevant to the present discussion. I only want it to be clear that by life I do not mean a quality or character of something but the immediate fact which to everyone is undoubted and indubitable reality. When we reflect on this reality and form a notion of it, when we ask the question, What is life?—we find that there are involved in the notion two concepts which are essential to it,—the concept of activity and the concept of duration. It may be said that these are but expressions of a more general notion which underlies them, the notion of movement or change. I prefer to identify change with the general notion of life, but I am now considering life as each individual conceives it in reflecting on his experience. To the individual, life is centralised and determined. It is the activity which is confined to a definite present moment, and also it is the duration of progressing action. There is, therefore, a dichotomy in the very notion of life. It splits into two antithetical notions and these stand over against one another and are mutually exclusive. The notion of activity seems to concentrate or focus all reality in one intense but isolable instant and to exclude from the present moment what has been or will be, while the notion of duration brings into the present moment both past and future. It appears to me that we have in this dichotomy of thought the essential principle which underlies the duality of mind and body. The body is the concrete realisation of the activity of life, the mind the concrete realisation of its duration.

Some of the most obstinate problems of philosophy are due to a natural disposition of our intellect which inclines us to dissociate thought and action, thinking and doing. We regard deeds as alone real in the full sense of actuality; thoughts possess a shadowy kind of reality which they derive from deeds. Consequently the living body which at each present moment is actually doing the action essential to its life seems not only the centre of activity but the whole activity and the source from which the mind derives its reality. But if the living body is

necessary for the performance of action, the enduring mind is equally necessary for the unity and continuity of the action.

When we try to form a distinct concept of the living body apart from the concept of the informing mind, it is at once evident that our notion is of an unenduring thing, that is, a perishing and not a persisting thing. We conceive, it is true, a continuity of purely bodily existence. We picture the continuity of the body of an individual being from birth to death. The same body seems to us to go through the most complete changes, changes of both matter and form, in infancy, maturity, and decay. At any present moment the body is only an aggregation of material constituents with a certain arrangement of juxtaposition in space, but it is also an order of succession in time. Ordered succession is implied in physiological process. The state at every present moment is determined by the state at the preceding moment. But this is not the concept of duration; on the contrary, it is the concept of the succession of a momentary existence lapsing into a non-existence which is absolute. The living body concentrates its whole activity in one present existent moment, and it perishes with that instant. Its continuity is a continuity of perishing. It does not share its existence between two moments in such way that part of it exists at one moment, part at another. Its existence at one moment means that it has ceased to exist at every other. We cannot form the concept of mind on that model. Duration is as essential to our concept of mind as non-duration is essential to our concept of body. Duration means the continued existence of the past and its comprehension within the present; non-duration means the continual going out of existence and new creation of the present.

Living action, therefore, involves for its actualisation two systems antithetical in their nature and divergent in their direction. Each of these systems organises itself continuously round one and the same individual centre of activity, and its organisation is the necessary condition of realisation in action.

One secures to living action its duration and gives it its free self-determining character. The other secures its efficiency and gives it mechanical necessity, inserting it into the universal system of interacting forces. Such is the nature of the antithetical systems which it seems to me are necessarily formed round every centre of life, realising the twofold character of action—duration and efficiency. Can we present the scheme of the genesis of these two systems, and will this throw light on the problem of the nature of their interaction ?

Living process, as I conceive it, is a progressive dichotomy. Throughout the realm of individual experience the fundamental principle of development is a dichotomy of thinking and acting. By the term dichotomy I wish to emphasise that the process of experience is single not twofold in its origin. Living experience is the continual differentiation of what is at first undifferentiated. The differentiating is not a mechanical division into parts, it is the imposition on the same material of two orders of arrangement, each following a different principle, but each order the necessary complement of the other. **III 926**

I will try to illustrate what I mean by taking first the simplest case of experience I can imagine and trying to follow its course. I will suppose that a single pain-terminal in my body is excited by an adequate stimulus. The result is a psycho-physical event, as simple and unique as an event can be. It is physical and it is psychical. As sentience (pain) it is psychical, and the pain is not existentially separate from the stimulus, which is physical. A later reflection may separate the two, but they are not experienced as two events in a causal relation. Yet this one single experience in its very nature affects two wholly distinct systematical orders, the mind and the body. In the mind it is undifferentiated pain, vaguely localised, and referred to something hurting. In the body it is the specific functioning of a specific minute structure, responding to a specific stimulus. This structure is

not interchangeable with any other so far as its function is concerned, yet it is in co-ordination with the whole body as a physiological system. I will now take a more complex and complicated case. I will suppose I am watching a violinist performing. I have before me quite clearly mental process and bodily action. Were there only bodily action I might hear sound or noise but not music. Yet for me there is only one fact, and it seems to me also that for the violinist there is only one fact, his living action; but this one fact necessarily enters his mental order and his bodily order, and each is changing at every point of the progressing action. Each order, the mental and bodily, is changing, however, on a totally different principle, so that there is not and cannot be a correlation between a constituent part of the one order and a constituent part of the other. His living action is not uniting two diverse facts, nor holding in a fixed correlation two series of facts; it is creating two different orders. My theory is, then, that living action is not the unifying of an original diversity but the dichotomising of an original unity.

If this be true it seems to me the whole problem of interaction, as hitherto understood, is transformed. Mind and body arise in the very process of living action, and arise not at some moment which we can fix or imagine as the absolute beginning of living action, but arise continuously from moment to moment of the progressing development. Every modification of ever-changing experience is a modification of mind and body, each in its individual integrity. The antithesis of the two constitutes the essential nature of living action. The principle of living action is an organisation of ends, an organisation of means, and a continuous adaptation of ends to means and means to ends. The organisations realise antithetical principles; the one achieves freedom, the other necessity. The notion of means involves rigid determinism, a means which is not the necessary means is not a means; the notion of end involves freedom, a necessary end is not an end. The dichotomy

itself is grounded in necessity. It is because the principles are antithetical that each must organise itself independently of the other. There is no common quality of mind and body and no common measure between them, which render it conceivable that mental things and bodily things enter indifferently into either a mental or a bodily process. Equally inconceivable is a mind without embodiment, and a body without mind to give purposiveness to its co-ordinated processes. It is only as whole and individual, and not as composed of classes of discrete entities, that mind and body are in perfect union in a relation of absolute mutual interdependence.

The term which seems to me best adapted to express the interaction of the mind and the body is solidarity. The old legal meaning of this word exactly fits the notion. It was originally a term of Roman and Civil law to express the character of a contract which, in a single matter, involved several obligations on the part of the debtors, with corresponding rights to the creditors. The term causality as used in physical science (apart from any question as to the legitimacy of its employment therein) means that in some way something which is distinguished as cause disappears, and its exact equivalent reappears in something which is distinguished as effect. The term solidarity means that diverse, even divergent, activities together bring to pass a single common result to which all the activities contribute without sacrificing their individual integrity. The interaction of mind and body is not of a causal but of a solidary nature. I may explain that I do not propose to substitute the term solidarity for the term interaction. I cite it as an illustration of a relation of interaction which is not causal.

I can now, I think, make clear my scheme of this interaction. Let us call living action A, then we may say that every A is BC, these standing respectively for what pertains to the system mind and to the system body. B and C are not in direct relation but only in indirect relation. A, which

implies B, also implies C. A B is different from A C, and the relation between B and C is that both are implied in A. Thus there is interaction between B and C without causal relation. For, let us suppose that the initiation of a change is in B, the change is a change of A, but A is also C; and, therefore, there is a change in C consequent on the change in B. It is the nature of the consequence which is all important in my theory. A is always changing, change being of the essence of activity, and the change of A is a change in system B, and a change in system C. The relation of B and C to one another is mutual adaptation. A profound change in B may necessitate very slight adaptation in C, may conceivably necessitate no adaptation at all, and then the changes in B and C are quite disproportionate. It is this that differentiates my view from parallelism. The change in the mind is never commensurate with the change in the body, and there is no one-to-one correspondence which would make it possible for an infinite intelligence to read the one in the other.

Let me try and apply the formula. Life I have said is enduring and efficient, and I have shown that these characters are antithetical. I suppose, then, life to exist as an undifferentiated unity. If I am challenged to justify this supposal by any actual experience, I have, of course, to acknowledge that there is no such experience. I am presenting a scheme of the genesis of experience, not a temporal history of it. There is no experience of life save as already differentiated into body and mind. This is not a difficulty peculiar to philosophy it is an inherent difficulty of scientific explanation. How, for example, can I schematise what light is without the notion of latent energy, yet, so far as experience is concerned, latent energy is non-existent energy? I conceive life, then, as first an undifferentiated unity which to realise itself, to become actual, to be living action, must differentiate itself. This differentiation is a dichotomy, a separation into two individual systems, the order of which is governed by principles

which are opposite and contradictory, but at the same time the systems are complementary. One principle is realised in the mind, the other in the body. One forms an enduring agent preserving past and projecting future action, and the other an efficient instrument inserted into the whole system of interacting forces within which it is operative. Freedom is essential to the agent, mechanical necessity to the instrument. Here it behoves us to be on our guard lest our metaphors defeat us. Agent and instrument are metaphors which almost directly suggest the distinction between a machine and its function, and the moment we identify this with the relation of mind and body we are lost. Between life and function there exists no distinction. The body is not like a motor car which a man leaves in his garage until he has need of it. Living action progresses with the continuous modification of mind and body. The action is neither physical nor psychical nor partly physical and partly psychical; it is psycho-physical. No physical influence affects the mind save through the body, and no psychical influence passes from the mind save through the body. All and every experience modifies both mind and body, yet the modification is not a mechanical addition to something which but for the addition remains identical with what it was before. However subtle and imperceptible the change may be which new experience effects on the mind, it is the whole mind which is changed. And however slight the demand on the body a new experience makes, even though the action called for may appear a mere repetition of countless previous similar actions, a change is effected in the whole disposition of the co-ordinated mechanisms which comprise the body. We know that the organs of the body and the constituent elements of the organs atrophy with disuse and grow with use. A continuity of change in mind and body is a condition of life.

Here I may offer a remark on the bearing of this theory on the question of survival. It is not strictly relevant to the special issue to which I have confined the discussion, namely,

what concept we can form of the interaction of mind and body in actual living individuals. Yet to many the predominant interest of the whole problem is the light it throws on the question of survival, and a word on this may serve to emphasise one essential feature of what I have called solidarity. I see nothing irrational in the notion of a survival of personal experience after death. The credibility of it, as matter of fact, must depend on ordinary scientific evidence, and with this my theory has nothing to do. The only question it is concerned with is how far the system I call mind is conceivable when the system I call body is practically destroyed. There are two types of religious dogma; one is the natural immortality of the soul, the other is the resurrection of the body. I do not propose to discuss or compare them in regard to their conceivability, but will only point out that, so far as the view of the relation of mind and body which I have tried to set forth is concerned, some embodiment is essential to every presentation of mind as image of a concrete person or as general idea or concept of an actual individual. If, then, we believe that the departed soul can or does return now and here, or that it may or will return hereafter, or that it moves to a new sphere and lives in other conditions, the pertinent questions in regard to any such belief are those which St. Paul set himself to answer: "How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?" A soul without a body would be a non-receptive, non-active mind, and that is only not a contradiction in terms because there are no terms to contradict.

Mind and body are, then, according to my view, two disparate but not separate nor separable systems or orders. They are the necessary condition of the realisation of life in action. They arise and undergo modification continuously in the progress of living action. They interact continuously by mutual adaptation. They are never in direct causal relation, in the sense in which that relation holds in an energetical system, but they have a common source and co-operate in a common end.

Let me, in conclusion, summarise the main points which I have endeavoured to establish :—

1. We are dependent on the organs of sense for our understanding, and on the muscles for the expression of our volition. Interaction of mind and body is therefore not theory but fact. The problem is to explain the conditions under which interaction takes place, and this involves a theory of the nature and genesis of the two orders, the physical and the psychical.

2. The relation of mind and body is not causality, nor parallelism, but solidarity. Causality means that mental and bodily events form one series and enter into one identical system of interacting forces. It implies that an equivalent energy may assume a mental or a bodily form. This if not inconceivable is at least indemonstrable. Parallelism means that there is a point-to-point correspondence of two completely independent series of events. It implies harmony without interdependence. It is, therefore, a denial of interaction and a hypothesis to account for its appearance. Solidarity means that there are two individual systems, distinct in their order and diverse in their function, which in a single matter and for a common end complement and co-operate with one another.

3. Neither the mind nor the body is a series of events, or collection of entities, formed by accretion or agglomeration. Each is an individual organisation. The principle of each organisation is antithetical to that of the other, the order or arrangement of the constituent elements of each is different, and the direction or orientation of function in each is divergent from that of the other.

4. The interaction of mind and body is not interaction of part with part, but always of whole with whole. "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth" is a maxim incapable of literal fulfilment.

5. Mind and body are not an original diversity held together and united in the psycho-physical organism, but a dichotomy

inherent in and necessary to the process of realisation of living action.

6. The two antithetical principles which mind and body represent are freedom and necessity.

7. Psycho-physical dichotomy is essential to living action. In the human form living action is realised in the two-fold nature of man, spiritual and material. Mind and body are its concrete expression. They have one origin and one end. There is no mind without body, and no body which is not a "machine for acting will" (Browning).

II.—THOUGHT AND INTUITION.

By KARIN STEPHEN.

It has been suggested that Bergson's philosophy is so popular because it offers an easy road to knowledge. Bergson's attacks upon thought are particularly welcomed, we are told, by the lazy and muddle-headed who shrink from the effort which thought demands, and are only too glad to be absolved, in the name of philosophy itself, from taking trouble, and ready enough to believe the philosopher who tells them that they will get on all the better if they give up any attempt to think things out and just let themselves go. If this be so, then Bergson's philosophy owes its popularity to a misunderstanding.

Bergson does, indeed, consider that intuition is the right method for philosophy, and he urges us to adopt it in place of our usual intellectual methods. But it is not fair to object to intuition on the ground that it is too easy; the question is, rather, whether it is not altogether too difficult an act for us to perform. In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson refers to "the essentially active, I might almost say violent, character of metaphysical intuition." For him intuition is the supreme effort, thought the *pis aller* with which we have to manage as best we can when the strain of intuition becomes too great for us to endure.

Bergson's theory of knowledge is rather different from those of other philosophers, in that it undertakes to show not so much how we do in fact get knowledge, as how we ought to set about getting it. Before discussing this question, we must first see what the problem is, by examining briefly what ways of obtaining knowledge are open to us, what ways we usually choose, and what motives determine our choice.

Whenever we pay attention we find ourselves in possession of some sort of knowledge. This way of getting knowledge simply by attending without thinking about what we know we will call "acquaintance," and what is known in this way we will call "our experience." We are in the habit of supposing, in so far as we think about the matter at all, that our experience, what we are acquainted with, is things having common qualities such as solid tables, sweet sugar, blue sky, loud noises, together with states of mind and feeling such as anger, hope, ambition, and so on, with which we can be acquainted if we pay attention, and which may be attended to over and over again. In the course of this paper we shall have to examine our experience carefully: and, as we go on, we shall see that this description of it is at least very much oversimplified, if it is not positively erroneous. There is one thing, at any rate, about experience which must strike anyone who begins to look into what actually happens and which appears to conflict with this simple view of what experience is.

If we examine what actually goes on in our consciousness, our experience seems to be in a perpetual state of change, so that we really never seem to be acquainted with quite the same direct experience even for two moments together. It would, of course, never occur to anyone to deny that our experiences do change very often; most people, however, would hesitate to say that there is no such thing as an experience which is not in process of changing. We all realize that the possibilities of our experience are limited and governed by the presence or absence of conditions outside the experience itself—we should all agree that no one could see the blue sky if he were either blind or were shut up in a cellar, and that he could not hear a song if he were either quite deaf or if no one were singing. We are quite ready to admit that changes in these outside conditions will produce changes in our experience. What is often not clearly realized, however, is the extent to which, even though there is no reason to suppose that there has been any

change in the conditions, our experience is, nevertheless, in fact always changing owing to variations in the intensity and direction of our attention. If, for example, you try to fix your attention on, say, a sheet of foolscap, and notice what happens, you will soon find out that it is a complete mistake to imagine that, during the time your attention is supposed to be fixed upon it, you are continually aware of the same direct experience of, say, whiteness, parallel lines, oblong shape, and so on. Try as you may to steady your attention, it is perpetually shifting, now concentrating on a tiny part of the whole field presented to sight, now expanding to include much more of it; and if, by a great effort, you manage to check this straying of attention, your object seems to elude you altogether, and you find that you are no longer even succeeding in confining your attention to what is presented to sight, but that now you are listening, perhaps, or attending to your breathing or the sensations of your clothes, and not to the sheet of foolscap at all.

If this be a correct account of what actually happens, continual ebbing and flowing of attention would almost seem to be an invariable condition of there being any experience at all. It would be a mistake, however, to think of these ebblings and flowings of attention as if there were any clear-cut distinction between them: they shade off into each other so that it is often very hard to say, in the case of any given experience, just where acquaintance ends. If I am hard at work in a room with a clock, who can say whether or not the ticking forms part of my experience? I might not have been aware of it, and yet if the clock stopped I might notice it; or, again, under special circumstances, it might turn out that I could remember it perfectly well. The clearest way of describing normal consciousness seems to be by distinguishing between the focus of attention and the vaguer experience which always surrounds it. We shall in future call whatever is clearly held before attention "the focussed experience" and the vague surrounding experience towards which attention is not at the

moment directed "the unfocussed experience"; when we mean to refer to them both together we shall speak of "the whole field of experience known by acquaintance." In the case of the foolscap the focussed experience would be the whiteness, the lines, or whatever part of it you succeed, for the moment, in concentrating your attention upon; the unfocussed experience would be the shape, perhaps, sounds within earshot, bodily sensations, your emotional state, and so on. The whole field of acquaintance will include the focussed experience along with all the rest of the sensations and feelings which make up the unfocussed experience.

It is very important to the understanding of what Bergson has to say to realize that our acquaintance is not confined to focussed experience but that, on the contrary, a close examination of what goes on in consciousness seems to show that this focussed experience is really only a small part of a much wider field of experience with the whole of which we are, to some extent, acquainted. The continual change, always taking place in our focussed experience, which we notice when we watch it closely for a while, is simply the continual shifting, relaxing and concentrating of our attention over this wider field of acquaintance.

So far our attempt to discover what ways there are of obtaining knowledge has not got beyond acquaintance, and we have seen that, even in the case of this most direct way of knowing, it is quite possible to make mistakes as to what it is that we know. Acquaintance, however, is not our only way of knowing: we are able further to supplement the knowledge with which acquaintance supplies us by thought. If all our wants were satisfied by the experience which we get in the ordinary course simply by paying attention, we should not trouble about getting any further knowledge. But experience alone is unsatisfactory, very limited, very uncertain, and hard to retain for long at a time, and, above all, very dangerous unless we can foresee what is coming. We shall not

rest satisfied until we can foresee and control what happens and recall and communicate it. These are our practical needs with regard to our knowledge, and I put them first because they are the most pressing. Moreover, we have also what we call our speculative curiosity: we want the fullest possible knowledge for its own sake, regardless of whether it may be of use or not. In order to satisfy these various wants we are driven to try and supplement the very limited knowledge which we get by acquaintance, and the way in which we usually do this is called thought. Thought, then, is, as compared with acquaintance, a *pis aller*. As Bergson says in *La Perception du Changement*, p. 5, we shall all be prepared to admit that "si nos sens et notre conscience avaient une portée illimitée, si notre faculté de percevoir, extérieure et intérieure, était indéfinie, nous n'aurions jamais recours à la faculté de concevoir ni à celle de raisonner. Concevoir est un *pis aller* dans les cas où l'on ne peut pas percevoir, et raisonner ne s'impose que dans la mesure où l'on doit combler les vides de la perception externe ou interne, et en étendre la portée." [If our senses and acquaintance were unlimited in their range, if our faculty of external and internal perception were unrestricted, we should never have recourse to the faculty of conception nor to that of reasoning. Conception is a *pis aller* in cases where perception is impossible, and reasoning is only introduced in so far as we need to fill in the blanks in external or internal perception and extend its range.]

In saying this Bergson is, of course, ignoring the whole field of pure thought, pure science, mathematics and logic, which could never be arrived at by mere perception, no matter how "unlimited" and "unrestricted." His pre-occupation is, throughout, with existence and with the ways in which we may hope to increase our knowledge of it. This fundamental pre-occupation, which leads Bergson to assume that the whole concern of speculative curiosity, and so of philosophy, is simply existence—an assumption nowhere clearly stated just because he takes it

so completely for granted, but always clearly discernible through all his writings—may go a long way towards explaining why it is that philosophers whose main pre-occupation is with logic and abstract thought often seem to fail altogether to make out what Bergson is talking about. Bergson is inclined to look upon abstract thought as, at best, a plaything on which it may amuse us to exercise our intellectual powers, but he warns us against over-indulgence in this pastime lest we be tempted to lose our sense of the distinction between the abstract and the concrete and to suppose that by studying abstractions we shall somehow be able to increase our knowledge of existence itself. It is not necessary to discuss here whether Bergson makes a mistake in thus confining his theory of knowledge to the problems raised by the knowledge of what exists. He believes that this is the problem with which philosophy ought to concern itself and he never discusses thought except from the point of view of how it may increase or stand in the way of our knowledge of existence.

Thought supplements the knowledge of existence secured by acquaintance by discovering the general laws of form and behaviour which apply to different kinds of experiences. It should be noticed that thought, in so far as it is concerned with experience at all, only gives us knowledge about experience, while acquaintance gives actual experience itself. The gulf between these two kinds of knowledge is obvious; no amount of knowledge about light or colour can ever give a blind man the experience of sight. Some philosophers, regarding experience as necessarily fragmentary, think that our speculative curiosity must, perforce, be content to supplement such fragments of experience as come our way with knowledge *about* the rest of existence. Some of them, disappointed with, or not attracted by, such knowledge about existence, turn their backs upon existence altogether, and become absorbed in abstract ideas. Bergson's curiosity is, as we have said, directed towards existence; abstractions do not interest him. For him mere

knowledge about, even though it be about existence, is a wholly unsatisfactory substitute for that actual acquaintance at which he aims. He condemns our common habit of concentrating so much of our mental energies on thought, which can never give more than knowledge about, because he believes that, if only we were not in such a hurry to secure this knowledge about, we might obtain a much greater measure than we usually enjoy of actual acquaintance itself.

Normally we use experience simply as material for thought, and we are always trying to pass from the particular experience to the general law. Bergson's first criticism of this habit of thought is that it diverts an undue proportion of our attention and energy from the business of acquaintance. Whether we agreed with this criticism would depend on the relative importance which we attached to acquaintance with experience as compared with knowledge about it, and this again would probably depend, largely, on the extent to which we thought it possible to enlarge and improve upon the sort of experience with which acquaintance usually at present furnishes us. We might well admit that the experiment of trying to widen and intensify our experience was at least worth making, since, after all, the wider our acquaintance was, the better material it would make for the further task of supplementing our actual experience by knowledge about it. Such concessions, however, would not meet the difficulty which underlies Bergson's criticism.

Bergson believes that there is a fundamental incompatibility between actual acquaintance with experience and knowledge about it. He considers that the fact of attending to experience as so much material for thought leads, not merely to a reduction in the amount of experience attended to, but actually to *the mutilation of such experience as we do still allow ourselves the opportunity to be acquainted with*. This is the essential point in Bergson's criticism of the intellectual method of thought. We shall see better what reasons Bergson has for making this criticism if we examine what it is that actually happens when

we use the experience given in acquaintance as material for that further intellectual operation, called thought, by which we get our knowledge about experience.

There are four stages in this business of deriving knowledge about experience from the actual experiences with which we are acquainted. The first thing we have to do is to learn to *recognise* the common qualities shared by different experiences; the next thing is to *classify* our various experiences by arranging them in groups by reference to the qualities which we are able to recognise in them. Once we have thus classified our experiences, we need no longer trouble to pay attention to the actual experiences themselves which make up any group. Henceforth we shall be concerned with the laws which apply to the group and with the relations of one group to another. This is the third step in getting knowledge about experience: it is called *induction*. We now no longer burden our attention with our actual experiences themselves in their entirety; we pay attention only to the qualities which distinguish one group from another. What we have now to do is to observe those qualities in order to discover the order of their occurrence with reference to each other. Once having discovered this, we need no longer trouble to attend to experience at all. Instead of the actual qualities we now take symbols, words, for example, or letters, or other signs, and with these symbols we make for ourselves diagrams of the relations in which we have observed that the qualities which they are to represent stand to one another. Thus we might use the words "lightning before thunder," or first an L and then a T, to express the fact that in a storm we usually observe the quality of flashing before the quality of rumbling. This arrangement of symbols is called *abstract thought*, and is the fourth stage in the business of getting knowledge about experience.

It will be noticed that, as thought proceeds, we are able more and more to dispense with acquaintance with actual experience, and to replace it better and better by symbols. Thus,

when we have recognised a given quality in any experience, it becomes no longer necessary, for the purposes of thought, to attend to all of it, since the quality recognised in it can be taken to represent the whole experience. Similarly, when we have arranged the experiences which share any given quality into one group, the quality can be taken to represent all the experiences in that group, and finally, in the diagrams by which we illustrate the relations of groups of experiences to one another, we can substitute symbols for the qualities which represent the actual experiences in the groups. At this last stage, therefore, we have freed ourselves entirely from the need of attending to actual experiences. We can, if we like, now proceed to arrange symbols representing imaginary groups, which do not and even could not exist, according to laws never yet observed, and even contrary to the laws which have been found to apply to actual experience. Such activities belong to the field of pure science, and do not come into our present argument; here we need only consider such of the constructions of abstract thought as may apply to experience, since it is with the relation of thought to experience that we are concerned.

The general laws discovered by induction will apply to our experiences just in so far as any of them can be fitted into one or other of the groups whose laws we have formulated, and thus abstract thought renews contact again with actual experience, and the whole method of thought is amply vindicated from the point of view of practical utility. The practical utility of knowledge about experience is so obvious that it is hardly necessary to labour the point. Bergson, indeed, does not attempt to deny the utility of this method of treating our experience; what he suggests, however, is that *the sort of experience which it produces,—a world, that is to say, consisting of solid tables, green grass, anger, fear, and so on—is but a fragment, and a distorted fragment, of the experience with which we have it in our power to be acquainted.*

In order to understand what leads Bergson to entertain this paradoxical notion we must see what actually is the effect upon experience of our anxiety to discover general laws, which is the principal motive of thought. We need not complicate the question by taking any further notice at present, of that part of our knowledge which consists of the general laws themselves. Bergson's criticism is directed against the actual experiences from which these laws are derived, and upon which they are based, the solidity which we actually touch, the green which we actually see, the anger which we actually feel. He goes so far as to say that these experiences are distorted, that they are arrived at by a process of falsification which we could avoid if we chose.

What, then, are these experiences, this solidity, green, anger, and so on, and how is it possible to say that they are distortions? Distortions of what? What alternative experience is open to us? What Bergson objects to in this everyday experience of ours is its form—the division of experience into qualities shared in common by more than one experience.

At first sight it may well look as if there were, indeed, no alternative to this experience composed of things sharing common qualities—the form which Bergson condemns, as if, whenever experience is given, common qualities are also given—perceiving an orange consisting, as it does, in perceiving its colour, shape, etc. As a matter of fact, however, by the time we are able to distinguish common qualities, the original stage of mere acquaintance has been left behind, and the preliminary operations of thought have already begun. Common qualities are only perceived as the result of an intellectual operation; we do not, as a matter of fact, distinguish qualities in perfectly unfamiliar experiences, we only learn to distinguish them after having been acquainted with a number of experiences more or less resembling one another. The perception of qualities involves recognition, and so includes memory, in addition to mere present acquaintance.

From the repetition of a number of resembling experiences, there gradually emerges something further, which we believe to be shared in common by all the experiences, and which we call "their common quality," with which we were not till then acquainted. How this comes about we are not concerned, just now, to explain; all that we need, for the moment, is to see what actually happens in ordinary recognition. Once we have found the common quality, we perceive it again whenever an experience occurs which can be fitted into the same group. That is why our ordinary experience does, in fact, come to us in the form of things and events consisting of qualities shared in common with other things and events. But this is not the only form of experience with which it is possible for us to be acquainted; it is only, in fact, familiar experience, experience which we can at once recognise, which has this form.

It is a little difficult to illustrate what is meant here from our ordinary experience, just because, long even before we have grown up, the process of familiarization is over, and we have arrived at most of the qualities which we need to be able to recognise for ordinary purposes, and so it is these qualities which we usually perceive. In this way it comes about that the ordinary experience of grown-up people consists of complex things and events all composed of qualities shared in common.

The best example to show that this form of experience is merely the result of familiarity, would, perhaps, be to take some form of modern art, best of all, perhaps, music composed according to a wholly foreign tradition, or orchestral music heard for the first time. In such cases the experience of the hearer will, in all likelihood, at first be no more than a confused noise. Gradually, however, if the experience is repeated, there will be a change, first one and then another sound will be recognised, until, finally, the earlier experience will have been completely transformed, and, in place of the original confused noise, the hearer will now distinguish instruments, notes, and motifs. This illustration of how we

gradually come to distinguish sounds in unfamiliar music will serve to show what is meant by saying that common qualities are not what we originally became acquainted with, the experience, when we have completed the work of recognition, being of quite a different form from that of the experience with which we were originally acquainted.

Now, of these two forms of experience the form of familiar experience, which consists of distinct things having recognisable qualities, is obviously the best for enabling us to discover the general laws which govern whole groups of experiences. In order to discover these laws it is essential that we should be able to classify our experiences, and the division of experience into things showing recognisable qualities is a necessary preliminary to classification. If Bergson is right (as I am assuming him to be throughout this paper) in believing that the key to our ordinary intellectual habits is to be found in our need for discovering general laws about experience, it would follow quite naturally that, whenever we became acquainted with any experience, our first object should always be at once to recognise in it as many common qualities as possible, thereby classifying it as belonging to the various groups of experiences distinguished by the fact of sharing one or other of these qualities. If in the end there is any part of the experience left over which will not fit in any group we commonly ignore it. The experience thus sacrificed would in any case be useless for the purpose of enabling us to discover general laws: for this purpose it is only qualities shared by more than one experience that are any good to us; that, in fact, according to Bergson, is why we ignore all the rest of our experience except the common qualities, his idea being that our habit of attending to experience in order to classify it originated simply in order to satisfy this practical need for securing the knowledge about experience with which general laws furnish us.

The more we classify an experience the clearer it becomes, and the clearer it becomes the better we think we know it. Such

clear classified experience is the ideal of science, and the intellectual method of thought is, par excellence, the appropriate method for science. As to which form of experience is best, the distinct form of classified experience or the undivided form of experience in which we have not recognised qualities, the question is, as a rule, simply not raised; we suppose, as a matter of course, that the distinct form of classified experience must always be best. Now, this is just what Bergson denies. He maintains that *classified experience is only best for the practical purpose of obtaining knowledge about experience*, but that, if we want the fullest possible acquaintance, it is better not to classify.

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that Bergson recommends us simply to return to our original unfamiliar experience itself. There are two ways in which classified experience differs from our original unfamiliar experience: there is, as we have already seen, a difference in form, classified experience being divided up into distinct things and qualities and unfamiliar experience not being so divided; but there is also a difference in content, classified experience including memory in addition to the mere present with which we are acquainted in unfamiliar experience. Now, in so far as the solid tables, green grass, and so on, are recognised experiences containing memory, they have a richer content than mere unrecognised experience and are an improvement upon it. It is to the way in which recognised experience differs in form from unrecognised experience that Bergson objects. The difference in content, which is made by the inclusion of memory, is a difference in the whole field of acquaintance, while the difference in form depends upon the focus of attention within that whole field. What Bergson would like would be to get an experience having its focus more like that of unrecognised experience, distributed over a whole field of acquaintance which, like that of recognised experience, included memory as well as mere present experience. His

objection to the method ordinarily employed in recognition is that it narrows down our experience by concentrating the focus of attention only upon the repetitions, at the expense of whatever else the whole field of acquaintance may contain, the motive for so doing being, as we have already seen, our need of discovering general laws about experience.

The explanation of the greater part of Bergson's philosophy is to be found in this idea of his of *the limiting effect which our practical need for knowledge about experience exercises upon the actual experience with which we are acquainted*. The greater part of his writing is devoted to the exposition and defence of this idea and the consequences which follow from it. His theories of sensible perception, memory, and the functions of the brain, all follow from this same assumption that our mental life is a struggle for economy in which we are perpetually thrusting away experience which we cannot use in favour of that which is of practical value for the discovery of the general laws on which our knowledge about experience rests. He sums up this idea in *La Perception du Changement* (p. 12), where he says: ". . . les faits . . . nous montrent, dans la vie psychologique normale, un effort constant de l'esprit pour limiter son horizon, pour se détourner de ce qu'il a un intérêt matériel à ne pas voir. Avant de philosopher, il faut vivre; et la vie exige que nous nous mettions des œillères . . ." [In normal psychological life the facts . . . point to there being a continual effort on the part of the mind to limit its horizon, to turn away from whatever it is to its material interest not to see. Before we can philosophise we must live, and life forces us to put on blinkers.]

This theory, that it is the function of thought not to extend but to limit our knowledge, is so vital to the understanding of all that is new and original in Bergson's philosophy, that it will be worth while for us to set it clearly before ourselves once again by contrasting it with the commonly accepted view of the effect of thought upon our experience.

The ordinary theory of the origin of our experience starts from the idea of external objects, or outside conditions of experience, soliciting our attention, on the one hand, and, on the other, our minds in a state, at first, of complete ignorance. Experience, on this view, begins at the moment when some external object or outside condition of experience first secures our attention. Before we recognise qualities in it, however, that is, until we can classify it, this original experience is supposed to be very limited, and it is imagined that the purpose of recognition and classification is to add to this original fragment fresh discoveries, thus gradually building up and completing our experience. Bergson, on the other hand, begins just the other way. Instead of setting out from the idea of a mind in a state of complete ignorance, he regards us as including potentially, in the whole field of our acquaintance, all the experience which the external objects or outside conditions which solicit our attention are capable of producing. He calls this our "*connaissance virtuelle*" [virtual knowledge], and he thinks of all the various intellectual operations by which we finally arrive at the experience which we ordinarily enjoy as so many ways of limiting our horizon, narrowing down our acquaintance, and confining it within such bounds as best suit our practical convenience. This limitation of the field of our potential acquaintance was begun, according to Bergson, by the act of attention, which first made us acquainted with an experience in its original unclassified form, and it continues *pari passu* with the operations of thought, which tend more and more to focus attention upon the repetitions in experience at the expense of whatever else the whole field of acquaintance may contain. It is this limited experience that Bergson means when he speaks of our "*connaissance actuelle*" [actual knowledge]. The brain he regards as an instrument, not, as is commonly supposed, for procuring us experience, but, on the contrary, for protecting us from the whole of experience with the exception of just so much of it as is of fairly immediate

practical interest to us. As he puts it in *La Perception du Changement* (p. 12):—"Notre connaissance, bien loin de se constituer par une association graduelle d'éléments simples, est l'effet d'une dissociation brusque; dans le champ infiniment vaste de notre connaissance virtuelle nous avons cueilli, pour en faire une connaissance actuelle, tout ce qui intéresse notre action sur les choses; nous avons négligé le reste. Le cerveau paraît avoir été construit en vue de ce travail de sélection." [Our knowledge, far from being built up by the gradual association of simple elements, results from a sharp dissociation; we make our actual knowledge by selecting out of the infinitely vast field of our virtual knowledge whatever concerns our action upon things; we neglect all the rest. The brain appears to have been constructed on purpose for this work of selection.]

Practical utility—the necessity which we are under of discovering general laws about experience, in order that we may be able rapidly to pass by inference from present experiences to others which are not actually before us at the moment, and so to anticipate what is coming—is, according to this theory, the principle upon which the selection is made, the object being to retain out of the whole field of acquaintance only so much as lends itself to that classification upon which is based all our power of framing general laws, and so of passing from the known to the unknown.

It would follow that classification, together with induction and abstract thought, which are only further stages in the same process of selection, are methods appropriate to science, whose object is the practical one of discovering as many general laws as possible about experience. Bergson, however, insists that the methods which are appropriate for the satisfaction of these practical needs will be found useless, and worse than useless, if we try to use them to satisfy speculative curiosity, which is the motive underlying philosophy.

It may, indeed, be argued that these two motives, practical necessity and speculative curiosity, do not really conflict, since,

admitting that it was practical necessity which drove us to attempt the discovery of general laws, the discovery of general laws happens also to be the best way, the only way, in fact, of increasing true knowledge beyond the narrow limits of such fragments of experience as each of us is able to pick up for himself. The plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that the only way of adding to the fragments of experience with which we are ordinarily acquainted is by getting more and more knowledge *about* experience: the notion that it might be possible to add to our store of knowledge by actually increasing our experience itself is not contemplated. According to this view the philosopher is thought of as seeking, like the scientist, for formulae or hypotheses which shall explain and supplement the particular set of experiences in which he happens to be interested. The aims and methods of the two are not looked upon as being really distinct at all, the chief difference between them being supposed to lie in the subject matter which each cares to investigate. Philosophy, on this view, is regarded as a branch of science. Bergson, on the other hand believes that it is really possible to satisfy our speculative curiosity, not simply by increasing our knowledge *about* existence, but actually by improving and enlarging our acquaintance *with* it. His point is that we have before us two alternative ways of adding to the very fragmentary acquaintance with existence which we ordinarily get—either we can devote ourselves to obtaining more and more knowledge about it (this is the line followed by science), or we can concentrate our efforts on increasing our actual experience itself by improving our powers of acquaintance. This, according to him, is the method of philosophy. We cannot, however, pursue both methods at once owing to the distortion of our experience which occurs as soon as we begin to use it as material for the intellectual operation of thought. He puts this view in *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 259, where he says: "A vrai dire, les deux démarches sont de sens contraire: le

même effort, par lequel on lie des idées à des idées, fait évanouir l'intuition que les idées se proposaient d'emmagasiner." [To tell the truth, the two activities go opposite ways: the same effort by which we string ideas together dissolves the very intuition which the ideas were intended to capture.]

Bergson does not, indeed, deny that many of those who have devoted their lives to philosophy have, in fact, adopted the methods of science in the pursuit of their speculative aims, but, he insists (*La Perception du Changement*, p. 8) that by adopting these methods they have simply defeated their own ends. "Nous disions que c'est l'insuffisance de notre perception naturelle qui a poussé les philosophes à compléter la perception par la conception, laquelle devra combler les intervalles entre les données des sens ou de la conscience et, par là, unifier et systématiser notre connaissance des choses. Mais l'examen des doctrines nous montre que la faculté de concevoir, au fur et à mesure qu'elle avance dans ce travail d'intégration, est obligée d'éliminer de la réalité une multitude de différences qualitatives, d'éteindre en partie nos perceptions, d'appauvrir notre vision concrète de l'univers; c'est même parceque chaque philosophie est amenée, bon gré mal gré, à procéder ainsi, qu'elle suscite des philosophies antagonistes, dont chacune relève quelque chose de ce que celle-là a laissé tomber. La méthode va donc contre le but qu'elle se propose; elle devait, en théorie, étendre et compléter la perception; elle est obligée, en fait, de demander à une foule de perceptions de s'effacer afin que telle ou telle d'entre elles puisse devenir représentative des autres." [We have said that it is the insufficiency of our natural perception which has driven philosophers to complete perception by conception, which is supposed to fill in the gaps in what is given by sense and in consciousness, and thus unify and systematise our knowledge of things. But an examination of their doctrines shows that, as the faculty of conception advances further and further in this task of integration, it is obliged to cut

numbers of qualitative differences out of reality, partially to extinguish our perceptions, and to impoverish our concrete vision of the universe; it is, in fact, just because every philosophy, whether it will or not, is driven to proceed thus, that it evokes rival philosophies, each of which picks up something of what the first one let fall. The method, therefore, defeats its own end; in theory it is supposed to extend and complete perception; in practice, it is forced to relegate a whole mass of perceptions to the background, so that this one or that may represent the rest.]

Having shown, as he believes, that thought, the method of science, far from adding any further experience to that with which we become acquainted in the ordinary course of things, actually narrows down the focus of attention so as to suppress a good part of the whole field with which we were already, in fact, acquainted, he proceeds to ask (*La Perception du Changement*, p. 8), "Devons-nous rester sur ce terrain, ou bien ne vaudrait-il pas mieux (sans renoncer, cela va sans dire, à l'exercice de nos facultés de conception et de raisonnement) revenir à la perception elle-même, obtenir d'elle qu'elle se dilate et s'étende?" [Must we remain on this ground, or would it not rather be better (without, of course, giving up the exercise of our powers of conception and reasoning) to return to actual perception and enlarge and extend that perception itself?] This is the secret of the new method which Bergson urges us to adopt for philosophy—de revenir à la perception elle-même, obtenir d'elle qu'elle se dilate et s'étende [to return to actual perception, and enlarge and extend that perception itself].—and the effort by which he proposes that we should widen the horizon of an actual acquaintance is what he calls the act of intuition.

It is sometimes fancied that this intuition is some new and mysterious faculty which Bergson has either discovered or pretended to discover, but which ordinary people know nothing about. To suppose this would be a great mistake.

The act of attention which Bergson would have the philosopher make, and which he calls "intuition," is by no means an absolutely unfamiliar mental operation. The intellectual operations of recognition, classification and induction, with which we usually occupy our minds, all, in fact, depend upon a preliminary act of intuition. Before we can begin to recognise and classify any experience we have first to attend to it in a very special way; we have to try, while holding the experience in question before us, also to link it up with our past experience—to place it. This effort to link up the present with the past is what Bergson calls intuition. It will be seen from the above definition that intuition is really nothing more than the act of attention which secures for us that whole field of acquaintance within which the focus of attention is constantly shifting and out of which we make our selection whenever we recognise anything. We saw, when we were considering the respects in which clear classified experience was superior to experience which was unfamiliar, that it was just this reference to the past, this placing a given experience by recalling other past experiences throwing light upon it, which gives present experience significance. Without memory experience would be devoid of meaning; reinforced by memory an experience, slight in itself, a faint whisper or a light touch, may open up a whole world to us. What we call "present experience," then, is usually largely composed of memories. This is true even of the ordinary everyday objects of sense—colours, sounds, smells, and so on—which we recognise as soon as they are presented to us. It seems, as we have seen, really to be only owing to the help of memory that we are able to distinguish such qualities at all; for we cannot do so until they have grown familiar to some extent, that is, until there are a certain amount of experiences of that kind in our memories to be recalled when a fresh experience occurs. Blue, for example, becomes a definite quality only when we have had other experiences like it which our present experience calls up. When we look at the sky our ability to

distinguish its colour depends quite as much upon past skies as upon the sky at which we are actually looking.

It seems, indeed, as if, whenever we have any acquaintance at all, we do always make some effort to place it—as if some effort of memory always accompanies every act of attention to present experience. If this be the case, it comes to saying that so long as we are conscious at all we are always making more or less of an effort of intuition. Intuition gives us a whole field of acquaintance, including memory as well as present experience, but within this field it is possible to focus our attention in many different ways. We noticed in our illustration of the sheet of foolscap how perpetually the focus of our attention to present experience appears to shift and change according to our particular interest at each moment. It may be argued, however, that, in the case of memory, our attention is not equally free to choose its object. It is not easy to lay down any exact rules as to just what the connexion between present experience and memory is. Dreams, curious cases in which events long forgotten, and perhaps never attended to even at the time when they occurred, are suddenly recalled, or cases in which enormous stretches of the past, apparently unconnected with what is being experienced at the moment, are remembered in a flash, appear to conflict with the accepted theories about the kind of association which enables present experience to call up memories. It looks sometimes almost as if the mere fact of having any present experience at all was of itself enough to call up almost anything that we have ever experienced, regardless of any discernible connexion between the present experience and that which is recalled. Nevertheless, it is true that, when we attend to any present experience, all the past experiences related to it in particular ways, such as similarity, either of quality or often, even, merely of name, association of time or place, causal connexion, and perhaps one or two others, tend to be recalled in preference to other memories not so related. From these facts it is usual to infer some general law

to the effect that relations of similarity, and so on, have a particularly binding effect between experiences, such that, when one experience having these relations to others attracts our attention, the others tend also to be recalled. This explanation of why experiences associated in these particular ways tend to appear before our attention together is not, however, the only possible one. Bergson puts forward an alternative explanation. The truth may really be, he thinks, that the same cause which governs our choice of what present experience we will focus our attention upon in the whole field of our acquaintance may also govern our choice of what we will remember. This fits in with his whole theory of perception, and it is the explanation of memory which he adopts. According to his theory, our pre-occupation with repetitions limits our memory just as much as it limits our present experience, and the suggestion is that by thus focussing our attention on repetitions we often pass by what is most interesting in the whole field of our acquaintance, setting a check upon memory which shuts out all that is most worth recalling.

It may be objected that all this is nonsense, since, as a matter of fact, the laws which connect memory with present experience are such that we can, in truth, only remember past experiences which are repeated in the present. Such an objection is not convincing. We have already referred to the curious mass of cases which appear to conflict with any such hard and fast rules as to what it is or is not possible for any given present experience to recall. But further, even if it be established as an undoubted fact that in the majority of cases we do only succeed in remembering experiences which are repeated in the present, that would in no way refute Bergson. For Bergson's point is that the whole focus of our attention, whether it be directed towards the present or towards the past, is governed by two principles,—our pre-occupation with repetitions which are needed for securing knowledge about experience, and our desire for economy of effort. Just as, in the case of present

experience, we focus our attention upon the repetitions contained in the whole field of our acquaintance, so in remembering we keep our attention under equally strict control, only allowing such past experiences as resemble our present experience to be recalled. Until we have begun to practise the distribution of attention which Bergson recommends, we cannot make any positive statements as to what it may or may not be possible to remember.

Bergson's theory of memory is very like his theory of present perception, and contrasts similarly with the theory currently accepted. Just as, in his theory of present perception, Bergson, instead of starting from the notion of complete ignorance, sets out from the idea of an act of acquaintance embracing a field of experience much wider than that which, in fact, constitutes our actual experience, constantly soliciting our attention, and only prevented from turning into actual experience by our indifference, so, in the same way, instead of starting from the idea of memory as a complete blank which we are able to fill in bit by bit, now with one idea of past experience and now with another, Bergson starts with the idea of memory as preserving and perpetually trying to press upon our attention every experience which we have ever had, so that we only save ourselves from being acquainted all the time with everything with which we have ever been acquainted by keeping vigilant watch over our attention, bestowing it only upon just so much of the past as may be of fairly immediate practical use in guiding our behaviour with regard to our present circumstances. What Bergson proposes is that we should relax our vigilance and allow ourselves to be acquainted with the whole of our memory along with the whole of our present experience.

One curious result which he thinks would follow from this widening of the focus of our attention would be that the everyday divisions of experience into things having distinct qualities would disappear. These divisions, according to Bergson, result

from the selective focus of our attention—whenever we stop attending to any part of the whole field of our acquaintance a gap occurs, and so things and qualities begin to be divided off from each other. Divisions, according to him, are the signs of failures of attention, and the fact that our everyday world of experience is so divided is one reason why he condemns it.

The ideal experience, for him, would be one in which there were no divisions either between quality and quality or between past and present, because the ever-widening act of intuition which embraced it would be so extended as to include past and present in one single continuous experience, and so focussed as to cover everything, not concentrating attention upon one point at the expense of any other. Bergson believes that we do, in a sense, already possess this experience, which is nothing more than the whole field of acquaintance supplied by the preliminary act of intuition that must always precede those further intellectual operations whereby we reduce experience to its usual form. He thinks that it is, in fact, just these intellectual operations which prevent us from enjoying the whole of our field of acquaintance.

Intuition secures for us the whole field of acquaintance: our intellectual operations consist in focussing our attention upon a part of this whole field and shutting off the rest of it. Intuition extends our acquaintance by recalling the past and adding it to our present experience; thought narrows down our experience, it is selective, experience only interests it in certain aspects, in so far as it contains repetitions on which general laws about experience may be based. Intuition supplies an ample material, but we, intent, as a rule, upon recognition and classification, which are the necessary preliminaries to the discovery of general laws, select from it only so much as lends itself to that purpose. It is as though we were always casting our net into the past and bringing it up full, and then only cared to keep a very small fraction of our haul, letting the rest slip back so that it is lost. It is of this that Bergson complains,

that we are so much pre-occupied with picking out the repetitions in every experience the moment it occurs, that we overlook a great part, perhaps the most interesting part, of the whole field of acquaintance with which our preliminary act of intuition supplied us.

Our attempts to see what Bergson means by saying that the ordinary view of experience as consisting of solid tables, green grass, and so on, is a distortion, have led us to examine further and further into our experience. We have seen that the experience to which we ordinarily confine our attention is really only a small part of the whole field of past and present with which we are acquainted, and we have seen also that Bergson believes that our ordinary intellectual habits all tend towards a further and further narrowing of the focus of attention to experience. We have said that what Bergson wants us to do is to reverse these intellectual habits of ours and devote our energies, not to narrowing the focus of our attention, but to widening it so as to include the whole field of our acquaintance, and even to extend that field. In order to do this we need have recourse to no mysterious new faculties. Bergson believes that we do already habitually perform acts of intuition sufficient to acquaint us with a field of experience, past and present, much wider than that to which we usually attend, and that it is only our intellectual habits of mind which stand between us and full acquaintance with a vast field of experience. As he says in *L'Intuition Philosophique*, "... il ne peut être question de se placer hors du temps ni de percevoir autre chose que du changement. Mais le temps où nous restons naturellement placés, le changement dont nous nous donnons ordinairement le spectacle, sont un temps et un changement que nos sens et notre conscience ont réduits en poussière pour faciliter notre action sur les choses. Défaisons ce qu'ils ont fait, ramenons notre perception à ses origines, et nous aurons une connaissance d'un nouveau genre sans avoir besoin de recourir à des facultés nouvelles." [. . . there can be no question of

getting outside time or of perceiving anything but change. But the time in which we naturally remain and the change at which we usually assist, are a time and change which our senses and our consciousness have reduced to powder in order to facilitate our action upon things. Let us undo what they have done, let us take perception back to the beginning again, and we shall have knowledge of a new kind without needing to call in any new faculties.]

If this were the whole of Bergson's criticism of thought, it would certainly be damaging, but it would hardly justify him in saying that such experience as our bias in favour of repetitions does allow us to get is positively a falsification of experience. We might admit that our experience is perhaps more limited than it need be, but why call it falsified? Bergson maintains that our everyday experience of solid tables, green grass, and so on, is falsified, not only because it is divided, which means, according to him, that the whole experience contains gaps due to failure of attention to the whole field of acquaintance, but also in so far as the qualities are supposed to be repetitions recurring over and over again.

We have spoken, all along, for convenience, as if the common qualities which we recognise were really repetitions of past experiences. According to Bergson, however, experience does not admit of repetitions. Every experience which we pick out of the whole field of acquaintance really has its own place in that whole field, and Bergson maintains that to isolate it is to falsify it. To take an illustration. You may see the blue of the sky one day when you are warm and happy and the sight of it may delight you, while on another day you may see it when you are shivering and gloomy, and it may only add to your depression. It would not usually occur to us to say that, on account of the difference in the rest of your state of mind on the two occasions, your experience of the sky was different; we should explain matters by treating consciousness as a complex, and saying that the one occasion was a case of your seeing

blue and feeling warm and happy, while the other was a case of your seeing blue and being cold and gloomy. Bergson, however, objects to this explanation. He maintains that, if we are to pick out the experience of seeing blue from its context in consciousness we must say that it is "modified" according as you are happy or gloomy, warm or cold, when you attend to it. According to this theory, the notion that the same experience of blue is repeated on the two occasions is a pure fiction. There is a very great difference between the whole experience blue modified by depression and cold, and blue modified by happiness and warmth,—a difference the extent of which we fail to realise only because we call both experiences by the same name, and, having once named them, take so little further trouble to notice what experience we are actually having. Such a theory, of course, immediately raises the question, why, if our experiences are all so different from one another, we call any of them by the same name; what other reason could we have for doing this except that the experiences, if not exactly similar, are, at any rate, very much alike? The way in which Bergson meets this difficulty will be found in the account of his theory of bodily recognition. We cannot do more here than indicate the outline of the theory, which is, briefly, this.

In a whole field of acquaintance containing past and present there cannot be repetition, because every part of the whole is modified by every other, and no later whole, from the mere fact of being later, can be quite like any earlier one in every respect. Repetitions do, however, occur in matter (*i.e.*, in existence not turned by an act of intuition into a field of acquaintance). The body (which is itself matter) can recognise repetitions in matter by making the same reaction to them. The same bodily reaction acts as a link between past and present states of matter which resemble each other. But when we attend to matter, past and present, we turn it by our act into a field of acquaintance. Past and present

then combine to form a whole experience within which every part is modified by every other. In such an experience there can be no repetition, because, though the present matter may itself be a repetition, the fact that each time it is repeated there is more past for it to combine with, modifies each fresh experience of it.

This account of Bergson's theory of recognition is so condensed that I am afraid it is hardly intelligible; we have perhaps said enough, however, to show that he puts forward a theory which tries to account for the fact of recognition without assuming repetitions in experience, but only in matter. It would be beside our purpose to go fully into the merits of this theory here. What is more urgent is that we should see how, supposing it be granted that there are no real repetitions in experience, Bergson accounts for the fact that we certainly imagine ourselves to be acquainted with similar qualities which are repeated over and over again. For it may well be asked how it is possible to suggest that we can be mistaken about any experience with which we are actually acquainted.

No doubt it is impossible to have such a thing as a false experience—an experience is what it is—only judgments can be false. But it is quite possible, particularly if one is not paying much attention, to make a false judgment as to what experience one is actually having, and this is the error into which Bergson thinks we are led by our habit of relying so much more upon our knowledge *about* experience, which we get by thought, than upon the experience itself with which we are acquainted. In order to see how it might be possible for us to slip gradually into false judgments as to what our everyday experience actually is, we must follow step by step the process of abstraction by which we ordinarily pass from our actual experience itself to those abstract ideas, or concepts as they are often called, of which the general laws which sum up our knowledge about experience consist.

We begin the work of getting knowledge about experience as we have seen, by recognising our experiences (whatever that may mean) and classifying them accordingly. This first step need not take us very far from actual experience itself. It may be true that, not being equally interested in all parts of the whole of our field of acquaintance, we begin from the first to discriminate, focussing our attention only upon a part of it and refusing to attend to the rest. In this way there arises some difficulty, even at the outset, in deciding how much experience we may really be said to have, as we saw in our illustration of a person hard at work in a room where there was a clock ticking. At this early stage, however, it appears to be simply a question of the limits of our experience. There is no doubt at least that we are acquainted with as much of the experience as we actually attend to.

The next step towards abstraction raises further difficulties. At first, when we classify experiences and think of them in groups, we attend to the actual experiences themselves of which the groups consist. By and by, however, as the groups get larger, and thought more subtle, it becomes troublesome to think of all the members whenever we want to refer to the group. We select, perhaps, some one member, or two or three, vaguely recalled, to represent all the rest, in our minds, and henceforth, when we concern ourselves with the group, we attend only to these representative experiences, it being understood that we could recall plenty of other members too if we chose to make the effort, and that what we think about the representative members applies to all the others likewise. Here we have the beginning of symbolism. We have begun to attend only, as it were, by proxy to some of the members of the group; we are no longer actually attending to them all. The split between acquaintance and symbolism has begun and, with the introduction of symbolism, truth and error are also introduced. As we proceed the split widens. By and by we find that it is not

convenient always to have to recall a particular member or members of a group whenever we have to refer to it. This stage is reached so soon as we begin to frame general propositions. Actually to have in mind any particular instance of the group concerned now becomes a positive disadvantage, as being likely to introduce irrelevant considerations belonging to it in its private capacity, so to speak, and not *quâ* representative of the group. For this reason it becomes not only less trouble, but even better, for the purposes of thought, to represent the groups about which thought gives us knowledge by using words or other signs rather than by recalling any concrete experiences belonging to those groups.

With the adoption of symbols in place of the actual experiences themselves, which make up the groups into which we classify our experiences, we enter a new intellectual world. We need not longer hamper our invention by restricting the arrangement of our symbols so as to correspond with what we observe of the behaviour of concrete experience: we can arrange and rearrange them according to principles wholly different from those observed in experience. We soon discover, indeed, that our symbols have themselves got laws of their own, which govern the ways in which it is possible for us to combine them. Pure logic is the study of these laws. We need not discuss this branch of knowledge further, because we are here concerned mainly with the knowledge of existence, and only with pure thought, in so far as it relates to such knowledge.

One way in which even pure thought may be of use in extending experience itself may, in passing, be mentioned. We find that, by combining one general law, based upon experience and consisting of symbols standing for groups of experiences, with another, we can arrive at new laws, which will actually be found to apply to all experiences which those symbols represent. Such manipulation of general laws, in order to arrive at new laws, is called framing hypotheses, and

is a very fruitful way of extending our knowledge about experience. It may even be of use in enabling us to pick out of the field of acquaintance particular experiences to which we might not otherwise have attended. An astronomer, for example, may discover by intellectual methods that between two stars which he has already distinguished there must, in fact, be another, and, through having his attention directed as to where to look, he may now be able actually to distinguish the new star. A similar experience must have happened to many people in connexion with the little rider star on the tail (or is it the neck?) of the Great Bear. Once it has been pointed out you cannot miss it, but you may easily pass it over till your attention has been directed to it.

So long as we are actually getting the material for framing general laws about experience we have to observe numbers of actual experiences to see what relations there are between all the experiences which can be fitted into one group and all the experiences which can be fitted into another. And this means that our attention is still, in a measure, tied to experience, though we shall not trouble ourselves to attend very closely to it since it is enough for our purpose if we can recognise it as "a so-and-so"—a member of one or the other of the groups in which we are interested. We should only trouble to attend closely to an experience if we were not quite sure whether it might or might not correctly be classed in some group whose general laws we were trying to discover.

Once the law is framed, however, the need for being even to this extent in touch with concrete experience disappears, and it becomes more convenient to represent the groups concerned by symbols than by concrete examples. Henceforth, in so far as we concern ourselves with experience, we shall devote our attention to the symbols which represent groups of experiences, and not to the experiences themselves which make up those groups. It is here that the danger lies; from our habit of attending more to the symbols used in thought than

to the experiences which they represent, we slip insensibly into the mistake of applying to the experience itself what really only applies to the symbols by which we represent it.

If this confusion can be made by people who really have paid sufficient attention to their experience to find out for themselves the general laws which apply to it, it is still more likely to be made by the rest of us. For most people do not give a great deal of their attention to the discovery of general laws. They take what is commonly believed ready made from what they are told or what they read. Such people are peculiarly apt to think in terms of words or signs rather than of actual experience. At most, these words or signs stand in their minds for a vague picture (often second hand at that, borrowed from reading or accepted notions) of some experience isolated, watered down, conventionalised, stripped of the setting in emotion and value which proper attention to the actual experience would inevitably arouse. From this loss of contact with actual experience which results from our inattention and our preconceived ideas there follow the gravest results. It is possible so to impose on us that we can be induced to entertain false beliefs, not merely about the nature of experiences with which we are not ourselves acquainted, but about experiences which we ourselves actually have.

In *Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p. 99, Bergson notices this effect which symbols, particularly words, have upon the experiences for which they stand. Referring to the way in which we are ordinarily acquainted with sensation, he says, "je l'aperçois à travers . . . le mot qui la traduit." [I perceive it through the word which translates it.] He goes on to speak of the influence which this word has on the actual sensation itself. "Cette influence du langage sur la sensation est plus profonde qu'on ne le pense généralement. Non seulement la langage nous fait croire à l'invariabilité de nos sensations, mais il nous trompera parfois sur le caractère de la sensation éprouvée. Ainsi, quand je

mange d'un mets réputé exquis, le nom qu'il porte, gros de l'approbation qu'on lui donne, s'interpose entre ma sensation et ma conscience; je pourrai croire que la saveur me plaît, alors qu'un léger effort d'attention me prouverait le contraire. Bref, le mot aux contours bien arrêtés . . . écrase ou tout au moins recouvre les impressions délicates et fugitives de notre conscience individuelle." [This influence which language exercises over sensation is more profound than we generally suppose. Not only is it language that makes us believe in the invariability of our sensations, but now and then language deceives us as to the character of the sensations which we experience. Thus, when I eat a delicacy which is said to be delicious, its name, coloured by the praise bestowed upon it, slips in between me and my consciousness: I might believe that I liked the taste, while all the time a slight effort of attention would prove the contrary to me. In short, the word with its clearly traced outlines . . . crushes or, at any rate, colours the delicate fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness.]

This is most obviously true in cases of feeling, which seems to offer terrible possibilities in the way of insincerity, self-deception and sentimentality. But it applies also to other kinds of experience. According to Bergson, we actually deceive ourselves every day and all day as to the experiences with which we are acquainted. He traces back to delusions imposed upon us by the preconceived ideas and loss of contact with concrete experience, which result from our habit of thinking in terms of symbols instead of paying attention to actual acquaintance, our notions of time and change as series of events, matter as consisting of things and qualities arranged in space, and, most misleading of all, our conception of own selves as consisting of states of consciousness, particular emotions, notions, feelings, desires, and so on. All these notions are, according to Bergson, intellectualisations of experience: they are what, on the model of the symbols to which we devote so

much of our attention, we suppose to be the form of that concrete experience which we take so little trouble really to observe. As he says, in *Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, "la conscience, tourmentée d'un insatiable désir de distinguer, substitue la symbole à la réalité, ou n'aperçoit la réalité qu'à travers la symbole." [Consciousness, tormented by an insatiable desire to distinguish substitutes the symbol for the reality, or only perceives the reality through the symbol.] Armed with preconceived notions drawn from our knowledge about it, we hardly ever attend to an experience with really open minds, or examine it without bias.

We have already referred to the fact that we are sometimes able to pick out fresh details in the whole field of our experience by knowing beforehand what to expect and being on the look out for it. It seems, unfortunately, also to be the case, however, that *when we are expecting an experience we find it, or at any rate believe ourselves to have found it, even though there was no such experience in the whole field of our acquaintance to be discovered, and no warrant for it in the outside conditions of our experience upon which the whole field of acquaintance is based.* Whether we may most correctly be said to hypnotise ourselves into having the experiences we expect, or to deceive ourselves into believing that we are having them, I do not know—the line between auto-suggestion and unconscious self-deception is narrow, and is perhaps no more than a question of words. In any case, we can now at last see what Bergson means by saying that our habits of thought falsify our experience. He means by this that they lead us to expect and to look out for experiences which no amount of unprejudiced attention to the field of acquaintance would ever have revealed. Whether this expectation actually leads to our having the experiences, or only to our believing that we have them, and acting upon this belief, may be left an open question. In any case the result is to shut us off from the real experience which unbiassed attention would otherwise have revealed.

The main grounds upon which Bergson's theory of knowledge rests have now been, I do not say established, but at least stated. They are these. (*a*) All experience is a combination of past and present. Past and present are combined to form experience by a mental act called intuition. (*b*) All knowledge of existence, not only the experience in which we are acquainted with it but also all our knowledge about it, rests upon an original act of intuition. (*c*) Knowledge about existence is derived from the field of experience embraced in intuition by a process of abstraction called thought. The object of thought is to formulate the relations between groups of experiences in general laws so that, as soon as we can classify an experience, we may be able to draw inferences about its relations to other experiences which will guide us in our behaviour. Thought formulates these laws by means of symbols representing groups of experiences which it arranges in diagrams representing the groups and their relations. The more we think the more we tend to withdraw our attention from the actual experiences themselves which make up the groups and devote it to the symbols by which thought represents these groups. The two ways of knowing exclude one another, so that the more attention we give to thought the less we have left to experience.

In practice, however, we try to carry on both operations at once, and the result is our ordinary every-day experience of things having common qualities and standing to one another in a variety of relations. This experience is a hybrid product resulting from the attempt to practise thought and intuition together; it has still some of the content of our original experience—a combination of past and present united in a single mental act—but whatever did not lend itself as material for thought has been left out, and it has borrowed the form which properly belongs only to the symbols of thought; what applies to the names or signs used for the purposes of thought to represent the differentiation which experience contains, is,

to some extent, applied also to the actual experiences which those names or signs represent. Thus it is that, whereas in fact every so-called repetition in experience is so modified by its context that no two experiences can really be alike, the fiction is adopted that experiences can be repeated over and over again, and, because this is true of the sign which stands for them in thought, we end by actually being acquainted, or at any rate believing ourselves to be acquainted, with experiences which are alike. Again, because after an interval we may still call an experience by the same name, the fiction arises of the unchanging experience which remains the same over a period of duration, and we end by being acquainted, or believing ourselves to be acquainted, with such experiences. These are two illustrations of what is meant by intellectualised experience, but, according to Bergson, the intellectualisation of experience is not confined to isolated instances here and there. He believes that the whole notion of experience as consisting of distinct qualities united by external relations of time, space, number, similarity, difference, and so on, in fact arises from the intellectualisation of the field of experience given by the act of intuition in which all experience originates,—that is from our imposing the form which belongs to the symbols employed by thought upon the experience itself with which intuition acquaints us.

His new philosophical method comes simply to this: that instead of confining our attention to a small part only of our present experience, and only to just so much of the past as may be of fairly immediate practical use for guiding our conduct in the circumstances at the moment, and instead of intellectualising even such experience as these limitations still allow us to attend to, we should reverse our mental habits and make an effort to widen rather than to limit the whole field of experience, past and present, with which intuition acquaints us, and to attend to it directly, as it really presents itself, without the intermediary of any thought or word or sign.

Philosophy may take us beyond our own individual experience in the end, but, at all events, it is from that experience that philosophy must set out. What Bergson asks is simply that the experience which is to be used as the starting point for philosophy should be as full and as immediate as experience can be.



III.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICISM.

By F. C. BARTLETT.

1. *The Problem Stated.*

IN carrying out recently a series of experiments on problems connected with perceiving,* I could not help remarking that in a number of instances my subjects prefaced their descriptions of the material presented by criticism, although the latter was neither demanded nor desired. Three typical examples may be cited: A picture was exposed which represented a small, reedy pond and two ducks, one standing by the water's edge and the other swimming.† Immediately after the exhibition of this drawing, and before any attempt at description had been made, subject A remarked: "I like that"; subject B asserted: "The birds are rather big for ducks"; while subject C, who was himself an artist, said: "That's a very odd picture. The bird must either be standing up in the water in an unusual way, or else he is floating very high. Whoever drew it must be a bad observer.

Each criticism appeared to arise from the feeling which accompanied the apprehension of the picture. In the first case, the feeling itself was simply and directly specified. In the second case, a slight accompanying feeling of dissatisfaction gave rise to criticism consisting in a very vague act of comparison of the presented material with earlier, unspecified experience. In the third case, the feeling of displeasure was far more definitely accounted for, and the subject performed an

* See, "An Experimental Investigation of some Problems of Perceiving and Imaging," *Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1916, pp. 222-66.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 241.

analysis, in the course of which the offending points were selected, and perfectly specific criticism was offered. Characterisation of the final type often results in the elaboration of rules of construction and the formulation of criticism in completely general terms. For example, the same subject C, being confronted by a drawing of a gate,* at once remarked: "Practically all gates have their cross-bars on opposite sides"; and then: "Accuracy of observation is as necessary to an artist as ability in the technique of drawing."

If we take these three instances as illustrating three broad stages in the development of criticism, several interesting problems arise:—In what ways are the three stages related? How do we pass from the mere specification of the feeling accompanying observation in terms of like and dislike, to the stage of analysis, and the evolution of rules of construction and criticism? Is criticism in all its forms the direct outcome of affective experience? A brief discussion of these questions will be attempted in the present paper.

2. *The Rise of Criticism.*

The first type of criticism to be considered is that which was expressed in A's statement. This will be called the case of simple appreciation, and the appreciation may be either positive or negative in nature.

Whenever material is presented to our observation, we may either merely interpret it, or, in addition, we may more or less explicitly characterise it in some manner. Interpretation takes the form: "That is x "; characterisation adds: "And x is of such and such a nature." Criticism is one variety of characterisation, and in its most primitive stages it assumes the form of simple appreciation.

Sometimes characterisation is effected through analysis of the object. A detail of a whole apprehended is selected for

* For a reproduction of this sketch, see *op. cit.*, p. 241.

particular notice, as when we say: "That is a brick, *and it is red.*" At other times no such effort of abstraction is present. The whole object, or the whole situation itself, receives the characterisation, and the latter arises from some accompaniment of the act whereby an object or situation is apprehended. All instances of simple appreciation are illustrations of characterisation of the second type, the accompaniment, or immediate generating factor, in every case being affective in nature.

Whenever a subject is confronted by an object, his reaction is, to some extent, determined by predisposing tendencies. No individual, in Professor Ward's phrase, is "equally ready to receive all impressions."* Suppose a situation occurs to which a given individual is relatively ready to respond. The required reaction arises immediately and proceeds smoothly; and, other factors not interfering, such a response will be accompanied by marked positive feeling-tone. Opposed to this condition of congenital adaptability is the case in which a reaction is difficult or ineffective, and under such circumstances strong negative feeling-tone will arise.† The first is the instance of ready reaction, and a *feeling of ease*; the second is that of checked or thwarted reaction, and a *feeling of hesitation*. Both are possible in primitive experience.

These two modes of affective experience may be taken as affording the basis of all criticism. In a broad sense, and subject to certain limitations, we may assert that whenever readiness and efficiency of response, together with the accompanying feeling of ease, are found, we have an attitude which is the true prototype of the "I like this" experience. On the other hand, feeling of hesitation yields the primitive form of definite dislike.

Clearly, however, like and dislike, as they enter into our normal life, or as they were found in the course of my

* "Assimilation and Apperception," *Mind*, N.S., vol. ii, pp. 347-62.

† Cp. Ward, Art. "Psychol.," *Encyclop. Brit.*, 10th Edit., p. 584.

experiments, are very much more articulate than are the primitive experiences just mentioned. In their simplest forms, indeed, the latter are merely somewhat vague attitudes, on the one hand of enjoyment, and of the other of uneasiness. Such attitudes contain closely intermingled constituents which come later to be discriminated one from another. At this early stage the subject has not learnt, for example, to distinguish clearly his act of apprehension from that which is apprehended, or both from the feeling which accompanies the act. But it is not until these distinctions have been accomplished that either the object itself, or the reaction, may be singled out and characterised definitely as liked or disliked.

Further, it is equally evident that the relationship existing between "ease" and like, and "hesitation" and dislike, under the forms in which like and dislike are found in our own experience, may be complicated in many ways, owing to the presence of other factors. Not only are numerous situations to which adjustment is most readily made, neither liked nor disliked, but sometimes "ease" yields instances of dislike, and "hesitation" of like. For example, to reach the room in which I am now writing, I had to mount a number of stairs. The required adjustments were made readily and efficiently, but the experience gave me no marked feeling of any kind. Many a man whose daily work is of a mechanical nature intensely dislikes the activities which he nevertheless most readily effects. And, on the other hand, the early stages of the acquisition of new skill or knowledge, when the necessary reactions are constantly halting and ill-adjusted, are frequently accompanied by marked positive affective-tone.

The fact is that simple feeling of ease or of hesitation, as it may occur in primitive experience, is practically never found in normal adult human life. All our reactions have a closely connected, and often intricate, setting of ideas, emotions, and desires. And the feeling that accompanies them is commonly largely determined by this setting, which, in turn, is to a great

extent the outcome of our own past experience. Complications thus arise, and it is no longer possible simply to say that, given a reaction of a certain kind, an accompanying feeling of ease produces an attitude of enjoyment. The complications, however, may themselves doubtless be reduced to order, and an attempt must be made to state at least some of the laws to which they conform.

3. *The Feeling of Familiarity.*

Whenever, under relatively simple conditions, an act of apprehension proceeds smoothly and efficiently, if circumstances give rise to its repetition, it will tend to be carried out with even greater readiness. Thus there will be an increase of expertness in perceiving, and the primitive feeling of ease will speedily give place to a specific feeling of familiarity.

Although this familiarity is very closely connected with the facilitation of apprehension, it cannot be synonymous with mere ease, because, in an as yet unspecified manner, it contains some reference to the past. In the case of ease proper, an experience is, in one sense, self-bounded. Were it the sole experience of a life, it might still possess the same quality of feeling. But familiarity always indicates that the experience which it marks is not unique.

Now, if it were true that, in regard to any impression occurring in the course of his life, the primitive subject must be either completely "ready" or entirely unable to respond, the relation between feeling of familiarity and the yet more primitive affective forms would be simple. Ease would speedily develop into familiarity, but hesitation would not develop in any way. No doubt there is a real tendency for difficulty of reaction to lead to desistence from all attempt at response. But this tendency does not proceed unchecked. Situations frequently arise in which impressions that an individual is "ready" to receive are closely connected with others that present greater difficulty. The ease of adjustment to the first

may then provide a stimulus for the performance of the more difficult adjustments demanded by the second. Practical needs also may force an individual to make responses for which he may be somewhat ill-adapted. And yet, again, the factor of "interest" or "bias," which we are never justified in ignoring when we have to deal with the psychical, may possibly, even from the first, be occasionally on the side of the difficult reaction. All these influences lead to repetition of the hesitating, as well as of the easy response, and with repetition both facilitation and familiarity go hand in hand.

Speaking very broadly, whenever we encounter a case of feeling of familiarity, we may expect to find appreciation positive in character. This is the more clear the more nearly we approach to quite simple conditions. Everybody must have noticed how children welcome the familiar. The folk-tales of primitive people are full of repetitions: an effective phrase or a striking incident, will recur many times in the course of a single narrative. Cumulative stories are popular in all countries.* Even under conditions that are far less simple the familiar is commonly approved. The examiner is often, perhaps unconsciously, favourably influenced when he finds his own words and phrases appearing in the answers of the candidate whose work he is judging. The musician discovers that repeated performance may give him an added pleasure, due to his familiarity with the tones and movement of the music.†

Thus it is clear that reactions which are originally hesitating may acquire the facilitation which repetition produces, and likewise that the attitude of uneasiness which originally accompanied them may be transformed into positive approval.

But if ease and hesitation alike give place to familiarity: if

* See, e.g., W. A. Clouston, *Popular Tales and Fictions, their Migrations and Transformations*, vol. i, "On Cumulative Stories."

† Interesting experimental confirmation is afforded by Urban, "The Logic of the Emotions," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1901, p. 366.

feeling retains its position as an important determinant of criticism; and if the dominant tendency is for familiarity to promote positive appreciation, it seems as if criticism ought to display a constantly increasing approximation to a single type in which the judgment passed is favourable. In point of fact, however, not only does disapproval show no tendency to die away, but probably it becomes more emphatic, and much more common, with the development of the mental life. It thus appears that though feeling of familiarity may be adequate to initiate criticism, it is not by itself sufficient, in all cases, to determine the direction of criticism. Some of the instances illustrating this fact call for brief consideration, though no exhaustive analysis will be attempted.

First, we have a very large group of feelings, desires, images, ideas, and general behaviour, which are definitely "kept under" by the individual, either because he regards them as directly inimical to his own life, or to that of others, or because of social convention. These practically all represent modes of response which the individual is eminently ready to make. That is, they are in great part activities which we should expect to find in origin accompanied by a feeling of ease, and an attitude of enjoyment; and in development very speedily marked by a feeling of familiarity.* Their forcible suppression may actually render them difficult of performance, as in many pathological cases of functional disability, and so, by the ordinary principle, lead to their being regarded with disapproval, or, when the suppression is only partially effected, may produce a clash of

* Under this head, of course, come all the elements which Freud and his followers regard as peopling the realm of the unconscious. Cp. C. G. Jung: "Comme on le sait, le contenu de l'inconscient se réduit, d'après la théorie de Freud, à des tendances et à des désirs infantiles réprimés à cause de leur incompatibilité avec le caractère. Le refoulement s'établit durant la première enfance sous l'influence morale de l'entourage, puis, devenu une habitude, il se continue pendant toute la vie." "La Structure de l'Inconscient," *Arch. de Psychol.*, No. 62, T. 16, p. 152. Tr. H. Mersén.

feelings in which familiarity is opposed to the emotional attitudes of disgust, repugnance, or fear. From out of this clash come critical judgments of the most unfavourable nature. Even where the reactions continue, and become completely familiar, they are still often judged with disapprobation. The subjects of obsessions, phobias, fixed ideas of various kinds, though their dominant reactions have become easy and familiar in the highest degree, yet often continue to regard their behaviour with complete horror and despair.*

Secondly, there are many reactions which we perform so frequently that they are highly familiar, and which do not suffer forcible suppression in any way, but which, nevertheless, we regard with disfavour. To this category belong many kinds of mechanical work (*cp.* p. 78). Oft-repeated routine is apt to appear monotonous, dull, and displeasing, and hence the ordinary effect of familiarity ceases to be secured.

No doubt many conditions may contribute towards the production of such a result: but we may with confidence state that at least one absolutely general principle is involved. Familiarity wins *persistent* approval, only when the familiar reaction is linked on with wider interests, or forms an integral part of a much larger system. The philosopher whose chief desire is to advocate a new theory is never tired of the familiar phrases; but to the student who does not see their subtle connection with a wider scheme, they are a mere bore. The dissociated reaction palls with but very little repetition, and either it becomes merely habitual, ceasing to have any marked affective accompaniment, or else the positive value of the familiarity is overwhelmed by the negative effect of satiety.

* It is of interest to note that not only does conventional criticism (*see* pp. 84-87) frequently constitute an important determining factor in suppression, but that suppression itself often provides a basis for the development of conventional as opposed to rational criticism. There is continual interplay between the fact of suppression and the growth of convention.

Now, the mechanical type of reaction, which is at once familiar and displeasing, is usually, at its initiation, or in the early stages of its performance, connected with very much wider interests and personal ideals. It is undertaken by the subject who wishes to "get on," or to secure a good economic position, to provide a home, or to learn a trade. If the work continues without intermission and without variety, its relation to these wider interests becomes increasingly more difficult to discern. More and more the routine behaviour appears as a dissociated element. In the popular language it has "neither rhyme nor reason." The familiarity loses all its "tang," and either, on the one hand, the oft-repeated response falls to the neutral level of the automatic, or, on the other, it becomes more and more an isolated event of life, and is entirely divorced from the end for which it was originally pursued. Under such conditions, the positive effect of familiarity is more than counterbalanced by the appearance of aimlessness and uselessness which the reaction acquires.

In the third place, a considerable number of reactions appear to be so initially displeasing that familiarity is powerless to alter the original attitude of dislike. Bodily pain, for instance, may be repeated so frequently that it becomes as familiar as a musical phrase, or as a particular "taste." But pain never thereby wins approval. The same may be true of strong aesthetic dislikes, such as an opposition to a particular colour, and, in general, of all personal antipathies. However, it is very probable that a careful study of the actual history of aesthetic dislikes and personal antipathies would reveal the fact that many of them bear a close relation to instances falling within the first of the three groups just considered.

Although, in each of these groups of instances, the feeling of familiarity alone does not determine the criticism, nevertheless, feeling in some form is markedly present, and it is out of this affective element that the criticism arises. Now, however, it begins to take a different form from that of simple appreciation.

4. *Conventional Criticism.*

Feeling of familiarity was distinguished from feeling of ease or hesitation by the fact that the former invariably carries a reference to the past. Yet certainly, in the large majority of instances, the reference is not to separate and clearly imaged past *individual* occurrences. That is to say, familiarity is not the product of a definite associative series.*

Similarly, conventional criticism is to be discriminated from simple appreciation, in that the former is always directed by reference to preceding experience. But here also the preceding experience is rarely specified. A particular event produces upon us a result which is due to a mass of past like experience, whether in our own lives, or as expressed in current maxims and popular sayings. The present occurrence is approved or disapproved as a result of its relations to this past experience, but our criticism need not make explicit reference to any individual event or events beyond the one now happening.

We are now at the second of the three stages distinguished at the beginning of this paper. By virtue of its reference to earlier experience, conventional criticism either explicitly states, or tacitly involves, some kind of comparison, as when subject B remarked: "The birds are rather big for ducks."

The most important characteristic of conventional criticism is thus the reference of a present occurrence to a standard which has been formed as a result of a emulation of past experience. In the evolution, and in the employment of the standard, the feeling of familiarity has a large part to play. When—owing, probably, in the main, to an affective accompaniment—a particular experience tends to become a nucleus about which other experiences may cluster, a result is speedily obtained such that, if any instance of a given kind occurs, it

will be at once readily interpreted and easily characterised.* Out of the consequent familiarity arises criticism.

The particular experience which, in this way, acquires a privileged position, will, in general, tend frequently to be repeated. If it is a form of bodily behaviour, for example, a circular reaction may be set up, or the series of responses may be repeated under varying conditions. If it is an act of perceiving, the content of the act may tend to be revived readily in some form of imagery, or the subject may seek again and again to come into actual sense relation with the same object. Thus, either the series of reactions themselves, or the object, acquires a familiarity such that, in the absence of counteracting conditions of the kind touched upon in the last section, we welcome its occurrence. When counteracting conditions are present, we may condemn or disapprove; but the condemnation itself soon becomes familiar, and may evoke precisely the same kind of feeling attaching to that which provokes conventional approval in the common manner.

For the past three years I have been in fairly close contact with a group of about twelve men belonging to the working-class. Over and over again I have been impressed with the immensely large proportion of their criticism which is conventional in precisely the way here described. And the men constitute by no means an uncritical group. Books, opinions, pictures, music, people, and things in general are criticised and appraised according as they do, or do not, conform to standard. The criticism is rarely reasoned, rarely analytical, unless reason and analysis are specifically challenged. Instead it consists in emphatic assertion. Needless to say, the large majority of the standards of criticism referred to are generalisations current among a certain class of people. These generalisations,

* That such a process does occur is evidenced by a series of investigations, the results of which have not yet been published, which I have made with a view to the experimental study of certain problems of conventionalisation.

frequently on the lips and in the minds of these men and their companions, possess, by the prestige of familiarity which they thus secure, a power to direct approval or disapproval which can hardly be exaggerated.*

Watch any such person when he is playing the part of conventional critic. No further evidence will be needed as to the closeness of the relation between criticism of this nature, and feeling. It is precisely conventional verdicts such as these, which are called prejudices by the people who possess a different history, or who belong to a different class. And nobody hesitates to connect prejudice with passion.

But were additional evidence desired, there is one significant fact that is worthy of notice. Conventional criticism is always seeking to arrogate to itself a complete universality. It is in truth different from simple appreciation in that it is not wholly tied to the present. We have seen how it carries a reference to past experience. In its expression, however, it is continually seeking to burst all bonds, and to overcome the narrowness of dates.

I have still in mind the small group of men just mentioned. I picture myself making what I regard as some perfectly harmless statement, say, concerning the need of the town worker for fresh air and open spaces. My remarks contain a distant hint of challenge to the accepted conventions of some of the men with regard to the observance of Sunday. One of them is roused, and with immeasurable scorn points out my miserable errors. His speech consists entirely of violent assertion. I have heard what he has to say many times already. Consequently I watch the other men. I note how they warm to the familiar phrases. Before long, they are completely captured, and I am left intellectually alone. If I attempt any opposition, my opponent becomes yet more sweeping. The universal particles—"all," "none," "always,"

* Cp. R. L. Stevenson, "Man is a creature who lives not upon bread alone, but principally by catchwords."

"never"—are frequently upon his lips. And, meanwhile, I reflect to myself that whenever we attempt to justify *any* proposition that is mostly the outcome of feeling, we tend to use the weapon of violent assertion.

Nevertheless, the conventional is never able to attain true universality. Freed, more or less, from the present, it is still not freed from the particular. That its reference is often to a mere *mass* of experience, wherein particular events are not clearly distinguishable, is of no avail. By analysis alone is the universal achieved. And conventional criticism is never truly the expression of the results of analysis.

There is, however, a type of critical judgment, the development of which follows a very different course from that taken by conventional criticism. This third type achieves the universalisation which the conventional vainly seeks.

5. *The Beginnings of Definite Analysis.*

Impartial, rational, or unconditioned criticism depends largely upon an apprehension of the nature of relations, and of their independence of particular settings. The reasoned rules which it establishes all concern the manner in which such relations may be illustrated in different material connexions. But to attain such rules a considerable effort of analysis is demanded. Accordingly, it is to the beginnings of definite analysis, in so far as these are important in the development of criticism, that attention must now be directed.

There are two cases which appear to be of particular importance in the present connexion, though they cannot be regarded as exhausting all the possibilities.

Suppose it should happen that a subject confronts for the first time a complex situation or object, some part of which is like, or identical with, an experience which he has already passed through. Very often the whole of the new situation will appear to possess a more or less vague quality of familiarity. This is rendered the more likely by the apparently common

occurrence of a "spread" of feeling.* The familiarity may display any degree of intensity, but when it is at once intense, and yet mingled with a peculiar consciousness of novelty, the illusion of false recognition arises.† There appears to be very good evidence that the latter does not normally persist for long together.‡ It leaves the subject wondering why the experience in question appeared familiar. Thereupon he probably scrutinises the detail of the present situation, so far as he is able, and also attempts to recall earlier experience. The identity of feeling which marked this and prior experience may well bring about revival of some quite particular situation, and the subject may then be in a position to note that "like," or the same, elements may occur in different settings. Obviously an act of analysis has been performed, as a result of which the subject is on his way to appreciating that certain elements of his experience are independent of particular settings. Moreover, the analysis in question has occurred in the closest connexion with affective experience, such as gives rise to criticism. The subject is now in a position to assign the critical characterisation of a

* This, also, was many times illustrated in the course of the experiments on conventionalisation to which I have already referred.

† It appears to me to be probable that an analysis of this nature would cover a large number of the instances of the illusion of *déjà vu*, as it is often called. The various attempts that have been made to account for this illusion constitute one of the most curious chapters in the history of psychology (cp. *Illusion de Fausse Reconnaissance*, by Bernard Leroy, Paris, 1898, or the references in Bergson's article, *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lvi, 1908, pp. 561-93). So far as one can discover, the illusion occurs with complex objects and situations only, some part or parts of which may well have been already experienced by the subject. The facts that familiarity develops very rapidly; that it is normally in itself of a pleasant character; that pleasant feeling probably shows a definite tendency to "spread"; that very commonly indeed we know that we have experienced details already, but are unable to state when, or where, they occurred; and that the illusion of false recognition is hardly ever of more than short duration, all go to suggest that the illusion may, in many cases at least, be explained in the manner proposed.

‡ "En somme," says Bernard Leroy, in considering the point, "je ne connais pas de cas où il soit prouvé que l'impression ait duré plus de deux minutes."

situation or object to some element of a given whole, and at the same time to distinguish the presence of this element in many different wholes.

Although the extreme form of the illusion of *fausse reconnaissance* is somewhat rare, in its less intense stages the experience is fairly common. And even under the latter circumstances an analysing attitude is apt to arise. An observant subject will frequently catch himself saying: "Now what is there in this object that can have made me think I have seen it before?"

There are other circumstances, no less important for our present inquiry, which serve to give rise to definite analysis. Reverting to primitive case of apprehension, we find upon examination that the success of an act of perceiving depends, in many instances, in part upon the structure of the object apprehended. Particularly important are instances (*a*) of symmetry, on the positive side, and (*b*) of marked irregularity, break of contour, extremes of size, and so forth, on the negative side.

Let us first consider the case of symmetry. Experiments on perceiving have repeatedly shown that symmetrical construction is favourable to ready and correct observation.* Now, though there is no *definite* analysis in early acts of perceiving, it is certainly true that what *later* comes to be regarded as a part generally receives special attention. For example, the upper part of a figure, or the left-hand part of a line, is often particularly noticed, while as yet there is no clear discrimination that what is perceived forms a part only of the whole presented. Before we can say that definite analysis has been carried out, however, the part attended to must be known not to constitute the whole figure; the rest must be specifically apprehended as "another part"; and, finally, the relation between the two parts must be appreciated.

We may observe how these further steps are taken in the

* Cf. my already mentioned paper on Perceiving, pp. 237-8.

instance of the apprehension of symmetry. A part of the symmetrical object is clearly perceived. The rest is dimly known, but it seems to be related to the distinct part by way of repetition. At first the whole experience is far from being clearly articulated. Hence, as in all cases of indefinite apprehension, the experient tends to use the word "feeling" in description of his appreciation of the relation. The subject who is given a regularly constructed object to observe will frequently remark: "I had an *impression* that what I saw is symmetrical," or, "I *felt* that the design repeats itself." Strictly, however, the term feeling is here misapplied; what it is employed to designate is really the indefinite apprehension of the structure of the presented object.

Hindrance or hesitation which is due to the structure of an object, may give rise to a somewhat similar result. When the object is very large, for instance, the subject probably does not at first get beyond the attitude: "This, which I am now seeing, is 'not all';" but in the case of break of contour, or of irregularity of structure, a vague "feeling" soon arises that "this part differs from that."

Doubtless there are other conditions under which we may observe the beginnings of the definite effort of analysis, and of the apprehension of relations. But the important point about these two groups of cases is that here the processes in question are intimately connected with affective experience. We find that instances in which relations begin to be apprehended are at the same time marked by the experiences of ease and hesitation. Hence, in accordance with the principle already stated (see pp. 77-79), such instances give rise to the modes of simple appreciation. Similarly, there are cases in which the analysis of elements is initiated by the very feeling of familiarity which itself induces conventional criticism. Analysis and apprehension of relations are essential for the development of rational criticism, and it is significant that they may thus from the first both be found to be closely associated with feeling.

6. *The Development of Analysis.*

Up to this point, both the criticism and the analysis must be regarded as confined within the narrow limits of a single experience, or, at most, as linking on a present occurrence with a relatively vague mass of earlier similar experience. We have now to consider how rules may be developed which have a completely general significance. And first we must study somewhat more closely the part that may be played by feeling in reinstatement.

Two points are important: (a) the modes of feeling are relatively few in number; and hence what is to all intents and purposes the same affective-tone may accompany experiences which differ widely, as regards the time of their occurrence, or in their attendant circumstances; (b) when a given cognitive experience is accompanied by marked affective-tone, if similar or identical feeling-tone has attended earlier experiences, the latter frequently tend to recur in some form of imagery.

The first point needs little comment. Whether the modes of affection may be reduced to two or three, as many psychologists have maintained, or whether further modes must be discriminated, it will be generally admitted that the total number of different feelings falls very far short of the diversity of situations which they accompany. Consequently some considerable amount of overlapping is inevitable.

The second point has received abundant illustration, both as a result of empirical analysis* and as an outcome of experiment. Whether as functioning in acts such as that of

* See, for instance, Urban, *op. cit.*; Ribot, *Préliminaires de Psychologie Affective*, and *La Psychologie des Sentiments*; Pillon, "La Mémoire Affective," *Rev. Phil.*, 1901, t. I, p. 124; Weber, "Sur la Mémoire Affective," *Rev. de Met. et de Mor.*, 1914, pp. 794-883; Dugas, "La Mémoire Affective d'après Stendhal," *Rev. Phil.*, 1916, I, pp. 72-81; and numerous other articles.

recognition, or as bringing about definite reproduction, it is indisputable that feeling is of great importance.*

The reproductive function of feeling, therefore, must, owing to the paucity of affective modes, frequently bring together individual experiences which differ in many assignable respects. This juxtaposition readily stimulates a questioning attitude. As already suggested, when familiarity and strangeness are connected within a given experience, an attempt is often made definitely to account for the familiarity. Thereupon similarity, or identity, of an element in this and some prior experience is suspected, and perhaps discovered.† Or again, an event which apparently is entirely unconnected with present circumstances may recur to mind. We then wonder why the past experience should have been revived. And after due consideration we discover that identity of elements or of structural relations has given rise to substantially the same feeling in the apprehension of the present circumstances as accompanied that of the past situation.

Here, then, the feeling appears itself to be due to constant or similar elements of an object or situation. That is to say, the affective experience may seem to be not an isolated and independent fact. Thereupon, we tend to refer the criticism, which arises as a result of the feeling, to the similarity or identity of elements or relations which we have discovered.

* A large number of experimentalists have pointed out the importance of feeling in recognition. See, e.g., Bourdon, *Rev. Phil.*, 40, p. 153; Whipple, *Amer. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1900-1, pp. 1-78; Abramowski, *Arch. de Psychol.*, 1910, pp. 1-38; Katzaroff, *Arch. de Psychol.*, 1911, pp. 1-78, and others. On the other hand, it has been denied that such a function of feeling is observable by, e.g., Roberts M. Owen, *Psychol. Monop.*, vol. xx, No. 86, and E. L. Woods, *Amer. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1915, pp. 313-89. Apart from specific studies of recognition, the function of feeling in reinstatement has been observed by Peters and Némecsek, *Fortschritte der Psychol. u. ihrer Anwendungen*, vol. ii, Part 2; and by Baxter, Yamada, and Washburn, *Amer. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1917, pp. 155-157.

† An interesting illustration is given by Louis Ferri, in his book on *La Psychologie de l'Association*; footnote on p. 258.

and to look upon the feeling as a mere go-between. This at once gives to our criticism an appearance of firmness and objectivity which hitherto it had lacked.

Finally, elements may remain the same, although contexts differ widely, and relations such as those of symmetry, balance, and proportion, are found constant with the utmost variation of material. Rules of appreciation are consequently laid down; and, though criticism first arises as a result of the affective accompaniment, when once the stage of rules is reached, the principles enunciated claim entire independence of the feeling. "Wherever there is this or that quality," we say, "this or that critical judgment is justified." Or: "Wherever we find this or that structural relation, then we may praise or condemn." We have now attained to the level of the third, or impartial, type of criticism.

7. *Rational Criticism.*

The chief characteristic of rational criticism is its appeal to rules or principles founded on analytical investigation. The principle very frequently concerns a mode of structure, and it is remarkable how commonly it has to do with a harmony or balance of parts, as if the primitive appreciation of symmetry still persists in a refined form. Sometimes it concerns subject matter, and prescribes what subjects may legitimately be expressed in a given medium. At the rational stage, our judgments have passed from the simple form: "I like this," to the definite: "This is beautiful," or "This is good." And such a judgment now claims to be a reasoned statement, capable of complete justification.

At the simply appreciative level, the question of justification hardly arises; there is no "because" at all. At the conventional level, the attitude is: "This is so, because I say it is so," or, "everybody says it is so," or, ultimately, "simply because it is so." At the rational level, the attitude is: "This is so, because to be so is a necessary characteristic, or consequence, of the quality here exhibited, or the kind of construction here

illustrated." Thus we may judge a combination of lines and curves to be beautiful, because of the balance of form they maintain, or a picture, because, as Shaftesbury says, "its details all yield to the general design, and are in all things subservient to that which is principal." A play, or a story, may be approved, because it forms a harmony with all parts in fitting proportion. We speak sometimes of the good life as being one free from all extremes, wherein each quality of man gains due development.

When conventional criticism is contested, the answer is often sought by way of violent assertion. But if there is opposition to a rational verdict, the manner of answer is by analysis, and calm reasoning. The one overbears; the other strives to convince. For we have now found one of the true paths to the universal, and possess the conviction that if we can but make the way clear all people must go with us. So long as the weapon of analysis is kept bright and burnished, criticism of this third type is beyond the scope of the affective determination that played a large part in the earlier developmental stages. Yet, at the same time, the very use of analysis may itself give rise to two opposing tendencies. Either it may produce a broad tolerance of principle which looks with qualified approval upon most situations that are criticised; or it may lead, through its increasing fineness of application, to a delicate sensitiveness of mind, which, though it follows genuinely universal principles, hardly ever finds them perfectly exemplified in actual experience. The latter is another of the reasons why disapproval may tend to become more common and more emphatic with mental development.

8. The Rational and the Conventional.

Once a rule of criticism has been evolved, it readily tends itself to become stereotyped, and a centre for that kind of feeling which always clusters about the conventional. Largely by the aid of intercommunication, in which social factors play important parts, the rule may attain the position of an accepted

standard, which is received widely, often without adequate understanding of the principles upon which it is founded. Thereupon it will soon be used to direct criticism, not as the result of analysis, but simply because it is ready to hand, and easy to apply. In this way there is a constant tendency for the rational to deteriorate into the conventional.*

At the same time, the conventional may furnish yet another foundation, in addition to that already described in this paper, for the development of the rational. Each group of persons will tend to have its established rules of criticism. Should these in any way be brought into conflict one with another, the clash of principles will probably stimulate a new effort of analysis, as a result of which a further rational development may ensue. The same effect may be secured when a new movement is initiated *within* a group, supposing that this ever does occur apart from the operation of influences coming from without. But concerning the precise conditions and mode of development in such instances much has yet to be discovered.

9. *A Fourth Type of Criticism.*

There is, however, another type of criticism to which the rational may give place. We have seen how the latter tends to

* This is very excellently expressed by Wordsworth in his essay on *Poetry as a Study*, which was written not long after Jeffrey's famous criticism of *The Excursion*. Wordsworth is speaking of those who have applied themselves to laws of poetry: "As this Class comprehends the only judgments which are trustworthy," he says, "so does it include the most erroneous and perverse. For to be mistaught is worse than to be untaught; and no perverseness equals that which is supported by system, no errors are so difficult to root out as those which the understanding has pledged its credit to uphold. In this Class are contained censors who, if they be pleased with what is good, are pleased with it only by imperfect glimpses, and upon false principles; who, should they generalise rightly, to a certain point, are sure to suffer for it in the end; who, if they stumble upon a sound rule, are fettered by misapplying it, or by straining it too far; being incapable of perceiving when it ought to yield to one of a higher order." Quoted by Hugh Walker, *The English Essay and Essayists*, London, 1915, pp. 214-5.

produce a delicate sensitiveness of mind which rarely discovers a perfect exemplification of universal principles (see p. 94). Doubt may then be cast upon the validity of the principles themselves. They may appear as, at the most, mere empirical uniformities; or they may be regarded as abstractions, inapplicable to the inexhaustible variety of the material of actual experience.

As a result, a complete renunciation of criticism might be attempted. But it would be extremely difficult to maintain consistently such a refusal. For strong affective and emotional disturbances would continue to be aroused in certain situations, and thereupon a tendency to criticism would occur spontaneously. Moreover, a critic always occupies a relatively privileged position; and, at the advanced stage now reached, this fact is usually quite clearly appreciated, and is itself exceedingly pleasing. So no renunciation is effected, but, instead, another plan is pursued.

The critic now seeks to justify his verdict, not by an analysis of the structure of an object, but by an appeal to the nature, both of that which he judges, and of his own experience. In one way this may seem to mark a return to an earlier attitude. Once more it is affirmed that "this is so, because it is so" (see p. 93). But the statement means far more now than was possible at the conventional level. The criticism is now regarded as inevitably arising from the peculiar character of the object, and of the relation between the object and the critic. The relation is a fact entering into a personal history. It may be explained by its position within that history. And consequently, seeing that it necessarily differs with each person, no one can be surprised that critical judgments passed by different people exhibit, as a rule, no wide unanimity. As for the peculiar contribution made by the object itself to the criticism, that, indisputable as it is, escapes all effort of analysis. The critic says simply that the object *is*, just as he asserts it to be, beautiful, good, true, or perhaps ugly, bad, false; and he

further holds that analysis of its nature is powerless to discover any further reasons for these characterisations.

This fourth type of criticism may perhaps be called the *intuitionist*. Its verdicts depend in no sense solely upon the mere fact that similar judgments have been called forth in the past, and they are not the result of analysis and the development of rules of construction. Nevertheless, they are regarded as sound and true. They are the expression of experience, the nature of which is due in part to its position within a particular personal history, and in part to the character of the object; and the justification of which needs no argument, since the very experience carries its reasons within itself.

10. *The Direction of Development.*

In considering the whole course of development here briefly sketched, the broad problem arises as to whether it exhibits throughout any one fundamentally important determining factor. The answer is that we may see, in consistent operation, the dominant influence of what has been called "effort after meaning."* Familiarity, with its linking on of the present to a relatively vague past, illustrates an early form of the working of this factor, the central characteristic of which is that what is presented is interpreted through its relation to some other experience. But in familiarity, and the other instances that belong to the same level, and produce conventional criticism, the operation of the factor is still restricted. Even when the reference is to a standard, the criticism is tied, not indeed to a single experience, but certainly to a mass of experiences, beyond which it cannot be said to have any application. Yet, through the continued influence of the effort after meaning, the critic attempts to discriminate those characteristics of a present experience which are bound neither to time nor to particular subject matter. Some other mode of

finding expression must therefore be sought than the conventional. The new mode, which calls for independent analysis, is, however, much more difficult. The attempt to produce continued criticism that does actually arise from a genuine analysis of the material criticised frequently involves no small strain. The rational critic must proceed according to wide laws of relation; and the discovery of the illustration and applicability, as well as of the nature, of these laws calls for constant vigilance. Whenever this vigilance slackens, the stereotyped or conventional way of criticising tends to arise once more. Conventional criticism is the easier mode. Consequently, it tends itself to be preferred. And, thus, it is always liable to become the dominant method of criticism, and its limitations frequently pass unnoticed. Similarly, the "intuitional" critic is often tempted merely to repeat earlier and perhaps well-established verdicts, rather than to record his own present impressions in all their freshness.

Every reversion to the conventional represents a thwarting of the "effort after meaning." For in all the later developments signalled in this paper—whether rational or intuitional—analysis and reflexion have provided criticism with a basis whereby the relations of a particular verdict to wide principles of construction, to other facts of personal experience, and to the peculiar character of an object, are definitely realised. Thus, each critical judgment appears to possess a character not merely determined by custom, but such that, in the very nature of things, it must of necessity be as it is. Only when such an appearance can be assumed by each verdict passed can the effort after meaning be satisfied, and the whole process of the development of criticism is a result of the endeavour to secure this satisfaction.

11. *Summary.*

1. The subject is from the first "not equally ready to receive all impressions."

2. Where readiness of response occurs, there is an accompanying feeling of ease, and an attitude of enjoyment supervenes. Difficult, or thwarted, reactions are attended by a feeling of hesitation, which gives rise to an attitude of uneasiness. Enjoyment tends to develop into definite *liking*, and uneasiness into *dislike*, these attitudes constituting that form of criticism called simple appreciation.

3. Repetition of a response speedily produces a feeling of familiarity. Such repetition occurs most readily in the case of the primitively "easy" reaction, but, under specifiable conditions, may obtain with other reactions also. Feeling of familiarity always bears a reference to the past, but the latter rarely assumes a clearly individualised form. Normally, familiarity tends to evoke approval, but this tendency may be thwarted, the conditions of its hindrance being capable of precise definition. Thus, although familiarity is adequate to initiate criticism, it is not, in all instances, sufficient to determine the direction of criticism. In all approval, or disapproval, on this level, the criticism takes the form of appraising a thing by virtue of its agreement or disagreement with prior experience. This prior experience may either be constituted by actual occurrences within the history of the subject who criticises, or may be embodied in maxims current in the social *milieu* to which the individual belongs. In both cases, the resulting criticism is to be termed Conventional.

4. Familiarity often occurs in close connexion with an experience of strangeness or novelty. Under these circumstances, a definite effort of analysis is likely to ensue, as a result of which it is discovered that like, or the same, elements enter into different situations, or belong to different objects. An early form of analysis likewise arises in connexion with the apprehension of regularity or irregularity of construction in an object. Here the affective modes of ease and hesitation are closely connected with the beginning of the apprehension of relations.

5. Feeling has an important function in reproduction, by virtue of which, and because of the paucity of modes of affective experience, situations and objects, different in important respects, may be brought closely together in mind. Such juxtaposition tends further to stimulate analysis. By the development of discrimination thus secured, common elements of different wholes and common structural relations are more and more clearly apprehended.

6. Thereupon, it is concluded that the affective experience may itself be referred to these common elements and relations, and, since the feeling induces criticism, that also is referred to the same common qualities and relations. Since such qualities and relations are, however, shown by the analysis to be independent of particular instances, it appears that the determinants of criticism may be regarded as purely general in nature. Emancipation from an immediate determination by feeling is thus secured, and the formulation of definite rules and guiding principles leads on to rational criticism.

7. The rules established by rational criticism may, by reason of the increase of familiarity which soon attaches to them, fall, more or less rapidly, to the level of the conventional.

8. The analysis demanded by the development of rational criticism may tend to produce a mind keenly sensitive to particular differences, and hence inclined to dispute the applicability to the material of experience of rules of criticism based upon universal principles. A further type of criticism—the intuitional—is thus produced, in which a verdict appears as the result, on the one hand, of some peculiar unanalysable characteristic of the object, and on the other, of the nature of the relation of the critic to the object.

9. The whole line of development, from simple appreciation to rational and intuitional criticism, is an important exemplification of the influence of the fundamental "effort after meaning."

IV.—THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY.

By G. E. MOORE.

THE fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* is a chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:—

"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It will explain why we deny that, *in the character which they exhibit*, they either *have* or *belong* to reality."*

Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, *in a certain character*, neither has nor belongs to reality: this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time *has not* reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time *is not* real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, "like space, has most evidently proved *not to be real*, but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that Time *is not* real. But there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice. In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion "Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying

* *Appearance and Reality* (2nd edn.), p. 35. The *italics* are mine.

"Time, in the character which it exhibits, neither has nor belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, be meant to imply that, in some *other* character—some character which it does *not* exhibit—Time *has* reality and does belong to it. And I shall presently have something to say about this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.

However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that *in some sense*, at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:—*

"For the present," he says, "we may keep a fast hold upon this, that appearances *exist*. That is absolutely certain, and to deny it is nonsense. And whatever exists must *belong to reality*. That is also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory. Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to an unknown extent may be something which, *as it is*, is *not* true of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to

* *Op. cit.* pp. 131-2.

repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for that sole reason, most indubitably *is*; and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it."

That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time has *most evidently* proved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems to declare equally emphatically that Time *does* exist, and *is*. And his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer nonsense to suppose that Time does *not* exist, is *not* a fact, does *not* belong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing," "being a fact," and "being" on the other hand—as if he meant to say that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yet *not* be real. And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say "Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time is real mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All that most people would mean by saying that Time is real could, it would seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully agreed with the view that most people would express by saying "Time is real"—as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is *not* real? He evidently thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which is *not* mere nonsense: and he certainly would not have chosen this way of expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here asserting about Time is incompatible with what people *often* mean when they say

"Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he is asserting is *not* incompatible with the assertions that Time is, and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean something *more* than merely that there *is* such a thing as Time, something, therefore, which may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a real difficulty in seeing that they ever *do* mean anything more, and, *if* they do, what more it is that they can mean.

The two expressions "There *is* such a thing as so and so" and "So and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with *existing*; he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be identical with one another. And, indeed, in another passage in the Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense *is*, qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time *is*; he must, therefore, allow that, *in a sense*, at all events, it is nonsense to deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word "real" may, *sometimes* at all events, be properly used as equivalent to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions cannot both be true, unless there is *some sense* in which the whole proposition "Time is real" is *not* equivalent

to and cannot be inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."

It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the statement "Time is real" is, in *one* sense, *not* equivalent to "Time exists"; though he admits that, in *another* sense, it is. And I will only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.

"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change is a fact and, further, *this fact, as such, is not* reconcilable with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how *the fact* can be *unreal*, we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless dilemma . . . But our real position is very different from this. For time has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider harmony. And, with this, the *appeal to fact* at once becomes worthless."

"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can prove *reality*. That I find something in existence in the world or in my self, shows that this something *exists*, and it cannot show *more*. Any deliverance of consciousness—whether original or acquired—is but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we have to accept. It is a fact, like other facts, to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any *fact* is better than appearance."

Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is something *more* and other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which I am going presently to discuss.

But I want first to say something as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be the explanation of the whole difficulty—the distinction implied by the qualification “Time, *in the character which it exhibits*”; the suggestion that, when we talk of “Time,” we may sometimes mean Time in one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation.

Stated very baldly and rudely, the difficulty which requires explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, “It is sheer nonsense to say Time is not real.” But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had said, “Time has most evidently proved not to be real.” Now, Mr. Bradley certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it *is* sheer nonsense. This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously, the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be holding that the words “Time is real” may have two different *senses*. In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense: in the other sense, so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different explanations come in.

The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr. Bradley’s words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said: “The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley says that Time is *not* real, what he means is that Time, *in the character which it exhibits*, is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, what he means is that Time does exist, *in some other character*—some character

other than that which it exhibits. He does *not* mean to make any distinction, such as you suppose between two meanings of the word 'real'—the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,' 'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction between *two* meanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means 'Time, in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time, in *some other* character, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve."

This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's meaning. And it must be admitted that it *would* furnish a complete explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another: on the ground that anything which has not got the character which Time exhibits, but only some *other* character, ought not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with the conception that one and the same thing may *at one time* possess a character which it does *not* possess at another, so that what is true of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is, familiar with the idea of a thing *changing* its character. But Time itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense. Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which it exhibits" and in which it is unreal *at one time*, and possesses some other character, in which it is real, at *some other time*. And hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself could have two incompatible characters; since

nothing can have two incompatible characters, unless it has them *at different times*. And this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to his meaning. Where he seems to imply that Time, in some character other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean that something completely different from Time, but which does in some sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of "Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as if it were Time itself in some other character: but this would go no way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of Time, which is real, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too, what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time is real? And I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a real *counterpart* of Time, completely different in character from Time, as we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart is like.

We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones.

But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinc-

tion between Time in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr. Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, in the character which it exhibits, neither is real, *nor* exists, *nor* is a fact, *nor* is. We should have to suppose him to be using all these four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it is *only* in its other character that Time either exists, or is a fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits." Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary, he means to affirm emphatically that Time *even* in the character which it exhibits, does exist, *is* a fact, and indubitably *is*, though it is *not* real, in that character. In the second passage, for instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist, are facts, and indubitably *are*, he is, I think, plainly talking of appearances, in the character which they exhibit—or, as he there puts it, their nature, *as it is*—he does, I think, mean that appearances, even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third passage, where he says, Change *is* a fact, and this fact, *as such*, is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such—change, in the *character which it exhibits*—change, *as it is*, is a fact; though, of course, he holds that *in* this character it certainly is not real. I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another. His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making a distinction between Time in one character and Time

in another, and it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that Time, *as such*, *neither* is real, *nor* exists, *nor* is a fact, *nor* is; but, on the contrary, that Time, even *as such*, does exist, *is* a fact, and *is*; but, nevertheless, is not real. This, at least, is what I am going to assume him to mean. And, on this assumption, we are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the word "real," and also as to the meaning of these other words "exists," "is a fact," and "is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, that "real" may *sometimes* be properly used as *merely* equivalent to these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he also holds that in another sense they are not equivalent, but that "real" means something more than the others, so that it is quite consistent to maintain that Time is *not* "real," and that yet it *does* exist, is a fact, and is. In holding this I think he is mistaken; and what I want to do is to explain, as clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him to be making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. I may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr. Bradley has made this mistake, and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he seems to draw between "reality" and "existence." To maintain that it is so is no part of my main object. My main object is simply to make clear the nature of this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley or not, and that it is a mistake; because it seems to me that it is a mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to avoid. I am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the question whether Time *is* real or not, but only to discuss the question what sort of things would have to be true, if it were unreal, and whether if those things were true it could still be true that Time either exists, or is, or is a fact.

Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. I think that part at least of what he means is just what he

ought to mean—just what anyone else would mean if he said that Time was unreal, and what any ordinary person would understand to be meant, if he heard those words. But I can conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what this is that he *ought* to mean, some people may be inclined to dispute whether he means any such thing at all. They may say that he is using the word “real” exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense, so that in asserting that “Time is unreal” he is by no means denying any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that “Time is real.” And that some special sense may *come in* to his meaning I am prepared to admit. I do think it is possible that *part* of what Mr. Bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated person would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit, therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by “Time is unreal” *merely* what other people would mean by this phrase, but something else *as well*. What, however, I cannot help thinking is that, even if he means something more, he *does* mean what ordinary people would mean *as well*: that what they would mean is at least a *part* of his meaning. And if even this is disputed, if it is maintained that he is using the words *exclusively* in some special sense, I own I do not know how to argue the question. If anybody really does take the view that, when he says “Time is unreal,” absolutely all that he means is something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would mean by saying “Time is real.” I do not know how to show that this view is wrong. I can only say that if this *had* been all that he meant, I cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form “Time is unreal.” The only further argument I shall bring in favour of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against it. When I have explained what he *ought* to mean by saying that “Time is unreal,” it will be quite clear that this is something which is in fact incompatible with the truth of the

propositions that Time *is*, or *exists*, or *is a fact*. And it might be urged that the fact that it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that Mr. Bradley does mean what he *ought* to mean, since, if he had meant it, he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meant *was* inconsistent with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he certainly does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument, which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a plausible one, as to how he could come to think that the propositions are *not* inconsistent, when in fact they are.

What, then, *ought* Mr. Bradley to mean by "Time is unreal"? What would most people mean by this proposition? I do not think there is much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by it. Of course, Time, with a big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind of entity, and to define *exactly* what can be meant by saying of an entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties. But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to ask what it *implies*, there is, I think, very little doubt as to the sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this, and to think what it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of different *kinds* of propositions, all of which plainly must be untrue, if Time is unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now; and so on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood of all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. And it is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts of certain corresponding kinds—no facts which consist in one event happening before another; none which consist in an event being past or future, and so on. That is to

say, what "Time is unreal" implies is that, in the case of a large number of different *properties*, which are such that, if they *did* belong to anything, what they belonged to would be facts having some common characteristic, which we might express by calling them "temporal facts," the properties in question do, in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of being a fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing; that that of being a past event belongs to nothing, and so on. And why it implies that all those different special properties belong to nothing is, I think we may say, because what it *means* is that the general property which I have called that of being a "temporal fact" belongs to nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing *does imply* that such special properties as that of being a fact which consists in one event following another, or that of being a fact which consists in something being past, also belong to nothing; in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being "coloured" belongs to nothing *implies* with regard to the special properties "being red," "being blue," etc., that they also belong to nothing. We may, then, I think, say that what "Time is unreal" *means* is simply "The property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing," or, to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in ordinary life, "There *are* no temporal facts." And this being so, we have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is predicated of Time with a capital T, by reference to a much more common and perfectly familiar usage of the term. The use of "is unreal" in the phrase "Time is unreal" has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase "Temporal facts are real." And its use in this phrase is, so far as I can see, exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are perfectly familiar; it is, I think, *the* commonest and by far the most important use of the term "unreal." The use is that in which we use it when we say, "Unicorns are unreal," "Griffins are unreal," "Chimeras are unreal," and so on. It is the usage

in which unreal is equivalent to "imaginary"; and in which to say "Unicorns are unreal" means the same as "There are no unicorns" or "Unicorns do not exist." In just the same way the proposition "Temporal facts are unreal," into which we have translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are no temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist," or "Temporal facts are imaginary."

I think, then, that what Mr. Bradley *ought* to mean by "Time is unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word "real"—or, if you like to put it that way, to one particular one among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand. And this particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most important of those for which the term does stand. I want, therefore, before going on, to dwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay that all that I have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been said before, but I think it is still very far from being generally understood.

I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought out in this way. I have just said that we have pointed out one particular one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand: and that is an excusable way of saying what we have done. But it would I think, be more correct to say that we have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage of the terms "real" and "unreal," and that one of the peculiarities of this usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal" cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. We have said that what "Lions are real" *means* is that some particular property or other—I will say, for the sake of brevity, *the* property of being a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does in fact *belong to something*—that there are things which have it, or, to put it in another way, that the conception of being

a lion is a conception which does apply to some things—that there are things which *fall under* it. And similarly what “Unicorns are *unreal*” means is that the property of being a unicorn belongs to *nothing*. Now, if this is so, then it seems to me, in a very important sense, “real” and “unreal” do *not* in this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The only *conceptions* which occur in the proposition “Lions are real” are, on this interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and (2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously “real” does not stand for either of these. In the case of the first that is obvious; but it is worth while pointing out that it is also true of the second.

For if “is real” did stand for “belongs to something,” then the proposition “Lions are real” would stand, not for the assertion that the property of “being a lion” belongs to something, but for the assertion that lions themselves *are properties which belong to something*; and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is not any such nonsense as this. “Real,” therefore, does not, in this proposition, stand for the conception of “belonging to something;” nor yet, quite plainly, does it stand for the conception of “being a lion.” And hence, since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in the proposition, we may, I think, say that “real,” in this usage, does not stand for any conception at all. To say that it did would be to imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that everything which has the property of “being a lion” *also* has this other property. But we are not, in fact, asserting any such thing. We are not asserting of any property called “reality” that it belongs to lions, as in the proposition “Lions are mammalian” we *are* asserting of the property of “being a mammal” that *it* belongs to lions. The two propositions “Lions are real” and “Lions are mammalian,” though grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; and one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas “mammalian” does stand for a property or

conception, the very point of this usage of "real" is that it does not.

To return to Mr. Bradley. "Time is unreal" *ought* to mean, according to me, "Temporal facts are unreal," in the sense I have tried to explain. And I cannot help thinking that this which he *ought* to mean is, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley *does* mean when he says "Time is unreal," though possibly he also means something else as well. But if so, it is quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent with its being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, is to assert, at least, that there are some temporal facts: it may assert more than this, but it does assert this, at least. And this, we have seen, is exactly what is denied when it is said that Time is unreal. "Time is unreal" just means "Temporal facts are unreal," or "There are no temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is also what is meant by "Time does not exist" or "There is no such thing as Time." There is, in fact, nothing else for these expressions to mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradley *ought* to mean and (according to me) does mean by "Time is unreal" is, in fact, inconsistent with what he ought to mean by "Time exists" or by "Time is." And yet plainly he does not think that it is so. Is it possible to explain why he should have failed to perceive the inconsistency?

I think his failure can be explained as follows. It may have been noticed that, in the passages I quoted from him, he insists, in one place, that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false but *self-contradictory*, and in another appeals to the principle that "any deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness" in support of his contention that what *is* a fact need, nevertheless, *not* be real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I think, give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the

following. It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts are unreal, *i.e.*, there *are* no such things, we can and do *think of them*, just as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns are unreal, we can and do imagine them. In other words, "temporal facts" and "unicorns" are both quite certainly "deliverances of consciousness," at least in the sense that they are "objects of thought"; being "objects of thought" they are, in a wide sense, "appearances" also, and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are so, they *must* at least *be*. "How" (I imagine he would ask) "can a thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and to be thought of? To say that it appears or is thought of, and that yet there is no such thing, is plainly self-contradictory. A thing cannot have a property, unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns and temporal facts *do* have the property of being thought of, there certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if a unicorn is what I am thinking of, then there certainly must *be* a unicorn, in spite of the fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of the words there certainly *are* no unicorns—that sense, namely, in which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that unicorns are real—yet there *must be some* other sense in which there *are* such things: since, *if* there were not, we could not think of them."

Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley should have been guilty of it. But there are other passages in *Appearance and Reality*—particularly what he says about Error—which look to me as if he certainly was guilty of it. I

suppose it will be quite obvious to every one here that it is a fallacy; that the fact that we can think of unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there *are* any unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what is *the* mistake involved in thinking that it *is* sufficient, and I am going, therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in the hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me.

The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that the proposition "Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of the same form as "Lions are hunted"; or the proposition "I am thinking of a unicorn" of the same form as "I am hunting a lion"; or the proposition "Unicorns are objects of thought" of the same form as "Lions are objects of the chase." Of the second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions—at least one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a certain property—which we will call that of "being a lion"—that there *are* things which possess it, and also with regard to another—that of being hunted—that some of the things which possess the former possess this property too. But it is obvious enough to common sense that the same is by no means true of the *first* proposition in each pair, in spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of the difference. It is perfectly obvious that if I say "I am thinking of a unicorn," I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of it, although, if I say "I am hunting a lion," I am saying both that there is a lion and that I am hunting it. In the former case, I am *not* asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of being thought of by me both belong to one and the same thing; whereas, in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a lion and of being hunted by me *do* belong to one and the same thing. It is quite clear that there is *in fact*, this difference between the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such

different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover, *exactly* what is meant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the hypothesis that there is something which possesses it, and (2) that the property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it, there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not give us completely what is *meant* by the statement, "I am thinking of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is certainly *not* that I am conceiving with regard to the property of "being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point which concerns us is that it is certainly *not* necessary for its truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sense whatever *be* a unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr. Bradley is that of supposing that, *in some sense*, it must imply this latter.

This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the reasons which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the proposition "Time is unreal" *must* be consistent with the proposition "There *is* such a thing as Time." Put shortly, it is that he sees (what is perfectly true) that "Time is unreal" *must* be consistent with "We do think of Time;" he thinks (falsely) that "We *do* think of Time" must imply, in some sense, "There *is* such a thing as Time;" and, finally, infers (correctly)

from this true and this false premiss, that there *must* be some sense of the proposition "There is such a thing as Time" which is consistent with "Time is unreal."

It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought to mean *both* by "Time is unreal" *and* by "Time exists," he is contradicting himself when he combines these two propositions. And I have said I feel convinced that he *does* mean what he ought to mean by the former. But I feel a good deal of doubt as to whether, all the same, he is contradicting himself, because it does seem to me doubtful whether he means what he ought to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that Time *does* exist, *is a fact*, and *is*, is that, properly speaking, he is not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever—*and*, therefore, that which they properly bear. It seems to me very possible that he has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there *must* be *some* sense in which, if I think of a unicorn, there *must be* a unicorn, that wherever he knows the former proposition holds, he allows himself to use the latter *form of words*, without attaching any meaning to them. What he is really asserting so emphatically may, I think, be not anything which his words stand for, but simply this verbal proposition that there *must be some* sense in which they are true.

V.—IS THERE A MATHEMATICS OF INTENSITY?

*Multum non multa.**By J. A. SMITH.*

IT will be best to begin with stating what, in my opinion, is, and what is not, the general nature of the inquiry undertaken, or rather initiated, in the following paper. It belongs to that kind of Logic which Kant called Transcendental Logic, and is therefore concerned with the foundations (*ἀρχαί*) of the sciences. The discussion moves within the same region as that explored by such writers (*quos honoris causa nominō*) as Mr. Russell and Mr. Whitehead. Yet that region extends, as of course they are well aware, more widely than the special province which they have chosen for investigation. Though I may draw some of my illustrations from that province, I do not regard the discussion which follows as being in any special sense mathematical. Whether I am right or wrong in my conclusions, the validity and value of mathematics are quite unaffected, or at least are only affected in a way which mathematicians may, without loss to their science, entirely disregard. The issue before us now is one in respect to which expert mathematicians are indeed excellent witnesses, but not necessarily either good counsel or good judges. It would surely be a prejudice to assume that a knowledge about, or a theory of, mathematics is itself mathematics. Again and similarly, I may draw some of my illustrations from the province of psychology, but the discussion will not thereby itself become psychological, and, disclaiming all pretence to be a psychologist, I do not admit that he who is not an expert psychologist is disabled from forming a judgment upon the issue before us, or that he who is such an expert is necessarily more competent to do so.

What I propose to examine is those mental activities, processes, or results which create or lay down or guarantee or test the substructures upon which certain of the sciences rest, not the superstructures themselves, or the manner of their building. Of course it is more than possible that ignorance or error in regard to the latter may embarrass or even falsify conclusions as to the former; all I here urge is that expert knowledge of the detailed contents of the several sciences is not necessary. But I am very far from encouraging the fancy that "logical" investigations can profitably be pursued by minds vacant of information concerning the general nature of these contents.

The very special problem which I have selected for discussion is but a small plot in this vast field. It is true that, in my opinion, this plot is a fair sample of the whole, and, as it were, a map in miniature of it. There is a certain arbitrariness in the selection of it, and some force may have to be exercised to prevent its expansion as the discussion proceeds and to restrain it within its first narrow limits. I may be permitted to explain why or how I came to select it. In reading Kant's first *Critique* once more I was struck by the language which he used about a certain point in his doctrine. It is always interesting to note passages in an author where, while he uses confident language, he nevertheless betrays a sense that he is skating on very thin ice. Now, concerning the point in question, Kant's language is confident. He uses the phrase *mathesis intensiva* (*Prolegomena*, § 25) as the name of a certain kind of synthetic *a priori* knowledge of nature (that is, of what is matter of possible experience, and therefore object of possible knowledge). Intensity is such an object, there is actual and genuine knowledge of it, and that knowledge or knowing is mathematical. It is not my aim here to enter further into Kant's subtle and difficult distinctions as to certain peculiarities of such knowledge, *e.g.*, as to the conception or category, the schema, the mode of synthesis therein involved. I here keep deliberately on the surface of Kantian philology. What

attracted my attention was not any doubt expressed by Kant as to his doctrine upon this point but certain phrases which indicated some surprise on his part at the discovery of the governing principle which he enunciates in regard to it. The surprise is natural, for the principle does nothing less than throw a bridge between the mind and nature. It assures to us a genuine knowledge of (physical) reality—a *realitas phenomenon*, no doubt, but still (as the object of, e.g., Geometry, is not) a *realitas*. That there is here a paradox shows itself almost in the grammatical solecism, but the paradox is still more apparent in the claim that we are in possession of genuine knowledge concerning, not the form, but the matter, of experience. Kant himself admits that this is *befremdlich*. Not only so, but he goes almost as far as to say that thus we may be sure that we can know something touching "die transcendente Materie aller Gegenstände, als Dinge an sich (die Sacheit, Realität)."

I will not labour this point, for I have, I think, said enough to show that there is a very serious problem here involved which requires further consideration. Kant's answer to it and his reasons for that answer call for review. It will be observed that on his own view there stands or falls with his answer to it the applicability of mathematics to certain physical realities, viz., those which are *intensa*. On our answer depends whether we are or are not entitled to say that there is possible or actual a mathematical knowledge of certain pre-defined objects—a *mathesis intensorum*.

Leaving Kant, let us now ask ourselves whether there is or is not a mathematics of intensity. Now, I have no doubt that of the objects which are *intensa* there is a knowledge possible and actual, and, when I say knowledge, I mean genuine knowledge, knowledge of understanding as well as knowledge of acquaintance, knowledge synthetic and *a priori*, or in whatever other way it appears necessary to qualify the knowledge meant as really knowledge. The question is

whether that possible or actual knowledge or knowing is or is not mathematical, whether, the essential character of the object being taken to be foreknown, the knowing of it must be, or can be, or can not be, mathematical. Suppose an actual instance of such knowledge, dissolve it by reflection into its constituent moments, the knowing and what is known, and ask what must have been their antecedent characters that by combination with one another the fact of such knowledge arises. As we ideally dissolve their union, the one becomes a power or a process or a method, and the other a problem or a task, but each on separation has a character of its own which fits it for union in such knowledge with its ideally divorced partner, and of these characters it must be possible to know something apart from the combination or "beforehand." That is on any view presupposed, for before the union which is knowledge by the one of the other, we, according to the Kantian view, foreknow the one to be mathematical and the other to be *intensa*; and the same presupposition is made by those who reject it. It may then be that our foreknowledge of the character of a method advocated and of that of a problem propounded is such that we also can with confidence predict an essentially and necessary misfit between the one and the other. Is that possibly or necessarily so here? If it is, there is no mathematics of intensity possible or actual.

What these reflections prescribe to us is a separate study of mathematics on the one hand, and of intensity or *intensa* on the other, and a subsequent consideration of the question whether there is or is not between them some *impedimentum dirimens*. It is all important that the study of the two factors should be kept as far and as long apart as possible, and we shall find much difficulty in accomplishing this. But the attempt must be made.

What, then, is the universal and distinctive (peculiar and exclusive) character of mathematics? We must here seek an answer which does not express this character in terms of what

mathematics is *of*, or, at least, we must be careful in passing answers of that type. We are to consider mathematics as a kind of *knowing* or learning, distinguishing it, if we can, by an *intrinsic* character, as if it possessed that character in its status as a purely "subjective" existent (process or method, or group of cognate processes, methods, etc.). And, again, we must be on our guard against so defining it that it shall merely be the equivalent of (a) knowing *simpliciter*, or (b) of knowing *per excellence*. No, we must acknowledge side by side with it and contradistinguished from it by the *differentia* chosen to distinguish it, other (specifically different) forms of genuine knowing *not* mathematical. The task is much harder than it looks, and perhaps it will be best to speak first and briefly of certain attempts which do not conform to the conditions just laid down, and which are therefore here formally "out of order."

For instance, to begin with an extravagance which I do not accuse anyone of holding, if anyone were to define mathematics as the knowing of, or about, all wholes-of-parts whatsoever, I should as the self-appointed chairman in this debate rule it to be "out of order," not so much because the definition was obviously too wide, but simply because it assumed, as already well known, the general properties of the objects, by reference to which its nature as (say) a reasoning of such and such a form was defined. The acceptance of such a definition would clearly anticipate the answer to our question, would prejudge or prejudice the issue. The same objection would lie against definitions of it, as, *e.g.*, the knowledge of classes, or of orders, or of quantities, or of quanta, and so on—in fact, against any definition which made its form dependent, not only upon the objects to which as reasoning it was applied, being just those objects that they are, but also upon their having certain general properties (Russell, *Principles*, Preface, vii). What is sought is some characterisation of mathematics by a "form" which does not "depend" at all upon its objects, but,

being independent of them and intrinsic to it, fits it to enter into that union with them which is knowledge of them. Now, I readily acknowledge that the defect to which I refer is formal, and that several of the definitions criticised may be re-worded so as to be in order. This has, indeed, in certain cases been done, and possibly in all cases (but for my want of skill) the amended definitions might here be set before you. Thus, to illustrate what I mean, instead of the definition of mathematics as the science of all orders, there might be offered the definition of it as itself the ordering of all orderings; in this way mathematics would be intrinsically characterised as a function (or exercise of function) distinct and distinguishable from all other functions or exercises of function. But, as I have said, I am not competent to execute the necessary translations, and I therefore reluctantly leave these definitions, and proceed to consider certain offered characterisations more obviously intrinsic.

In turning to these I must repeat that any definition which does not characterise mathematics by a *differentia* which is its exclusive possession is "out of order"; and, therefore, that there cannot be accepted any definition which ascribes to it merely a superior (or even superlative) degree of what in some measure belongs to non-mathematical knowledge. Nor do I think that I am demanding more than (say) Mr. Russell would demand of himself. In his chapter entitled "Definition of Pure Mathematics" (for my purposes here I regard "Pure" as a warning, not as a limiting, epithet) he subjects himself to the rigorous conditions of "exactly justifying" the various parts of his own proffered definition, *i.e.*, he pledges himself to establish their exactness and certainty by a method itself exact and certain. Could he accomplish this, he would, indeed, furnish what I desiderate. We should be in possession of a definition of mathematics by purely intrinsic characterisation, and we should then be in a position to ask the question which that definition had not

decided or prejudged, viz., whether mathematics as so defined was *true*, i.e., was the possible or actual knowledge of such and such independently characterised objects.

Now, of all such definitions by intrinsic character, there may be taken as a fair sample the assertion that amongst knowledges mathematics, and mathematics alone, is "exact." "The exact sciences" is just a synonym for mathematics; all other sciences are inexact, not as having less exactness, but as being wholly without "exactness"; there are no degrees of "exactness." What, then, is "exactness"?

It is not unreasonable (is it ?) to look from the claimants to be the possessors of "exact" science for an "exact" account of what they mean by the term. But, so looking, I have not discovered much help from them. Though, *e.g.*, Mr. Russell not infrequently uses the word or its synonyms, it does not occur in his index, nor again in Clifford's (posthumous and unfortunately unfinished) work called *The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*, is any explanation of it offered. The mere substitution for it of other words, such as "precise," "accurate," "rigorous," "strict," etc., helps us not at all. And surely it is no use to be told that "the exact sciences are the mathematical sciences," or "those which partake in the character of mathematical sciences, or in so far as they do so"! Other efforts such as those of Comte, Spencer, Bain, and Pearson merely play about with vague and outworn antitheses, like "abstract" and "concrete," or "ideal" and "real." Is any comment necessary upon the dictum of Professor J. A. Thomson, "the term 'exact science' may be used more generally to indicate all science that has resolutely begun to 'measure,' including in 'measurement' all forms of precise registration"? It looks disappointingly as if, though we in distinguishing mathematics from non-mathematics cannot avoid speaking of "exactness," we must be content with an "inexact" understanding of what "exactness" is. Of course, that is a highly unsatisfactory position, and our contentment might just as well be called

discontent. And the worst of it is that we are left without any "exact" distinction of mathematics from other knowledges or at least unable to decide whether we are or are not in possession of such a distinction.

In a kind of desperation, I seemed to descry a haven of refuge in the suggestion that mathematics is all such knowledge, as is in the ultimate resort reducible to arithmetic (Russell, *Principles*, p. 259), or, to throw the suggestion into the form above demanded, that mathematizing is just counting or numbering, or that "to know exactly" = "to know the number of." I am aware that this would not be admitted by mathematicians, unless they were permitted to give an unusual sense to the word "number," and that, even with that permission, it would probably not be accepted by Mr. Russell. Yet, perhaps, even he could by a further stretching or straining of the meaning of the word "number" bring all that he wants into mathematics.

It is just here that my perplexity comes to a head, for I ask myself whether the required extension of the meaning of the word "number" is possible. The problem to which I here invite your attention is an interesting and important one, and it may be put as follows: In the chapter of his *Introduction to Mathematics* which is entitled "Generalisation of Number," Mr. Whitehead says, "Mathematicians have a habit, which is puzzling to those engaged in tracing out meanings, but is very convenient in practice, of using the same symbol in different though allied senses. The one essential requisite for a symbol in their eyes is that, whatever its possible varieties of meaning, the formal laws for its use shall be always the same." And he illustrates this doctrine from the past history of mathematics in the most clear and elegant manner. But the doctrine itself *donne occasion* à *penser* for whatever success or convenience has in the past been found guarantees only past extensions, and yields only at most hope and not certainty about the future. The word "number" is a symbol:

can we be quite sure that each new variety of meaning added to the old stock will always be "allied," and that it (the whole new meaning, or its "formal laws") can always preserve its identity? Is it, indeed, not quite certain that *some* addition must cause a break with its past? And can we ever be sure beforehand that any new addition proposed and as yet untried will not be "the last straw" that breaks its back? It will be observed that "exactly" the same doubt affects attempts to extend the meaning of the word "exact"; some time or other in the process of extension, its meaning must become "inexact," and it may be that this is destined to occur at the very step which we are just invited to make. This possibility is extremely disconcerting, and, if I understand him rightly, it has at one time disconcerted Mr. Russell. I refer to a theory of his which I know only at second hand (Poincaré, *Science et Méthode*, p. 205), "D'après la 'theory of limitation of size,' une classe cesserait d'avoir droit à l'existence si elle était trop étendue. Peut-être pourrait-elle être infinie, mais il ne faudrait pas qu'elle le fut trop." I take this to mean that, if to a whole which is a class successive additions of members are made, some time a whole must or may be reached which can only be called a class in a sense discontinuous with the senses in which the previous lesser wholes had been called classes. M. Poincaré adds: "Mais nous retrouvons toujours la même difficulté; à quel moment précis commencera-t-elle à être trop?" That is just my difficulty, the difficulty which prevents my assent to the proposition that there is in principle no limit to the gradual extension of the meaning of a mathematical symbol, such as the word "number." I am indeed obliged to go further and propound the view that at least where it is fore-known that the varieties of meaning of a symbol are related as successive members of a series (or at least when the number can be indefinitely increased either by interpolation or extrapolation), the same name applied to each and all of them must become equivocal, or to employ Mr. Whitehead's terms, the formal laws

of the use of the identical symbol cannot for ever remain identical, *i.e.*, the meaning of it to fit its enlarged denotation must become "inexact." These considerations force me to the conclusion that the method of the mathematical sciences is not merely counting, but "counting out," or what I may call "denumerating" (including the denumeration of denumerations). What I feel is that when the mind goes beyond that, it at once ceases to work "exactly" or mathematically. Something like this appears to me to be involved in Mr. Russell's statement that "arithmetic has no indemonstrables" (*Principles*, Index, *s.r.* Arithmetic).

I am, however, for the time willing to depart a certain distance from this rigorous view, and to allow that mathematizing includes measuring as well as counting. This concession, I am well aware, would not satisfy Mr. Russell but it does seem to me sufficient to delimit what many mathematicians consider to be mathematics, what I may call actual or extant mathematics, a sphere beyond which lie methods as yet doubtfully "exact." And I will close this part of my discussion with the suggested doctrine that, if the word mathematics is still used of what lies beyond, it is affected with a perplexing possibility of inexactness in its meaning, having in its extension suffered some kind of disruption of contact with its former "exact" meaning or meanings.

It is time now to turn to the other side or factor and examine its character. If that kind of "object" is arrived at by disengagement from its involution in knowledge and considered apart, it presents itself as a kind of "problem." We have to ask ourselves what as a universal and exclusive character distinguishes this kind of object or problem from all other kinds. The kind of objects which, on my view, present insuperable difficulties to mathematics is one which is, *prima facie*, heterogeneous from all those which actual mathematics successfully handles. Such objects are wholes, wholes-of-parts, but they are not either denumerable multitudes or demesurable

magnitudes. Nor are they either quotities or quantities, and what we ask concerning them is neither "how many?" nor "how great?" but another question, viz., "how much?" (Some of them are perhaps not even wholes, but all actual instances of them are, I believe, wholes, and, in any case, are presumed to be so when the question "how much?" is asked about them.) To this kind of whole I beg leave to assign the name of "a much" or "a muchness." Every actual "muchness" is homogeneous, or has a (determinate) homogeneity (its quality or such-and-such-ness) which is omnipresent or all-pervasive. Anything which has this quality and is less than the whole is a portion or part or sample of that whole. What I call a "much" has, in the history of philosophy, borne various names and from time to time attracted attention. Attempts have been made to discover and expound the universal and exclusive character of such wholes: into these I cannot now enter. I will only express the view that, however analogous to magnitudes and multitudes they may be, they are disparate from the one and the other. I refer to them because I believe that intensive wholes fall within the field of "muchnesses," and that in the end the misfit between their nature and that of exact or mathematical methods is traceable to this fact. It appears to me that every intensive whole is just a linear or uni-dimensional "much," or can be completely symbolized by a length. At least, this is so in certain cases, and what I propose to contend is that, where that is so, the symbolizing or diagrammatic length is not such that its representing structure can be exhaustively explored by any actual mathematical method. Such a length may also be called "a range," and I will suppose that it may be (and often actually is) (*a*) bounded and (*b*) continuous. As "a much" such a range has within it endless "varieties," each of which is a "shade" of its universal quality *Q*; the variation of *Q* is confined to the range between a downward and an upward limit which fixes the total length, and within that range the

distance between any two varieties whatsoever is a "degree," so that any two varieties whatsoever differ from one another in degree. What I have called a "variety" or "shade" of Q may also be called a "value" of Q , and the whole, therefore, styled a whole of values. The account above given sets forth the necessary inner structure of such a whole, and where such a whole exists (*i.e.*, is in its own way fully determinate), its structure can be completely expressed by the arrangement of all the possible values of Q in order along a length. *But*—and this is the main point—there is in the original intensive whole so expressed or symbolized no necessary metrical relation between the distance from a to b and that from b to c (where a, b, c are any varieties of Q whatsoever, of which b lies between a and c). Consequently, if in the diagram metrical relations appear or are found, they correspond to or symbolize nothing in the original, and belong to the nature of the diagram only. The inner structure of the original intensive whole is essentially ametrical or *adit*, if it is metrical, its being so is accidental to it, and may be removed without its character as an intensive whole becoming other than it is. I am therefore driven to reject the argument of Kant that the matter of an actual object of sensation necessarily is, or is representable by, a whole which is either a magnitude or a multitude (however manifoldly manifold); between the two there is always what I have called a misfit, always only an analogy, and not an "exact" or point-to-point correspondence. If this be so, it follows that there must likewise be a formal inadequacy of any and every "exact" or mathematical method now actual or extant to advance our knowledge of the inner structure or form of such an object. This view must be understood to carry with it the unsuitability for this purpose of what Kant, I suppose, is here most anxious to defend, *viz.*, the Calculi. By no mathematical method then or now known is it possible to differentiate or integrate such a whole. Kant, as I have said, is surprised by his own conclusion, and speaks of it as "startling," as exciting

"a natural wonder," as "a question well worthy of a solution"; it seems to me that his own principles should have required him to doubt, and even to reject as impossible, the supposed fact, or at least, if he could not do so, to revise his whole position in respect of knowledge.

It may be urged that, even if I am right, I shall have done no more than show that, as mathematics stands at present, it does not possess any method formally adequate to such objects or problems as I have mentioned, and it may be added that mathematics has more methods than I wot of in prospect or *in petto*. But it does not appear to me that this rejoinder is sound, for, whatever sense we at any time assign to "exactness" as a universal and exclusive character of mathematics, there will at that time lie beyond its reach objects which are admitted to be knowable otherwise, and, as a matter of fact, it will be itself one of those objects. The situation in which we now stand is a necessarily recurrent one, and therefore inevitable or always actual. The result may be unsatisfactory, but we have to accept it. No doubt the result is, or looks, unsatisfactory enough, for it amounts to this, that with regard to certain objects our knowing must be and remain "inexact." Yet, in regard to them, "inexactness" is not a demerit and a defect, but a merit and a power. Though this character is named negatively or privatively, it is *quid positivum*. To put my doctrine in its most paradoxical shape, exactness in the correspondence of subjective to objective (or method to problem) requires in the former a necessary "inexactness," or what we may call an essential and vital flexibility (sharply contrasting with the essential and vital rigidity or rigour of mathematics). I protest against the view that this flexibility spells looseness or formlessness. In fact, I believe that the nature of this flexibility may be made in its own way as determinate as that of mathematics, and that so, its form being discoverable in advance of its use, progress may be made in genuine knowledge of the inner structure of intensive wholes. That progress must,

however, be embarrassed and delayed so long as the natures of the two methods remain confused.

I have hitherto, for the sake of clearness, avoided giving illustrations of "intensities" or intensive wholes—objects of which our total actual knowledge contains this necessary and profitable "inexactness." First, I mention such "physical" wholes as density, temperature, illuminatedness, and next (and to me much more interesting) the "psychical" cases of attentiveness, consciousness (in the sense of "awakeness"), strength of desire or will, assertiveness in judgment. Perhaps what I have been saying may be best illustrated by reviewing one case drawn from the psychical field. There is a certain object which we call "the good"—a whole or universe throughout permeated by the quality of goodness (or value for desire or will). Every part of or portion of it whatsoever has a different value, has a "variety" of value, and that this should be so is its (foreknown) structure. It is in every way such a whole as I have called "intensive." Now, we have a knowledge, and indeed a progressive knowledge, of it—a knowledge not merely abstract or general but also detailed or concrete. I do not suppose it will be questioned that our actual knowing of it is "inexact," nor do I imagine anyone supposes that any actual knowing of it can ever become completely "exact." But it is seldom recognised that, this world being (and being foreknown to be) what it is, it is just this ill-named "inexactness" which is required for any knowing of it. This character of the knowing is generally regarded as a demerit and a source of weakness, whereas it is just the contrary. The erroneous diagnosis of what is amiss leads to the suggestion that the panacea is to be found in the creation of novel exact or mathematical methods and the application of them to its problems. What I am here suggesting *per contra* is that such proposals are in principle illusory, and have plausibility only so long as analogy is mistaken for identity and the clear cut technical terms of mathematics employed with an undetected equivocation—in a

confusion which blends exactness and inexactness, and so destroys the value of both. And I end by praying expert mathematicians in aid of my endeavour to expose the ineptitude of such proposals and to put an end to such disastrous ambiguity. Surely they realise the danger threatened to the progress of their own beautifully arranged and ordered world by the institution outside it of anarchic pseudo-mathematical sciences, parodying, caricaturing, undermining, its respectable and even reverend authority.

I hope it will be obvious that in what I have said I am far more in agreement with Mr. Russell and those for whom he speaks than in disagreement, or rather that I am in such agreement as is consistent with there being matter still open for discussion at all. It is not merely that I accept upon their authority what is offered under the name of "a (or the) mathematical theory of infinity, continuity, &c."; my agreement goes very much farther. For I believe that what Mr. Russell is often discussing under other names is what I call a "muchness," or "muchness" as the constitutive property of all "muches." And I greatly admire (from a distance which I would gladly diminish) his subtle and profound speculations. The difference between us might seem little more than verbal, for the question might be stated in the form whether the method appropriate to the exploration of this field should or should not be called mathematical. Yet I cannot persuade myself that the difference is merely verbal. Similarity or analogy between the method or methods and those of actual mathematics is certain, but the question remains whether this similarity can itself be reduced, or brought to "exact" correspondence. Of similarity I find in Mr. Russell no express account save (*Principles*, p. 113) that it is "one-to-one correspondence." This seems to me to rest necessarily upon "number" in the ordinary sense of the word. Thus everything in the end turns upon what we mean by "number," and whether we can stretch its meaning as far as Mr. Russell thinks we can without cracking it. The difficulty

affects not only "number," but "class" itself. It has no necessary connexion with there being a usual or colloquial or elementary sense of the word. Let us treat Mr. Russell's "Class" as a conventional symbol and write it (say) "Qlass." Let it be supposed to have at the outset any definite or definable meaning whatsoever, and now suppose its "denotation" (the "Qlasses") to be set out in a serial order, in which each successive Qlass contains something not present in any of its predecessors; one term must ultimately be reached, to which the name can only be applied with a meaning no longer the same as that which it had in application to the predecessors of that term, or, at any rate, we can never make sure that that will not prove to be so. Perhaps I had better express myself even more guardedly, and say that, even if the identity of meaning persist, it does not follow that it can be expressed or "exactly" defined: it may be that the apprehension, and, indeed, the knowledge, of it may project beyond any defined or definable meaning. This is what I believe to be the case, and, if so, our knowledge will always extend beyond our "exact knowledge," nor can it ever be otherwise. Indeed, this appears to me to be an axiom (which is another name for a neglected truism). Define "knowledge" as we will, some possible object of knowledge will fall beyond it, but this "beyond" is not unknown or unknowable: it is what is known in some other way than that which we know what lies on the hither side of the temporarily fixed frontier, and this otherness is perpetually diminishing (though it can never wholly disappear), for knowledge is always advancing (is always "learning"—neither more nor less). That is to say, in knowing we are in course of traversing just such a series as gives rise to the difficulty, so that in using "knowledge" of what we have up to date reached our meaning is only up to that date definable, and whatever definition we assign to it will require amendment as we progress further. At any, and, therefore, at every, date no definition assigned can be final.

That is what appears to me to be what is meant by the doctrine from which Mr. Russell dissents, viz., that what can be mathematically demonstrated is not necessarily "true" (*Principles*, p. 338). But further to discuss this controversy would lead us on to a field outside that of our present (artificially) limited problem.

VI.—INDIAN IDEAS OF ACTION AND THEIR INTEREST FOR MODERN THINKING.

By F. W. THOMAS.

I NEED not, perhaps, apologize for starting a philosophical discussion upon an Indian basis ; because, on the one hand, it seems likely that philosophic ideas present the most favourable field for a common understanding between East and West, and, on the other hand, I am persuaded that a metaphysical tendency, no doubt with language for its vehicle, is a distinguishing factor in the common Indo-European heredity. I will not labour this view, which has such a strong support in the philosophical achievements of the Greek, Teutonic, Romance, and Indo-Iranian nations. The alternative view, according to which culture is a product which travels, whether by a law of its own or by the law of events, without reference to innate tendencies, has still, no doubt, its defenders. In any case, it is interesting to compare ideas, where possible, with a people so highly gifted philosophically as are the Hindus.

1. *Antecedents and Consequences of Action.*

The idea which I propose to examine is now in some aspects rather familiar. We know that according to the general Indian view our experiences are the results of actions committed in former existences, and our acts are accumulating the conditions and experiences of future lives. The short title of this doctrine is the doctrine of *Karma*, or action ; its particular features would vary according to the system of thought with which it associated itself, but its aspect was more often that of a cosmical law than of a divine ordering. Its

operation being, therefore, causal and not judicial, a nexus of mechanism is required, and this furnishes us with three more technical terms. The act produces in the agent a something not there before (an *apūreā*), which we may also style a conformation or impression (*saṃskāra*), or, more delicately, a perfuming (*rāsanā*). These, since they have their seat in the soul of the agent himself, or whatever soul-substitute may be adopted, are plainly able to condition his future state and experiences. No doubt we might discriminate the three terms historically and in connection with different systems, and then we might find in *saṃskāra*, which has been rendered by confections, dispositions, and so on, a more structural idea as disposition or *διάθεσις*, while *rāsanā*, more ethereal, belongs to a different soul-theory, and *apūreā* is decidedly non-committal.

It is plain that this theory is primarily of an ethico-psychological character, which character in fact it has never abandoned. Even the generation preceding Buddha was much occupied with the question of moral and religious responsibility and had ventilated all the various hypotheses of fate, accident, natural and elemental qualities, divine appointment, and the like. The conclusion ultimately reached was that not action itself, but its moral quality, was the effective force; and, whether activity or quiescence was advocated, the important matter was the soul-attitude, namely its desire for result or its detachment. This ethical character pervades even those doctrines which minutely ascribe all the features of mind and body to several developments of *karma*. Even the Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine, which treats the operations of nature and mind as mechanical, regards the *karma* as exercising a selective effect upon the psychical experiences. But clearly the ethical aspect is not essential; and, in fact, the Vaiśeṣika system extends the theory to inanimate nature, attributing such phenomena as elasticity and momentum to *saṃskāras*. Non-ethical theoretic experiences are also commonly explained upon the same

hypothesis, and universally memory and recollection are so conceived.

As an equivalent for *karma* we may therefore select character and constitution, but with a qualification. For character and constitution are unities, whereas *karma* is an aggregate. A striking comparison is afforded by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga books, which declare that

“ This mind-stuff, compacted from beginningless time of impressions left by experiences of the fruition of tainted (= not wholly impassive) actions, is, so to speak, diversified in all parts thereby, like a fish-net strung with knots.” (*Yogasūtra*, II, 13.)

The mind-stuff is, in this view, a changing aggregate of changing factors. Nor is the case seriously different with those doctrines which, denying a mind-stuff, conceive of mind as a bundle of separate successions, in connection with which ingenuity is required in order to provide an aggregate at all; and, as Śaṅkara observes, is hardly successful in the attempt. As essential features of this theory we may select three: the individual persistence of the impression-effects, latency, and numerical immensity. Thus we read that—

“ Until that *karma* which precipitates the birth as a young elephant acts as manifestor to an impression due to an experience as a young elephant in a previous birth, for so long it is not capable of producing an experience proper to a young elephant ” (I, 24):

and as regards stimuli—

“ When a presented object phenomenalizes any sub-conscious impression, then that object is the suppositum of that sub-conscious impression ” (IV, 11).

The original *saṃskāra*-producing stimulus may be characterised either by force, or repetition, or selective interest.

Again—

“As are the experiences, so are the subliminal impressions, and these are in the form of perfumings by *karma*; and as are the perfumings, so is the memory; hence memory arises from subliminal impressions, although births and places and times intervene, and again subliminal impressions arise from memory. Thus both memory and *saṃskāra* are made manifest through the *karma* accumulation (ethical potentiality) assuming a particular state” (IV, 9).

Again—

“So the mind-stuff also, diversified by absolutely countless sub-conscious impressions, exists for the sake of another” (IV, 24).

Lastly, we should observe that the theory is invoked for the explanation of instinct. Thus the child sucks the breast from such an impulse, and

“not instilled by either perception or inference or verbal communication, spontaneously even in a new-born worm, the fear of death, essentially a vision of extermination, forces the inference that the pangs of death have already been experienced in previous existences” (II, 9).

It is not so many years since this doctrine would have seemed a curiosity of Oriental religion. That our actions should contribute to our development, we should have said, common sense, ethics and religion have always agreed, but this was in a vague and general sense, and we have nothing to do with this mechanical co-ordination. But now it would appear that natural science is prepared both to endorse the theory in general and to present us with a good technical equivalent for the Indian *saṃskāra*. What indeed is the “Mneme” of Semon and his fellow-workers but the *Karma* of the Indians? What are their *Engramms* but *Saṃskāras*? According to this line of

research a stimulus of appropriate force, frequency or kind* produces in an organism a synchronous (instantaneous) and then an *akoluthic* excitation, which subsequently may be recalled to life even by a diminished, a partly identical, or an associated stimulus, or, failing that, by the mere power of time, *i.e.* of periodicity, by ripening (*ripāka*), as the Indians would say. The theory is applied to the explanation of memory, heredity and instinct. I take the following from the third edition (1911) of Semon's *Mneme*.

"In very many cases it may be observed that the stimuable substance of the organism, whether belonging to the Protist, vegetable or animal world, after influence and cessation of a stimulus and after return to the secondary state of indifference, is permanently changed. I designate this effect of the stimuli their 'engraphic effect' since it engraves or inscribes itself in the organic substance. The so occasioned alteration of the organic substance I designate the 'engramm' of the particular stimulus, and the sum of the 'engramms' which an organism possesses its 'engramm store,' wherein we have to distinguish an inherited and an individually acquired 'engramm store.' The manifestations which in the organism result from the presence of a definite 'engramm' or a sum of such, I designate 'mnemic' manifestations. The concept of the mnemic aptitudes of an organism I designate its *Mneme*" (p. 15).

These engramms are immensely numerous—

"The stimulability, as we find it to-day in the single organism after a history of many millions of years, is interwoven with countless engramms and thereby altered" (p. 107).

* Semon's words "strength of stimulus, frequency of synchronous stimulation, focussing of attention" (p. 125), seem almost a translation of the Sanskrit "force, repetition, and regard."

They have a latent period—

"The interposition of a period of latency between the synchronous and mnemonic excitation may appear at first sight a remarkable peculiarity of the mnemonic phenomena. It is in fact in the highest degree characteristic, and it is therethrough that the mnemonic excitation first appears to us as a 'reproduction'" (p. 35).

The latency is explained by the circumstance that the "engramm" is really a complex of several distinct factors, having independent periods of recurrence.

"The passing of a portion of time means for a plant or an animal the passing of a definite number of life-processes within it" (p. 59).

The "engramm" is revived by a reintegration of the excitation-complex or constellation. But most commonly, as we have seen in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, it is revived in connection with an appropriate external object.

This theory of Mneme has been worked out in detail, and with the support of numerous experimental proofs applied to the demonstration of the actual transmission of acquired characters. In accordance with the theory, we might envisage the mind organism as an immense system of would-be circles of different sizes, revolving at different rates and subject to jolts from the outside, which permanently modify their shapes. Each jolt affects only some of the circles, and results in a particular joint state of excitation. When the dislocated parts of several of the circles come level again spontaneously, the organic experience is repeated. But, further, the concurrence of a few has the power of bringing more up to the same level, and also the repetition of the shock can draw most of the affected parts once more abreast. How this can happen, and in particular

the character of the axis upon which all the circles are ranged, remains a problem.*

We see, accordingly, that the most recent theories concerning Memory and Instinct are substantially identical with the old Indian views. We must not add heredity also, because there is here a significant divergence. The Indians were without a theory of heredity, since their speculations had reference to a continuant which was a transmigrant soul, while the modern views relate to a basis of living matter.

Another striking, but, in fact, only apparent, divergence belongs to our special theme of action. We shall immediately be struck by the fact that, while the modern view is chiefly occupied with the effect of stimuli, the Indians usually speak of the traces of action. The difference is only apparent, because the Indians do, in truth, insist that experiences of all kinds, and not only actions, give rise to *saṃskāras*.† But clearly, and, indeed, we may say inevitably, from a religious and ethical point of view, the case of actions had a primary interest for them. At first sight we might be inclined to ask why actions should come at all into the question. Action, we may say, is of a catabolic, not of an anabolic nature: let actions be outcomes, results, or issues. Why attend to their supposed reactions upon the agent? Perhaps it is a general experience that an expression of a thought is often followed in the mind by a doubt or retreat, as if expression were, indeed, a process of putting away or rejection. And we are also acquainted with persons, of the kind called irresponsible—including, perhaps, an irresponsible part of ourselves—to which actions are really a mere katharsis, a getting rid of internal stimuli, the soul

* The idea of the circle is applied to mental processes by Plato in the *Timæus*: it recurs in Professor Lloyd Morgan's paper of last session. Semon's own striking simile (pp. 98-9) of a musical rendering by several voices and instruments, each performing its own task, omits this feature.

† "All persons think that there is a residual effect in the case of all objects cognized by a definite cognition" (*Śloka-cūṭtika*, XII, 99).

being no less detached than the Indians held of their Yogis, who were stated to act without aversion or desire. The religious consciousness, however, as well as common experience, avers that actions do, indeed, leave their effect; and, though this may be in part only a paradox dictated by social expediency, or a psychological reflection from social expediency, we are not concerned to deny to actions a normal moral reaction. At any rate, this was the view taken in India, with the qualification that not the action itself, but the soul's interest therein by way of desire or aversion is the real cause of infection; could we attain a state of entire detachment, no action would leave the slightest stain.

Here comes in the distinction between doing and suffering, which for logic is unessential, and for Semon would be simply the presence or absence of a stimulus. Psychologically analogous, more or less, to the distinction between intelligence and will, scientifically to that between anabolic and catabolic processes, it is important for the Indian doctrine as providing for the normal liquidation of *karma*. The two experiences of doing and enjoying are attended respectively by the pairs desire and aversion and pleasure and pain, what is dispensed in the former being repaid in the latter. In this way a term was put to the duration of *samskāras*, a thing which Semon, laying stress upon persistence and, no doubt, not envisaging an *infinite* past time, does not seem to have done for his "enграмms."*

Accordingly, we may sum up the *samskāra-engramm* doctrine by the statement that every experience of a living organism produces a double effect:

(1) Immediate (Semon's "akoluthic") effect upon the next succeeding experience;

(2) A permanent, structural effect (Semon's "engramm," the Indian *samskāra*) which, while modifying the organism as

* Unless this takes place by way of Mendelian "dominance" or "Ausschaltung" (cc. XII-XIII), or might a *continuum*, though finite, contain an infinite "engramm store"?

a whole, retains its individuality, and may be revived by stimulus or time.

The Indians further recognize a twofold aspect of these effects, as objective or ethical. The whole theory recalls that simile of book-keeping by double entry whereby Weissmann illustrated his doctrine of heredity. While it is not found quite complete in any single Indian source, most of its elements are united in some places, and the others are without difficulty fitted into the plan. Not a little ingenuity was required, however, in the case of the Vijnāna school of Buddhism, which admitted no reality beyond instantaneous thinkings. They laid stress upon a doctrine, wherein they have modern followers, namely, the doctrine of unconscious thoughts.

2. *Indian Grammatical and Logical Theories of Action.*

It is evident that this theory, with its bewildering relations of actions and states, calls, whether in its ancient Indian ethico-psychological or in its modern scientific form, for a logical examination. We desire to know, in the first place, what is an action, and what actions and classes of actions are to be recognized, and how they behave in regard to momentaneity and duration. Especially are we concerned to ask what is the subject of the action and what is his relation thereto. Even in the scientific doctrine, where we start with the unity of the organism, this unity is immediately dissolved by the recognition of the fact that the organism responds with different parts to different stimuli, and retains these effects by varying combinations*; while in those philosophies, Indian and other, for which the agent is a bundle of separate series, some perhaps conscious, others unconscious or intermittently conscious, the unifying factor is decidedly obscure. One Indian philosophy (the Sāṅkhya), in some respects the most

* Semon, however, considers (pp. 150, 184-5) that every cell, or even smaller factor ("protomer"), contains the whole inherited and, with local variation, most of the acquired "engramm store."

consistent and interesting, regards all the psychical processes as mechanical, though perhaps not exactly material, and speaks of a self which is an absolutely impassive spectator, for whom Nature unselfishly enacts her drama. I will proceed to set forth what the Hindus have to propound in regard to this class of questions.

According to one view, the meanings of verbs may be classified as follows :—

“ There are certain roots added to which a conjugational affix signifies only that action of the agent which ends in his acquiring his own existence—*e.g.*, ‘is,’ ‘exists,’ and the like. In the case of other roots, when the agent is already an accomplished entity, the action signified is that which brings about the existence of something else—*e.g.*, ‘sacrifices,’ ‘gives,’ ‘cooks,’ and the like, and the word ‘procedure’ signifies only that a particular substance, endowed with peculiar potencies, moved in its pristine character, having a mixed nature, having an existence in the past and in the future, is moved from its former position and has not reached the next. And in the case of some verbs, it is the agent himself that is regarded as being in this situation, while in others, where the agent is a well-established entity, it is something else ” (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, trans. Gangānāth Jha, pp. 127-8).

This seems to divide verbal notions under the heads of “existence,” “performance,” and “change.” As regards a general definition of the verb, we are told that

“ Words on the utterance of which the objects denoted by them are not found to be present at the time are ‘verbs.’ ”

But, no doubt, a much more penetrating definition is one which is the earliest of all, namely, that which distinguishes the verb, as a word of becoming, from the noun, which denotes being. For we may recollect that all verbal notions, for example, the notion of acting, can be represented in a static

(non-serial) form as nouns, *e.g.*, "action." This applies even to becoming; and perhaps we may find a way of adapting it, as hinted in the first passage, to the very class of "is" and "exist."

The relation of the agent to the act is from the same linguistic-realist standpoint the subject of a controversy as between "effort" and "procedure." According to the former view all actions of unconscious, or at least of inanimate, subjects must be regarded as ascriptions due to the anthropomorphic instinct, a consequence which is clearly recognized. Essentially and historically such a theory seems to have a fair chance of being true; but considerable ingenuity is required for dealing with verbs such as "he strives," "he wills," which themselves denote effort. Perhaps we might here invoke the "effort of living" (*jīvana-yamī-gatna*), with which we are now familiar as "the vital impulse."

Coming now to a system, the already mentioned Vaiśeṣika system, which presents certain resemblances, not, I think, wholly accidental, to that of Aristotle, we find action installed definitely as a category along with substance, quality, universality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence (sometimes others also). These categories are conceived, not like those of Aristotle as partly no more than modes of predication, but as realities. Action, however, is confined, as already stated, to physical motion, the actions of the soul being treated as qualities, *i.e.*, as modes. In the living the activity follows upon the mode called effort (*conation*), which is caused by desire and that again by cognition. A characteristic of this system, which, though atomic, ascribes to things, as products, a real existence, is that it provides for the relation of agent and action by its special category of "inherence," which is said to be "one, eternal, and incorporeal," constituting the connection of wholes with parts, of substances with qualities and actions, and of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes. Hereby the relation of agent and action is identified with that of substance and attribute, individual and universal; and we may inquire

whether our European logic is not at the same standpoint, when it proposes to treat the judgment in general as a determination, and to resolve the verbal expression "he goes" into "he is going." The necessity for the special category is contested by other schools, whose adherents argue that it involves a *regressus ad infinitum*. Whatever may have been the rights and wrongs of this question, the Vaiśeṣika school was at one with nearly all its adversaries in treating all action as instantaneous, and bringing in the conception of *saṃskāra* to supply the continuity. It is definitely stated that the second momentary action of a moving body is caused by the *saṃskāra* of the first, a view which has perhaps some analogy to our scientific concept of momentum. Scholastically, again, perhaps also upon the principles of Semon scientifically, elasticity would with reason be thought, as by the Vaiśeṣika school it is, to exemplify the same phenomenon.

An obvious criticism upon the Vaiśeṣika position, which regards composite things as real, has not, so far as I am aware, been ventilated by its opponents. If the tree, for instance, exists, it certainly does things, for instance, grows, which cannot be viewed as motions; and such an objection has a very wide range, the action belonging universally to the same world as the thing. Nor can the thing elude its companion action even by having a momentary nature. The tree may perish at each instant; but this does not save it from a serial process of birth, growth, and decay; for which reason some of the Indian "cinema" doctrines recognise destruction under two separate aspects.

If now, *pace* the Vaiśeṣikas and with the support of some of their adversaries, we may contemplate action in the mental sphere, where most Europeans would find it universal, at any rate in willing and conceiving, the *saṃskāra* doctrine reappears in a particular connection with the word and the sentence. Inasmuch as the spoken or written word is serial, and still more clearly so the sentence, we require a ground for the indisputable

unity of the apprehension in either case. Here we can be grateful for our President's paper on *The Moment of Experience*. The Hindus hold that the apprehension of each successive part is affected by the *saṃskāras* of the apprehensions of the preceding parts, until the last utterance combines the whole as a sort of composite photograph. This view, which in substance is universally held, though by some schools not regarded as sufficient, is perhaps not refuted by the frequent apprehension of the whole before the complete enunciation of the parts, which would be merely a general feature of recognition, whether by sound or by other suggestions.

We might, perhaps, pursue the matter further and apply it to the Syllogism, and then again to the progress, continuous or interrupted, of a treatise or a work of art. But this the Hindus have not expressly done; and as we are here in the sphere of more or less conscious memory, we need not trespass upon familiar ground.

3. *The Category of Action.*

It will be seen that the Hindus, in spite of some notable intuitions, have not succeeded in isolating with sufficient clearness the general nature of action. The conception is clearly of primary importance, since Bergson derives from the necessities of action the fundamental tendencies of our intellectuality, and Croce couples the practical with the theoretic as the two ultimate aspects of spirit. As the subject has a linguistic importance also, I would venture to use some Indian suggestions for a little further deliberation.

Aristotle, in his work on the categories, gives us the concept of action under the two heads of acting and suffering. In the same connection he speaks of motion (*κίνησις*), a term which he clearly uses in a sense borrowed from the Platonists, namely, that of change. Elsewhere he states that motion, meaning change, occurs in the case of all the categories, but, in general, he restricts it to motion in space, and change quali-

tative and quantitative, the last-named being, for instance in the case of triangles, distinct from mere addition of parts. He endeavours to show that, whatever moves, *i.e.*, moves in space, is moved by external compulsion, which leads to his doctrine of the *primum mobile*, itself unmoved. Motion, or change, has a reality, but only as a transition from one state to another, from the potential to the actual. As Bergson points out, such a view is characteristic of the ancients, who found in achieved states a higher reality than in the transitions between them. As regards the instantaneous, Aristotle departs from Plato, the apparent inventor of the conception,* denying that the line is composed of points or motion of movements. Action and suffering he conceives as aspects of an identical occurrence, teaching and learning, for instance, being in each particular instance a single process.

It may, therefore, be said that Aristotle recognizes action as a reality (1) in the case of change, (2) in the case of movement, at least of those things, such as living things, which have the *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* in themselves, or substances which have an affinity for certain parts of the universe, however we may in this connection interpret his view that whatever moves is moved from without. The question as to the subject of the action appears in his illustration of the man moving his hand, and the difference between doing and suffering is shown to be merely a reference to an external point. Whether European logic has more thoroughly treated of action as a category, I am not in a position to say.†

Not all verbs in our language denote actions, many of them are names only of states or static relations. Many, again, express mere causality in regard to states or actions, as "to kill" (which may be at times the effect of the subject's mere

* See *Parmenides* 156D on ἡ ἐξαίφνης φύσις: the conception was perhaps evoked to meet the Heraclitean doctrine of flux.

† For a metaphysical discussion, see Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 44-53, 62-70.

existence or appearance) or "to attract." In all such cases the nominal object is the real subject of the action; while in the case of mental actions, it is the object that is generally merely causal or determinative, as "loves" (the person being possibly even dead or non-existent), "remembers," etc. We may, therefore, begin by deciding with our Indian thinkers that action inheres in the agent. This requires us strictly to define the agent in his extension. Language and common thought here lay many traps for us: we say, for instance, that an army or an individual fights; whereas, in fact, fighting is an action of which the subject is at least two parties, though "striving" is not. Similarly, motion in space, being, as even common sense suspects, entirely relative, is action not of the thing which is said to move, but of the system to which the thing belongs. On the other hand, the action does not necessarily pervade the agent, since, *e.g.*, "I carry" an umbrella, while a great part of me is uninterested in the matter. Again, since action is a temporal matter, the agent requires to be timed. When we say that the Duke of Wellington won the battle of Assaye, we are making use of what some Indian logicians, countenanced, I believe, by Bradley and other moderns, would regard as a time universal: in narrative such a statement would never occur, since the Duke of Wellington did not exist at the time.

Having recognized these conditions, we may hazard a classification of actions as follows:—

(1) In some cases the action is conceived as passing without permanent modification in the agent, as "the bird flies," "the man laughs," "the stone falls."

(2) In other cases, namely cases of resistance, nothing is changed, but change is prevented, as in "he supports;" or such actions may be combined with the former class, as in "he carries," *i.e.*, "he moves supporting."

(3) Thirdly, there are cases where the agent is conceived as changing, as in "the light fades," "the bomb explodes."

As regards duration, it will be seen that the actions under

the second head do not imply duration, but are capable of it: they are therefore susceptible of continuous quantity. Under the first and third heads, we have both the momentary and the durative. Regarding the duratives under (3), it would seem that the action is qualitatively the same throughout, since we clearly do not mean that, when the grass grows, a series of different subjects goes through a series of different actions; we mean that a single action is experienced, as it were, at compound interest, the modified being continuously modified in the same sense. As to Aristotle's dictum that all change is "ecstatic," we may perhaps say that in such cases the question of continuity and atomism is the same as for quantity generally, and has no special application. It would seem that such changes would have mass, but not totality. Or is it the fact that we do conceive of changes which are wholes, as when the larva becomes a chrysalis? If that were so, the change itself would have no quality, but would be a case of evolution (if that is change without quality or continuity of transformation) defined by an interval.

Under the first head it would seem that we must have actions that are wholes. For something must happen other than mere change in spatial or other relations. As the subject is not changed, while some change not instantaneous is conceived, it seems to follow that we have a whole composed of dissimilar parts. This is the case with Bergson's example of the raising of the arm, and more obviously in such a case as walking, which is a repetition of steps that are such wholes.

These considerations would seem to give us:—

- (a) Actions, momentary or total, or repetitions of these.
- (b) Efforts and resistances, momentary or continuous.
- (c) Changes, momentary or compound.
- (d) Evolution, or continuous transformation.

This classification cannot pretend to be more than a first sketch. It is only partly deductive, and, further, we may fear

that language and thought will always prove too subtle for classificatory systems. Yet, perhaps the scheme may cover most of those actions that are primarily entitled to the name, which are most intimately known to us, and from the analogy of which the others may conceivably be derived, namely, mental actions. The instantaneous would seem (we are dealing only with appearances) to be abundantly illustrated by perceptions, conceptions, and willings; the potentially durative by wishes, cravings, sustained attention, efforts, etc. (which may often, however, be, like reading, intermittent or vibratory); and changes of the actual self we know both in sudden (revulsions of thought or sentiment) and continuous (changes of mood) forms. But plainly the most significant class of cases is that of actions which are essentially durative, being composite wholes. The most decisive example of this is the judgment or proposition. That the proposition or judgment is not only a psychical act, but a logical action, may be argued as follows. If we speak of a "white horse" or a "trotting horse," plainly the intended relation between "white" and "horse" and "trotting" and "horse" must be the same as that intended in the sentences "the horse is white" and "the horse trots." In both cases logicians speak of a determination of the subject; but the word determination is equivocal, since it means either a given determination or one in the making. Clearly the attribute is a given determination; but the proposition (or judgment) is a determining, *i.e.*, an action. This action is the same for all finite verbs, including the copula (expressed or unexpressed), and in all propositions, whether categorical or hypothetical; it is the action called predication, and a finite verb is essentially a word which predicates—we may disregard the distinction which grammarians draw between the grammatical and the real, what they call the psychological predicate, the difference being a matter merely of rhetoric or idiom.

If the proposition is a mental action, it is certainly a most

peculiar one. It is not, like a perception, related to a single object, nor, like a feeling, a mere experience, nor, like a change of mood, a transition from state to state. It is a passing, as it were a melting, from content to content in their objectivity; and it takes place in such a way that neither the first content or subject, nor the second content or predicate, loses its identity in the product. It would seem as if this experience, which gives us an inner knowledge of, as it were, objective action, might be a fundamental factor in our conception of actions; and as the ideas involved are psychical acts as well as contents, we may find here an analogy, the only one that has occurred to me, to the Indian *saṃskāra* doctrine, and the "engramm" theory of Semon. We should also here recall the already quoted Indian distinction of "those roots added to which a conjugational suffix signifies only that action of the agent which ends in his acquiring his own existence, *e.g.*, 'is,' 'exists,' and the like" (*i.e.*, all static determinations); as if a thing's being were regarded as its self-predication. The proposition being in this sense an action, while it has distinct parts and is yet an undeniable totality, it is the most decisive example of an action essentially non-momentary. It would be impossible to reconcile the idea of instantaneity with a process which consists of at least three dissimilar parts, A+action of connecting (or separating)+B.

This mode of approaching the question of action seems therefore to give, as regards duration, three concepts, instantaneity, continuity, and totality. If this division were valid, it would be hard to contend that action is the source of the idea of the momentary; and, in fact, the temporal nature of action does not seem to be that of occupying a certain duration, but that of occurring at a certain when. The second division into act, effort, and change would render it insufficient to say that we live in a world of change; it may be the fact that every act is accompanied by a change, but we do not so conceive it, and, moreover the action, *e.g.*, walking, is not the same as the

change, *e.g.*, improved circulation. If we seek for a general term to cover the three modes, we might select the word "occurrence" as denoting that concrete whole or *σύνολον*, which we analyse into noun and verb. For this view a certain amount of linguistic support is supplied by those numerous languages which are without anything corresponding to our verb, and in which the work of the verb is usually performed by words expressive of occurrence. We should then suppose that our actual extraordinary wealth of nouns and verbs is due to the analytic effects produced upon external appearance by the categories of substance and action, first evolved from the inner life. Sometimes substance is the prius in the analysis of an occurrence, and then the verb is the residual complement; thus an experience of Mr. Boycott gives us the verbal idea of "boycotting." Sometimes the action is what holds the attention, and then we get a residual substance; thus flowing water gives us "river." The same applies to states; the being legible produces the residual idea of a book, and the being ailing that of a disease. Applying such ready-made conceptions freely to new cases, we obtain varying aspects of a single thing or occurrence. Macaulay writing his *History of England* is a phenomenon, a material thing, a physical object, a chemical construction, a living creature, a social animal, a human being, a Scotch-Englishman, a bachelor, a statesman, a historian, etc.; in each case attended by a different residual action. But, just as we are compelled to believe that he is a single unity, if we had power to conceive it, so in the action of writing the history we must somehow conceive a combination of his various activities; for the history would certainly have been different if Macaulay had been differently constituted as regards digestion, cerebral apparatus, extraction, education, status, etc. His *History* might be defined generally as the response of Macaulay as he was in his quasi-entirety, when confronted with a knowledge of the history of England. The impossibility of conceiving such

totalities of action and the non-recognition of definite principles in the selection of aspects may be a real cause for the capricious and arbitrary character of history-writing.

How far the conception of action exists in physics, I would hardly pretend to inquire. Movement might be action, if not of the moving thing itself, at least of the whole system which embraces it. In stresses, attractions, affinities, impacts and the like, we may have action both in the momentary and the durative form. Action as totality should not be recognised, any more than things, except as aggregates, since totality is an affair of meaning. Do wave motions, vibrations, etc., do anything in science in virtue of being such? As regards subjects, it is of course notorious that substances are being more and more resolved into motions. But physics would hardly yet dispense entirely with a substrate. If it pressed on to this end, it might be under the necessity of frankly demanding for its appreciation, like the Indian monism and the modern philosophy of change, new intuitions to replace or supplement the actual mind. In the meanwhile, we may appeal to logicians for a further exposition, if possible, of the logic of action. Can activities take place and produce effects without the intervention of structure? Can they as such be combined, and can they be wholes? The relation of aspects and actions seems to present difficulties. If aspect and action together are insufficient to give a real occurrence or *σύνολον*, we get a fact-abstraction, scientific or otherwise; thus, the statement that a bachelor wrote Macaulay's *History of England* would be either sociology or gossip. At the other extreme we have the contention of the nihilist school of Buddhists that the doer of an action is the agent as such, whence it follows that there are two actions. One might compare with this Mr. Bradley's conclusion: "So far as the end is considered as the thing's activity, it is regarded as the thing's character from the first. Thus, it somehow *was* before it happened" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 64).

VII.—THE THEORY OF A LIMITED DEITY.

By CHARLES F. D'ARCY, Bishop of Down.

A STRIKING work by a very brilliant popular writer has recently drawn attention to the question before us. In this way a mode of thinking which has for a considerable time occupied the minds of many philosophical theologians has been given a wide currency and been made a common theme for the pulpit and the debating society. This is all to the good. It is another proof, added to the many which the world now affords, that philosophy is, after all, very close to the needs and aspirations of our common human life. People are finding out that philosophy has a message for mankind.

Another consideration, which is suggested by Mr. Wells' book* and the interest it has created, is that there has come to us a new manifestation of the impossibility of separating philosophy and theology. The philosopher often tries to escape the theological net. He sometimes ventures to affirm that his study has no place for the conceptions of theology. Like Kant or Spencer, he may even go so far as to make the impossibility of theology an essential of his system; but, like both these thinkers, he is always certain to leave a weak point somewhere at which the forces of theology sooner or later break through. The truth is that to most thinking men the real interest of philosophical study is just this—can it, or can it not, throw light on the great problems with which theology has tried to deal since the beginning of reflection? If it can tell us anything at all, positive or negative, about the things or values

* *God, the Invisible King*, by H. G. Wells.

which ordinary men try to express by such terms as God and Immortality, it is well worthy of attention. Or, if there is any hope that, as time goes on and study develops, some further light may be thrown, by means of philosophical thought, on these problems, the time and effort which they take are well and wisely spent. So most thinking men will judge—or, at least, feel.

The doctrine which Mr. Wells puts with so much force and freshness is, in the main, a popular presentation of the ideas of the late William James, as expressed in his delightful lectures which were published under the name *A Pluralistic Universe*.

But the idea of a limited God, as an idea which can be entertained or justified on philosophical principles by the modern thinking man, has appeared in recent times in many shapes and in writings which come from various schools of thought. I may mention such representative names as those of Mr. Bradley, Dr. McTaggart, and Dean Rashdall, all of them thinkers who contrast strongly with William James and his school. With some, there is no acceptance of the doctrine of God in any form; their position being that, if He is to be thought of as existing at all, and in any possible sense of the term, He must be a limited Being who exists within the Universe, and who, like ourselves, is involved in a struggle with an environment which is more or less intractable.

While the philosophies of these thinkers are very various, I may venture to make one general observation upon them. Their reason for believing that the theory of a limited Deity is the only possible theory is, in every case, the same. These thinkers hold that the existence of evil—or, perhaps I should say, the range of antinomies which are most forcibly exemplified in the problem of evil—makes the doctrine of an omnipotent God impossible. Now, I might spend much time and space discussing the meaning of the word *omnipotence*, and I think I could show that it is quite possible to give it a reasonable meaning which would go a long way towards disposing of the difficulties

which it is usually supposed to create. Theologians who define omnipotence as the power of God to do what He wills are able to make a good case for the doctrine that the apparent limitations imposed on itself by a will which is always good are not really limitations at all but the means of attaining a larger freedom than would be otherwise possible. For, first, it can be maintained that only a good will is truly free; and, secondly, it would appear that if God limited Himself by the creation of finite wills capable of evil, His doing so made possible the final attainment of a kingdom of ends in which goodness, and therefore freedom, could attain an infinitely grander development than would be possible in a universe in which everything was necessarily determined.

I do not dwell upon arguments of this kind, because I am very keenly sensitive of the incapacity of the concepts which they employ to express the reality with which they endeavour to deal, though I cannot regard them as valueless on that account. I desire, in the present effort, to turn away from the "high priori" road, and to take the lowly path of human experience; and I, therefore, refuse to take advantage of any of those great logical processes which seem to carry us on, by a movement of pure thought, to the comprehension of the Absolute.

As we have already seen, it is the great problem of evil, as forced upon our attention by the actual condition of the world in which we live, which has driven so many thinking men into revolt against the doctrine of an omnipotent God. It is very interesting to observe the modernity of this frame of mind. Mill's outburst of moral indignation against the worship of a God whose actions would not prove Him to be good in our human sense of that word, marks the turning-point of modern thought on this question.* In the great theological systems of the middle ages and of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

* *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Chap. VII, p. 129. 5th Edition.

it seemed impossible to go behind the will of God. It is a very remarkable fact that the age of science has also been a period of such rapid progress in moral ideas that we are now prepared to criticise the universe for not being up to our ethical standard. Some, apparently, go so far as to doubt that Reality forms a Universe, on account of the unsatisfactory character of the reality which comes within our experience. Here, as in every other similar case, the logical form which these arguments take is superficial. The real controversy is between ideas which belong to the later stages of the development of thought and those which arose earlier. I hold, in fact, that we must first turn to history for an understanding of the position, and then view the problem in the light of experience.

Within the last half century there has grown up a truly scientific study of religious ideas, as they have appeared in the history of the human race. It has been shown that these ideas are much less disconnected and also much more intimately related to man's psychical constitution than our former imperfect knowledge seemed to warrant. The primary religious impulse seems to be expressed in the conviction that there is a mysterious potency in certain persons and things, to which, in turn, all forms of psychic activity are attributed. Out of this conviction arises that form of religious belief which is termed *animism*, and which, in one shape or another, appears to be the very type of primitive religions. So far as we know, all primitive peoples are, or tend to be, animists,—believers, that is, in the existence and operation of spiritual powers. Face to face with the world, confronted with a multitude of things which are in various degrees mysterious and intractable, the savage inevitably discerns the influence of spiritual agencies which, like himself, are possessed of mind and will. He is always a believer in a spirit-world. Behind the things that he sees and handles he ever suspects the presence and agency of unseen conscious powers. Every notable feature of the world about him, every mountain or river or great tree; every

striking event or influence which affects his life, such as a storm or a disease; every difficulty or trouble which he encounters in his contact with the material world; all are connected in some undefined way with spiritual activities which he is somehow impelled to postulate.

As savage thought advances, these ideas assume clearer outlines, and there emerges belief in a vast multitude of nature-spirits; and, in addition, a profound conviction as to the continued existence of the departed. Thus is savage life surrounded by hidden perils and overshadowed by the consciousness of mysterious influences which are sometimes regarded as good, but more often as dangerous or terrible. The spirits must be remembered, their desires must be considered, their possible hostility must be guarded against. Hence follow all sorts of magical rites and ceremonies which mimic the respect paid to important men.

It is easy to see that we have here the origin of those religions which we commonly call *pagan* very clearly indicated. As thought rises to higher levels, the world of petty spiteful spirits is replaced by a hierarchy of nature-gods, terrible or beautiful, who are regarded as possessing superhuman powers, who are more or less interested in the doings of men, and of whom account must be taken in human affairs. Out of animism arose the religions which impressed their character on the great peoples of ancient Egypt, Greece, and India, religions which venerated gods of the sun and the moon, of the earth and ocean, and which recognised a pantheon of deities of various grades of importance and power. A wide survey of polytheistic creeds reveals the fact that any part or aspect of human experience, any department of life or quality of character, might come to be represented by a corresponding deity. The tendency of man's mind in relation to this matter is to project himself and his experience into the unseen, and to find there the counterpart of his own spiritual nature. We cannot, therefore, be surprised to find that the organisation of human society is

reproduced among the gods ; and as kingly rule was established over great nations and territories it became inevitable that great sovereign deities should receive recognition. Thus, Zeus, Jupiter, Odin emerged. Thus, also, we find national and tribal gods, such as Bel and Marduk. Also, in the city states, deities who, like Athena at Athens, represented the genius of the community.

It is very important to observe that polytheism is, on its own level, an eminently reasonable creed. The world is full of differences and oppositions, of conflicting agencies and influences : good and evil, light and darkness, pleasure and pain, health and disease, tribe warring with tribe, community competing with community. For those who start with the animistic habit of mind, nothing can be more inevitable than to regard all these contending elements as the spheres of the activity of diverse spiritual agencies. Here, in fact, is the solution of our problem for the polytheistic mind. It is the solution which would probably get a majority of votes if time could be annihilated and a *referendum* could be taken on the subject amongst all intelligent people who have lived on earth since the dawn of civilization. But we have got beyond this solution. Along some lines of development men have been beyond it for thousands of years. In the great age of Greece there were minds which rose to the conception of a Supreme One, a *μορφὴ μία* expressed by many names. Indian monotheism, though maintaining itself with difficulty against pantheism, has a history which extends through thirty centuries. In China and Japan, millions of people who are nominally Buddhists are really monotheists. Amida-worship is essentially a monotheistic creed. Those who know tell us it is the religion of half Japan. To us, monotheism has come through the spiritual experience of pre-Christian Israel. The history of that people is the record of how the God of a nation came to be recognised as the God of the Universe. From Israel the monotheistic creed passed to Christianity

and to Islam, and so became the possession of the modern world.

It would be a mistake surely to imagine that this great development of doctrine has now ceased. It seems clear that the controversy which has been aroused by the pressure of the problem of evil on the modern mind is preparing the way for another step onward. The war has awakened us to a realisation of the difficulty which is involved in our monotheistic faith. What has happened is that, having grasped the idea of God as one, supreme, and good, we have begun to think out the meaning of the goodness of God with more thoroughness. Wisdom and power impress us less than they impressed our ancestors, and goodness impresses us more. It is quite possible to conceive a Deity who is not quite good, as we think of goodness, but to imagine such a being as the Sovereign Power of the Universe is to our minds absolutely intolerable.

So the problem stands to-day, and it is extremely interesting to note the ways in which thinkers of various types are dealing with it. Some abandon belief in God in any sense of the term. For them the difficulty amounts to a demonstration that the theistic interpretation of the Universe must be definitely given up. Dr. McTaggart's presentation of this view is the most valuable and suggestive.* He regards the Universe as a democratic republic, not as a monarchy. It is a system of souls. It is clear that Dr. McTaggart's doctrine can take a definite place in that great historic series which I have briefly indicated, in which man sees in the heavens the reflection of his own spiritual nature and his own social institutions. As monarchical government enabled man to think of God as Sovereign Ruler, so we can imagine modern democracy leading the world of to-morrow to think of the Universe as a great republic, and perhaps even placing Dr. McTaggart beside Mohammed as the prophet of a new

* *Some Dogmas of Religion*, Chaps. VI, VII, VIII.

religion. But I do not think this will happen, because in man's commerce with the Universe the needs of his heart have driven him continually upwards from height to height of faith, enabling him to believe in beings spiritual like himself but above him in spiritual capacity, as such capacity has been conceived by him at the time. And this advance has been, on the whole, a progressive unification. The reason is surely clear. We seek, and are bound to seek, for security. Whatever we may think of pragmatism as a philosophy, there can be no doubt that the pragmatic method is common to all human endeavours. We are like creatures moving over thin ice and feeling our way as we go. How far will it bear? That is the question. So it is that science has gained all her wonderful victories. So it is that philosophy tries method after method and theory after theory in the effort to include all the facts of experience. So it is also that theology puts forth creed after creed, hoping to interpret our religious experiences and to satisfy our spiritual needs. The inevitable aim of all such efforts is unification. For only in that way can we attain security. Thus only can we find ourselves at home in the Universe. Thus we gain the conviction that there is an underlying trustworthiness in things. And as all our science has proved itself by demonstrating, so far as it has gone, this trustworthiness, so must our theology.

It seems to me that here we have the explanation of the upward movement of thought from animism to polytheism and from polytheism to monotheism. At the present moment our hold on this faith has been shaken by our vivid realisation of the problem of evil, but I do not see how we can hope to overcome the difficulty by rejecting all that man has won by the struggles of all the centuries, and turning back to a doctrine which is essentially a form of animism.

Dr. McTaggart's doctrine seems to me to fail because it asserts that all souls form a system, but gives no convincing reason for the assertion. It would seem to me that the

problem of evil supplies a very cogent proof that they do not form a system. When we are told that the whole multitude of souls, who, on this theory, form the Universe, are a system, the meaning is, if I understand Dr. McTaggart aright, that these souls stand in such relation to one another that a harmonious order is the result; or, at least, that a harmonious order will eventually be attained. Now, surely the existence of evil is a sufficient proof that there is no such harmonious order among souls. Whatever force this difficulty has against our faith in monotheism, it has also against the doctrine of the Universe as a multitude of souls standing in harmonious relation to one another. And there is here the possibility of an appeal to experience which does not exist in the other case. Religious experience has dealt with this very problem for thousands of years. Sin and atonement, repentance and forgiveness, injury and restitution: these ideas have occupied the religious consciousness of mankind more than any others. And the net result of it all is just this—that the problem of evil is absolutely insoluble for finite souls. Innocence can never be restored, the lost opportunity can never be recalled, no repentance or restitution can ever make up for evil inflicted. Atonement is impossible in a world in which there is nothing higher than the finite soul and its relations to other finite souls. Yes, if religious experience teaches anything it is the helplessness of the human soul—the only soul we know—in the presence of the problem of evil. It is just this fact, so keenly realised by the religious consciousness, which, more than any other element in experience, has driven man on towards monotheistic faith. Feeling his own helplessness, he has stretched out his hands towards some power greater than himself, which he has been impelled to believe in, and, more and more, as the range of his faith has extended, has he gained in his conception of the greatness of that power, until he has reached the idea of the one supreme almighty God, in whom alone is the ability to overcome the evil. This is

surely a reasonable solution of the problem, if there be any real ground for believing in the existence of such a Being. Nor do I see that the difficulties which an acute dialectic can detect in the abstract conception of omnipotence form a serious objection. Most reasonable people will hold that, when dealing with a reality so far above us, the concepts we employ cannot possibly be adequate. The idea, therefore, of the Universe as a democracy of spirits does not satisfy our religious needs or solve the supreme problem.

The second stage that we marked in the great advance of the religious conceptions of mankind is the polytheistic. We noted the extraordinary superficial reasonableness of polytheism to minds rising out of a primitive animism. The oppositions and confusions of the world inevitably suggest to such minds the existence and operation of a multitude of spiritual beings varying in power and character. This belief was, of course, rendered easy by the lack of a mode of thinking which has become instinctive to the modern mind. We think of natural forces as constant in their operation. For us, effect follows cause in unvarying succession. Not so was the mind of man in its earlier stages. For it, the world was filled with capricious activities. The idea of regular sequence was in its infancy. The foaming torrent suggested the water-sprite, the falling avalanche the fury of the mountain-god. To the Arab of to-day, the tall column of dust moving across the desert seems to mark the path of a mighty jinn. Nor are these ideas, in their place and degree, unreasonable. Suppose, for a moment, that the polytheistic conception of the world is true. What must follow? Why, surely, that there must be continual interferences, on all sides, in the regular course of natural events. Miracles must happen every day. Here is the simple meaning of a miracle. Man is the great miracle-worker. He is constantly interfering with the course of nature, for his own purposes. In relation to the physical world the human will operates, and manifests itself, by unceasing meddling in

physical processes. It is only because you are all miracle-workers that I can recognise you as men and women. Your habit of interfering in the course of nature makes me discern in you a spontaneity like my own. So it was that the polytheist recognised his god. The storm, the lightning flash, the flood, the sudden appearance of disease, sun-stroke, and so on, seemed to point to the agency of living conscious powers: and so overwhelming was the impression that even the most regular of natural events, such as the rising of the sun, or the springing of the corn, were regarded as the acts of distinct gods. Considering the pre-suppositions with which he started, polytheistic man was quite correct. Finite gods must reveal themselves, as men reveal themselves, by showing their power in nature. Miracles must happen constantly.

Now, it seems to me, if I may venture to say so daring a thing, that most modern believers in a finite God are not nearly so reasonable as the old polytheists. They try to make us believe in their god on every possible ground except the only really convincing one. A finite God must reveal himself by miracle. It is the only way in which he can do it. He does not hold the Universe, the Universe holds him. He is in the world, as we are; and, therefore, must, in some way, as we do, deal with the forces of the world. If he lives in our part of the Universe, and takes any interest in the affairs of men, then we should see and hear and feel his action, manifested in great events, every day we live. If he is good, as those who believe in him affirm, why does he not overthrow the hosts of Germany by some signal action, or, in some other unmistakeable way, bring this desolating war to an end, *so as to promote the triumph of righteousness and peace?* To my mind, the Homeric gods who held their own opinions and had their own preferences about the wars of the Greeks and Trojans, and also did their best to help those whom they approved of by actual interferences, were far more reasonably

conceived deities than the finite God in whom some of our modern thinkers profess to believe.

One of the strongest points made by some recent upholders of the doctrine of a finite God living, like ourselves, within the great encircling Universe, is that it is in that way the minds of ordinary religious men conceive their deity. William James, writing of his doctrine that "there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once," affirms that these "are the terms in which common men have usually carried on their active commerce with God; and the monistic perfections that make the notion of Him so paradoxical practically and morally are the colder addition of remote professorial minds."* Mr. Wells is equally insistent on the limitations involved in the ordinary modes in which religious people think of the God they worship. It is certainly true that the average man thinks of God as enthroned somewhere in the Universe, hearing from that distant throne the prayers and praises of His faithful people, interfering in the course of events in order to help those who trust and serve Him, sending forth His angels to succour the needy. With what eagerness the accounts of the angels of Mons were received by multitudes!

These ideas are, of course, a reproduction of human experiences. The simple mind makes a picture of a great sovereign, endows him with all the attributes and resources of authority and power, and then transfers the whole from its earthly scene to some distant heaven. But what other imagery is possible? How else can the mind of man obtain a language to express his spiritual experience? And the infirmity which thus belongs to the language of religion is a universal characteristic of the human expression of spiritual things. Every word used by philosophy has undergone some similar transformation. When we speak, for example, of "spirit" or "person," we are taking

advantage of a process which has caught up a material image into the unseen. Yet, the new and higher significance is none the less valid.

And just as philosophy uses material metaphors with a significance which is not material, so the average religious mind uses the imagery we have just described with an application which involves a real though imperfect recognition of God as infinite and all-inclusive. For every sincere worshipper thinks of God as actually present, and listening to the prayer which is offered; and not merely as present, but as intimately aware of every thought of the human heart and of all the circumstances of every life. It is indeed characteristic of Christian prayer to assume the omniscience and omnipotence of God; and in the deeper experiences of religion the conviction that all thoughts and intents are open to His scrutiny becomes absolutely overpowering. Also, as Mr. C. J. Webb points out, the feeling of the religious mind that God is intimately acquainted with the secrets of the heart, however impressive it may be, is wholly distinct from the feeling which instinctively arises from the idea of any human being possessing the power to penetrate the inner sanctuary of our personality. As Mr. Webb says, "it is not uncommon to find people shrinking from having anything to do with hypnotism, lest they should become—or even be convinced of the possibility of becoming—the victims of such an invasion."* For man, such an invasion would be an outrage; for God, it is inevitable and right. So the religious mind conceives; and the fact proves that God is not regarded as one person among many, distinguished from others only by the possession of greater knowledge and power.

It is not, however, in external spatial relationships that Professor James and Mr. Wells discover the activities of the Deity in whom they believe. Their doctrine is founded mainly

* C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, pp. 147 and 148.

on what I venture to call "mystical experience." To quote Professor James,—“The believer finds that the tenderer parts of his personal life are continuous with a *more* of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of, and save himself, when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck. In a word, the believer is continuous, to his own consciousness, at any rate, with a wider self from which saving experiences flow in. Those who have such experiences distinctly enough and often enough to live in the light of them remain quite unmoved by criticism, from whatever quarter it may come, be it academic or scientific, or be it merely the voice of logical common sense. They have had their vision and they *know*—that is enough—that we inhabit an invisible spiritual environment from which help comes, our soul being mysteriously one with a larger soul whose instruments we are.”*

In a very similar way, Mr. Wells bases his belief in God on experience—an “undoubting, immediate sense of God.”† He “knows,” and so do other kindred souls, that God exists. They have had experience. That is enough. But Mr. Wells goes a step further than William James. It is not merely that he believes in a larger self with which we are continuous, but he holds that larger self to be the synthesis of all that is best in the spiritual life of man. Mr. Wells, in fact, has fallen back on the ideas of Fechner. He believes in the compounding of various consciousnesses so as to form consciousnesses of higher degree.

These speculations seem to me to be of peculiar interest in many respects. For example, they afford a curious justification of polytheism. Fechner is really much more consistent than either Professor James or Mr. Wells. There is no reason why

* *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

we should limit our belief to one such larger self. When we consider the matter, we shall see reason to believe that mankind as a whole does not possess anything like the degree of unity which marks certain communities of men. A nation may be completely cut off from the rest of mankind and yet attain a very high degree of spiritual excellence. For centuries, Japan had no commerce with the rest of the world, and yet possessed a notable civilization of her own and an art which was in many respects as fine as that of the best of the western nations. Again, certain communities, like Athens in the ancient world or Venice in the modern, attained something very like a distinct personality. If there is any truth in the principles laid down by Professor James, and accepted and enlarged by Mr. Wells, Athena must surely have been a real live goddess and not a creation of the myth-gendering imagination. If it be true that a real living personality can arise out of the synthesis of a multitude of selves who together form a human society, it would seem to be altogether unreasonable to affirm that this is true of so loosely connected an assemblage of individuals as the whole human race and to deny it of so closely knit a community as that of ancient Athens, or indeed of any other of the old city-states. The doctrine we are considering is, I hold, essentially polytheistic. It brings back the whole pantheon of tribal and local deities. If it be true, the Kaiser is quite right when he appeals to the German God and claims him as an ally. That God is more than an ally: he is, of course, the very genius of modern Teutonism. Mr. Wells, I understand, admits that his God is not necessarily immortal. If humanity were to perish from the earth, this God would pass out of existence. Here Mr. Wells is perfectly consistent. But when we extend Mr. Wells' doctrine in the way which seems to me perfectly inevitable, what an interesting light it throws on the past! When the old Athenian community was finally broken up, the noble lady Athena pined and died. When Christianity triumphed over paganism, there was confusion and dismay, and

finally dissolution, in the old pantheon. Milton's noble lines are, then, no mere poetic imagination :—

“The oracles are dumb ;
 No voice or hideous hum
 Runs through the archèd roof in words deceiving.
 Apollo from his shrine
 Can no more divine,
 With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving.
 No nightly trance, or breathed spell,
 Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.

The lonely mountains o'er,
 And the resounding shore,
 A voice of weeping heard, and loud lament ;
 From haunted spring, and dale
 Edged with poplar pale,
 The parting Genius is with sighing sent,
 With flower-inwoven tresses torn
 The Nymphs in twilight shade of tangled thickets mourn.”

Such lines as these might well make us wish that Mr. Wells could give back to us the old faith which peopled the unseen with potent spirits, beautiful or terrible, beneficent or dangerous. And, indeed, I do not write all this with the purpose of reducing the doctrine in question to an absurdity. I do not think it absurd. What I wish to point out is that here we have a very interesting modern parallel to the old polytheism. But I hold that the evolution of religious thought has long ago left all such solutions of the problem of the Universe behind.

Further, there are two very serious difficulties. First, what is there to prove that many consciousnesses can be compounded so as to form a distinct and greater consciousness ? Or, to use Mr. Wells' language, what proof have we that the better elements in our varying minds can combine in a synthesis so as to form a great Divine Spirit, a Captain of our souls ? This God is definitely described as a Great Person. He is as distinctly and definitely personal as I am, or as you are. But where is the proof ?

Professor James depended on two considerations. First,

our consciousness of God as witnessed to by the mystics and by others who have had notable religious experiences. I admit the importance of this evidence, but do not agree that it gives any testimony in favour of James' theory. On the contrary, I hold that its tendency is all the other way. To this we shall return. Secondly, Professor James relied a good deal on the evidence yielded by modern experimental psychology as to "the numerous facts of divided or split human personality which the genius of certain medical men, as Janet, Freud, Prince, Sidis, and others, have unearthed," together with the "phenomena of automatic writing and speech, and of mediumship and 'possession' generally."* These and the experiences and impressions of religious mysticism led James to hold that our consciousness is continuous with a great superhuman consciousness which, he admits, may be conceived either polytheistically or monotheistically, but which, on account of the existence of evil, must be finite.

The evidence derived from divided personalities and other phenomena of that nature seems hardly capable of supporting the weight which is here placed on it. There is, first, the question as to whether it is correct to speak of divided personalities at all: and, further, these cases are distinctly pathological, and not a guide to the normal constitution of the mind. But, apart from all this, what evidence do they really afford of the possibility of the theory before us? How can it be supposed that they supply any degree of proof of the astonishing assertion that psychical elements belonging to a multitude of human personalities combine to form a great superhuman personality. If this assertion were true, I can imagine two ways in which we could really obtain convincing proof of it. First, we should find in our own normal experience: or, at least, in the normal experience of some exceptionally gifted persons, the power to know the minds of

* *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

other persons from within, to think with their minds, to look with their eyes, to hear with their ears, to recall with their memories, to anticipate with their hopes; and that not by any sympathetic *rapport*, or by the intervention of any material medium, but by direct intuition of the identical experiences. If such mental composition is possible, it ought to be found in the relation which the mind of man bears to lower intelligences. Why should not a human mind include the mind of his trusty and sympathetic friend, the dog? And if it be argued that possibly our minds do include elements which belong also, in their very identity, to many lower minds, I ask, how is it that we are not aware of it? The evidence, in that case, goes to show that the great superhuman mind, existing in this way, is unaware of the fact that he is compounded of human thoughts. He has no knowledge at all of the minds in which he shares. He is a god without knowing it.

Secondly, and in my judgment even more decisively, a mind of this kind must show himself by active intervention in the material world. We must see him at work. He must manifest himself as a great miracle-worker. If not, how does he work? What is the sphere of his activity? Apparently, according to his prophets, his way of working is entirely limited to an inner inspiration. He touches the world only by means of our organs. He is a psychical reservoir of high thoughts and noble aspirations. By sharing in his spiritual life we are helped and saved, but, except through our instrumentality, he has no way of influencing events. This may be a highly poetic conception, but I cannot think that the evidence offered is of any scientific value. The facts on which it is based are capable of other explanations, though a truly scientific reserve should, I think, make the psychologist hesitate before he offers any but the most tentative explanation in the present state of knowledge. To found a theology on such fragments of uncriticised observation seems to be, indeed, a risky proceeding.

The truth is that the only real evidence which is available is that which James derived from his examination of a multitude of cases of religious experience in which the human mind seemed to come into immediate relationship with some source of spiritual power. As he puts it, "the believer is continuous, to his own consciousness at any rate, with a wider self from which saving experiences flow in." There is no doubt that conviction as to the reality of this experience is very common and quite unshakeable. It finds its verification also, as James proves, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, in the acquisition of a moral power which in many cases effects a complete change in the quality and direction of the life. But what, we may ask, do these facts prove as to the finiteness of the source from which the influence comes? A close examination of James' discussion in this part of his argument seems to me to show that the true tendency of his reasoning is in quite another direction. What forces him to his belief in a finite God is simply the old difficulty of the problem of evil. That and nothing else. As he says himself, "the only way of escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from—the mystery of the 'fall,' namely, of reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfection into imperfection; of evil, in short—the only way of escape from all this is to be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has itself an external environment, and consequently is finite." "The line of least resistance," he adds, "both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing."*

Here, then, is the issue put clearly before us. The question is between a conception of God which regards Him as but a part of the Universe and a conception which regards Him as All-inclusive. And this alternative has nothing at all to

* *Op. cit.*, p. 310.

do with the great range of psychical fact which recent psychological study has brought in. So far as religious experience goes, the superhuman consciousness might just as well be infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent, as finite. But, indeed, this is an under-statement. It refers only to a class of experiences to which James devoted special attention. If he had given more attention to the writings of the great mystics he would have found clear evidence to prove that the consummation of all mystical experience is the discovery of God as the all-inclusive Reality. We have already seen that the simplest form of religious faith—that which finds its expression in ordinary worship—thinks of God as the discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Its characteristic attitude towards Him is that which approaches Him as the All-knowing and the Almighty. Yet, this is only the first step. In the higher ascents of devotion, the mystic finds in the Deity the very life of his life, the inmost truth of his being. The human soul seems to enter into unity with the Divine. I mention this not so much for its value as a testimony to fact as to show that a strict application of James' own method leads to a conclusion quite other than his.

It is only, then, the great problem of evil which forces him to deny the all-inclusiveness of God. Thus James comes into line with all the other great thinkers who have dealt with our problem. So does Mr. Bradley. He is, as all know, a profoundly convinced believer in the Absolute. Here he contrasts most strongly with James. While the latter regards the doctrine of that final all-inclusive Reality which is termed the Absolute as the supreme heresy of metaphysics, Mr. Bradley regards it as the supreme truth. But it is interesting to observe that the reason of his attitude is, for each philosopher, the same. James denies the Absolute and affirms the disconnected pluralistic nature of reality, because he comes up against "the mystery of the 'fall,' of reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfection into imperfection." The only

way to escape, he says, from this monster is "to be frankly pluralistic." Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, finding exactly the same difficulty in everything he examines, declares that in all the things men commonly talk about and trust in there is nothing but "appearance," and that reality is only in the Absolute which is far above all our thoughts. Even God, he holds, belongs to the realm of "appearance," not reality. And the reason is just because men talk about Him and trust in Him. For this reason, if He exists at all, it must be in relation to men, and, that being so, both God and man must disappear in the Absolute. For if you affirm God, you deny man; and if you affirm man, you deny God. Therefore, both must be lost in the final unification. It is singularly interesting to observe how close Mr. Bradley comes to the experience of the mystic. For in that final "deification" of which mysticism speaks with bated breath the human soul ceases to affirm itself and is lost in God.

Let us now turn back to the historical development of the doctrine of God. Christianity received from Judaism a very lofty monotheistic creed. But it was, in the main, the creed of a narrow nationalism. All around it was a great world, marked by a high civilization and slowly attaining that remarkable unity which the Roman Empire finally reached. The situation was a notable one. The narrow national ethos enshrined the great idea of Unity. The world as a whole was, in the realm of thought, the scene of extraordinary confusion. Polytheistic creeds were jostled by eastern mysticisms and speculative cults without end. Old forms of nature-worship and new philosophies were jumbled together. And out of it all emerged a new doctrine of God. The essential idea of the new doctrine was that God is both the Supreme Infinite One and also that He enters into the stream of natural and human life. The Greek School of Alexandria developed the idea of God both as the Infinite and as the Logos, guiding the destinies of the Universe, saving man from his sin, and the world from all the contradictions and

confusions which we describe as evil, and so preparing the way for the final consummation in which God shall be all in all.

Now, surely this was a very splendid effort to deal with the very problem with which we are now confronted. It was an effort to combine Mr. Bradley and Professor James in one scheme of thought—if an anachronism of language may be permitted. No one can pretend that it was a complete logical success. But mark what followed from it. It led directly to a further accentuation of the great difficulty. From the time of Augustine onward we find the minds of thoughtful men dealing with the problems of sin, forgiveness, atonement; and, in the course of the vast discussions which ensued, we find the personality and responsibility of the individual soul coming out into clearer light. And from this affirmation of the individual sprang the claim of the modern mind to enjoy full liberty of thought and discussion. So strongly does the individual now assert himself that we find him claiming happiness as his inalienable right and condemning the universal scheme of things, or denying its very existence, if he does not get happiness.

Here is where we stand to-day. We have on the one hand the traditional doctrine of God and on the other the keenest realisation of the difficulty created by the problem of evil. Some modern theologians, notably the late Bishop Westcott, have tried to find a solution by returning to the Alexandrian conception of the immanent Logos. But it cannot be said that their work has settled the question. Others, and here I must mention Dean Rashdall, hold that God has limited Himself in order that the multitude of finite spirits may enjoy their freedom and work out their salvation in co-operation with Him. God is, therefore, limited; but it is a self-imposed limitation, adopted with a view to the accomplishment of a supreme beneficent purpose. Yet, this does not restore to us our faith in God as the Infinite and Absolute Being. He is not All-inclusive. We are not enveloped by His all-enfolding life. We are persons who stand in relation to Him as Person. "Personality," Dean Rashdall writes, "is

undoubtedly inconsistent with the idea of the Absolute or Infinite Being." "The Absolute," he continues, "if we must have a phrase which might well be dispensed with, consists of God and the souls, including of course all that God and those souls know or experience."*

However reasonable this doctrine may seem, I do not think that it really solves the problem. It is very close to Dr. McTaggart's solution. It is, in fact, Dr. McTaggart's, with a limited deity added. If Dr. McTaggart thinks of the Universe as a republic, Dr. Rashdall thinks of it as a limited monarchy. And I fear that this conception is open to all the objections which have been so skilfully marshalled by Dr. McTaggart against the idea of a limited deity. God is one who fights for the good and may be defeated. The fact that His limitation arises, as supposed by Dean Rashdall's doctrine, from the act of His own will, does not seem to me to alter this; for if we imagine the great experiment failing, and the divine will annihilating the wills it had called into existence, that in itself would be defeat. Good can only be realised in a society.

It seems to me that if modern thought is to deal with this problem with any degree of success, it must work along the lines of the great historical development. And any solution which does so must, on the one hand, hold fast to the Absolute or All-inclusive; and, on the other, must find God at work in the universe. In the past, advance was made by elevating, and never by degrading, the idea of God. If I may venture to say so, I think Dr. Rashdall has presented the problem which we have to face in a very clear way in his declaration that "Personality is inconsistent with the idea of the Absolute." Mr. Bradley has set us the same problem in his discussion of the relation of personality to the Absolute. But, indeed, he has done more than set us the problem, he has also pointed out in the direction in which, I believe, any

* *Personal Idealism*, p. 392.

solution must be found. "The Absolute," he writes, "is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true. And yet in these denials we may be falling into worse mistakes. For it would be far more incorrect to assert that the Absolute is either false, or ugly, or bad, or is something even beneath the application of predicates such as these. And it is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. But neither mistake should be necessary. The Absolute stands above, not below, its internal distinctions. It is better in this connection to call it super-personal."*

Mr. Bradley leads us along a hard path, and one which, I fear, many will refuse to follow, on account of the method adopted by the guide. May I venture to say that I am convinced there is an easier and safer way? A very familiar and fundamental experience seems to me to indicate it. Why should we believe in the unity of the sum total of being? Why should we inevitably speak of this sum-total as *the Universe*? Surely the basis of all such thought and language is the fact, given in perception and grasped by inter-subjective intercourse, that the material world, the world in space as well as time, is one. We all know this world in our several ways, and from our several points of view, but it is one world all the time. It is one and the same material universe which we, each of us in his own partial way, apprehend. And this one material world is always given as experienced—not perhaps the experience of the individual (that way lies solipsism)—but certainly the experience of the race of sentient thinking beings. Now, how can a world which is only given as experienced exist otherwise than as it is experienced? And, further, how can it enter at the same time into a multitude of experiences, each of which has its own incommunicable (that is personal) point of view, unless there is a universal experiencer who is something more than a person? These considerations when thought out seem to me

* *Appearance and Reality*, Ch. XXVII, p. 533.

to show conclusively that we are bound by the very fundamental conditions of our spiritual life and experience to believe in a great final concrete unification, or rather unifier; and to hold that in Him both the material world and the world of spiritual beings are included, indeed constituted; and that the term *person* which we use to designate our own spiritual life is not incorrect, but inadequate to express His nature.

From this it follows that while we may, indeed must, use the language of personality when speaking of the All-inclusive Spirit, we should recognise that this language, while true enough in a degree, must always fail in the effort to solve, or even to state, certain questions touching His relation to us. There, I believe, is the real reason why the problem of evil has proved so troublesome. It is concerned essentially with our relation as personal beings to the Great All-inclusive Spirit. While the concepts of our thought remain what they are, the problem must prove insoluble. But it does not follow from this that there is no solution from the divine point of view.

Having thus pointed out the direction in which, I believe, a solution of the problem must be sought, let me say a word on the language which is usually employed in these discussions. Dr. McTaggart's criticism of current theological conceptions depends almost entirely on the scholastic precision with which he uses and analyses the word *omnipotence*. If there is any soundness in what I have just now ventured to set forth, all such terms as *omnipotence*, *omniscience*, and *infinite* are but imperfect modes of expressing the divine All-inclusiveness. To treat them as scientifically accurate is to mistake their nature altogether.

There is one criticism of the doctrine I have just stated which is sure to be made. It will be said, this is Mansel's doctrine over again. Its effect is, it will be added, to make the language of theology unmeaning; so that, for example, when we speak of God as good we are not using the word *good* in its proper human sense, but in an unnatural theological

sense, which can carry no real meaning or comfort to the human soul. This objection is extremely important, because it brings out the true meaning of what I have tried to express. The doctrine here set forth is not Mansel's, nor is it Mr. Bradley's. In relation to the latter there is a very important distinction. I hold that God is personal, because the material world is an experienced whole; and, therefore, all strictly personal terms may be truly applied to Him. He is true and good and a lover of the beautiful in the same sense in which any man may be. But he is also super-personal, because He is the all-inclusive life in whom we live and move and have our being; and, therefore, any terms, such as omnipotent or omniscient, which aim at expressing His super-personal nature, are imperfect, and cannot be made the foundation of strictly logical argument. They are efforts to express the inexpressible; and, therefore, rather poetic than scientific language. What I have thus endeavoured to set forth is, I am convinced, far more in accordance with the religious experience of mankind than are any of the definitely logical systems which have been elaborated. Religion has always fearlessly made use of poetic language; and what we need in our theology more than anything else is a philosophical justification of religion.

There is one final question which must be briefly dealt with. I pointed out that believers in a finite God ought to be able to point to His activity in the world in the form of unceasing miracle. But what about the All-inclusive Deity? How does He stand in this regard? Those who have been at pains to work out the old much-discussed proofs of the Being of God always found themselves confronted by an important difficulty: were they to seek for the signs of the divine activity in the regular succession of physical causes or in exceptional events which seemed unaccountable from the physical point of view? There was a time when miracles were regarded as the principal proof of God's presence and work. There was also a time when

“new beginnings” in creation, the origin of motion, the origin of life, the origin of consciousness, were pointed to as the main proof that modern science was not destroying the foundation of our faith. Then came a phase of thought when it was realized that this was a somewhat dangerous position to adopt. Is God a great engineer who, having made a wonderful machine, has to interfere from time to time to help it to work as He desires? It seems to me that a finite God if He is regarded as Creator, must be thought of in that way to some degree. When, however, we rise to the conception of the all-inclusive God these difficulties drop out of sight. God’s divine activity is everywhere, in the regular sequence of natural causes as in the exceptional events which, perhaps cannot be naturally explained; in the mind and will of man as well as in the processes of nature. Thus it is that the religious mind thinks of God. For it, God is always both personal and super-personal. And to the God who is so conceived can be applied, far more truly than to the pantheistic substance, the great words of the poet—

“I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”

VIII.—ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND TRUTH.

*By J. B. BAILLIE.**αὐτὸς (ὁ θεὸς) ἐνηθρώπησεν ἵνα ὑμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.*ATHANASIUS: *De Incarnatione.*Ist nicht der Kern der Natur
Menschen im Herzen?

GOETHE.

THERE is a pathetic irony in the constant recurrence throughout the history of the human intellect of the elementary question "What is truth?" After the brilliant and comparatively successful achievements of science during the last hundred years, this question is still raised with all the freshness of a new problem. And it is perhaps all the more curious that the scientists who claim to possess truth hardly seem to trouble themselves about its nature; while those who seek to know its meaning are not in general scientists, but "philosophers." Underlying the question there seems to lurk a sense of disappointment with the results derived from the arduous activity of the human intellect, a feeling which suggests not so much "Was it worth while to spend human energy in this way?" as rather "Is this all that the intellect can contribute to enrich the human spirit?" A skilfully linked chain of reasoning, a system of ideas or concepts, be they never so "objective," an orderly arrangement of categories—in what way do these or can these satisfy the mind? There is also implied the suggestion that even on the most favourable view of truth it is but one direction in which the mind seeks fulfilment; and that its direction must be distinguished from, or co-ordinated with, other equally important human interests in what is good, or, again, in

what is beautiful. There would clearly be no meaning in raising the question if scientific "truth" were literally all that the human mind sought; or, at any rate, the question regarding truth could not be raised in this simple form. If the answer is to be forthcoming it can only be given in terms different from, and, in general, wider than, truth itself. Otherwise we should raise the question again in our answer, or know the answer before we raised the question; and either way our procedure would be frivolous.*

It is because of this inherent limitation in the significance which truth has for the human mind, a limitation which becomes as obvious by our increasing success in reaching truth as by our failure to attain it, that the mind in its concern for its completer life seeks to fix the place of truth in the economy of its experience. In our own time we find those who, laying stress on the independence of truth, treat the human mind as but a medium in which truth is intermittently realised or focussed: the mind is subordinate to the truth, and shapes its conscious processes in terms of an "objective" order or system. In inevitable reaction from this position there are those who consider that truth is not independent of the mind, that truth is at best but subordinate to and dominated by the prior practical interests of the mind, a mere instrument for its purposes. The one, it may be said, holds that the individual mind is made what it is by the truth, the other that the truth is what the mind practically makes it to be; the one insists that ideas "work" because they are true, the other that they are true because they work; the one maintains that the course of our ideas is determined in the interest of the truth, the other that the truth is determined in the interest of our practical

* It is for a like reason that the answer to the question can never be given by stating a "criterion" of truth. A criterion of truth must itself be a true criterion, and we are thus at once in an indefinite regress in the search for such an instrument, or we already have it in our hands all the while.

ideas. Between these two, clearly, no reconciliation is possible; nor can the one give way to the other, for no argument from either side reaches the underlying assumptions of the other. Both, indeed, may agree that a truth can be true only for an individual mind, since there is no mind which is not an individual mind in some sense or degree of individuality; but there is no possible agreement between them when one says that a truth is never true if it is only "my truth," while the other says that a truth which is not "my truth" is no truth at all. These are contrary propositions: they may both be false, but cannot be true together or be reconciled as they stand. The assumption in the one case is that the individual mind is always qualified by a particular element which either is, or should be, in process of dissolution into the universality characteristic of truth; the assumption in the other case is that the particular element is in itself precious to the individual, and neither can nor should be surrendered to the claims of a universal which, however important, is always "abstract" and incapable of doing full justice to what is particular. Whatever language each may use to express its views, and whatever special aspect of individuality may be emphasised in one case or denied in the other, the generalisation of the principles defended in the two cases leads us inevitably to this sheer divergence between their fundamental presuppositions.

Both views ignore two fundamental conditions of human experience, and neglect of these is the chief source of the difficulty of finding any reconciliation between their opposing positions. They both deal with the individual mind as a fully developed and fully equipped finite reality face to face with a statically complete and finished realm of objects, or groups of objects, existing alongside the individual mind. The activity of the mind is thus made to consist in co-ordinating its processes to this objective realm, one view laying chief stress on the reference to the objective sphere with which the mind has to be co-ordinated, the other on the mental process of co-ordination.

It is forgotten by both alike that the individual mind is never fully developed at all, but is ever growing from the earliest date of its existence to the last; that its growth towards ever increasing fulfilment of its being and of unison with its world is the very essence of its experience.

Again, both overlook the fact that behind the processes of both practical action and intellectual procedure lies the more ultimate reality of the single indivisible individuality itself. It is this which determines the laws and conditions of practice, and the laws and conditions of intellectual activity. Thus, for instance, the essence of all thinking consists in grouping differences within a single principle, in finding an identity which animates distinctions. But this character of thought is derived from the nature of the individual mind, which is a living unity of all its varied manifestations. To attempt, therefore, to express the whole nature of human individuality in terms of the intellect, to describe its living procedure as a logical procedure, and its chief end as the attainment of some scheme of conceptual truth, is a complete inversion of the actual connection between thought and mental individuality. Individuality prescribes the course which thought has to take, not thought the character which individuality should possess. It is because the mind is an organic unity in variety that thought is a function of mind operating in the way it does, viz., by seeking identity in difference. Individuality is not wholly or simply logical in its procedure, because it can function logically; and, therefore, logical procedure is neither the sole aim nor the sole clue to the nature of individuality.* That logical procedure

* This fallacy, or, shall I say, misconception, seems to me to underlie the work of Mr. Bosanquet, who may be taken as one representative of the view that human individuality finds itself in becoming conscious of an independent scheme or system of intellectual truth. We have but to recall his constant use of such expressions as the logic of will, the logic of feeling, the logic of individuality, and the like, not to speak of his insistence on the logical principle of non-contradiction as a clue to ultimate truth, in order to see the justification for this remark. Doubt-

is not the sole clue to the meaning of mental individuality is plain when we note that the same fundamental nature of mind as an indivisible concrete unity of all its processes determines the laws and conditions not merely of practical procedure in the strict sense, but the emotional life of mind, its æsthetic procedure, the process of striving, the processes of memory, imagination and perception. All these operate in their own sphere as special expressions of the fundamental nature of mental life, of which each is but a particular form. They require no assistance from intellectual procedure as such, and are not affected or governed by its peculiar laws. This is seen in actual experience, *e.g.* in the success with which the life of the ordinary moral agent, or again of the artist, can be prosecuted in spite of the fact that these individuals neither can, nor care to, understand the attempt to interpret their procedure in the language and in the terms of conceptions, which is the peculiar business of those who are mainly interested in intellectual activity. Nor are they perturbed by the contention, put forward by those who pursue the aims of the intellect, that thought occupies a privileged position in the life of mind, seeing that thought interprets and understands. For the reply is obvious that thought only has a primary significance for those whose business it is to pursue the aims of thought, and that it is natural to regard as more important what one finds to be one's main interest. The philosopher (or the man of science) can convince no one but a philosopher that thinking holds a place of privilege in the life of the mind. Men of action or artists will

less he is forced by the facts to use other and quite different expressions, as I shall point out; but there can be no question, I think, of the main tendency of his view. The facility with which the processes, for example, of will can be rendered into logical formulæ is largely illusory. Given that the mind is the source of the laws and conditions of both will and intellect, and that the same ultimate principle of mind (unity in variety) governs and determines both, and the possibility of translating the processes of one function into the terms of the other follows almost as a matter of course. And in the same way we might, and do, translate intellectual processes into the language and procedure of will.

neither concede nor deny the contention of the philosopher they will regard it with indifference or toleration, and will feel instinctively that it is an argument in defence of a foregone conclusion based on prejudice or predilection. The artist will probably say—

The rest may reason, and welcome,
'Tis we musicians know.

If, then, we are to determine the place which truth holds in experience, in its value for human life, we must start from a position which does justice to the nature of human individuality; for this is fundamental to the whole problem. I feel on solid ground when I regard the individual mind as a supreme conscious realisation of the energy of life, rooted in the inorganic elements of nature, inseparable from lower organic processes and conditions, and utilising all these to sustain and fulfil the higher level of vital energy in which mind consists. Being a form of life, the characteristic quality of its activity is that of development in response to and co-response with the world in which it has become consciously alive. Being more than mere physical organisation, its development is more than mere physical growth, and is not arrested at the stage of physiological maturity. Its development consists primarily in development of internal arrangement, not of external embodiment, a qualitative rather than a quantitative process. As a developing individuality, it faces its world with its whole energies, in their global entirety, if I may call it so, a development which proceeds not in a linear direction, but as a compact whole, carrying all its specific functions along with it in indissoluble co-ordination. Differentiation of its functions arises through its action and reaction on its world, but the integrity of the whole remains a reality, the primary reality, from first to last. In much the same way (though profoundly different in kind) a plant does not cease to be a whole after it has become differentiated into trunk, branches, leaves, and fruit. What we have later in the fulfilment of mind is the

same unity of life as we have earlier, and the same interpenetration of the processes constituting its life. In actual fact we never lose sight of, or ignore, this solid integrity of the mind's life. What I wish to urge is that we have no ground for losing sight of it in the interests of theory, but every ground for insisting on it and recurring to it, if we are to assign each operation of mind to its appropriate place in the context of experience. The singleness of mind is present and omnipresent in all its operations; the slightest variation of conscious life, be it even a sensation, reverberates throughout its whole being, modifying and sustaining its course of development and relation to its world. Its unity is manifested most prominently, though not exclusively, in the concentration of its energy, now in one specific direction, now in another,—a concentration which takes, amongst other ways, the form of what we call attention. With its singleness of being it faces the real world around it, and forces itself into living association with other beings, and by so doing grows to the fullness of its mental stature. The surrounding world of beings evokes its energy of self-maintenance and self-fulfilment. It does not exist for them nor they for it; they all co-exist, so far as they, too, have individuality, as single realities in a world of reals. It measures their individuality by its own, and, as certain philosophers maintain, arranges the reality of individuals as a scale of beings occupying different degrees of reality. Doubtless other real beings, especially if conscious, do the same, and also measure and scale up the real beings different from themselves. The course of the mind's development may fairly be described, relatively to its initial starting-point in time and place, as a process of discovery, a discovery of what its own nature contains, and, as the correlate of this, a discovery of the significance of the other beings in relation to which it lives and moves and has its own being. This process of discovery is what we call experience in its most general sense. Experience is thus always double-sided; we grow into our world, our

world becomes articulate in its detailed reality as we proceed. We do not make the reality of other things any more than we make our own; we find and become conscious of both in fulfilling the energy of our own mind. We do not break down the distinction between our reality and that of other beings as we proceed; we establish both by the process of becoming aware of both. Neither gives way to the other, neither strictly depends on the other; they are inter-dependent. We never face other beings with one of the functions of our mind; we face other reality with our whole mind, and we estimate it in terms of our whole nature, from the first stage to the last in the career of our experience; and one being differs from another according to the call it makes on our whole being, and the response our whole being makes to it.

In the course of our development, and as the result of an indefinite variety of activities conscious and sub-conscious, specific functions of the mind arrange and assume a definite place in the economy of our mental life: perception, memory, imagination, emotion, conscious striving. We come to be distinctly aware of them and to rely on them and operate with them. Some emerge into clearness early, some later in our mental history. Instead of the first stage of quasi-undifferentiated mental unity, we have later a complex and articulate arrangement of mental functions in and through which the mind operates. These arise through the successive and successful efforts of the mind to retain its hold on its world, and its place in it: and so to fulfil its being. Each and all have reference to reality in some form or other, and no one exclusively.

On this interpretation, the pursuit and the attainment of articulately conceived systematic truth by the intellect is a single, a distinctive, but not the exclusive, and not necessarily the highest, channel through which the individual mind fulfils its proper nature. This deliberate search for intellectual truth, moreover, is controlled by the same fundamental conditions as

direct and determine the mind's activity in every other essential direction. In each and all the concrete individual is endeavouring at once to fulfil its being to the uttermost, and to become consciously alive to the world of beings which co-exist with itself; and these two processes are but aspects of its self-maintenance.* No one direction of the mind's life can be a substitute for, or supersede even in importance, another, any more than in a high organism one organ can really take the place of another organ. Perception does not make sensation any the less necessary; both are qualitatively distinct from memory and from judgment, as these are from each other; while, again, scientific, or systematic, knowledge is as different a level of mental energy from all of those mentioned as it is from the activity of the moral life, of art, or of religion. By each of these, and by the different degrees of each kind of activity, the individual mind attains a different level of being, acts and reacts upon its world in a new way, fulfils a distinct mode of its life, and thereby establishes its own existence, in the face of a ceaselessly varying realm of objects.

No one of the directions assumed by the energy of the human mind is less or more of a purely human activity than another; and none carries the human mind beyond the ambit of its own sphere of existence, since all subserve the fulfilment of its being as a living individuality. If religion and art, if morality and technical adaptation to nature, are essentially modes of human life, forms of its expression, science and the pursuit of intellectual truth are equally so, and no more than particular manifestations of the mental energy of human beings or rather of a restricted number of individuals. And, if

* In that sense scientific knowledge is certainly "instrumental," as it has been held,—a means, that is to say, to self-fulfilment. It is obviously not merely instrumental in the interests of "practice": for practice itself is in the same way instrumental to the self-fulfilment of the individual mind. Both, in short, are directly instrumental to complete individuality, and only indirectly to each other. So of art, morality, and religion

memory, perception, and imagination are but ways by which we apprehend the real so as to conserve the stability and unity of our individual minds, conceptual activity, judgment and inference perform a similar function in precisely the same interest.

This view of human experience in general and of knowledge in particular is what seems best described as Anthropomorphism. The term is sometimes applied in a narrow sense, to refer to certain ways of ascribing literally to non-human kinds of reality qualities which are exclusively human.*

Properly understood, however, this is only a subordinate meaning of the term. In essence it means simply the point of view of humanity at its best, the way in which a human life, within the peculiar limitations and specific conditions of its existence, consciously arranges its world in terms of its own perspective, and in so doing at once fulfils its own nature and adjusts itself to the indefinitely complex realm of beings with which it finds its existence associated. Every type of being in the real world is constituted by its own peculiar laws, and maintains itself in terms of these laws. Man has a type of his own, and secures his place by fulfilling the laws of his special form of being, whether those laws are physical,

* This is often described as a peculiar tendency of the primitive mind. But it is by no means confined to the primitive intelligence. The difference between the uncultivated and the cultivated mind does not consist in the former being anthropomorphic in the narrow sense, while the latter eschews anthropomorphism. Both may be anthropomorphic in the same sense; the difference between the two consisting in the sort of human qualities ascribed to non-human objects. Thus, the primitive mind will ascribe human emotions—anger, pleasure, etc.—to external beings, whether natural or non-natural; the “maturer” mind will ascribe human ideas—conceptions, volitions—to non-human beings. Scientists and philosophers alike show this tendency. Why the primitive attitude should be rejected with contempt, and the attitude of the more developed mind treated with profound respect, is not evident, except to those who prefer to ascribe to non-human realities human thoughts rather than human emotions, and who imagine that a later generation must necessarily be wiser than the earlier.

moral, æsthetic, or intellectual matters not ; the issue of his activity is the maintenance of his individual being by the fulfilment of his type of existence.

We are not concerned here to show how this conception enables us to interpret the significance of all the modes of this life. We are more especially interested in indicating its bearing on the problem of knowledge.

We shall not deal with all the forms of knowledge, but only with those which present the greatest difficulty—scientific procedure through conception, judgment and inference, by which intellectual truth in the usual sense is obtained. In the case, *e.g.*, of sensation and perception, which are also channels of knowledge, it is fairly easy to show that these functions of the individual mind are rooted in the peculiar psycho-physical conditions of human individuality, and are constituted by the peculiar laws of man's specific organisation. The essentially human character of knowledge at these levels of man's life may be considered beyond dispute. The same is true of memory or, again, of the imaginative grasp of ideals of knowledge. Let us, therefore, confine attention to the harder case of conceptual activity, and the higher intellectual "truth," with which indeed most theories of knowledge exclusively deal, and in reference to which the claim that truth is "transcendent," "objective," "independent," is currently made.

I.

There is nothing magical in the form or the procedure of intellectual activity that we should be disposed to credit it with the power to carry us beyond the conditions or limitations of the human mind. The conceptions with which mature intellectual activity, *e.g.*, science, deals, are the outcome of and display the abstract character possessed by mere intellect as a specialised function of mind. They are literally the expression of this abstract function. The intellect does not find them ready made and waiting to be apprehended or picked up

by the intellect. Nor are they by chance the convenient material suitable to be handled by the abstract activity of the intellect. We often treat them in this way, it is true; but that is because reflection upon the whole procedure of the intellect is an after-thought; and, when undertaken, we seem to have a great variety of conceptions with fixed characters on the one hand, and a uniform power which deals with them on the other. What more natural than that in such circumstances we should fancy the conceptions to be the ready-made material offered to, or fortunately adapted to, the operation of an abstract intellect? But, in fact, the intellect is in nature and origin prior to the conceptions with which it deals: these are one and all created by it in the course of its effort to grasp the world in the interests of the unity of the mind. The deliberate aim of the intellectual process is to bring to bear on the variety of objects confronting the mind the all-pervading unity of the mind's life; or, as we sometimes put it, to bring the variety of objects *under* the general unity of the mind. This is one of the ways in which, as we find, the mind maintains its integrity in the face of the world of beings in relation to which it stands. The unity of the mind is the single constant and uniform principle throughout all its experience. The mind may only be aware of it in a vague way at first or it may assume the character of a pure abstraction, and be looked upon as it was, *e.g.*, by Kant, as but a logical centre of reference. Yet, in all cases intellectual activity consists in bringing this unity as such into conscious connection with the varied world of objects in the midst of which the mind lives.

The plurality of conceptions devised for this end are the outcome of its efforts in this direction. They have the generality of the single unity which they seek to carry out, but also something of the concreteness of the actual objects with which the mind as a concrete individuality is concerned. They are thus, in a manner, intermediate between the mere unity of the mind, and the complex diversity of things. But

they never leave the region of abstraction, since the intellect has only to do with satisfying the mind's general principle of unity. The intellect thus always stops short at the abstract conception, not because it might not go further if it chose, but because its function is limited by this purpose from the first. Hence, we find, on the one hand, that the conception never professes to give us the full particularity of the concrete object. On the other hand, the intellect endeavours to connect the conceptions as conceptions with one another; for the same demand for unity, which starts the mind's search for conceptions, instigates the mind to unite the conceptions themselves when they are found. It does this through the intellectual processes of inference, of systematisation, or again of establishing a hierarchy of conceptions, and perhaps in other ways.

The abstractness of the conceptions devised by the intellect, and the connection of these with one another, do not furnish any ground for holding that we go beyond the mere purposes of the finite human mind in intellectual activity. The intellect does not de-anthropomorphise the human mind. Indeed, there seems a transparent paradox in maintaining that a function which is less than the whole mind can carry us beyond the mind altogether. This is so evident from the forms assumed by the language of men, and from the variation in the range of conceptual span, as I may call it, from individual to individual, that it would hardly require to be emphasized were it not for the mysterious, almost magical, significance attached by some minds, scientific and philosophical alike, to the mere quality of abstraction characteristic of the conceptions of the intellect.

What is true of their abstractness is equally true of their quality of universality and objectivity. Their universality is ultimately derivable from, and is determined by the extent to which they reflect, the single unity of the individual mind exercising the function of intellect on its own behalf. This unity remains the same throughout all the life of mind,

and if a conception can be devised in which the consciousness of this unity is maintained throughout all change in the content of the object grasped by the conception, that conception assumes the character of being universal. The assumption is that the conception will remain what it is as long as the unity of the mind subsists, and that means always. Social intercourse helps to confirm this quality by bringing out that the conception in question reflects the unity of life not merely of one individual mind but of a number, large or small, of other minds equally individual in their life.* The exact number of individuals holding such intercourse is irrelevant to the universality: two may be sufficient for certain kinds of conceptions; a hundred will strengthen the claim to universality in other cases. But social intercourse does no more in any case than confirm or emphasize the universality: it cannot create the universality in default of the operation of the individual minds who affirm it.† The universality may be so indubitably a quality of the conceptions in certain cases that we find it said, for example, that certain conceptions hold "for all mankind," are confirmed by the "universal experience of humanity," are valid "for consciousness in general." Such expressions are obviously mere hyperbole: no one imagines that all mankind are really aware of these conceptions: no one has ever tested all the individuals in humanity to see if each and every one holds the conceptions in question. All that is really meant is that the conceptions so described are such that they seem bound up with the very unity of the individual mind, if it is to maintain itself at all. When conceptions have this quality, it is easy to see how they may

* Hence the reciprocal relations of social intercourse and universality of thoughts: social intercourse secures, to some extent, the *ratio cognoscendi* of universality of thoughts, the latter being, to a like extent, the *ratio essendi* of social life.

† In point of fact, the highest forms of intellectual universality are not held to be dependent for their worth on social intercourse. Indeed, socialisation of ideas is in inverse ratio to their intellectual universality and abstraction.

come to be considered outside the mind altogether or independent of the individual mind, and hence to give rise to the illusion that intellectual activity working with these conceptions carries us outside the limits of human mentality. A conception which is held to be true at all times and for all seems to have a being of its own whether any individual holds it explicitly or not: just as we are apt to suppose that a social institution which remains a permanent part of the life of a society has a being of its own independently of the individuals who successively or periodically embody its purpose and then pass away. Such a view is a useful method of conveying vividly the significance of the quality of universality; as a statement of actual fact it is a transparent absurdity. For it takes the quality of universality which is derived from the more ultimate fact of the unity of an individual mind to be a reason for separating the conception from the individual mind altogether. Both the conception and its quality as universal have the same source in the individual mind, and have neither being nor life apart from it. As well might a child disown all parentage and all continuity with its past when it has come to maturity, after the manner of the high priests of Israel who claimed to have neither father nor mother when once they had devoted themselves to the service of Jehovah in the Temple.

In the same way the quality of "objectivity" possessed by conceptions can be shown to have its source in the operations of the individual human mind. Conceptions are objective in the sense, and only in the sense, that they express the mind's sense of unity in dealing with the objects confronting it. It is the function of thought, as we have said, to keep the mind's sense of unity secure in the face of the variety of the world of objects. When this purpose is successfully fulfilled, the conceptions do not change, any more than the unity of the mind changes. The realm of objects is from the first as real and as enduring as the being of the individual mind. Our intellectual knowledge does

not alter the nature of things, and things are quite indifferent themselves to our intellectual operations. But, once conceptions are obtained, it is a convenient and perhaps a natural form of metonymy to ascribe to conceptions the quality of the objective world with which they deal, or again to ascribe to objects themselves the conceptions which the intellect has devised to enable the mind to handle the world of objects. This is convenient to emphasise the significance of the result obtained by intellectual activity, viz., that the mind has secured its unity in the midst of the real world; it is only objectionable if taken as literal fact. We then disturb the whole situation; we regard the conceptions as themselves objects, and thus independent of the mind as objects in fact are. Such is the naïve attitude of the recent revival of mediæval realism. It is not putting the position too strongly to say that if conceptions were really objects they would not be objective at all: for they would not be mental functions, which they are: they would no longer refer to objects, they would be the objects themselves. Yet, it is in their reference to the objects that their objectivity consists. It is the reaction upon our thought of the language in which conceptions are clothed, coupled with inadequate analysis of the situation, which has led many minds, and most of us at one time or another, to treat the objectivity characteristic of conceptions as equivalent to the summary identification of conceptions with the objects.

It is sometimes held that the successful corroboration by the objective world of certain conceptual processes and results is an unanswerable argument in favour of the trans-human quality ascribed to thought. If we can predict the course of nature with invariable accuracy, surely, it is said, our thoughts cannot be merely our own as human beings; they must be an expression for the nature of independent things themselves. This is a familiar proposition, and the illustrations usually given are drawn from stellar and planetary mechanics and applied physics or, again, chemistry, sometimes also from pure mathematics.

Setting aside the fact that the proposition does not hold of conceptions in all the sciences, and setting aside also the fact that the success means no more in some cases than that scientists have agreed mainly as the result of social intercourse, there is even in the most approved cases of such success nothing to justify the assertion that thought liberates us from the limits of the human individual mind. What is really implied is that our whole mind is so constituted as to be an integral component of the world of things with which its being is associated. Our mind, as a whole, is interwoven with the very texture of the real world,—fitted, so to say, to the environment of the rest of reality; and, if it but fulfils, in its own order and according to its own conditions, the laws of its own being, the issue will confirm and establish this congruence with the world. It is not that the intellect, and the intellect alone, gives us the true nature of the independent world of things; but that the individual mind is from the start and all through its history a substantive constituent of the real. Its one purpose is to fulfil itself, and its detailed operations contribute to this one end. The so-called success of the intellectual process in particular corroborates this primordial character of the life of mind. It is not, therefore, that the intellect alone finds the whole truth about the world, but that our mind as a whole enables the intellect to bring out the essential congruence between the mind and the real. It is the mind working with its whole energy through the channel of intellectual activity which makes possible the successful operations of the intellect in dealing with the world. The intellect merely brings out explicitly in its own way what was implicit all the while—the congruence of the whole mind with the real in the midst of which it lives and moves and has its being.*

* To begin with, this congruence is, in a sense, a postulate, as we so often say. It is not, however, a postulate for the mind, it is only a postulate for the specific operation of the intellect. The mind, as a whole, no more doubts or questions or even "assumes" that it has a place amongst real

So far we have considered the claims of the intellect to transcend human limitations by an analysis of the conceptual as such and at its best. The same result is even more evident when we bear in mind that the creation or discovery of the conceptions and their connections, by which the intellect apprehends the world, always involves an effort of mind, experiment, trial, and error. The conceptions and conceptual connections are not given to the intellect ready made; they are deliberately designed, and are only found after a severe intellectual struggle, in the course of which they are formed and reformed, proposed and rejected. The history of science and of philosophy is strewn with the wrecks of expeditions in the seas of thought. All conceptions are at the start nothing more than tentative efforts

beings, than trees or birds; and it no more "postulates" its congruence with other real beings than it postulates their congruence with itself. A postulate is only made by a partial function in an interest going beyond itself; it always implies an end beyond itself which is presupposed before it sets out to confirm the reality of the end. The mind has no end beyond itself that it can seek; it seeks simply to fulfil itself. But a *specialised* function like the intellect, an abstraction from the whole life of mind, must make the assumption that, in spite of being an abstraction, it will yet be able to attain in its own way and to express the fundamental nature of the life of mind which it partially embodies. The success of its procedure confirms openly the assumption it has made at the outset, and explicitly reinstates in a special way the fundamental character of the mind's life. Such a confirmation is often regarded as a kind of wonder, or surprise, as if the mind should be, as it were, grateful to the intellect for having done so much on the mind's behalf. Yet, the whole process is such an obvious circle that there is no more place for wonder or surprise than in the resolution of a child's puzzle. The intellect is in the control of the mind all the while, and is brought back to its starting point, as it must be, when its operation is completed, for the starting point is its guiding assumption throughout all its procedure, directing and limiting its course of operation. This is seen without difficulty, if we merely note that the intellect is always selective in its operation,—a selection which is guided by an end in relation to which the selection is made. When we say, therefore, that the intellect grasps the nature of the real, we should observe that this is at best only a partial statement even of the operation of the intellect. The successful result of the operation of the intellect has always a double-sided significance; it conveys what the real is in relation to the mind, as interpreted by

of the mind to establish a unity amongst things. The progress of science finds its growing point in suggested hypotheses. No one would dream of regarding the embryonic stages of true knowledge as other than phases in the life of the human mind. How, then, can any one maintain, when these stages have arrived at a point in their development which satisfies the mind, produces general acceptance, and enables it to maintain itself in relation to its world, that suddenly the thoughts thus secured cease altogether to be our own and become non-human or impersonal in character? If tentative hypotheses do not give us the very "nature of things," why should a successful hypothesis do so?

intellect, it also conveys what the mind is in relation to the real world. It must do both at once, because it is a manifestation of the life of mind as one real being amongst other real beings. It is because we so often ignore the one side of this result, and lay exclusive emphasis on the grasp of the independent real object achieved by the intellect that we treat the intellect as a revelation of the independent object, and the truth obtained as consequently independent of our own minds. Such a one-sided view is sure to distort the actual situation, for it leads us to ignore the vital connection of the intellect with the whole life of mind. If we could imagine a flower thinking about the botanist as the botanist thinks about the flower, we might have similarly one-sided misinterpretations of the significance of the results arrived at by the plant intelligence. The plant's thoughts would surely be a mere manifestation of its life, however accurately in its process it succeeded in diagnosing the being of the botanist; and its thoughts would emphatically not be those of the botanist, no matter how accurate they were to the plant itself. And so generally; if other orders of beings, some of which palpably have intelligence, were to think about their world,—the things with which they are confronted,—their thoughts would, in every case, be the expression of their own specific intelligence, and would remain constant for them because accurately embodying the laws of their own being. It is hardly imaginable that the thoughts of all the different orders of beings would be the same, or that the "nature of things" would be completely revealed by each type of thought. In a word, Heraclitus' criticism of the popular religious views of his time has but to be generalised to see the inadmissibility of attributing to the specific thoughts of human intelligence a capacity to convey the nature of things in a manner which, however successful, implies that because thought is true it is therefore impersonal.

We can often go a long way with an inaccurate hypothesis ; we can prophesy by it, to a certain extent, and it bears this test of success ; nevertheless we are led to give it up, and to describe it as merely a human conjecture. Since it is by a continuation of the same activity of the mind that an inaccurate becomes an accurate hypothesis, it is surely impossible to dehumanise the hypothesis once it becomes finally established. Is the only quality of thought which remains human to be the capacity to make mistakes, and shall we deny ourselves the right to call true thought human just because it is true ? This seems neither justified nor intelligible.

But when we look at the process of thought as it actually takes place, we find that intellectual activity is never in fact purely intellectual activity at all. We never think in an abstract medium of pure intellect, not even in the most abstract of all sciences. We start from, and constantly draw upon, the resources and deliverances of our perceptual experience. We repeatedly substantiate our thinking by linking its conclusions with perceptual facts, and sometimes we call this procedure (paradoxical as it sounds) the verification of our thoughts. And we invariably make use of the medium of perceptual experience to give body, shape, and form to the whole process of thinking, for there is no continuous thinking possible without written or spoken language, which belongs wholly to the region of perceptual experience. Now, perception is not merely inseparable from our specifically human mind, it is not even separable from our peculiarly constituted nervous system. When we proceed to think about things, the operation of thinking is instigated in the first instance by the mode in which things are perceived. Perception sets the task, and furnishes the character which the things possess about which we think. No thinking can dispense with its own facts or leave the facts behind. And since these are constituted by the special nature of human perception, our thinking is held

captive by, and is beyond all hope of escape from, the limits of the human mind. This point has been so often emphasised, that it requires no more than a passing remark. What is so curious is that the use of language in which to convey thoughts should ever have created the illusion that our thought can transcend the human mind. It seems to be supposed because language is "outside," or a symbol, and the form of the symbol is irrelevant, that therefore thought is independent of all human conditions. Yet, it is precisely the symbol which compels thought to keep in touch with the actual human mind, which always lives as a concrete whole; or, conversely, it is precisely because thought cannot lose touch with the concrete mind that it must use a symbol. The symbol, be it ever so slight, *e.g.*, a mere sign, holds thought in chains to the conditions and laws of perception, without which the mind would lose its living contact with its actual world. The insignificance, the very perceptual abstractness of the symbol, just corresponds to the abstractness of the conceptual activity: indeed, only such a symbol would be adequate to the quality of the conception. Hence it is that the more abstract the conceptual activity, the more the language used becomes a mere character or sign: numbers, *e.g.*, are conveyed by mere lines in space, straight or curved or otherwise arranged. And the less abstract the conception, the more does the symbol conveying it have a greater perceptual significance, sometimes even appealing to different senses.

Again, it is important to note that contradiction, which is so characteristic of thought, is the direct consequence of the abstract nature of its procedure as a specialized operation of mind, and confirms the essentially human quality of its process and its results.

Contradiction has always been the main source of uneasiness in the intellectual conscience, goading its waking life with the remorse of doubt, and troubling the dreams of the most accomplished builder of systems. Some have treated it as a

kind of thorn in the flesh, others have used it to make a crown of thorns for the brow of intellectual freedom. And indeed the fact of contradiction is at once the puzzle and the paradox of intellectual activity; a puzzle because it is difficult to see why the intellect should ever contradict itself; a paradox because the creation of a contradiction is the work of thought as much as the resolution of it. No other phase of mental life is subject to this condition; perception, emotion, volition, imagination, memory, have no share in it; their deliverances are final for the mind. If these deliverances are found to contain contradictions it is not for the functions themselves that the contradiction exists, but for the intellect which reviews or criticises their results. So close is contradiction bound up with intellectual activity that a certain familiar form of speculation regards contradiction as the life-principle of thought itself and the clue to its development of the nature of truth. Contradiction, it is said, *e.g.*, by Bradley, arises when a conception is pushed to the end of its meaning; and every conception, it is held, will prove contradictory if it is pushed to its extreme point; hence thought activity essentially tends to contradiction. Such a contention at once creates suspicion and distrust, for surely the initial mistake may lie just in pushing the conception too far. Why go to extremes in thinking any more than in any other form of experience? By hypothesis we are not bound to do so, for, if thought be not pressed to the breaking point, it will not be contradictory, and will still be thought. Thus, in making contradiction the essence of thought, we have no right to console ourselves with the reflection that we are making a virtue of a necessity, for we are really making a virtue of a blunder. And the things about which we reflect are transparently indifferent to the contradictions into which we fall when we think about them—they remain in solid and stolid security, maintaining their full reality, regardless of the conceptual tangle into which our minds may have fallen. Indeed, it is partly because they maintain

their concrete integrity that our minds are checked in the course of their intellectual procedure.

The source of contradiction is to be traced to the general character of intellectual activity. It arises from the demand for complete mental unity on the one hand, and on the other from the tentative selective efforts of the intellect to meet this demand through a variety of conceptions. The unity of the mind is, as we have seen, the presupposition and the consummation of intellectual activity, and without its presence in the process of the intellect no contradiction would arise. Variety of conception there must be, since a plurality of real things has to be unified. When the unity of the mind is not satisfied by a particular conception or a connection of conceptions, contradiction appears. It is, thus, always a transitional characteristic of intellectual procedure; and, as we find, it varies in kind from individual to individual, and in degree according to the nature of the conception involved. Thus, what seems contradictory to one mind seems not always contradictory to another, as we see constantly verified in the course of debate, especially on fundamental questions; and some conceptions are found to be partially contradictory, others wholly so, by the same mind. The mental grasp of one individual differs from another, and one individual thus neither feels nor sees a contradiction, *i.e.*, his mind's unity is satisfied, in a relation of conceptions which seems to another riddled with contradiction, *i.e.*, giving no mental security. When we use such expressions as a "self-contradictory conception," or connection of conceptions, and again such terms as "absolutely contradictory," "inherently contradictory," and the like, what we mean is that, with the best intellectual effort which we and others, who agree with us, can make, no sense of mental unity can be arrived at by the conceptions in question. In a word, contradiction is nothing more than the condition in which the intellect fails to satisfy the mind's demand for complete unity in the special case of the conceptions or

connection of conceptions created by the activity of the intellect. Contradictions are thus, in this sense, always created by the intellect itself, as Kant pointed out in the case of one form of intellectual activity in particular, and it is just because they are so created that the intellect can always remove them, either by retracing its steps or by advancing further. Hence it is useless to describe conceptions, or thoughts in general, as inherently contradictory: conceptions have no being except as expressions of intellectual activity, and thought removes contradictions, as well as gives rise to them. But for the tentative, selective, piece-meal procedure of thinking, *i.e.* its human character, contradiction would not arise at all. It is neither a virtue of thought nor a disease; it is in the long run due to the self-criticism by the mind of its own thought, and reveals the negative control exercised by the mind over the fundamentally abstract nature of the intellectual activity which seeks to work in isolation from the rest of the life of mind.

II.

One of the most familiar admissions made regarding intellectual activity is that it is "unable to explain everything," that "it has its limits." And by this is meant not that the individual mind making the admission is incapable of advancing further, but that the intellect itself will not allow the mind to go beyond a certain point in dealing with the real world. This is not discovered and stated simply as a

* It only differs in form and not as a mental operation from the check exerted by the solid integrity of the mind over all the specialised functions of its life. The analogue of contradiction in the sphere of feeling is the sense of pain arising from a misdirected course pursued by the mind in its uniform career towards satisfaction or fulfilment; while, again, in the case of striving or volition we similarly find the sense of failure or defeat arising from the pursuit of an end futile in itself or hostile to the supreme purpose of mental life—a sense of failure which appears in such different forms as mistaken effort or remorse of conscience.

practical experience; we find it time after time erected into a general or philosophical tenet. We have but to recall the long-standing contrast and quarrel between faith and intellect in Western thought, the sceptical criticism of the intellect by Hume, the theory of Kant, and more recently the vigorous re-assertion of the same doctrine by Mr. Bradley, to find ample proof of the existence of this conviction. And it is a remarkable confirmation of the same contention that those who either do not admit it or who seem to maintain the self-sufficiency of thought do so only by blending thought with other and consciously different functions of the life of the mind. Thus, Spinoza, in spite of his intentional and initial pure intellectualism, reaches true reality not by the intellect alone but by intellectual love. Hegel at once openly confesses the impotency of conceptual procedure to deal with the teeming detail of nature and history, and yet seeks by a kind of *tour de force* to establish a quasi-logical connection between thought at its highest and nature in general,—an attempt which acquires whatever value it has from his sheer identification of intellectual activity with the entire self-conscious life of the human mind. In a work of a more recent date we find a thinker of like tendencies (Mr. Bosanquet) making the significant remark, apparently without any consciousness of its far-reaching importance for his whole view of thought, that “it is the strict and fundamental truth that love is the mainspring of logic.” These examples are quoted merely to give an indirect proof of the contention put forward frankly by the other thinkers above referred to.

Such a position was for long a source of grave trouble to myself, for I could neither admit the contention that the intellect cannot explain everything nor accept the philosophical theories put forward on its behalf, nor find complete satisfaction in the way of thought adopted by those who maintained or sought to maintain the opposite view. It seemed impossible to understand how the intellect could at once be taken as the only avenue to the intelligible, *i.e.*, mentally satisfying

apprehension of the real, and yet to hold that it was compelled to leave over a residuum of the real as beyond its grasp. The difficulty was only increased by recognising that it seemed to be by the intellect itself that this limitation of its function was discovered and formulated. How could the intellect maintain or admit its own insolvency and yet try to carry on its proper business? When, however, one observes that the intellect is from the first and in principle a mental operation consciously distinguished from, and even set apart by, the mind itself, in contrast to the other functions of the mind's life (more particularly the functions of feeling and striving), the difficulty in question disappears. For, then, it follows at once that it cannot be expected to get the whole of the real world into its net, since it starts by being only a partial expression of the full reality of the mind's life.* It does not reveal the whole nature of mind; and, therefore, the mind cannot be wholly satisfied with its deliverances, however rich and complete in their own order these deliverances of the intellect may be. The mind has other functions and other ways of approaching the real world, and no intellectual activity can be a substitute for these.† It is thus not because the intellect is incompetent to do its own work that it fails; it is because the mind in its entirety cannot be satisfied in its relation to reality by the exercise of only one of its own functions. The mind is aware that the real contains more than the intellect can supply, because the mind is related to the real through all its functions and finds the real responding and co-responding to the other

* The limitation of thought in its relation to the real rests on, and is due to, the initial separation of thought from other functions of the mind.

† The real makes an appeal to the emotions of the mind as well as to thought, to the will as well as to the emotions. It is this sphere of the real which thought can neither touch nor think away, which bars the process of thought and limits its range of operation. It is, indeed, a residuum for thought, but it is an integral part of the nature of the real for mind in its concrete fullness.

demands made upon it by the mind. The limitation of the range of the intellect does not arise because the intellect falls into contradiction when it tries too much, as Kant maintained, nor because thought is relational, as Bradley puts it. It seems absurd to condemn thought for trying to do too much, since it can never exercise its activity too far; the more it does in fact the better the result intellectually, and the intellect can never trespass beyond the sphere of intellect. It seems equally mistaken to condemn thought because it is relational, if it cannot but be relational. The restricted range of the activity of thought is determined not by thought itself, but by the more concrete reality of the mind's whole life. The fulfilment of this can alone bring satisfaction; and, while the intellect can make its own contribution to this satisfaction, the whole mind can never find that contribution sufficient for all its needs. Whatever truth the intellect attains, therefore, it must always be less than what meets the mind's requirements; and if we take the full satisfaction of the mind to be the only adequate expression for the "whole truth" regarding the mind's conscious relation to its world, then the special truth achieved by the intellect can never be the "whole truth" required. And if the "intelligibility" of the world is only reached when the mind is fully satisfied, then intelligibility involves something more than the results, however great, of intellectual activity. The limitation of thought is thus not a defect of the intellect, but merely a specialisation of the life of mind.

And just because it is so limited by and for human ends, its process and its results have all the more a human value. They can never be less than mentally satisfying, and they can never be more than this; and thus they can never overthrow nor imperil the major ends that make for and secure human satisfaction.*

* It is a mistake in principle to describe this result as the failure of thought to grasp the real; and misleading to employ such an expression as that of Lotze, that "reality is richer than thought." Thought does

The mind is always instinctively alive to the limited possibilities of satisfaction to be achieved through thinking, and seeks through other and distinctive channels to supplement the inadequacy of thought to supply entire satisfaction. It approaches the real by the avenue of emotion as well as by that of volition, and endeavours to secure in its relation to the real the highest satisfaction that these functions alone can supply. The concentration of the integrity of its life into these channels constitutes the search for beauty on the one hand and for goodness on the other. Just as the highest fulfilment of its life through the function of thought brings what we call (intellectual) truth, so the consummation of the mind's possibilities of emotion issues in the realisation of beauty, and the achievement of the work of volition is the attainment of goodness. The conventional difference of the terms employed to describe the main avenues of the self-fulfilment of the mind tends to obscure their essential connection with one another. They are connected in their source and connected in their final purpose. They emanate from the one integral life of mind seeking at all costs

not fail of its own purpose, nor does it fail to contribute its own need of satisfaction to the mind. In the face of the extraordinary achievements of scientific procedure, and, we may say, also of philosophical reflection, it seems a travesty of the facts to speak of the failure of thought. Moreover, the failure of thought would, in the long run, mean the failure of the mind to be itself or to attain its end; and it is difficult to attach any meaning to that expression, since the mind cannot bring about its own failure, and no other reality is in a position to perform that office on its behalf. It is, again, misleading to say that "reality is richer" than thought; for thought always enriches reality by lighting up for mind the meaning of things; the real would be infinitely poorer by the absence of thought. And, indeed (if it be possible at all to compare thoughts and things in this way), thought, even as thought, is much more important and more valuable for mind than many forms of the real. Just as the greatest criminal is a higher being than a beast of prey, so the poorest thought of a mind is a finer product of creation than the beetling cliffs or the immeasurable desert spaces of the earth. What such a questionable expression means is not strictly that reality is richer than thought, but that the mind is richer in its life than the processes of thought alone.

and by all its operations to maintain itself through developing its powers to meet the call of the real world. And, on the other hand, each of them finds its ultimate goal in the contribution it makes to full satisfaction of the whole mind's life, and to this they are subordinate, and by this the limit, the range of operation of each, is determined. Hence if we emphasize their community of interest and purpose, we may quite correctly regard them as identical, and this is often done even by those who have a specialised concern for the pursuit of only one of them. The poet says, "Truth is beauty: beauty truth. This is all we know on earth and all we need to know." The philosopher (Mr. Bradley) on the other hand says that in his maturer years he finds himself "taking more and more as literal fact what I used in my youth to admire and love as poetry." When, however, we do not emphasize this community of aim, and only then, we can regard these avenues towards mental satisfaction as different, each pursuing its own course in terms of its own laws and conditions.* Each is pursued in abstraction from the others, because only by so doing can the finite mind concentrate its energies. It concentrates in order to achieve, and to get the utmost in one direction it must, at least temporarily, isolate one channel from the others. We find this in the case of thought: it holds equally in the case of emotion and of volition. Each is abstract by itself, but one abstraction is as much justified and as inevitable as the other. Were it not for the abstraction of thought, we may say, the other abstractions would not be made or required. If the one abstract activity can accomplish its end, so can the others. The attainment of the utmost that emotion and volition can supply is necessary to

* But if we lose sight altogether of their inherent connection, the inevitable result will be the creation of conflicts between their aims. And this we find constantly happens in actual experience: truth at war with goodness, goodness at war with beauty. In such conflicts we shall find at once some of the greatest tragedies of experience and the greatest comedies.

balance the utmost which thought can achieve. And when the mind is in possession of the resources and accomplishments of all of them it reaches the highest level of its life. This consists in the restoration or reinstatement, at a higher level, of the primordial integrity of mind from which its being as an individual whole starts, and for the maintenance of which the enterprise and adventure of its experience are undertaken. This highest level is a restoration, because the primal integrity was broken when the abstraction of functions from one another took place; it is a reinstatement because the maintenance of its integrity from first to last is the final purpose of all its operations. The equipoise of its being in the midst of a changing and varied world is the essence of its satisfaction and fulfilment.

The demand, therefore, for the maximum of enjoyment, or again of good, in the mind's relation to the real is the necessary counterstroke to the effort to reach truth through the channel of the intellect. And it is important to observe that the mind insists on regarding both beauty and goodness as universal and objective, though under the same limitations as conceptions are held to be so. The ascription of beauty to the real world and, again, the insistence that the world is on the side of goodness are no more metaphors than the assertion that conceptions or truths are valid of the real. The universality of a judgment of beauty is as certain as that of a scientific judgment, and as certain because it possesses the same characteristics of universality: it is permanent for the mind that holds it, and it holds for a plurality of minds. In fact if beauty and goodness had not these features, so commonly ascribed to truth alone,* it would be impossible, *e.g.*, to give meaning to the life of the artist, or to justify the most elementary act of moral goodness. The real supports the ends of the artist and the

* The explanation of this is the mere accident that the problems of knowledge have centred round the nature of science.

moral agent, as completely as it corroborates the assertions of the scientist. That beauty and goodness are so often held to be merely subjective or mental states, while truth is considered to be characteristically objective, seems partly due to the fact that in the case of the former the tendency is to think more of the origin and process of achievement, in the case of the latter to pay attention to the result and overlook the process; and partly to the fact that in the former the sensuous elements of human life are more in evidence than in the case of thinking.* What holds of truth, however, certainly holds in the same way of the pursuit of beauty and of goodness: and, conversely, if the latter are human creations established in the interest of the self-fulfilment of the mind, the like must be maintained of the basis as well as the superstructure of thought.

It is because of the abstract character which each of these channels possesses in relation to the other and to the whole of mind, that we find in experience that one of them is exclusively chosen by certain types of mind as the main channel of satisfaction. The choice is a matter of individuality, capacity, and instinctive interest, and no principle can be laid down which shall declare that the choice of one is more essential to the mind than another. For in each case the choice is justified by the fact that the world does bring satisfaction in its own kind to the mind. The suggested emphasis on one at the expense of the other is an unfortunate, but a natural psychical, result of the selection. In consequence, we find the attempt sometimes made to subordinate one to the other, or even to establish the value of one in terms of the other. Hence the forms of æstheticism, intellectualism, and pragmatism in the history of the human mind. These are at best but misdirections or

* On the other hand, when the essential universality of beauty and goodness is emphasized, the tendency is to treat them as containing conceptions of a type similar to intellectual conceptions. This is equally mistaken: but, at any rate, it brings into prominence the affinity between the effort after beauty and goodness and the effort after truth.

exaggerations of a healthy tendency to select the line of approach to completeness that best suits an individual mind. Each individual suffers from the prejudice created by his choice; but that is merely of biographical importance and interest.

III.

The last point I wish to refer to is that intellectual processes are never merely intellectual. Distinct as thought, emotion, and striving are, as channels towards mental fulfilment, both in their course and in their issues, it is remarkable how in actual experience they betray the community of their source in spite of their distinctness. It is as if the integrity of the mind refused to be disintegrated by these abstractions, however firmly the abstraction tries to keep to its own groove. The whole life of the mind as a unity of intellect, emotion, and striving asserts its sway over them; and, indeed, permeates the separate avenues which it takes to attain completeness. Thus, in the case of intellectual activity strenuousness of effort or striving is a fundamental condition of reaching an intellectual result, though such strenuousness is not in itself an intellectual quality, but a quality of volition in the stricter sense. Intellectually such strenuousness is indispensable to the process, and yet is irrelevant to the logical value of the result attained. And with this volitional element are bound up many derivative conditions of intellectual success, conditions which we sometimes speak of even as virtues of the intellectual attitude, *e.g.*, those of honesty, truthfulness, sincerity, seriousness, perseverance, courage, and the like. None of these strictly constitute an intellectual conception or arrangement of conceptions; but they most certainly regulate the course of our intellectual activity. In some cases they may effectively determine the issue of our thinking, *e.g.*, by narrowing the outlook or by arresting thought in the interests of preconceived ideas, relevant or irrelevant. And, at any rate, the neglect of these virtues does most certainly alter the value

of the result which we reach. Similarly, the emotional element plays a most vital part in the operations of the intellect. The bent of our intellect towards a certain type of inquiry or course of thought is settled, more than we often willingly admit, by the emotional attitude we take up to the object considered. How, otherwise, can we explain the indifference, and even revulsion, some minds feel towards history, mathematics or metaphysics? * Surely, if the intellectual activity was in no way affected by emotions, individuals should be able to take a continuous intellectual interest in every object alike, though doubtless the degree of attainment would vary with intellectual capability. But this is not what in fact we find. To some minds the intellectual attitude is rendered impossible from the start by an emotional recoil from the object to be thought about. Those matters in which we take a keen intellectual interest make, either at the beginning or very quickly, an emotional appeal to the mind amounting in some cases to an intensity of passion which will carry even an inferior intellect over the most serious obstacles to understanding. We may generalise Shakespeare's maxim regarding education, and say "No profit is where is no pleasure ta'en; in brief, sir, study what you most affect." For, indeed, no mind can long sustain continuity of intellectual activity without the impulsion derived from a strong emotion of curiosity, or without the emotional elevation which is the better and larger part of the reward of unimpeded intellectual effort. The most impersonal scientific mind is far from being emotionally colourless; or, if it does become indifferent even to the emotional effect of successful achievement, it is curious to note how soon either ennui or depression seizes the mind. It has often been remarked that, in philosophical speculation, the most severely abstract and rigorously formal thinkers seem dominated by a kind of

* It is noteworthy that the initial emotional attitude is, in most cases, an index and anticipation of the intellectual capacity to understand.

fanatical enthusiasm for logical order and dialectical display. Now, this emotional accompaniment of intellectual activity has emphatically nothing to do with the constitution of the truth which the intellect seeks to secure. The truth is determined simply and solely by the canons and conditions of intellectual procedure. The emotion pervades the activity, but it does not directly regulate the conduct of the understanding.

Yet, so profoundly does it affect the character of intellectual activity that it sometimes seems as if, at least for certain minds, the intellectual process were undertaken to secure a result which should be not merely an intellectual satisfaction but an aesthetic or emotional satisfaction at the same time. Everyone with very strong intellectual interest in some field of thought must have felt the peculiar thrill which invariably follows the apprehension of an illuminating principle. Such a thrill is purely aesthetic in its quality, and yet may seem as important, sometimes even more important, for the mind than the abstract truth of the principle itself. Similarly, the sense of form is a most important factor in determining the intellectual result. The mere beauty of the arrangement of the conceptions involved in a specific sequence of thought gives a satisfaction all its own, and seems worth securing for its own sake. The intellectual labour seems to find its perfect consummation in the symmetry of the product of its activity. This holds of scientific thinking in the narrow sense, as any one acquainted with, *e.g.*, mathematical investigation is aware. But it holds as much, and even more, in philosophy, where the idea of symmetrically arranged thought plays the part, for certain minds, of a kind of additional canon of intellectual truth. Systems of philosophy, as systems, are the outcome of an aesthetic interest in intellectual procedure. They are the products of the artistic imagination operating on the material provided by the conceptions of the intellect. They are designed to satisfy the aesthetic sense rather than the purely intellectual attitude, and illustrate by an extreme case the

inseparable connection between emotional and intellectual processes of the mind.

We need not consider how in the same way intellect is involved in the fulfilment of the emotional attitude of the mind, or in that of volition; nor, again, how the aesthetic element plays a part in the achievement of goodness. Analysis would reveal that, in the attainment of the end pursued by each of the abstract operations, the other factors of the mind are present as co-operating influences. But indeed no deep analysis is required to demonstrate a fact which experience is constantly bringing to light. On the one hand the condemnation of beauty in the name of goodness or of goodness in the name of beauty, on the other hand the term "beauty of holiness," or again the utterance of truth with the perfect grace of literary expression, are familiar illustrations of the indissoluble blending in actual experience of the distinctive attitudes assumed by the human mind in its process of self-fulfilment, however much the attitudes may claim specific independence of one another. The solid integrity of the whole life of mind will not allow itself to be set aside by any exclusive interest in one of its abstract functions. However much this insistence on its concrete entirety may spell inconsistency or hamper with irrelevance the abstract procedure of each distinctive attitude, apparently the mind as a whole prefers the inconsistency and the irrelevance to the impoverishment of its life by an over-emphasis on one of its functions. And some of the more open-minded of those who have sought supreme satisfaction along the intellectual channel of the mind's activity frankly admit in the end that their special avenue does not give the whole truth they desire, does not even give the whole truth sought along that one channel. I recall in this connection the admissions made by the strenuously intellectualistic mind of Mr. Bradley that, in the long run, as he paradoxically puts it, "truth cannot become consistently and ultimately true," that truth is more than consistency and contains more than the criterion of non-contradiction

can supply; that our minds and our feelings must, at least in part, determine the composition of the final satisfaction we find in truth, and indeed that a man's philosophy is in a real sense a matter of personal choice.

It is partly because these three attitudes of the mental life emanate from the essential integrity of the mind, and partly because in actually fulfilling the demands of any one the others indirectly reveal their presence, that the mind is induced, at any rate, to hope that in the long run the achievements of their several aims will converge or co-operate in the production of a supreme state of mental satisfaction. This would restore at the consummation of thought, of emotion, and of striving, the sense of unity from which their divergent operations start, and in the interest of which they prosecute their course towards completion. Such a hope is certainly warranted, and the realisation of it is the larger part of the best religious experience. The convergence of these aims, however, can never be more than an aspiration for any one of them. Each by itself is burdened with its imperfection, and even at times haunted by defeat, simply because by itself it is abstract and consciously abstract. The imperfection is expressly admitted in a curious way. It is held, *e.g.*, that for the fulfilment of the purposes of the intellect, as well as those of goodness, "faith" is required. This faith is brought in to give the assurance of final completeness, which each by itself never seems to reach. This supplementary faith at once removes or corrects the imperfection due to the abstract procedure of thinking and striving. It is the way in which the mind as a single unity asserts or reaffirms its hold over the abstract aims of thought (and striving), and keeps them in immediate and continuous contact with the integrity of its life. The faith is not an attitude of the intellect itself (or of volition), but an act of the whole mind. Properly speaking, it does not mean that in time the intellect will create final satisfaction for the mind, for it will never do so, no matter how long it operates.

Nor does it mean that the intellect might ultimately fail unless it were held up or kept going by faith; for the intellect is always attaining success wherever and whenever it fulfils the conditions of intellectual procedure, and the mind has never any honest doubt about the value of intellectual activity. This so-called faith is simply the attitude by which the whole mind lays claim to all the achievements of the intellect in the pursuit of its abstract career, gives them their place in the constitution of that supreme satisfaction wherein the mind is fulfilled and on the attainment of which its hopes are set. The faith so exercised is thus the correlative of that hope for final fulfilment to which reference has been made. That it should be found necessary is a complete confirmation of the position maintained throughout this argument, viz., that intellectual activity is an abstract operation of the human mind, and finds its entire significance in contributing to the fulfilment of a human individuality. The faith called in to supplement intellectual procedure is meaningless outside the interests and conditions of human life. It is irrelevant to the world of things whether organic or inorganic. So long as faith is thus necessary to give significance to the aims of the intellect, there is no escape from the essentially anthropomorphic character of intellectual procedure, even apart from the considerations already adduced to establish the same conclusion.

While the various ends pursued by the human mind in its process towards self-discovery or self-fulfilment are thus one and all—truth as well as goodness, and beauty as well as truth—anthropomorphic in origin and realisation, this conclusion must not be misunderstood. They are, on this account, neither purely subjective nor mere passing shadows on the surface of reality. In achieving these ends of its being the mind is using its utmost powers to secure and maintain its place amidst the world of beings with which it is confronted, and in which its lot is cast—the endless variety of objects which make up what we embrace under the terms nature, human nature

and supernature. And this supreme aim dominates the mind's career from first to last. At its earliest stage of development it faces its world as a plastic but largely undifferentiated unity, adapting itself as well as it can to the incessant challenge made upon it by other beings. At its latest stages it brings out all its resources separately and successively to meet the call of its world, and establish its unity in relation to its world. In fulfilling these demands it at once develops its own nature, and establishes its place in the realm of reality. By so doing, it achieves the highest of which its special order of being—that of an individual human mind—is capable, and therefore it expresses all that reality in the form of a human mind contains. If we call this supreme result, as we may, the “full truth” of mind, then the mind's entire fulfilment is in very literalness a revelation of the real. If we say, as some do, that in the human mind the real world becomes articulately conscious, then we may put the same position in the form that the human mind is a conscious exponent of the nature of reality. But such a manner of expression adds nothing to the main contention, and is apt to be misleading, since it suggests that the processes of our mental life have a kind of inarticulate embodiment in the non-human domain of the real whereas my contention is that the processes and their outcome have neither existence nor significance beyond the domain of the finite human mind whose peculiar nature they unfold or express. It is enough for us that our place in the world of the real is as well established and as much an embodiment of the nature of reality as any other being claiming to be real. Our place becomes established when our ends are completely fulfilled, and by realising our place our ends themselves are shown to be of the essence of reality. By assuming human shape, ultimate reality thereby literally becomes human. And we need not say, with Athanasius, that this was done *in order that* we might become like the ultimately real. For, in fact, we have neither the capacity nor the desire to be other than that part of ultimate

reality which we embody. To be this fully is to be both human and ultimately real at once. Only with our whole mind can this be accomplished ; but with this it is, not as an act of faith but as literal fact, attained.



IX.—REALISM AND POLITICS.

By J. W. SCOTT.

SUMMARY.

The paper is intended to show how little surprising it is that the speculations of M. Bergson and Mr. Russell, in practice, should work out in the same way; that people in the more advanced social movements of the present time should think to draw inspiration from both sources. The thesis is that there is something common to both the ways of thinking, that with this part of themselves they touch social movements, and that the feature in which they at once touch social movements and touch each other is their realism.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that in speaking of politics here, I am not using the word only in its newspaper sense but also academically, as it might be used in the same breath with ethics or economics or metaphysics, for the title of one of the human sciences. The coupling of the term with realism is simply a way of raising the question what sort of politics is legitimated by a realistic metaphysics. And it may be noted, in regard to the "is" in this statement, that no fine distinction between existential and other significance is intended. The word is to be left for the moment with the happy combination of meanings which it usually carries in actual discussions about things that matter. We are simply asking what sort of politics is actually being legitimately derived from a realistic way of looking at man and the world, or is legitimately seeking inspiration there, or is legitimately finding it without seeking.

To begin with the first word in our title, what is realism? When one begins to look for specimen thinkers whose thought

shall deserve description by this word, one naturally turns to English philosophy as a promising field, but with less success than might have been expected. The reason is that Berkeley is there and he rather upsets calculations. One thinks at once of Reid and of Locke, not to go as far as Hobbes. It is rather puzzling at first to know where to put Hume. This is because Berkeley is always at the back of our minds. With Berkeley as standard Hume is an idealist; and by the same criterion Reid, the enemy of both, is a realist. But compare Hume with Locke. Locke's faith in the strict deliverances of the senses is almost timid compared with the lengths to which Hume carries it. Surely, there is a plain sense in which Hume was the greatest realist of them all. Yet, what is Hume but a very consistent Berkeley? Was Berkeley himself a realist, then, "immaterialism" and all? My own belief is that our difficulties here are evidence that our standards have gone wrong somewhere. So long as our notion of realism is too much influenced by memories of Berkeley, it remains too vague to help us in deciding either who are the realists, or what is realistic about them.

It would be a pity on this account to discard idealism and realism as over-driven terms. A genuine antithesis between them can still be defined, I think, by approaching them from another quarter.

Reid says somewhere: "For forty years I have considered the view that things do not exist outside us, and for forty years I have been unable to see why." It would seem that to Berkeley's assertion, "You cannot prove that things are material," Reid would reply, "You cannot prove that they are mental." "I see no grounds for saying they are without," says one party to the controversy; "*I* see no grounds for saying they are within," says the other.

Upon all these matters I still venture to think that Kant brought quite a different line of considerations to bear. He, too, was bothered a little about where phenomena were; but

his main point was that there were laws amongst them : and Fichte, going one better, held it was necessary that there should be such, and that they should be the laws they were ; it was necessary with the necessity of spirit.

Here we have another meaning given to idealism. It is now the doctrine that things are a construction and are spiritual because they offer the spirit of man its good and its freedom. That view of things is now idealistic, which, upon finding the place of anything in a world construed in the direction of wholeness of spirit, assumes that then or there it has found the truth of that thing. Its reverse is the view which is, as far as possible, non-constructive : whose aim is, so far as possible, to get at things as they are or appear when the minimum of construction is put upon them. With this criterion in our hands we can see that realism is empiricism (pluralism), and that Locke, Berkeley, and Reid were all realists in spirit ; because in their several ways all of them had a great reverence for the immediately given, and were possessed of a great desire to accept it. If Berkeley was idealist at all it was because of the suggestion, baseless, as I think, yet perhaps inseparable from his having taken outer things as inner, that he thereby made them more pliable to human freedom and richer in human good. It is a great thing, to certain minds, to have it made out that the stuff of the outer world is mind-stuff.

Judged by this standard, we seem to have genuine realists at the present time, and such realism has a politics, a fact which is testified to, to some degree, both by political theory appearing over realists' names (I am thinking here of Russell) and by the political movements to which realistic philosophy has given encouragement (I am thinking here of Bergson). Our problem is to construe the nature of this co-operation between a phase of current thought and a phase of current social tendency.

Does the bare mention of Bergson's name in such a context

provoke a challenge? I trust it will not go even further and prove simply distasteful. It is easy to imagine such an unhappy result. It is easy to conceive minds to whom the mere suggestion that Bergson's political influence is an example of realism in politics would convey nothing but a disheartening sense of the elasticity of terms and the uselessness of philosophical discussion. I do not think that such a feeling would be well founded. I do not think that any mere abuse of terms is being perpetrated here. If we take "realism" simply and take Bergson's teaching simply too, I think it can be shown that his teaching has a realistic side, and that with this side of itself it touches political movements.

The justification of the opinion that there is realism in Bergson is a matter of keeping well in view the distinction we have made between a Kant-derived and a Berkeley-derived idealism; it is a matter of defining realism by opposition to the former and not the latter. Realism is not the view that things are non-mental. It is the view which treats the question of their position in the best arrangement, the best "place for the soul," that the universe will make, as quite indifferent to the question of their reality. It is the view that the most indubitably real is the most nearly non-constructed.

I do not believe that the conception of realism so arising is out of relation to ordinary usage. The word is used in ordinary intercourse with abundant looseness of meaning. It has become so worn and debased that many would like to see it excluded from the philosophical vocabulary. But is the nucleus of the ordinary usage so difficult to fix? As a term, realism can appear in the most various quarters. Yet, the thing can appear in as many, and without losing a certain simple and fairly definite identity. Realism, the thing, is a temper of mind. It is the temper which wants to meet reality, and means thereby not reality arranged for show but reality naked.

There is a sense in which, in almost any of the higher human pursuits, a man may resolve to take his raw material raw. A musician or a novelist will achieve a certain character if he resolve as far as possible to take his materials, his sounds, or his situations, as he picks them up, and not to practise on them to nearly the usual extent that selection which pleases. There is the spirit which worships *das Vorgefundene*. Conscious theory apart, there are people whose practice presumes a value in things in virtue of the mere fact that they are to be found. This I take to be the spirit of realism. It is a picker-up of unconsidered trifles. It loves the neglected given.

We can go further and say realism loves the given. It loves what is to be had for the admitting. It takes to easy things. On occasion we pass this judgment upon it almost without thinking. We turn upon the plausibilities of *Realpolitik*, for example, with the very natural remark, "that's easy." This remark is just to the thing. Realism, indeed, is thorough. Glaucon in the *Republic* was complimented upon his thoroughness. But fundamentally this is not its character. Realism only possesses the peculiar sort of thoroughness which is compatible with a fundamental taking of things easily.

Realism is thorough in this, that while it adopts what just meets the eye, it yet to a certain extent mounts guard, is very vigilant in refusing to adopt what just meets anybody's eye. There is such a thing for it as a prejudiced eye. There are minds which never see the naked given, people whose habit is to "take the higher view of things." They are unfamiliar with the elemental, not in that they have never seen it, for it comes into every human lot, but in the sense that even if for once in a while some sudden outcrop of the stark and ugly does happen to leap into view for a moment and be seen, such minds are so made that they do not retain the vision: they cannot dis sever this basilisk-glance from the rest of the picture; they cannot help dragging in along with it the thousand and one other things which go with it and help to

compensate for it, and eventually overlay and transform it, and make it not, perhaps, good, but far less crudely evil than it seemed. Such minds have an eye of their own for the world, an eye which always does a certain work upon the real, bringing it into the light of other things, and thus instantaneously, besides seeing, estimating it. The realistic temper is not going to adopt whatever meets this type of observation. It does not accord therewith. It would seize the reality before this work upon it has begun, or it would take it up after the effects have been stripped off. The realist, as radically as he may, will "cut" the idealising; and this, whatever his pursuit, poetry or music, history, drama, storytelling, or anything else. His thoroughness is real, but his thoroughness is also negative in character.

If this characterisation be sound, the realistic spirit is susceptible of definition. It emerges as the desire to take the given as given, and not do anything to it. In the literal sense of the terms, it is against work. This emboldens me to say that realism in philosophy, too, though in different degrees according to the species it is of, is the apology for mental *ignavia*. It does not seem lazy. It seems strenuous. It is exceedingly strenuous. But this does not invalidate the contention. We have always to ask in what enterprise? Many lazy people are strenuous—when they are avoiding work. There is no end to what they will undertake with that in view.

I have no wish to load the dice in the philosophical game or appeal to a metaphor against any school of thinkers. But between the Herculean labours of the realists and the case we have cited, there seems to be more than a fanciful analogy. Realism has let itself in for a great deal of labour; that, I think, is undoubted: and it appears to be the consequence of its having permitted itself at the first to do something whose seductive easiness was its most conspicuous feature.

The extent of the labour in which realism has involved itself is spoken of by two facts; although, in making the

remark, I should say that the realism affiliated to Meinong and Russell, not Mr. Alexander's, is primarily in question.* On the one hand, it is committed to opening up in the universe a bewilderingly vast and unexpected field for "mental adventure." There is no end to the things which, on this view, may be. On the other hand, there is a very rapid end to the significant things which we can be sure are. One sometimes wonders what can be the sober judgment passed upon such a book, for example, as Mr. Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*, in a quiet hour by the class of readers to which it is addressed; surely that very little is quite certainly true, according to this book, and that little not very much worth believing. What the same common-sense readers would think, did they realise how many trivial things are certainly true, would be hard to say. I do not know, for instance, with what emotions they would learn, from a perusal of Mr. Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, this about Socrates and Plato; and it is quite certainly true: that twice Socrates multiplied by Plato with the square of Socrates and the square of Plato added, are the equivalent of the square of Socrates and Plato taken together.† It is not strictly accurate to say that realism has not many certainties to offer. It is just to say that it tends to fill the world very full of very irrelevant ones. Since our minds are so made that they tend to attach importance to things in some sort of proportion to their certainty, this means that it provides us with an extraordinarily unfamiliar and upset universe.

In whose name, we must next ask, is all this work being wrought? In the name, it must be answered, of something very easy, what we can only call the *just-there*. It reminds one irresistibly of the person strenuously lazy. What does the

* Although the number of "paradoxes" which Mr. Alexander finds himself needing to spring upon us would seem to involve him a little too. See below.

† *Principles of Mathematics*, Sec. 7. Mr. Russell, of course, says, "if Plato and Socrates are numbers," but that is surely understood.

realist feel has been outraged by a long philosophical tradition, except the direct deliverances of our apprehension? What is he doing to restore perspectives except this: first standing idly before the given, being tender to it, abandoning all attempts to construe it, trying simply to *take* it, muttering to himself in succession, "just this," "this *here*," "this here *now*," "this *out* here now;" and, secondly, having secured this first, easiest, and idlest of all knowledges, espousing it as the most indubitable truth in the world and driving everything out of the realm of metaphysics which does not leave it inviolate? Here he takes his last stand; all else must conform. If this involves that there must be objective errors, then objective errors there must be. If this involves that things must be real which do not exist, then things are real which do not exist. If this involves that every possible appearance is an eternal entity, then an eternal entity it must be. Everything in the circle of the realists' horizon must make way for this-here-now-outside-the-mind. What is the outcome except the nemesis which overtakes the same procedure elsewhere, the unwilling hard labour of working against the grain of the world, to which those are condemned who will not work with it? The world has a grain. The realists are apparently having to work frantically against it. The explanation seems to be that they have turned and taken it smoothly in the one little corner where it was cross, and now cannot change their direction. This turning upside down of the world of common sense through the effort to take as unmodifiable a very small part of it is less apparent in some realists than in others. It is possibly due, however, only to there being some not so thorough as others. The quandary is in the nature of the situation. The situation is that realism in its own proper character has crossed over from other forms of human pursuit into philosophy and has brought its fruits with it.

I should not think of thrusting upon Bergson always and

everywhere the spirit of keeping the given inviolate which I take to be the spirit of realism. He probably does not exhibit it to any great degree anywhere. But its traces are to be found, I think, in his treatment of the will. What is characteristic in his treatment is, at any rate, much nearer what the spirit of realism would prescribe than is the representation of the will given, say, by an idealism of the Hegelian type.

How should one proceed in a treatment of the will in order to be as faithful to the realistic spirit as possible? Not, in any case, after the fashion of idealistic politics. "The state is the individual writ large." "The state is a kingdom of ends in which everyone is both sovereign and subject." "Obedience to civil law is simply the will submitting to its own higher and saner self." "As a citizen the individual approves the laws he obeys and obeys the laws he approves." "The coming of democracy is the coming of freedom." What is wrong with such statements as these? Why are they so plainly not the language of realism? Because, as I think, the attitude they bespeak is one which conspicuously does not determine itself by reference to man's given will. Such language refers to a freedom and a sovereignty and an expression. They are the freedom, the sovereignty, or the expression, not at all of man's given will but, if of anything, of a will so sublimated as to find in the established institutions of society its aptest instruments.

As in regard to facts realism distrusts idealising, so in regard to the will it distrusts sublimation. As real fact is "this now here before me," so real want is "this [gap or lack] now here in me." The same brand of thoroughness appears here as before. The realist seeks to begin at bed-rock want, as he sought to begin at bed-rock fact. He finds it in the same fashion. To find what he *really* wants, he has to let himself go for the moment, to slack out, resign the effort to do anything to whatever appears, say to himself "just this now felt here in me," idly allowing to the "this," the "here and now" and the "me" the full emphasis which they draw upon themselves. Bed-rock is

the uncontaminated given. Having got it, the realist sets to work. So far from refusing to construct altogether, he proceeds to construct most strenuously—or “reconstruct.” But the parallel with his adventure in knowledge holds precisely. It is in the name of the given (will) that he conducts a reconstruction which involves him in a Herculean labour.

Now, when the human will is under treatment in Bergson's pages, there is a leaning towards the principle that the real is the given; or that that which is non-constructed, along the lines on which the mind of man naturally constructs, is the truly human thing.

It is common knowledge that Bergson suspects the intellect in the region of conduct. Artist as he is, the admirable life exhibits to him, firstly, grace. Look, to go no further, at his theory of laughter. Laughter is the great social cleanser; and its object is the awkward, the mechanical, which means, in the light of Bergson's other teaching, the spatial and ultimately the intellectual. And as the intellectual is a thing to be laughed out of a proper society, so also it is a thing to be dispensed with in a properly free will. Bergson answers the cardinal question of freedom positively. He believes that man is free. But he rests his case on the non-intellectual character of the free decision. So far as the intellect and all that involves its guidance—systems of thought, language, ideals, social relations—constitute the mind's native work of construction, so far the human will becomes human by being non-constructed. Its direction is away from these things. Its freedom is its power to withdraw from these, recoil upon itself, and act without them. You find the real human will just when you find it able to escape or undo its own native movement. Here we have in another way the maxim: Let the non-rationally-constructed suffice. The theory takes as the will, that which does not intellectually construe and predict, that which is given as the will, apart from the labour of rationalisation. Herein consists the realism of it.

It will be claimed at once that Bergson insists, both regarding the intuition whereby man perceives the truth and regarding the recoil of personality upon itself in the moment of great free decision, that it is by no means an easy matter. This, however, does not touch our point. Of course, Bergson makes this claim. His Kingdom of Heaven too suffereth violence, and the violent take it by storm. He tells us in studied variety of language that intuition is an effort, even a violent effort. But the question recurs, effort of what sort? Violence how directed? Is not the answer as before? Is it not simply that the mind long accustomed to trying to *think* its way to the truth or to a decision finds it hard to cease from this native direction of its energy? Does not Bergson say that to philosophise is "to invert the habitual direction of the work of thought"? In its great effort towards truth and freedom, is not the mind precisely in the case of the old shopkeeper who found it impossible to take a holiday, because he had never had one? It was too hard work for him. Yet, it was still the difficulty of doing nothing. This strenuous intuition of Bergson's is still akin to the child's state of mind; it is still akin to a taking of our ease, a letting ourselves relax and rove and dream; it is akin to the instinct of the animal. The effort of intuition is an effort backwards. That from out of which mind must withdraw itself in order to be free is the native work of the mind. It was the sense of this work being thus proved all vain so far as truth and freedom were concerned that led the present writer, quite apart from the parallelism between Bergson's system and Schopenhauer's, to look upon it as pessimistic.

The realism in Bergson consists in the affinity between what he says is the true nature of the will and what the will is first given as, in the child or in the animal. The point of affinity is its being not rationally-constructed; in other words, the unpredictableness of its movements, its incalculableness. With this side of itself, now, the system touches political movements.

This realistic ingredient in the system explains what would otherwise appear a strangely fortuitous historical chance. For there has been a meeting between two of the very strong forces of our time, Bergsonism and what we may call, for the moment, the new socialism. On the side of one of the partners there has been no evident desire for this union, but underlying affinities seem to have proved too strong.

I am not sure whether Bergson has taken any public notice of the interpretations which the syndicalist part of his following have put upon him. On the merits of the case it is not easy to see what reply he could render. One line would, indeed, be open to him to take. He might say that from his teaching no set of persons had any right to deduce any programme for the future improvement of mankind whatever. But what he could reply to a plea from the syndicalists of not guilty on this charge; what he could answer to a protest that they had not done this thing, that, on the contrary, the very charm of Bergson's doctrine was that you could not get a programme out of it, that they did not want a programme, that it was their very policy to go on without one—does not appear. And this is precisely what the newest socialism, that is to say, revolutionary syndicalism, has been saying through the mouth of its high priest for some considerable time. The mission of Georges Sorel, as he himself conceives it, appears to be, not to tell the working classes about the new régime they are to prepare; not to tell them what it is to be, and how it is all to come; but to tell them just that it will not be if they plan it, and to warn them not to have to do with the intellectual bourgeoisie who profess to plan it for them. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald put it very well in the *Sociological Review* for 1912. "Sorel says quite candidly, 'I cannot tell you what is going to happen, I am mainly interested in getting action.' The reformist syndicalist says, 'Act wisely'; the syndicalist revolutionary, of which Sorel is the teacher and the philosopher, and, above all, the poet . . . says, 'Do not bother about the adverb, be quite

sure of the verb ; you need not necessarily act wisely, but, in the name of everything you hold good and dear, act.' " According to Sorel, what move mankind are not plans which are realised, but myths which are never realised.

Now, Bergson endorses this. He cannot help it. It is in the very cast of his metaphysic ; and that, again, is due to his way of meeting a philosophical situation which others than he have sought to meet. There are indications that the motive of Bergson's philosophy is much the same as that which lies behind the thinking of Green, a desire to withstand the claim of naturalism, i.e., scientific metaphysics, to take the whole universe for its province. But, whatever the motive, the object of attack is clear. He attacks the scientist's instrument, the intellect, and the world of ideas generally. Against these is put up the charge that they do not yield the truth either of what is within or of what is without, either of man's inner personality and its creativeness or of the creative evolution going on in the world around him.

In this account of things there appear two features which both suit the syndicalist. We are shown what is at work making the universe. And we are shown that this agency is beyond man's intellectual powers to comprehend.

What is at work is life penetrating matter. A vast, single force has ever since the beginning of things been occupied making a stupendous upward thrust against resistance. Matter is the resistance, and life, the life which we see bursting through matter at every pore, is the creative force. Evolution is the story of how this *élan vital*, forcing its way up, has canalised matter into ever more and more complex configurations, until at length, through the inconceivably intricate channel of the human brain, it bursts into the light of full consciousness. This side of the story suits the syndicalist, inasmuch as it gives the locus of any social movement which can take itself sufficiently seriously. The world-life itself must be what is taking further shape in all the further

progress of humanity. The foremost movement, whatever it is, must constitute the crest of the advancing wave. This, of course, is the *rôle* which syndicalism conceives itself to play.

The other feature of the doctrine is that the life-force escapes the comprehension of the intellect. Its nature cannot be rationalised. Its further track cannot be mapped out, foreseen, or arranged for. Freedom of will is at root freedom of the *élan vital*, and unpredictability is of the essence of Bergson's conception of freedom of will. This precisely supports the syndicalist in what he feels has been wrong with the old socialism from the beginning. The old pioneers of socialism gave you a finished sketch of how the new socialist state was to be all arranged. They built Utopias. They kept mapping out all the perfection to be. Marx temporarily lifted socialism out of this, but only temporarily. There arose an order of creature after him, peaceably-minded revisionists, Fabians, *et hoc genus omne*, smoothing over his sharp points and toning down his martial spirit, who are regarded by the new lights with abundant loathing. Now, Bergson helps to define those bourgeois within the camp, and it is well known that you cannot despise a set of persons to any purpose till you have defined them. Those people profess interest in the workers. But they are "intellectuals." They make plans, they study the science of sociology, they amass statistics, they write books. They see how the great programme is all going to work. They have even tried to commence the working. They have put on their big spectacles, and taken up their long forceps, and begun to patch and to doctor, as in Will Dyson's great cartoon. After Bergson, what does all this mean but that they are just what their name implies—that they have become the dupes of the intellect again, have tried to act like beings who could foresee, and not simply sought to lie back on the running flood, spread their sails to the winds of God, and await the splendid catastrophe?

Bergson's assumption that the will of man becomes characteristic through reversing its natural movement and going from rational construction instead of deeper into it, leaves, at least, one realistic feature a permanent character in the will of man—incalculableness. The syndicalist, who saw how well such an instrument fitted all his purposes, would have been more than human had he not availed himself of it.

But there is another feature in the given will besides its incalculableness. That is its narrowness. And there is another side to the history of socialism than its gradually learning to accept and justify incalculableness. That is its learning to accept and justify narrowness. The latter is the direction in which the professed realism of Russell, as distinct from the implicit realism of Bergson, agrees with it and helps it.

Our contention is that the tendency of socialism to accept and justify incalculableness has been supplemented by a new tendency to accept and justify narrowness. This is, I think, historical fact. In this respect, too, the latest socialism is in contrast with earlier forms.

There would seem to be very little mystery about either of the two following circumstances if looked at from a sufficiently detached point of view: (*a*) that the socialistic activities of two or three generations ago should have learnt to shape themselves into the sort of socialism that stands before us to-day as "official" or "parliamentary"; or (*b*) that the latter should have acquired so many doubts about itself and should have become the object of so much extraneous criticism from both above and below as it has to-day. These facts are straws which showed how a very strong tide was running.

(*a*) Given the sort of ideas from which socialism both in this country and in France drew its first inspiration, the obvious practical method of bringing the socialist dream nearer realisation was bound to appear to be the getting of men inspired by these ideas into the legislature.

It is true there was a kind of knight-errantry about the earliest socialism that favoured isolated spasmodic efforts. Men like Saint Simon and Fourier and Robert Owen presented schemes for the regeneration of society into which state action was not primarily looked to. Owen's *Book of the New Moral World* is an elaborate deterministic philosophy, designed to show that only by bettering man's condition can you better him, and that to better his condition is to better him. The contention is that man's nature has been artificially warped. You only need to remove the fetters of custom and convention and set him in the free air again in order to see him grow natural and beautiful and good. The view, it is easy to see now, was cataclysmic in character: and Owen's experiments were foredoomed to failure.

But the failure of the earliest socialism had the effect of changing the point of assault upon the old régime. Owen was fated to discover that man could not profit by the socialist régime until he was ready for it. Man's actual state was the real problem. His transition to the ideal must be just as fast as the whole of society can move along with him. At what point, then, could a reformer best hope to move the whole of society? Surely, by acting at its centre, by getting the right men into the legislature. The double lesson, that of trying to move not isolated little communities but the whole state, and of trying to move it not all at a rush but gradually, could hardly be overlearned, even under the influence of the later teaching of Marx and Engels. It was supported by too many collateral facts.

With these two leaders the catastrophic view arises again. When Marx passed the prophetic word that socialism was no dream, but was coming, that evolution itself had the matter in hand; that capitalism by its inherent nature was drifting towards its Niagara, and that the workers of the world need only unite and push it over, the resulting impetus to socialistic thinking was greater than any that it had ever known.

Yet, it did not gain undisputed possession of the field. The republican spirit of France seemed to hope for another way, and so did the common-sense of England. The very obviousness of the evils of the present system, the comparative plainness of the remedies and the ease with which they could be imagined, the resemblance between the practical measures which promised alleviation and socialistic measures, all pointed to an easier solution of the social problem than through a revolution.

Particularly in England, socialism was associated with enlightened common-sense. There, confronting our daily observation, plain for any man to see, was the enormous mass of good things got out of the earth by men's labour. There, on the other hand, was the preposterous inequality of distribution. To put the land into the hands of the inhabitants of the country, and place in the same hands all the instruments which the country contains for making the earth yield her treasure, was a big transaction—too big to be done at a stroke. But such an ideal could be set up. And the obvious way towards its realisation was to get representatives of the proletariat into Parliament pledged to support every measure which promised to bring the ideal nearer; and there were plenty of measures, actual and possible, which had the appearance of doing this.

(b) What is the nature of the cloud of mistrust that has gradually arisen to overshadow so promising a scheme? Again, it is no mystery. Results simply have not come up to expectations. Many reasons might be adduced. The basal one seems to be that the process has found itself caught in the coils of a vicious circle. Labour members have been pushed into Parliament, have supported or even originated measures of "socialistic" tendency, promoted state regulation of industry in the workers' interest and state relief for workers' burdens, without apparently coming any nearer either to being rid of capitalism or to making a real difference in the workers' position. This has begun to seem as though it were in the nature of the pacific solution. If a state or municipality will not rob; if it

pays a man money for the railroad or tramway system or water-works which he owns, the situation as regards capitalism does not alter. The man is as rich as ever, remains in the place of power, can turn and buy up something else, is able still to divert to his own use an enormous share of the good things produced by human labour. He cannot be bought out. In Mr. Hilaire Belloc's blunt words, "if you are going to confiscate you must confiscate." And protective legislation for the workman is caught in the same circle. The compensation which the shipbuilder has to pay the injured workman is taken out at last in the price of the workman's tea which the ships must bring to him. The cost of the factory acts goes on to the price of the flannels.

There has resulted from this entirely comprehensible sense of disappointment over the fruits of the labours of those who have wrought for the peaceful evolution of the socialist state, a change of ideal, a turning towards something else than had hitherto filled the horizon of the socialistic thinker; and the character of the new ideal is that it is something narrower and nearer. Advanced social movements are beginning to accept, and so implicitly to justify, not merely their incaleulableness, but a certain narrowness.

From the beginning two instruments awaited those who wanted to effect a social change in the workers' interests. The workers might be got to agitate for the power to send men of their own to speak in Parliament, or they might strike. Of the two weapons, the former, if it could have been made to work, would have done the bigger thing. The latter aims at less, but accomplishes more. Of the two, the strike weapon has proved itself the more capable of great extension and great immediate effect. What we are here calling a change of ideal has consisted partly in the vague, half-conscious, general feeling on the part of the workers that their power in the way of strikes was not nearly exhausted, and that their parliamentary ambitions were, on the whole, rather a futile affair, tending to make their

leaders lose their class sense rather than to have any other obvious effect. This diffused feeling of having exhausted their strength in one direction, and of not being nearly at the end of their strength in another, has tended to shape itself into a quite definite change of outlook. Socialism in its more advanced forms is turning from its pre-occupation with the consumer to take a new interest in the producer. It has discovered, quite rightly, that in the past the consumer has been the focus of interest; and it will begin to think more, now, of the other party.

What is the inwardness of this change? It would seem to be of the nature just indicated. The reforming spirit is content to be narrow, attempting less for the sake of accomplishing more. Ever since the latter part of the 18th century industry has been growing more organised. The questions, Whose shall be the fruits, and who shall arrange the producing of them? have been questions ever since the organisation itself began to be. From the beginning there were the three possible claimants: the proprietors of the factories, the people who work in them and make the goods, and, thirdly, the people who buy and use the goods. Now, of course, everyone uses goods. We are all consumers. In taking the consumers' point of view, therefore, the older reformers took the whole community into their focus of vision. In this sense they aimed high. They attempted much. They would reform human life as Livingstone would evangelise Africa, "from the centre out." They sought the remedy which would bring the wider benefit. They would make the state the owner, and also make the state the people. The watchword in effect was "Nationalise, and leave the democracy power over its own officers." We have seen, however, how slowly the plan works and how vexatiously. It was inevitable, in so far as the desire lived and another unexhausted instrument for achieving it lay to hand, that attention should begin to be directed on another centre of interest and another ideal. And the nature of it is too plain to escape observation

"Why persevere," the sub-conscious thought seems to be, "trying to secure the equitable distribution of goods and services among all consumers? We are coming no nearer our goal. Going round by way of the legislature and the state, we are trying to fetch too wide a compass. Even if we do keep an eye, still, upon this more distant object, why not turn our attention meanwhile to the things more immediately within our grasp, and strike for that higher life to ourselves, as members of this or that industry, which earlier ambitions would fain have brought to the whole community? Let us strike, not for higher wages merely, that is a *cul de sac*; we pay it all out again in prices; but for the control of the industries we work, so that we may fix our conditions of labour, and exact from the rest of the nation here and now the kind of life we want. Instead of merely sending speakers to Parliament to persuade the whole people to come along with us to some, perhaps, self-contradictory goal, to which the whole people cannot be brought, why should not *we*, at any rate, simply take to our own feet and walk to our goal ourselves?" Such is the unspoken language. The instrument is the strike, the goal is the autonomy not of the community but of an industry: and an industry's good is something less than the community's, something narrower and nearer.

Now, this is the movement which Mr. Russell's realism, his fondness for the given, has taken in mid-flight and helped on its way. He thinks he sympathises with the syndicalists. What they are out for, he thinks, is a large part of what he also wants to see. Only, a philosophical principle is clear to him which is obscure to them. They want the people who work an industry to seize control of it. He wants the principle of that, multiplication of small organisations, so that the individual who cannot get scope for himself in the service of a great wide state may be able to select a sphere which suits him and get scope there for that in him which the wider

world has no use for. Partly, too, the principle of the destructive side of syndicalism is present, in that institutions must be changed in so far as they are hostile to instinct and impulse. "It is not only more material goods that men need, . . . but more freedom, more self-direction, more outlet for creativeness, more opportunity for the joy of life, more voluntary co-operation and less involuntary subservience to purposes not their own."* And the place to find all this is in the giving of greater autonomy to narrower organizations and in relaxing their reference to a wider. Mr. Russell's whole book gravitates towards the given will; a strange circumstance, and yet, when one looks more closely, not at all strange.

It cannot but have struck many readers as curious, in an author so conspicuous in his devotion to reason, that in a work on *Social Reconstruction* the language of the passionate should so largely have been preferred to the language of the rational. This is a genuine feature of the work. Mr. Russell's book is about social institutions—the state, property, education, marriage, and so forth. It is a plea for their reform. That which figures to him as central human nature, that in the name of which all of them are to be reformed, is always the higher impulses of the individual man or woman. He says that "all human action springs from impulse and desire," but impulse is what he would have us reckon with. "The part played by desire has always been sufficiently recognised," he says, but "desire governs no more than a part of our activity, and that not the most important, but only the more conscious, explicit, and civilised part." He reckons the thing of value in human nature in similar terms. What is great in a man, what counts in life, what institutions must preserve or be scrapped if they do not preserve, is his "vital impulse," his "creative passion," and so forth. This preference for the language of

* *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 43.

passion is due to the current he is in. It is entirely in keeping with what we have called the spirit of realism, the spirit, as one might call it, of first appearances.

What "reason" is first given as, that it remains. Mr. Russell first meets with reason in the field of formal ratiocination. This is where what we call reason first appears. That anyone should cling to what he there finds it as; that it should remain for him the thing which syllogises, which says two and two are four, or which performs operations still more elementary, is entirely in the spirit of what we have called realism. From this standpoint all the catering for instinct and impulse is only the recoil of human nature. Formal ratiocination is but a thin product of the mind. The part of life guided by it is but a superficial fragment. In practical affairs it becomes necessary at once to reckon with other things. If it is "reason" it becomes necessary to call the things which count in practice by names which contrast them with it. And so you have the language of passion. But it is no mere matter of nomenclature. The essential pessimism remains. There can be no entire State. Bundles of irrationalities as we are, a State cannot be made of us. We must do what the new socialism is finding it necessary to do, even measure our capacities and aim at something less. We cannot look so far as the State. We must have narrower associations. There is a fatal faintness of heart somewhere in it all, yielding to which only, as always, complicates the task. For where is the given will going to be satisfied? After seven changes? Not after seventy times seven. The same reason which in metaphysics devotes its Herenlean strength to an attempt at keeping the ring around the inviolate given fact, whatever it should cost the world, transferred to politics, finds its natural function in an attempt to devise means and find scope for the given human will, whatever it should cost the native historical structure of society.

Not many people who can write and think so convincingly as Russell are specially fond of anybody who can be so convincing

to an opposite effect as Bergson. And, as philosophers, the two are opposed with an animus which almost already bespeaks the possibility that they are relatives. But if the foregoing considerations have any weight, the idea that a relationship exists between them does not rest on this precarious basis alone; they display to a third, a common relation which rests on a real affinity between the two. We have tried to bring out this triunity in these pages. We believe that anyone who will take the trouble, and succeeds in the attempt, to view the three things—first each in its *tout ensemble*, and then all together—(a) Mr. Russell's suggestions towards social reconstruction, (b) the direction in which history shows modern movements for the renovation of society to have been drifting, and (c) the logical incidence upon social theory of Bergson's doctrine of the *élan vital*, will find that they all meet surprisingly near about a point. And by the time the observer has got them all together he will have envisaged perhaps a big and noteworthy trend in modern life and thought. To suggest what the observer might find, did he try to look further, and compare the total movement (if one can call it so), which these combine to form, with anything which would be at all equal to the necessities of the social and metaphysical case, is beyond the limits of this paper, even if I could hope to suggest it in any way which would carry conviction. All that apart, however, it does seem intelligible that the three forces we have indicated should meet; that the speculations of Bergson and of Russell should work one way; that that way should also be the way of the modern trend in social movements; and that, without being at all fools, the men in these movements should attempt to hitch their waggon to both stars.

X.—OMNIPOTENCE.

By F. C. S. SCHILLER.

THE age of miracles is not yet over. Indeed, it may only just be effectively beginning. For Mr. H. G. Wells's excursions into theology and studies in episcopal psychology have actually stirred a real Bishop to a serious and candid attempt to defend the traditional dogma of God's "omnipotence" against the heretical questionings which are pullulating both within and without the Church.* And when one recalls the adamant silence with which the professors of theology camouflaged their embarrassment forty or fifty years ago, when J. S. Mill's *Essays on Religion* attempted to raise the question whether the ascription of omnipotence to God was either necessary or beneficial to religion, and the strange unanimity with which the historians of philosophy have managed to obscure the fact that the doctrines of such first-class personages as Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant are really incompatible with this dogma, it is evident that we are making progress, and that the Bishop of Down's attitude may be epoch-making in theology. Indeed, it is so encouraging to me personally that I am tempted to turn back to views which I expressed so long ago as 1891,† but which were then too repugnant to the dominant philosophic prejudices to seem worth developing, in order to consider whether the present discussion of a limited deity does not render it timely to modify or to expand them.

In so doing I hope to follow Dr. D'Arcy's excellent example not only in the tone of his discussion, which is laudably free from the contempt and vituperation with which it has been

* Cf. The Bishop of Down's paper which appears in this Volume, p. 158.

† In *Riddles of the Sphinx*, ch. X.

customary to deluge those who would not accept the belief in an Absolute and refused to identify it with the deity (without proof), but also in the method by which he handles the controversy. For he does not make any direct attempt to establish his own belief in an omnipotent God, or to overcome, by a direct frontal attack, the obvious and overwhelming objection to it which rests on the existence of evil, seeming content to leave it as a "great problem." He tries rather to support his position indirectly by finding flaws in the arguments by which the further and positive determinations of the "finite" God have been reached. Similarly, I shall endeavour to show that Dr. D'Arey's criticisms are far from conclusive, and that the alternative theory of an infinite or omnipotent God is not acceptable either on logical, scientific, or religious grounds, without entering into the positive reasons for believing in a "finite" God.

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Before doing so, however, it will be advisable that we should remind ourselves of the constituent problems of what is really a very complex controversy, which raises many distinct questions. Many of these are ultimate, but they are not intrinsically insoluble, or even difficult, if they are kept separate; indeed, they are simple enough if they are recognized as *many* and as comprising a plurality of problems which cannot all be solved in a single breath. Traditional theology and, in a less degree, traditional philosophy have attempted the impossible in trying to make the same answer do for a multitude of different questions.

(1) The first and most ultimate of these questions is ontological. It inquires whether unity, duality, or plurality can be predicated of reality. Is being ultimately one, or many, or of two kinds? And which of these answers is the *best*? To these questions a plurality of answers can evidently be given, and they should all be investigated. Thus (*a*) it may turn out that *not one* of these attributes can, in the actual state of our know-

ledge, yield an adequate description of reality. Or (*b*) it may appear that they can *all* be used, and all succeed to some extent, or that each succeeds for some purposes, though not (as yet) for others. (*c*) If so, and only if so, the question will arise whether we are entitled to give an absolute preference to *one* of these answers, to universalize it and to treat it as the complete solution, even *in spm* and in principle, of the problem of reality. (*d*) If we venture on so bold a course, we assume certain logical obligations. We manifestly undertake to explain away the difficulties and objections that resist our interpretation, and to reduce to subjection, by some means or other, the recalcitrant features of reality. If, and in so far as, we fail to do this, we may have to confess our theory wrong, or are at least driven to the conclusion that we have tried to go too fast, and to solve a problem not yet ripe for scientific solution, and ought to retrace our steps. For, after all, suspense of judgment may be at present the right attitude of philosophy towards the question of ultimate reality,—a question which can hardly be said urgently to demand immediate solution on pragmatic grounds.

(2) The quantitative aspect of reality is evidently not the only one that can engage our attention. A great variety of qualitative questions also may be raised about the real. We may ask, for example, Has it ultimately a cause and a beginning? Is it good and just and intelligent? Is it at all responsive to our demands and sympathetic with our wishes? If it is, to what extent? If it is not, is it merely unresponsive and indifferent, or actively hostile? Now, clearly all the answers to such questions will be alternative interpretations of reality. They will also all be tentative, *i.e.*, hypotheses about reality which will have to be ratified and verified by the behaviour of the real.

To this series or collection of questions the conception of "God" forms *one* of the answers. It is one of the most ancient and comprehensive of such answers, and certainly the most attractive. It answers a great number of questions about

reality, and does so in a vital and interesting way. But we are not entitled to assume that it answers them all, or answers them completely, or is itself to be exempted from further scrutiny. On the contrary, it immediately leads on to the further question—What do you mean by “God”? And this question may at once involve theologians in difficulties. For it seems to show not only that they are not agreed about what they really mean by “God,” but also that they have really left the conception very indeterminate, and capable of alternative interpretations.

(3) If so, any demand for a clear definition of the notion of God will produce a civil war in theology and involve a restriction on its theological employment. For it will not, naturally, answer as many questions when it is defined, as it seemed to do when it was left vague. The answer, however, will be more satisfactory, at all events to those who desire to think clearly; and so the attempt will be made to determine the nature and qualities of “God.” This should be the aim of the science of theology.

(4) Theology, however, should not content itself with merely laying down the meaning, function and character of “God.” It should not be merely a hypothetical science of abstract definitions, but should endeavour to tell us whether a being coming up to its specifications actually exists, and how the existence of “God” can be ascertained by us. It should provide not only a logical analysis of the conception of deity which it favours or adopts, but also a *ratio cognoscendi* of a really existent God. This, in default of any successful claim to have immediate cognizance of God, will necessarily take the form of an argument which *infers* his existence from his operations. If such an argument succeeds, we shall gladly dispense with the juggling of the “ontological proof,” which professed to define the notion of God with such marvellous dexterity that a really existent God would necessarily emerge from the definition.

Now, when we have thus analysed the problem of "God" into its constituent questions, it becomes easy to apprehend that the doctrine of orthodox theology about the unity, "omnipotence" and "infinity" of "God" represents only one out of a large number of possible answers, which may be connected and combined in a great variety of ways. Any particular combination, therefore, will be open to questioning and attack all along its line of thought. For example, it cannot be taken for granted even that reality is *one*. Nor, certainly, is it proved to be one by calling it one, to wit, a "world" or "universe." The most that can be proved would seem to be that reality is such that *some* of the qualities we have embodied in our notion of a whole or world appear to be applicable to reality and more or less to fit it; we live in hopes, therefore, that eventually they may *all* fit, and fit even those manifestations of the real which as yet we do not claim to know. Now, if this is all that can justly be said for monism, the metaphysical foundations of the argument for God's "omnipotence" are evidently insecure.

But, even if monism were established, monotheism would not follow. Monism is quite conceivable without theism. Theism, on the other hand, is quite compatible with pluralism; the truth being that the question whether reality is numerically one or many is intrinsically independent of the question whether its *quality* deserves to be called divine. This independence is further attested when we find that within theism it has historically been quite an open question whether gods were many or one, and that even within nominal monotheisms there is always a plurality of objects of worship, and outbreaks of downright polytheism continue to occur. Also, as there is never complete agreement about "God" in the religious world, it always, collectively, presents the spectacle of a plurality of "gods," who are in being and in competition together.

Similarly, when we come to the question of the quality of reality, it soon appears both that theism is not the only

thinkable solution, since there are many sorts of atheism, and also that much depends on the qualities of the "God" our theism postulates. Very different views have been taken by the various religions and theologies; and, even collectively, they cannot be said to have exhausted the logical possibilities. Before, therefore, predicates like "omnipotent" and "infinite" are ascribed to a "God," it ought to be made quite clear both what precisely they mean, and what consequences they entail. It is hardly enough to evade the philosophic problems their attribution generates by declaring that they "are but imperfect modes of expressing the divine All-inclusiveness. To treat them as scientifically accurate is to mistake their nature altogether" (p. 182). If this vagueness and lack of scientific accuracy is not to be to their discredit theologically, it is all the more a slur upon the scientific status of theology.

Lastly, it should be made clear that all this *a priori* defining and deducing must be *tested*. We must go to the facts and ask what differences we should expect to find according as our theistic hypothesis was true or false. For on pragmatic principles* a "God" who was conceived to make no difference to the course of events would clearly be an unmeaning superfluity, while one who lets the world go to the devil would clearly be suspect of collusion or identity with the destination thus indicated. On James's principles not only the *value* but the very *meaning* of theism depends on its guaranteeing a course of events superior to that which might otherwise be expected.

II.

Bearing in mind the complexities foreshadowed by this multiplicity of problems, let us study the chain of arguments by which Dr. D'Arcy seeks to defend the traditional theology. We shall find a number of spots where his synthesis is weak in

* The methodological value of which I am glad to see Dr. D'Arcy does not dispute (p. 165).

the joints, and where the most favourable verdict can only be "not proven."

(1) Dr. D'Arey holds fast to the identification of the deity with the Absolute or All-inclusive; but his argument for monism appears to be somewhat perfunctory and merely verbal. He asks (p. 181) "Why should we believe in the unity of the sum total of being? Why should we inevitably speak of this sum total as *the Universe?*" and apparently expects the answer that reality forms a unity because it is *called* a "universe." Now, we do undoubtedly apply *our notion* of a "whole" or sum-total to reality very much as a matter of course; not to do so, therefore, demands some self-restraint. But I have shown above that this question need not be begged. It is possible to abstain from assuming that reality forms a world or "universe." And we may now observe the serious obstacles which lie in the way of treating reality as a "whole" in any effective sense.

(a) There appears to be no meaning in conceiving as a "whole" a world which is taken to be physically infinite in space and time. No intelligible propositions can be framed which would hold of *all* of it: whatever we predicated of a "part" or period of its existence might be falsified at an earlier or later period or by a further "part," and such could always be found. To call it a "sum-total" would be self-contradictory, for it would be a "sum" that could never be summed.

(b) Hence it is logically inadmissible to attach any predicate *universally* to any reality which is "infinite" in the above sense.* It is, and can be, known to us only in part and for a moment, and even if what we assert of it is true here and now it may become false elsewhere or at another time.

(c) Of the known reality much is, even now, recalcitrant to all attempts at unification. We endeavour to minimize this fact by value-judgments which condemn these portions of the

* I am aware that there are other senses of "infinite" to which this objection does not apply. But they do not seem to be relevant here.

real to an inferior status. They are said not to be truly "objective," but "merely subjective." But, nevertheless, they form a large and important part in every man's experience; and life, individual alike and social, would be transformed out of all recognition, if we conceived them to be somehow eliminated. An experience which contained nothing "merely subjective," whether feelings, thoughts, fancies, dreams, illusions, hallucinations or errors, would be utterly unlike anything known to science; and, even if it were conceivable, it would go only a very little way towards establishing the monistic postulate of an all-inclusive mind. For a true "Absolute" has not only to be truly "real," and so free from every human limitation and frailty: it has also to be truly inclusive of all the illusion, insanity, and bestiality that exist in reality, and to compound out of such heterogeneous materials and discordant postulates a perfectly united and harmonious cosmos! Where, we must ask, does the monism exist that has succeeded in this synthesis, or even seriously considered the conditions of its possibility?

Not, at all events, in Dr. D'Arey's philosophy. For he, too, when he comes across such *partes hontuosas* of the universe in the concrete, balks at them. He does not require his "All-inclusive" to swallow them, nor distend it into a rag-bag: they are cast out as "pathological and not a guide to the normal constitution of the mind" (p. 174). Now, the psychologist may claim a technical right to dismiss as "abnormal" the evidence of divided personality, though we may question the wisdom of a policy which would exclude constituents of the mind so interesting theoretically and important practically, and also so common and "normal," as "moods," "moral struggles" and "dreams." But what right has the metaphysician to exclude them from the Absolute? If it is not absolutely all-inclusive, what right has it to its name? What would become of its primary theoretic function, if it did not afford an asylum to the maddest fancy and the most monstrous disease? Surely, an Absolute which stands upon its dignity, and will not open its

bosom to all comers, is not all-inclusive but *selective*; it ceases to be the universal receptacle of being by becoming particular about what it will include. The critics of monism are, surely, entitled to demand that the Absolute shall not be trifled with; and that its all-inclusiveness shall not be reduced to absurdity by such snobbish exclusiveness, and that the "real" shall not continue to be employed ambiguously as a term of selective approbation in monistic "proofs" of the unity of the universe.

(2) Having got his unity of the universe in this questionable fashion, how does Dr. D'Arcy pass from it to a personal deity? At first this seems a desperate undertaking, to be compassed only by a *salto mortale*. "I hold that God is personal, because the material world is an experienced whole; and therefore all strictly personal terms may be truly applied to Him" (p. 183).

We have seen that the world *as experienced* is anything but a whole, and the *material* world is a *selection*, or rather a construction based on a selection, for the purposes of physics, from the experiences which may be taken as "common" by a number of minds. Even then it can be taken as a whole, only if it is taken as finite. But even if it were a whole, and implied a percipient, it would not follow that *all* the "personal terms" could truly be inferred. For a universal experiencer or unifier need not be more than a sort of *world-reflector*, contemplating all time and all existence, while not a moral agent. Indeed, it would be as hard to see how any moral personality could be infused into so intellectual a being as into the Eternal Self-consciousness, out of which T. H. Green vainly laboured to extract an ethical principle.

(3) Dr. D'Arcy, however, gets on to safer ground when he appeals to religious experience to bear out his theology. "It is," he urges (p. 170), "characteristic of Christian prayer, to assume the omniscience and omnipotence of God; and in the deeper experiences of religion the conviction that all thoughts and intents are open to His scrutiny becomes absolutely overpowering," and this "proves that God is not regarded as one

person among many, distinguished only by the possession of greater knowledge and power."

At first sight this interpretation, despite its puzzling limitation to "*Christian*" prayer, seems plausible enough. It proves, no doubt, that God is not conceived as an ordinary person; He must be a being vastly more powerful, intelligent, sympathetic, merciful, trustworthy, and, above all, discreet. For, as Kipling observes, we feel that "He will not peach on a pal." But do these postulates of a Deity with whom spiritual communion is desired, demand His "omnipotence"? Hardly. They ascribe to Him only the function of an All-Father Confessor. And if we look more closely, we may even note some points about the practice and benefit of prayer which seem incompatible with the ascription to God of omnipotence and omniscience. For is it not hard to understand how a truly omniscient being can have anything to learn from the self-revelations of his worshippers, and how a truly omnipotent being can be strengthened by their feeble co-operation with him? It may seem truer, therefore, to say that the attitude of prayer implies confidence in a power to help and a wisdom to understand that shall be *adequate* "to any mortal need, but, nevertheless, remains subject to the condition that this help shall be *sought* by him that prays." And is not this a limitation? "Adequacy," as Kant's critique of the argument from design had the merit of first pointing out, does *not* imply omnipotence.

(4) However this may be, we need not insist on the point, for we must surely admit that men may be wrong in interpreting their religious experience. This applies particularly to the mystic experience, which is now generally recognised as a specific and distinctive fact of spiritual experience. Of the substantial identity and enormous impressiveness of the mystical experiences as "*subjective*" facts, there can be little doubt; they are felt to be experiences of something emphatically divine (*θεϊόν τι*), superhuman and overwhelming. But we may admit this in the handsomest terms, and yet leave ample

scope for diversity of judgment about its objective import and psychological interpretation. That this tremendous spiritual experience should be interpreted by the religious, and especially by the more famous "greater mystics," as a direct contact with the Deity is natural enough; but it does not follow that it unequivocally attests the presence of God in a human soul. Critical reflection here, as always, raises doubts and points to alternatives, which too find support in an impartial survey of the recorded facts.

(a) It seems that the mystical experience is not very congenial with orthodox theology, nor is the "God" of the mystics readily identifiable with the "God" of the theologians. He tends to depart from the latter in the direction of ineffability and negativity, and to land the mystic on the borders of an agnostic pantheism.

(b) The *spiritual colour* of the mystic experience often seems questionable. It does not always make the mystic a better man in himself, and it very often makes him less serviceable to others. It may even unnerve him completely for the business of life, and weaken or demoralise his character. If, then, we try to apply the pragmatic test to the mystical experience, and ask whether it is justified by its fruits, as it surely must be, we get rather a mixed response. A question may, therefore, be raised as to whether the objective ground of the mystical experience is always as "divine" as it is taken to be. It has to be admitted that the mere occurrence of a spiritual influx proves little as to its source: it may be merely a volcanic "subliminal uprush" from the unconscious depths of personality; or, if its influence proves evil, it may even have to be regarded as diabolical. These possibilities have to be disposed of before the mystical experience can afford much of a basis for religious apologetics.

(c) Without entertaining such depressing hypotheses, we may ask whether there is not another great spiritual event of which the mystical experience strongly suggests a foretaste.

What is described as an overwhelming inrush of the divine fullness regularly entails, it would seem, a complete obliteration, a temporary annihilation, of the individual consciousness. May not this reveal to us what a *dissolution of personality* would feel like, may it not be a foretaste of *death* as a spiritual experience? I confess that this interpretation was strongly suggested to me by the most recent, most scientific, and most candid of mystical records, the extraordinarily interesting case of "Cécile Vé," published by Professor Flournoy in the *Archives de Psychologie de la Suisse Romande*, No. 57 (May, 1915).^{*} This lady, who was an orthodox Christian and a Protestant, and in practical life the head of a flourishing girls' school, did not at all relish the impersonality of the "Divine," and the "beyond-good-and-evil" impression made by the mystical experience, which, in her capacity of a trained psychologist, she has, nevertheless, recorded so admirably.

(d) But even if we are willing to dismiss all these scruples and to take the mystics' own interpretations of their experiences more or less at face value, what do they prove about the quality of God? Hardly divine Omnipotence. For they all agree that the intellectual content of the mystical revelation is singularly vague and meagre, or even, strictly speaking, *nil*. The experience itself is too absorbing to allow the mind to discriminate within it. The effulgence of the Divine Presence is far too dazzling to leave it capable of making a distinction between the impress of a power immeasurably greater than man's and one absolutely omnipotent. The fact, therefore, that the Divine Life is felt by the mystic to permeate and absorb his consciousness is by no means an adequate proof that it includes everybody and everything; it might as well have been argued, from the fact that "Sally Beauchamp" was immediately and completely aware of all the feelings and thoughts of "B. I.," that she must be similarly capable of penetrating into

^{*} Cf. also my abstract in the *Journal of the Society for Psychological Research* for March 1916.

the mind of "B. IV," and was bound to sympathize with both the personalities she had invaded. Yet, she was neither capable of the one, nor susceptible of the other. A technically "finite" God then would be quite an adequate cause of all the phenomena described by the mystics, and so long as this is the case their experience cannot be held to establish the omnipotence of God.

(5) The last of Dr. D'Arcy's objections to the theory of a limited deity is, perhaps, the most surprising of all. For if it is to be described shortly, it must be called, I fear, an *argument from the impossibility of miracles*. This implies so strange a position for an orthodox theologian to take up that it will be best to quote it somewhat fully. Dr. D'Arcy (pp. 183-4) recognizes it as "an important difficulty" for theologians to make up their minds whether they were "to seek for the signs of the divine activity in the regular succession of physical causes or in exceptional events which seemed unaccountable from the physical point of view." For though "there was a time when miracles were regarded as the principal proof of God's presence and work," and "when new beginnings in creation, the origin of motion, the origin of life, the origin of consciousness, were pointed to," it was realized later that "this was a somewhat dangerous position to adopt. Is God a great engineer who, having made a wonderful machine, has to interfere from time to time to help it to work as He desires? It seems to me that a finite God, if He is regarded as Creator, must be thought of in that way, to some degree." Previously he had declared (p. 168) that "finite gods must reveal themselves, as men reveal themselves, by showing their power in nature. Miracles must happen constantly. . . . A finite God must reveal himself by miracle. It is the only way in which he can do it,"* whereas "when we rise to the conception of the all-inclusive God, all these difficulties drop out of sight"

(p. 184). The unexpressed premiss in the Bishop's argumentation seems to be Hume's *miracles do not happen*. For only so can it be inferred that a doctrine which requires them to happen must obviously be wrong.

Now, I am well aware that the question of the logical status of miracles is a somewhat thorny one; for the conception of miracle has been more disputed about than analysed. Still, it hardly seems judicious in a theologian to make controversial use of it. He at once exposes himself to the question, "What do you *mean* by a miracle?" and to this question modern theology does not appear to possess any satisfactory answer. In whichever way it answers, it embroils itself—either with the scientific postulate of the uniformity of nature, or with the traditional belief in the spiritual value of miracles. In this dilemma its only resource would seem to be a vagueness which refuses to define the meaning of "miracle," but does not refrain from using it loosely. Dr. D'Arcy exemplifies this in describing polytheism as making man "the great miracle-worker" (p. 167), because "he is constantly interfering with the course of nature for his own purposes," and "it is only because you are all miracle-workers that I can recognise you as men and women" (p. 168).

This usage, however, will hardly do. For (a) how is continual miracle to be distinguished from the *routine*, and so the "law," of nature? (b) Until the conception of a fairly fixed *routine* of nature has been formed, which *is* *hypothetical* has not yet been done in the early polytheisms, what is there for "miracle" to be opposed to, and so what is there evidential or wonderful about it? The belief that miracles have a religious function seems to imply an order of nature, which is *not*, however, absolutely fixed, but admits of occasional improvement by intelligent intervention.

Hence, (c) to attribute positive value to miracles seems to be open only to those who think that the course of nature can be bettered, and do *not* regard the order of nature as expressive

of unlimited goodness and power; those who do must either ascribe the miraculous departures from *routine* to an *evil* agency, or declare it *impossible*. The latter course is logically very simple; but it has disadvantages. It obliterates, for instance, the difference between intelligent guidance and automatic development. A "God" who *never* interferes with a necessary order of nature seems to be merely another name for it, and its pragmatic equivalent. A "God" worth having must, surely, make *some* difference to the course of events, and be the author of some good in it which it would not of itself assure to us.

On the other hand, it is not necessary that a finite God should be conceived as working miracles continually. If he were also regarded as the author of the order of nature, it would follow that the frequency of divine intervention would be related to the goodness of this order. It would only be an inferior order that would need continual intervention; the better the order the fewer would be the "miracles" needed. Hence there need not be any at all if the cosmic order were such that it could be adequately guided without any special intervention. So that the hypothesis of a "finite God" neither demands "miracles" nor repudiates them *a priori*; it is compatible with whatever course of events is actually found to occur. Neither does it conflict with the normal religious sentiment, as the "infinite" God does, by becoming otiose and indistinguishable from the order of nature.

III.

This conflict is, indeed, bound to break out everywhere sooner or later. It is quite a mistake to suppose that its most glaring is also its sole example. The "problem of evil" is usually admitted to be insoluble by theologians in the handsomest terms, both before, and after, their attempts to render it compatible with the dogma of divine "infinity" have manifestly broken down. What they do not ever admit is that their

dogma is to blame; what they do not see is that the reason of their failure lies, not in any exceptional perversity of a particular problem, but in the general and total incapacity of human intelligence to apply the notion of divine infinity to any aspect of human experience, and so to get this hypothesis confirmed in any way. On this occasion, however, it will probably suffice if only one more illustration of this incapacity be added to "the old difficulty of the problem of evil." I shall select the conflict between the notions of *teleology* and *omnipotence*.

Whenever we consider the operation of the human mind, we speedily find that it acts teleologically; i.e., it has to take means to its ends. This it has to do because it cannot attain its ends directly or by any means it pleases; not having strength and power enough to do so, it works up to them gradually along a definite line marked out for it by its limited power. To interpret teleologically, therefore, by using the relation of means and ends, while it is a characteristic method of human intelligence, and one which (when it succeeds) renders the teleological order eminently intelligible and congenial, is a method which implies quite definitely a limitation in the intelligence which operates teleologically. A mind which can entertain purposes as yet unrealised and achieves its ends by the skilful adjustment of the means it controls, is definitely *limited*.

An *unlimited* mind, on the other hand, would not act teleologically. For it would not be subject to any restriction in the choice of the means to ends. Anything could for it become a means to anything else. It could put out a fire with oil as easily as with water. It could not, therefore, be tied down to any determinate sequence of events. If Omnipotence so pleased, anything might happen, and lead to anything else. No definite order of nature could withstand such power. It would be abrogated in principle. If, in point of fact, there appeared to be an order of nature, it would be a fact only *de facto*, and not *de jure*. It would indicate only that Omnipotence was,

fortunately for us, a creature of habit, and had not (so far) desired to dissolve the cosmic order. But this order would be inherently irrational, because there would be no intrinsic reason why it should exist and be as it was, and not otherwise. Nor could an omnipotent mind act *purposively*. It could not have any purposes, in the sense of aiming at something it proposed to do, but had not, or not yet, been able to achieve. There could not be for it any interval of striving (successful or otherwise) between aim and achievement, nor any process, development, progress, consummation. Its mere *fiat* would mean instantaneous realisation. All its "aims," therefore, would be eternally achieved; all the vicissitudes and variations of things would have one and the same meaning and one and the same sanction. Everything would be what it was, because Omnipotence willed that it should be thus.

It is, of course, an obvious corollary that the distinction of *good* and *evil* would not exist for such a mind. It would not exist, because the distinction of *good* and *bad* would not exist for it. For the good is that which conduces to an end (which is, therefore, called its "good"), the bad that which thwarts it. If, then, no ends exist to be achieved and no means can thwart or fail to achieve them, it is evident that the predicates good and bad have become unmeaning and impossible. Omnipotence must transcend all human valuations.

But it follows, conversely, that, *for a human mind*, such an intelligence would be non-existent. It would have become *invisible*, because it could not be inferred from any of its operations. We could never recognize its working, which would be utterly alien to that of our intelligence. Seeing that it had no ends and needed no means, we could neither guess at its ends nor trace its skill in making the most of its means. It would be scientifically worthless, because nothing in the order of nature could be deduced from it. It would be logically worthless, because it would have no point of contact with our intelligence. And it would be religiously worthless, because it

would convey no aid to any of our spiritual needs. An infinite "God" then would be unrecognizable, unknowable, and so useless; an intelligible and intelligent God must be limited.

IV.

How, then, it will be said, has it come about that the divine Omnipotence has become a theological dogma, and is generally regarded as a religious postulate?

The answer, it is plain, can only lie in the region of religious psychology. We must try to trace the confusions of thought which have elevated the Omnipotent into a source of religious edification. Fortunately this is not very difficult.

(1) It is easy to understand that a more powerful deity is religiously preferable to a less powerful. The more powerful he is the better he can help. Hence it becomes tempting to infer that an *all-powerful* "God" must be the best of all. But the inference is false, because the notion of "power" evaporates when it is raised to infinity. It is not observed that what we mean by "power" implies resistance, just as what we call motion implies friction, and that in the absence of resistance we could no more recognize "power" than we could move in the absence of friction.

(2) Similarly, the notions of providential guidance and purposive process imply an opposition which can only be overcome gradually and in time. Only when this is *not* perceived, does it become possible to reason, as, Dr. D'Arcy tells us, did the Greek School of Alexandria, when they "developed the idea of God both as the Infinite and as the *Logos*, guiding the destinies of the Universe, saving man from his sin, and the world from all the contradictions and confusions which we describe as evil, and so preparing the way for the final consummation in which God shall be all in all" (pp. 178-9).

Here the notion of a "*Logos*" clearly implies an analogy with human intelligence, and the "guiding of destinies" a purposive direction of a time process intended to lead up to a

"consummation," such as a human intelligence can aim at. But why is such a process needed? Because the end cannot be attained without it? Moreover, the spiritual value of this theology does not lie in the "consummation." An end of the world-process, which left God literally "all-in-all," i.e., merely all alone as the All-One, would have no spiritual value. It could only excite amazement and regret that so prodigious an effort and so protracted an agony should end so tamely in the mere re-absorption into the Divine of a world which had issued from it so unintelligibly and had made so miserable a use of its illusory existence. The value and real meaning of the doctrine lie in the assurance it seems to give of the ultimate achievement of a final harmony of all existents, and in the assurance of divine aid during the gradual approach towards this end. These are the real religious postulates which the human heart demands. Yet, do they not manifestly imply a limitation of the divine power, in order that a meaning may be given to the process and its guidance?

(3) The most characteristic confusion, however, is probably that which arises from the religious mind's over-anxiety to get a guarantee of the victory of good over evil. In view of the actual character of the world of experience this anxiety is natural enough. For the evil in it seems so strong, so all-pervasive, so deeply, so variously, so subtly rooted, so persistent, so adaptable to every device for defeating it, that man may well despair of overcoming it unaided. It is natural, therefore, to postulate a "God" whose existence assures the potential victory of the good cause which we all make bold to believe is identical with our own. "God" is sure to win, and we with Him. But the victory is, alas, so long in coming! God can afford to wait, but short-lived mortals grow impatient. Is it a wonder that they should be assailed by doubts whether even a god can overcome such stupendous evils in any finite time? They consequently hail the suggestion that the best assurance of God's victory is so to *define* God that His defeat shall be impossible, or, more

properly, *unthinkable*? Define Him as "omnipotent," and he becomes the ever-victorious God, whom nothing can, or does, resist, who has never to struggle painfully towards a distant consummation. To ensure that God is *going* to win, therefore, we declare that He *has won already*.

But our method of hyperbole betrays the very instinct that employs it. If God has won already, man has no longer a case against the world. The world is now, as always, all that the All-powerful means it to be. There is no evil in it. Evil is an illusion. It lies not in the real but in our defective vision.

Yet, is not our defect, our illusion, our resentment, a real item in the real? When the theologian pronounces *πάντα καλὰ λίαν* in the world because "God's in His heaven," must he not except himself and his fellow men? Our very inability to acquiesce in the proof of the divine Omnipotence and the world's perfection seems to prove imperfect a world that cannot reflect its true structure in our understanding, and a God impotent, who cannot remove our incapacity.

Thus the extremes of theology would seem to meet. Omnipotence merges into impotence; an all-absorbing "God" is the equivalent of none at all. The attempt to extract out of a theological definition an absolute pledge of the prosperous issue of the world-process has ended in a failure to secure even a right of ameliorating its most crying evils. In reducing evil to illusion we have, all unwittingly, condemned good to unreality as well. Nothing remains of a bad argument by which theology has unwisely arrested the progress of religion.

(4) And yet does not the root of the trouble remain? Theological dogmas and bad arguments do not arise out of nothing for no reason at all. Bad arguments are as surely grounded in human nature as good, and are even more persistent. Theological dogmas are characteristic products of human mentality.

Viewing them thus, we are able to trace the doctrine of the "omnipotence" of God to its ultimate root in a very widespread and potent human instinct, the desire for safety and the

fear of risk. This instinct naturally and necessarily pervades our whole life. It is not merely in "practical" affairs that men play for safety and desire to avoid risks. This feeling attends all the operations of the intellect, and may plainly be traced in the methods and structure of the most "theoretic" sciences. It disguises itself, of course, under reputable names. It figures as a demand for "scientific caution," "certainty," and "necessary truth," as aversion from rash speculation and temerarious hypothesis; but it springs from sheer fear of adventures in the world of thought.

It has perverted, for example, logic, as it has theology. Indeed, it is the real inspiration of the traditional theory of proof and the source of the logical notion of "validity." For why, after all, should it ever have been laid down that the type of reasoning must be represented as a "demonstration" which proceeds from absolutely certain and assured premisses to a "valid" and absolutely cogent conclusion? The reason for this postulate of "logic" cannot be found in any desire to describe human thought as it actually is; for, on any showing, absolutely certain and true premisses are admitted to be hard to come by, and our actual conclusions are rarely (if ever) absolutely cogent. Actually, moreover, we reason quite as well (or better) from premisses which are hypotheses or postulates to conclusions which have to be verified empirically. Such reasonings are infinitely commoner (at least) than those of the perfect kind which engross the attention of logicians. Why, then, should they be despised and ignored? No reason is given. But it may be suggested that the real reason is not logical. Logic shows a strange bias in favour of absolute proof, not because no other reasoning has logical value, but because it panders to the desire for safety. If the premisses are absolutely true and certain, nothing can upset them. Nor, what is even more important, *us*. And if the reasoning can be enclosed in a "valid" form, we can trust it absolutely. "Validity," no doubt, was only "strength," originally. Yet, our craving for it

was so strong that it has come to mean much more. The "validity" which logic demands and glories in is *superhuman* strength, strength such that nothing can conceivably upset it. Is not that "omnipotence"? And does not the demand for it mean in logic what it means in theology? It means, in both *alike*, a demand for absolute assurance, which is so eager and so blind that it hardly sees or cares that the conditions under which it claims fulfilment of its desire are such as to make it nugatory. For just as no power or force the human mind conceives is ever emancipated from resistance, so no human conclusion is ever absolutely "valid."

The desire for absolute truth and indefeasible assurance, therefore, frustrates itself. It merely plays into the hands of scepticism by forcing all human truth to side against it and to disclaim the ambitious aim it cannot attain. It condemns as "sceptical" the "inconclusive" and "invalid" procedures by which the sciences increase our store of truths. And it impedes their progress by systematically discountenancing the doubts which illumine the penumbra of ignorance, and discrediting the inquiry which dissolves the sacrosanctity of accepted dogma. It has not grasped the elementary facts that cognitive activity proceeds from *doubt*, and not from *certainty*, and approaches the latter only asymptotically. Is it not, then, a typical example of a false and futile postulate?

And is it not a curious fact that *the same persons* should be found to incline both to this logical postulate and to its theological analogue? Most students of religious psychology have probably noticed that men differ considerably in the value they set upon the relief from doubt and the assurance of safety ("salvation"), as also in their willingness to rely on authority and to commit their affairs to the spiritual guidance of others. The mentality which puts a high value on these advantages has a natural inclination towards Catholicism, while the Protestant temper appears to be relatively adventurous and self-reliant. It can hardly, therefore, be an accident that the strongest and

sincerest champions both of the traditional logic and of the traditional theology are the Scholastics of the Church of Rome. They cater in both cases for the same cravings of the human soul; but though they seem to concede its immediate demands, they do not ultimately satisfy either it or all the conditions of the philosophic problem.

For should we not, after all, bethink ourselves that avoidance of risk is not the last word of human wisdom? Is that all we ought to live for? Shall we, indeed, save our souls by adopting blinkers and wearing rose-coloured spectacles, by clinging to the leading-strings of authority and never venturing out into the wilds either of action or of thought? This attitude may be prudent, but it is not heroic: there is even something craven about it. Moreover, it does not look very likely to be effective, or even safe, in a world as wild and paradoxical as ours, in which it is so often made a condition of life that he that loveth his life shall lose it, and he that hateth his life in this world can make a better world for himself and others.

It may be suggested, therefore, that certainly in logic, and not improbably also in theology, a good deal more value should be attached to the willingness to take risks and to try beliefs which do *not* contain a verbal (and therefore illusory) guarantee (which turns out to be worthless) that failure is impossible. If the world is to contain a real moral issue, it must be *denied* that the victory of right has been assured from all eternity—if for no other reason than that, if it has been, there cannot be anything wrong with the appearances which exhibit right so often overborne by might. If these appearances are unreal and do not matter, they need not be changed; and so there can be no reason why the right should ever *appear* to triumph. On the other hand, if there is a real moral issue, the power of God cannot be “omnipotent”; it can, and therefore may, need our co-operation and support. Moreover, even the humblest effort may turn the scale and the merest nite of a contribution to the good may entail its victory. We become

therefore, not merely spectators of the unfolding of a predestined drama of which the author has rehearsed the plot and determined every incident, but agents in a real action, in which it is an honour to be killed. It would be quixotic, perhaps, to expect the generality of men to rise to the sublime heights of loyalty shown by the warrior in the old Norse Saga, who when Ragnarök breaks out and heaven and earth are ablaze, undauntedly sets out "to die with Odin"; but might we not be encouraged a little by our spiritual guides to think that our world may have a purpose, and may even achieve a good, without being absolutely guaranteed by a vain "omnipotence"?

XI.—BEHAVIOUR AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT.

By ARTHUR ROBINSON.

§ 1. *Introduction.—How the Problem Arises.*

PSYCHOLOGY has adopted terms in common use, or terms used in other sciences, and applied them in senses which tend to be more and more specific and technical. Such a desirable strictness of application is meanwhile hampered by associations from looser settings, and common agreement is let and hindered by the individual variations of psychologists who attempt peculiar usages and fail to convince their fellows of the value of the definitions suggested. From these circumstances many of the difficulties of psychology derive their being, or, at any rate, some of their persistent and confusing shapes. The questions we are now to discuss arise from the use of a term, "behaviour," which has a popular and less definite sense, and also a scientific and more definite sense, for example, in biology. It is now assuming in psychology a sense highly technical—or, rather, several senses, hence, in part, the trouble. But only in part, for we have now not only to do with *behaviour*, but also with *behaviourism*. We find behaviour used to designate the subject-matter of psychology, the crude problem with which it has to deal, or, again, one of its departments, or, finally, its whole and complete field. Broadly, we may say that many who hold the traditional view of psychology mean by behaviour bodily adjustment and physiological change abstracted from conscious processes which accompany or condition them. The behaviourist proper would say, on the other hand, that conscious processes are as negligible for

psychology as for physiology, bodily adjustment and physiological change are the subject-matter of psychology. It would however, be unwise to jump to the cheerful conclusion that such a simple statement would cover the ground. There are behaviourists and behaviourists, and more and other every day.

It is worth while to consider briefly how this situation has arisen. Three contributory sources at once suggest themselves: (*a*) the influence of biology on psychology; (*b*) the intensive study of animal psychology; (*c*) the rise of various shades of realism:—

(*a*) It is obvious that biology and psychology are sciences which in certain regions stand very close to each other, and the boundary line is so difficult to draw that it is not a matter of surprise to find biological categories used in psychology and psychological categories in biology. It is true that psychology has suffered in the past from attempts to translate it into mechanical or chemical terms. Further, one gathers from the outside that biologists have not so completely settled their own special problems that they may be expected forthwith to straighten out the psychological tangle, *ἐκ πλεπέρου*, so to say. At any rate, it is from biology that the notions of behaviour, as well as of response and of environment, have entered the field of psychology, and it is this fact which at present concerns us. But it should not be assumed too hastily that these notions are as adequate in the one field as in the other.

(*b*) Behaviourism largely finds its champions among our American colleagues, many of whom have done brilliant work in the field of animal psychology, or, as it is often called, animal behaviour. In this department introspection is impossible, and objective methods only are available, so success naturally raised the question, if there can be an objective science of animal behaviour without appeal to consciousness, introspection, and the subjective generally, why not an objective human psychology as well? Inferential or imagina-

tive construction of animal consciousness might be discarded with advantage, as results proved. Introspection on the human level seemed only to lead to interminable hair-splitting. Why not neglect the consciousness of the human organism, and watch what the organism overtly and palpably *does*? In short, why not elevate (or depress) human to the level of animal psychology?

(c) Another contributory circumstance has been the reaction against idealism or the rise of what is broadly described as neo-realism. Not that all neo-realists are behaviourists. True, they started with one programme and one platform, but no programme is necessarily fatal to variety of individual performance, and any platform may be the stage for dramas quite diverse. But it is easy to see that in the neo-realist "hoard of maxims" there are some which point to at least a revival of psychology. For instance, Professor Perry says: "The object or content of consciousness is an entity in so far as it is responded to by another entity in a specific manner exhibited by the reflex nervous system." . . . "The specific response which determines an entity to be content of consciousness does not directly modify such entities otherwise than to endow them with this content status. In other words, consciousness selects from a field of entities which it does not create" (*The New Realism*, pp. 475-6). The neo-realists maintain that both dualism and idealism have been sources of confusion in psychology: the actual psychologist "has in his laboratory remained a Cartesian dualist. And it is unmistakable that the results of the study of the soul are to-day, and have been through the last three centuries, read off and tabulated in terms of two substances—matter and mind" (*op. cit.*, pp. 37-8). "Psychology has not yet found the right fundamental categories, and will not find them as long as dualism continues to hold sway" (*op. cit.*, p. 39).

It is not necessary to elaborate this point. If one accepts (a) epistemological monism, or the theory that when a given

thing α is known, α *itself* enters into a relation which constitutes it the idea or content of a mind; (b) the non-dependence of objects (both as to their existence and nature) on being known, or being content of a mind; (c) the theory that consciousness is "external" relation; and (d) response of a nervous system as the starting-point of psychology—then the way to behaviourism lies open.

In addition to these more conspicuous tendencies it is quite easy to detect in much current psychological literature a naïve behaviourism which does not appear to recognise the principles on which, in fact, it moves, and has not thought out the position involved in its procedure.

It will be quite clear that it is impossible here and now to consider fully the varieties and ramifications of our problem. Accordingly I shall select three main positions, each of which has the advantage of being stated by an able exponent. According to the first view, behaviour is the starting-point of psychology; according to the second, behaviour is its sole and characteristic category, its beginning and its end: the third view includes the second, but carries it further by defining behaviour as specific response.

§ 2. *Behaviour as the Starting-point of Psychology.*

Mr. McDougall in his book *Psychology, the Study of Behaviour*, after rejecting the definitions of psychology as the science of the soul, as the science of mind, and as the science of consciousness, proceeds to say:—"We may then define psychology as the positive science of the behaviour of living things. To accept this definition is to return to the standpoint of Aristotle, and to set out from generally recognised facts, unprejudiced by theories" (p. 19). What "behaviour" means in this context Mr. McDougall immediately explains. "We all recognise broadly that the things which make up our world of perceptible objects fall into two great classes, namely, inert things, whose movements and changes seem to be directly

determined according to mechanical laws, and living things, which behave or exhibit behaviour; and, when we say that they exhibit behaviour, we mean that they seem to have an intrinsic power of self-determination, and to pursue actively or with effort their own welfare and their own ends or purposes. The manifestation of purpose or the striving to achieve an end is, then, the mark of behaviour; and behaviour is the characteristic of living things" (pp. 19—20).

With the effort to start from common ground we must all sympathise, but it is not clear that the ground thus specified is common. Self-determination and pursuit of ends are to the behaviourist extremely vague notions, and would certainly not be classed as "generally recognised facts unprejudiced by theories." It is of course true that we can point "to facts open to the direct observation of all men" as instances of what is meant by behaviour, and say, these and the like facts are what psychology investigates. Still there will be considerable difference of opinion as to the extension of purposive activity so far as to include the growth of a nettle. Mind may be "an extremely ill-defined object," but is behaviour or purposive activity in any better case? Mr. McDougall urges (p. 31) that "mind" is "incapable of being clearly defined except in terms of some questionable and speculative hypothesis. No one can point to a mind and say, that is what I mean the word mind shall denote." Each one of us may not, it seems, instance his own mind, partly because he does not quite know what it is, and partly because it cannot be put on the table for everybody to see. In Mr. McDougall's view, introspective material would furnish a dubious starting-point, its place comes later; each consciousness knows another only by inference or imaginative reconstruction. The extreme Behaviourist, on the other hand, rejects introspection, the "privacy" of minds, and the bridge of inference from mind to mind.

To sum up, Mr. McDougall's position is (a) that behaviour

affords a means of definition and an acknowledged starting-point for psychology; (b) that purposiveness is the mark of behaviour; (c) that the subject-matter of psychology consists of (1) consciousness and (2) behaviour. Consequently his use of behaviour is primarily by way of definition, but also it is recognised as a department of psychology. A definition of mind comes later, after the study of consciousness. "We are now in a position to make a proper use of the word 'mind.' We may define the mind of any organism as the sum of the enduring conditions of its purposive activities" (p. 70). Are the bones, then, part of the mind?

A further indication of the difficulty of Mr. McDougall's position appears in his view of the relation of psychology to physiology. These sciences are held to have the same province. "We may express the relation which actually obtains between them by saying that physiology investigates the processes of the parts or organs of which any organism is composed, while psychology investigates the activities of the organism as a whole, that is, those in which it operates as a whole or unit" (p. 35). Surely the organism as a physiological system might also have physiological activities "in which it operates as a whole or unit," and there might be purposive activities which do not involve the whole organism. If digestion turned out to be a process in which the whole organism was active instead of a process performed by the stomach, it would not *therefore* pass from the physiologist's to the psychologist's domain. Mr. McDougall is, of course, not a behaviourist. He is, according to Professor Holt, "not untainted with subjectivism" (*The Freudian Wish*, p. 208). The claims of behaviour as a starting-point for psychology could scarcely have been urged more persuasively than they are by Mr. McDougall, but his position does not seem to me to cohere with the genuinely "psychological psychology" to which he passes in succeeding chapters. Behaviour is not *in itself* a possible starting-point for psychology, and the reason is simple. When so used, it

cannot mean merely biological or physiological behaviour, bodily adjustment, and physico-chemical process. If it does, psychology disappears. It ought not to mean mental behaviour, for then it depends for its significance on the very notion it is intended to replace—temporarily in Mr. McDougall's case, permanently in the case of the behaviourist proper.

§ 3. *Behaviour as the Sole and Characteristic Category of Psychology, or Psychology without a Mind.*

Professor J. B. Watson, in his book entitled *Behaviour: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (New York, 1914), gives an admirably vigorous and definite statement of the extreme behaviourist position (Ch. 1, "Psychology and Behaviour"). Its main theses are as follows:—

Psychology is an objective experimental science, and aims to predict and control behaviour. It does not rest on introspection and need not use it. It is proposed to investigate the behaviour of men and of animals without reference to consciousness, for psychology as a science of consciousness has failed. "This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences, The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms" (p. 28). Psychology then will not be expressed "in the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, will, imaging, and the like," but "in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of habit formation, habit integration, and the like." (p. 9).

Behaviour is response to environment, and is always physico-chemical. Environment compels the formation of habits, and here Professor Watson makes a distinction of capital importance for his theory. After general bodily habits come language habits; these increase in complexity, form short circuits, and finally words come to be, on occasion, substituted for acts.

That is, a stimulus which, in early stages, would produce an act (and which will always do so under appropriate conditions), now produces merely a spoken word, or a mere movement of the larynx (or of some other expressive organ) (p. 19). Accordingly Professor Watson divides behaviour into *explicit* and *implicit*, and explicit behaviour is further divided into "immediate overt response," and "delayed overt response."

"When the stimulus produces either an *immediate overt response* (as, *e.g.*, when John is told to go to the side-board and get an apple—taking it for granted that he goes), or a *delayed overt response* (as, *e.g.*, when an engineer is asked to think out and make an apparatus for the conversion of salt water into sweet, which may consume years before overt action begins), we have examples of what we may call *explicit behaviour*. In contrast to behaviour of this type, which involves the larger musculature in a way plainly apparent to direct observation, we have behaviour involving only the speech mechanisms (or the larger musculature in a minimal way: *e.g.*, bodily attitudes or sets). This form of behaviour, for lack of a better name, we may call *implicit behaviour*. When explicit behaviour is delayed (*i.e.*, when deliberation ensues), the intervening time between stimulus and response is given over to implicit behaviour (to 'thought processes')" (p. 19).

Reasoning is not admitted to be "a genuine type of human behaviour except as a special form of language habit" (p. 319). It is by the possession of language habits that man differs from the brute. Mental imaging and the affective processes are not serious obstacles to the views of the behaviourist (pp. 16-26).

The reduction of reasoning to a "special form of language habit" is nearly as indefensible as it is ingenious. What does "special" mean? Professor Watson's book is not merely a tracing of the movements of his "larger musculature." But we must remember that Professor Watson candidly describes the view set out in his book, *Behaviour* (Ch. X, "Man and Beast")

as "the highly speculative position we have tentatively put forth here" (p. 334). In the *Psychological Review* (Sept., 1917) he gives as one of the four main classes of reactions—"Implicit habit responses: 'thinking,' by which we mean subvocal talking." It looks as if it were proposed to investigate language apart from meaning, and a psychology of reasoning on these terms should have the merit of novelty and no other.

Even if it were true that psychology as a science of consciousness has failed, it would still be true that behaviourism has yet to succeed. The root and branch rejection of introspection requires some sort of justification; the fact that an organism feels pain has a *prima facie* relevancy to its action, and if the behaviourist sets that fact aside as irrelevant he is surely called upon to say why. We are told that the business of psychology is to predict and control behaviour, and behaviour here means bodily movement and physico-chemical change. I do not contest the value of Professor Watson's investigation, but it is biological or physiological and not psychological. It assumes that there is no relevant difference between a conscious and an unconscious organism and yet claims to bear a name which in its general acceptation implies the opposite. The issue can be stated without discussing the status of the image or of feeling or the existence of an entity distinguishable from the body,—“the so-called mind.” No behaviourist goes the length of denying the fact of consciousness in the sense of awareness, but all behaviourists must maintain that the fact that an organism knows its environment makes no difference to the response.

§ 4. *Behaviour as Specific Response.*

Professor E. B. Holt considers that behaviourists do not “realise the significance of what they are doing,” and “the remarkable novelty, which behaviour, considered just as they are considering it, does in fact involve” (*The Freudian Wish*,*

All references in this section are to *The Freudian Wish*.

p. 164). His position seems to be as follows. The discussion of consciousness *versus* behaviour rests on the "bead theory" of causation,—that is, the theory that the state of x at one moment is the cause of its state at the next. Once start in this direction and it leads to an analysis of component processes which in psychology breaks up the man into "a flow of ions in neuro-muscular tissue." "But now the functional view, moving in precisely the opposite direction, admonishes us to keep the man whole (if it is *behaviour* that we are studying) and to study his movements until we have discovered *exactly what* he is doing, that is, until we have found that object, situation, process (or perhaps merely that relation) of which his behaviour is a *constant function*. The analysis of this behaviour, as thus exactly described, will come in later; but it in turn will be carried on in the same spirit, *i.e.*, of discovering always and solely *functions*" (p. 163).

But Professor Holt urges there is really a novelty in behaviour over and above the constant functions which biologists and behaviourists study, and so an exact definition of behaviour is needed. Behaviour (*a*) is "a process of release" (of "stored energy"); (*b*) "is not a function of the immediate stimulus"; (*c*) "is a function of some object, process, or aspect of the objective environment." Thus, "behaviour is any process of release which is a function of factors external to the mechanism released" (pp. 164—171). Again, behaviour is specific response: "The organism responds specifically to something outside, just as the falling body moves specifically towards the earth's centre" (p. 168). The object cognized or content of consciousness corresponds to the object of which the organism's behaviour is a constant function. "When one is conscious of a thing, one's movements are adjusted to it, and to precisely those features of it of which one is conscious. The two domains are conterminous" (p. 172). Volition is "identical with that which one's body in the capacity of released mechanism *does*" (p. 174). Feeling "is some

modification of response which is determined by factors *within* the organism" (p. 193).

The outcome of this theory is that mind is "integrated reflex behaviour" (p. 82). We start with the activity of a reflex arc which "is not aware of anything," we end with integrated reflex behaviour and the cognitive relation. It is clearly stated that behaviour differs from mere reflex action (pp. 156 and 160). "But it is the co-ordinated totality of these least components which *cannot* be described in such terms, nor indeed in terms resembling these. For such neural and reflex terms fail to seize that integration factor which has now transformed reflex action into something else, *i.e.*, behaviour." So "the most essential thing of all" is "the *organization* of these processes." What, then, is integration? Consider Professor Holt's hypothetical water-animal (pp. 52 *seq.*). It has two eye-spots, two reflex arcs, two fins, one on each side of the posterior end, each fin with a backward thrust. If light strikes the right eye the left fin sets to work and the animal spins to the right. As a result light strikes the other eye, the right fin operates, and the two fins together propel the animal in a straight line towards the light. Either reflex singly merely spins the animal, under their combined action it responds specifically or behaves. Add a third reflex arc, a "heat-spot" with the necessary connections, and you provide a means of stopping the animal from swimming towards the light to its destruction. There is now an "objective reference" in the process of release.

Surely, if a specific response is "a reaction which is definably distinct from a reaction to any other entity whatsoever," spinning is as much a specific response as moving in a straight line. Further, behaviour, we understood, should not be defined in reflex terms nor in terms resembling them. How does the definition given fulfil this promise? Is the whole mystery of integration, and the passage from reflex action to behaviour and consciousness, merely the difference

between one pull and three pulls acting together, and producing a result modified by their joint action? Whatever the novelty involved in behaviour may be, it cannot possibly be a mere case of the composition of forces.

Professor Holt believes that with the advent of behaviour evolution "turned a corner," and that the essential point of behaviour lies in this, that it is "any process of release which is a function of factors external to the mechanism released," and *not* of factors internal to the mechanism. Yet we find it stated that feeling "is some modification of response which is determined by factors *within* the organism" (p. 193). Behaviour will accordingly be complicated by feeling, "just as the constant of gravity is complicated by skin friction, wind, and other forces which act on falling bodies." But this admission is disastrous to the definition of behaviour, as previously stated. For the actual behaviour of an actual organism can plainly *not* be a function of external factors, but of those together with the internal complications or feelings. Or does the new psychology propose to describe the behaviour of hypothetical and phantom beings—behaviour as it would be with no contribution from the nature of the behaving organism—behaviour corrected for the "skin friction and wind" of feeling? Further, there is some ground for supposing that, on Professor Holt's theory, feeling would have to be unconscious; if it is not the object responded to and of which behaviour is a function, why should it come into the field of consciousness at all? The fact is that this attempt to resolve psychology into behaviour rests not only on a rejection of "subjectivism" and the "subjective" (two quite different things, by the way), but also involves the position that consciousness as a bare relation, the mere fact that an organism is aware, is irrelevant to the nature of its response. In reality, according to this theory, the specific response *is* the cognitive relation. How is this any better than the

epiphenomenal consciousness of psycho-physical parallelism which the behaviourist so contemns?

Similarly, in behaviourism, "no distinction can be found between function, wish, and purpose" (p. 95), a statement which reads curiously as an argument *for* behaviourism as a science of human action. Teleology is bowed out of court as being only the distinction between part deed and whole deed. And all this rather than admit that relevant distinctions may be found in the consciousness of the agent. Thus does pan-objectivism, as Professor Kallen remarks, become pan-objectivism!

The whole theory goes to show that an attempt to resolve mind into external behaviour and avoid subjective categories can only get along by ignoring events which undoubtedly happen, and by calling different things by the same name. An instance of the latter process is the straightforward identification of volition with the actual movement of the body. It quite plainly rests on a defective analysis, or else on a conscious rejection of certain elements in the situation as being irrelevant. The justification of such a rejection is precisely the point to which behaviourism should address itself.

Is the body the "knower"? The question does not seem to me as vital as some other issues raised by the behaviourists, but there is one strong objection to saying that it is the body which knows. If we use the term body we ought to mean by it precisely what the physiologist means, no more and no less. But if we do use the term in that sense I can discover little illumination in the notion that a collection of bio-chemical processes

"looks before and after,
And sighs for what is not."

Nor do I feel drawn to a position which seems to involve the unqualified identification of thought with activity of muscle and "varying degrees of muscular tonus." Motor attitude, we are told, "is thought. It differs from overt

behaviour only in the small degree of muscular action which it involves. The one fundamental principle is that no member can move in opposed directions at once, and impulses that impel to this efface each other" (p. 69). "This," says Professor Holt, "is very simple." It is—too simple. So simple, in fact, that the psychological differences between Shakespeare conceiving Hamlet and walking down the street would resolve themselves into the difference between a tracing of the movements of his "larger musculature" in the latter case, and a tracing of the movements of his larynx in the former.

This discussion of Professor Holt's views is based on his book entitled *The Freudian Wish*. The view maintained in *The Concept of Consciousness* seems to me different in several important respects, in particular the use made of "neutral entities," a cross-section of which constitutes the object of response, and is defined by the response of the nervous system. This theory is discussed by Professor Dawes Hicks (*Proceedings*, vol. xvii. pp. 346, *supp.*), and there seems no necessity to do more than refer to his critique. But, in particular, I heartily agree with the statement (p. 349) that "it is only because 'consciousness' is surreptitiously introduced into the nervous response on which it is declared to depend that the account given of the nervous response as selecting and defining the contents of consciousness wears even a semblance of plausibility." The response with which psychology, in its proper sphere, deals, is a response to a known situation, and in this knowledge and its implications its true "specificity" is to be found.

§ 5. Conclusion.

The objections which I have urged against behaviourism I believe to hold without going beyond the relational theory of consciousness, that is, without assuming that mind means more than the mere relation of knowing. For even with that limitation, consciousness would be at least useless to the organism. For my part, I hold no such view of mind. Nor

do I think behaviourism can give an intelligible account of recognition and memory. With regard to the latter, we may note, in passing, that on the functional view there can be no appeal to "stored stimuli"; they are "beads" if anything at all. No less difficulties await the theory if it seriously faces the problem of response to a foreseen situation.

The attack on subjectivism is in part misdirected; or, at any rate, goes too far. You cannot leave the cognitive relation permanently loose at one end, and it does not readily tie to the body as such. There need be nothing mystical in the notion of a subject or a mind; it is hard to discover any "ghost-theory" in Stout, or any dualism as devastating as the neo-realists maintain to be characteristic of the traditional psychology.

Psychology, then, is the science of the conscious organism *qui* conscious; it has to study the processes whereby such an organism becomes aware and acquires knowledge of its environment and responds thereto. Such parts of the total response as an onlooker can observe may be called behaviour, but behaviour is not the characteristic, still less the sole, category of psychology.

XII.—THE CONCEPTION OF A UNITARY SOCIAL ORDER.

By H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

I.

It was inevitable and fitting that the discussions of this Society should reflect the striking and important movements that are stirring in the world to-day, and the Society has been fortunate in having had, during the last three years, statements of the philosophical foundations of certain new conceptions of social ordering which are likely to affect profoundly the structure of our civilisation. It is to these that I wish to recur. Most of the material which I shall discuss is contained in the *Proceedings* of the Society since 1914.* I shall, therefore, spend as little time as possible in exposition, and try to consider chiefly what seem to be the main philosophical issues involved.

It will be agreed, I think, that the most impressive characteristic of recent social philosophy and propaganda has been the distrust of the institution which we call the State, and the desire to substitute, for the unitary control of social life by the State, a divided control over the different interests or aspects of life by the institutions corresponding directly to these interests. The assault upon the State has come from all quarters, and it has been inspired not primarily by the

* The references are Mr. Cole's paper on "Conflicting Social Obligations," 1914-15; Symposium on "The Nature of the State in its External Relations," 1915-16; Mr. Bosanquet's paper on "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," and the Symposium on "Ethical Principles of Social Reconstruction," 1916-17.

prejudice and incompetence displayed by every State in the management of its affairs, or by the failure of the State to become in practice what it claims to be in idea, but by the belief that that idea itself is wrong. The State fails, not as every human institution must fail through the defective insight of the finite mind, but because it is trying to be or to do something which, in the nature of the case, cannot be done. It is the expression of a false principle of organisation, of a false view of the nature of the human mind, and is therefore essentially repressive and obstructive in its operation. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the classical philosophical theory of the State has come in for a considerable share of the criticism. For if philosophical theory cannot be regarded as responsible for the practical defects of the State, at least it has done something to perpetuate the false idea which the State is trying to embody. And that, if it is true, is surely, in Mr. Russell's phrase, "a regrettable thing."

The problem, then, which I should like to consider is twofold. I want to ask, first, what exactly is at issue between these new critical movements and the traditional philosophical theory, and, secondly, what is the bearing of this issue on certain problems of social organisation.

What I have to say must incur the reproach of being "unscientific," *i.e.*, it is not primarily concerned with the psychological and other conditions which produce certain defects in actually existing states. That this is an extremely

* This is Mr. Russell's criticism of most politico-philosophical theory (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915-16, p. 301). Perhaps I may add that I do not dissent from Mr. Russell's view as to the enormous part which instinct and impulse play in life; or from his view that philosophers are apt to overestimate the part played by reason. But I should still hold that the rational action is the characteristic human action; *i.e.*, I think the direction of progress is that action should become less an affair of inherited psycho-physical mechanism and more an affair of rationally conceived ends. Mr. Russell, on the other hand, though he maintains the competence and rights of reason in the speculative sphere, seems to regard it as essentially obstructive in action.

important inquiry—perhaps of more immediate practical importance than ours—I am fully ready to admit. But it is a psychological and historical inquiry rather than a philosophical one. Here we are concerned with the *εἶδος* of the State. I want to approach the problem very much in the same way as, *e.g.*, Mr. Cole approaches it—to inquire what it is that the State seems to be trying to be, and what the *rationalis* of that type of organisation is in the mind and will of man. This inquiry, of course, if it concerns a “form” which is nowhere adequately realised, yet springs out of the actual structure of our social world, and throws light upon it. In particular, if we find any ground for this form of organisation in the nature of man’s mind, we may have some confidence in the soundness of direction of the movement which has produced it.

The first is our main inquiry, and I believe the answer is not difficult to find. There are manifest differences between the various critical theories, and I shall consider two main types of them. But, in spite of these differences, there seems to be a common character in their relation to the classical theory. So far as it can be expressed in a word, it is this. All these theories appear to deny the view which idealist philosophers, who are the main representatives of the classical political tradition, have taken of the unity of the mind. And it seems to me that this denial shows itself in the assumption or implication in these theories, that somewhere in the development of the mind and of its embodiment in the external world of nature and society there is a real break in continuity. Some part of the work of the mind (and preferably its work in the building of our present social order) has been simply a mistake. We have side-tracked ourselves, somehow contrived to labour in vain. And the only thing left for us to do is to break with our history: either to get back to something which we mistakenly thought we had outgrown, or to start all over again on a new line.

It is hazardous to sum up a tradition of many centuries in

a phrase. But I think we may take as the cardinal doctrine of idealism in this connexion* simply the belief in the relevance of the actual form of mind to its essential nature. It is true that no thinkers have insisted more forcibly than the idealist philosophers on the incompleteness and instability of the *de facto* individual mind. Nevertheless, they have held that, at every stage, there is implicit the true form of mind. Mind is never merely a fact. Wherever it truly is, it is a fact on the way to becoming a bigger fact: and this immanent dialectic is the clue to its nature. "Properly speaking, ideality is not somewhat outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality."† The idealist view of mind is that this principle is as true of it as of the world to which it belongs. Its principle is self-transcendence, the transition from one form of unity to a fuller and more concrete form. "Thought," says Dr. Bosanquet in a summary of his own doctrine, "has always the nature of a system of connected elements, and is an effort to take that form which we may call a 'world.'"<‡ If for the more restricted word "thought" we write "mind," as expressive not only of intelligence but of will, this is a statement of the central idealist doctrine of mind.

My thesis is that, at bottom, it is this view of the nature of the mind which is denied. I shall try to bring out the implications of this denial, and to suggest that ultimately it eliminates the whole conception of "obligation" which is the clue to any rational explanation of social organisation.

* Since we are dealing with a problem of mind and will, there is no need to raise specifically the question of the relation of the mind to the external world.

† Hegel: *Smaller Logic*, § 96 (Wallace trans.).

‡ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. xix.

II.

The keynote of this criticism in all its forms is "freedom." The State is conceived to be hostile to the freedom of individuals and of all other forms of social grouping. It is a vast institution, covering a great range of interests, and requiring for its maintenance a formidable apparatus of official mechanism. Hence the attack upon it takes two distinct forms: first, that it is overwhelmingly formal, rigid and mechanical, stifling spontaneity and growth in all the concerns of life which it touches; and, second, that it invades too many provinces of human interest, and, by arrogating to itself competence in all the departments of life, it prevents the free development of that variety of institutions which are the natural repositories of the different human interests and loyalties. Together, these two criticisms represent the main strength of the reaction against the State: and though some writers, like Mr. Russell, hold both to be true, they are urged by quite distinguishable schools. The former is chiefly associated with the extraordinarily diverse social movement which claims some sort of kinship with Bergson;* the latter with such writers as Dr. J. N. Figgis from the side of ecclesiastical institutions, and Mr. Cole from the side of industry.

We may begin with the first: since, although the charge of mechanism is brought with special emphasis against the State, the issue raised by it has a far wider reference. It concerns the whole nature of life in organised society. For all organisa-

* It includes, besides Mr. Russell, writers as far apart in many ways as Sorel and the French Syndicalist group, Dr. L. P. Jacks, and Professor Patrick Geddes. While this paper was being written I received Mr. J. W. Scott's recent communication to the Society on *Realism and Politics*, which seems to me a very penetrating analysis of the fact to which I have referred—the likeness of Mr. Russell's theory to Bergson's. The way in which I have tried to approach the problem is rather different from Mr. Scott's; but I do not think my conclusions differ greatly from his.

tion involves to some degree the qualities of rigidity and mechanism. Society is a complex of institutions; and an institution, though it may originate in impulse or instinct, maintains itself only when the interest embodied in it assumes a certain permanence and stability. The interest, that is to say, has to become a purpose; and the stability of the purpose is reflected in the stability of the institution. Purpose, then, is at least one remove from the primitive level of life. At its simplest, life is an attempt to satisfy a continuous series of impulses, instincts and wants, and it runs most easily and pleasantly when these impulses meet with no impediment, but enjoy a free and ready expression. A purpose, on the other hand, is more rigid and permanent, and is not submerged in the stream of satisfactions. It maintains its identity over a long period of time, and exercises a certain controlling force over the direction of life's activities. It can do this just because it is rational. It is reason which has this trick of looking before and behind. It catches up impulses, and converts them from momentary immediate things into elements subordinated to the plan of a larger whole. It imposes restraint, interrupts the onward flow of life, and arranges its several elements into a more or less permanent order. Because of this, Mr. Russell thinks,* "the complete control of impulse by will is not really desirable. A life governed by purposes and desires to the exclusion of impulse is a tiring life; it exhausts vitality, and leaves a man in the end indifferent to the very purposes which he has been trying to achieve. Industrialism and organisation are constantly forcing civilised nations to live more and more by purpose rather than by impulse."

It is reason, then, which, by transforming impulse into purpose and will, brings rigidity, hardness of outline, and mechanism into life. Of course we cannot do without it altogether. There are some impulses that make for death: and

* *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 18.

these we must restrain. But, at the best, in the sphere of action, reason and the restraint which the embodiment of rational order in stable habits and institutions implies are purely instrumental. We progress, therefore, not, as philosophers have supposed, by letting reason carry on its work of synthesis, of shaping the elements of our life into a growing form of unity, but by holding it to its subordinate function, and by releasing the infra-rational forms of life from its domination. In them lie the spring of progress, and the true unity of the self.

This attitude is written plainly over the whole type of social doctrine to which I have referred. Sorel's championship of the "myth" of the general strike, *e.g.*, is inspired by his belief that what is wanted for social building is not an appeal to the reason in man but to his instinctive recognition of "class-solidarity." And one comes across it again in the characteristic refusal of certain of his disciples to shackle themselves by predicting (*i.e.*, inferring) any new social world. "No more dogmas or formulas: no more futile discussions as to the future of society; no more comprehensive plans of social organisation, but a feeling of the fight quickened by practice, a philosophy of action which accords pre-eminence to intuition, and which declares that the simplest workman in the fight knows more about the matter than the most abstract doctrinaires of all the schools."*

The affinity of all this with Bergson's doctrine of the primacy of intuition and feeling is unmistakable. Reason, with its cinematographical analysis, arresting and fixing the movement of life, is incompetent to understand, still more to originate the continuous and infinitely varying process of the hidden inner life of the self. Our freedom lies in our power to penetrate beneath this rational, calculating self of which we are ordinarily aware, but which is indeed only a "ghostly and

* H. Lagardelle, *cit.* Webb, *The Crusade*, August, 1912, p. 143.

colourless projection" of the real self, to "our inner states as living things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable to measure."* If that doctrine is true, it is justification enough for withdrawing most of our lives from participation in organised institutions. If our good is to possess and express this real self, what we should look for in the world is not an increasingly comprehensive and unified social structure, so that our activities are more perfectly adjusted to one another and brought into harmony with a conception of life as a whole. We want rather a world which comes as little near us as possible, which leaves us most alone to our own intense selves. Our ideal is, as Dr. Jacks says, a "minimum of government," to restrict within the narrowest possible limits the "tampering with individuality"† which social organisation involves.

It hardly needs elaborating that this doctrine denies the relevance of the actual form of mind to its true nature. The tradition which has read, as a revelation of its true nature, the progressive rationalisation of man's mind, its arduous ascent to the mastery of passion by reason, and to the embodiment of a rational order in a complex structure of habit and social institutions, has mistaken the instrument for the end. Instead of building a world which is the reflexion of itself, mind has built one which operates as an external constraint, and whose perfecting will simply be a more intolerable tyranny.

Perhaps the most direct way of testing the issue is to ask whether individuality really is something which is impeded by social organisation. It surely is so, if it is to be found *at its best* simply in an experienced common origin of diverse impulses.‡ Then the self is exclusive, and is imperilled by anything, even

* *Time and Free Will*, Eng. trans., p. 231.

† *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1916-17, pp. 264-5.

‡ Cf. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 24. "The impulses and desires of men and women, in so far as they are of real importance in their lives, are not detached one from another, but proceed from a central principle of growth."

by that fragment of itself, which imposes order from without. That there is such a form of individuality or self-hood is true; and it is the basis of what philosophers have regarded as a more developed and complex self-hood. It seems, however, hard to attach to such a self any conception of quality of life at all. Quality seems to involve content. But, once we have implied content, there is no returning to the self as simple feeling. For to win content the self has to adventure out of its narrow exclusiveness into a range of more or less universal interests. These still belong to the self; but the self is not only their common point of origin, it possesses them in some form of wholeness which is the beginning of rationality. The self's activities are not a mere series, but already some kind of system. Their serial order tends to be overlaid by an order of value; and the self is committed to them less in virtue of their felt continuity with one another, than of their belonging to its "world."

But, even admitting that a rational order in this sense is not alien to individuality, may it not still be true that its formal organisation is hostile to the inner life of the self? The unity of its own life, however complex it may be, still belongs directly to the self; and is capable of endlessly subtle adjustment from within. There need be no hardness or opposition of elements: they all belong to a single continuous process, and assume the form which the direction of that process requires. Yet, if the self arrests that process at any point, and, taking the order which it finds there to be permanent, confers on that a certain external embodiment in the form of habits, or of social institutions, then real inwardness of life is gone. There is something fixed and stable, standing out of the stream, and diverting its natural onflow; perhaps even, if the organisation becomes elaborate enough (as in the State), throwing itself like a dam across a river, so that there is no novelty of direction, no exploration of new courses, but a regulated flow between the high banks of a canal, safe, perhaps till the gates burst, but joyless and commonplace to the end.

The basis of this attitude, it seems, is the characteristic Bergsonian fear of space or externality. Rational control is apt to stereotype the life of the spirit, and that process is completed when reason contrives to embody itself in that external form in which it is most at home. Part of the answer, I suppose, is simply to deny, as Kant did in spite of his doctrine of inner sense, that the pure form of time, apart from space or other forms of order, is competent to furnish a unity of mind. If the apprehensions of temporal and spatial order are mutually conditioning, then the attempt to make space alien to the life of the mind, or to make it, at the best, the form of only a part of the mind, is in the end to deny the wholeness of the form of time itself, and, with that, all real continuity of life.*

But if this is sufficient to disprove the intrinsic hostility of a formal organisation of the elements of life to the inner unity of the self, even if it proves that it is a condition of any unity of mind at all, it might still be true that that unity is purchased only at the cost of arrestment. Once the elements of life have assumed an order, genuine change or novelty becomes correspondingly difficult. Some measure of organisation may be essential to mind, but it is still obstructive in its operation. Change and movement will still originate in the unorganised level of mind. Organisation is in itself static, and, wherever there is a real advance, it is due to the uprising of forces from the hidden self, which break through the barriers and rush onwards, till they, in turn, are caught into

* It is significant that, even in the famous passage (*Creative Evolution*, p. 212) where Bergson describes our experience of pure duration, the spatial reference is still present, "our personality concentrates itself on a point, or, rather, a sharp edge, pressed against the future, and cutting into it unceasingly." I imagine the spatial reference is due not so much to the fact that Bergson is here trying to do what is, *ex hypothesi*, impossible—i.e., give an intellectual account of a non-intellectual experience—but ultimately to the fact that whenever we try to abstract "time" wholly from "space" it lapses into mere succession.

a net of organisation, and confined within fixed and stable forms.

The assumption here is still that organisation and life are opposed, that there is nothing creative in the organising activity of mind, no logic which compels it to new syntheses. Indeed, since organisation is the condition and expression of unity, the real opposition lies between unity and creativeness. Unity turns out to be a more or less accidental characteristic of mind, necessary, perhaps, because mind is incapable of continual creative effort, but, in principle, hostile to that effort. To say that mind is one is just to say that its effort has ceased, and, by that very fact, its renewal has become more difficult.

Yet, if this is what is meant, it is hard to see by what right we speak of novelty, or even change, for these things imply unity and continuity, not as accidental characters, but as conditions of their being. If there is no unity, there is not even succession, and wherever we postulate for life not only succession but progress, unity is no longer an external but an essential quality. Hence, in so far as organisation is a condition of unity, it is also the condition of creativeness. And that is precisely what we discover in all the developed activities of mind. It is organised knowledge, will, and feeling which are aware of their own inadequacy, and are compelled by their own nature to new adventures. Indeed, wherever we can trace progress of life, there is progress of organisation, and the mind's power of orderly synthesis is the very principle of its own development.

Moreover, if at any subsequent stage it were true that unity and organisation are thus hostile to life, it is hard to exempt from the same condemnation the assumed original unity of self. We can do so only on the ground that there unity is simply a datum, involving no construction, no effort of the self to maintain itself as such. In that case it is not apparent how so moribund a self can be a real principle of growth. Its unity lies merely in a felt awareness of opposition

to other things, not in any structure of its own. It is merely a relaxation of effort, and not the attempt of a form of life to create and interpret itself more fully. And this surely does less than justice even to the impulse from which we set out. For impulse is not simply something which happens, and acts solely by a caprice of its own nature. At every stage it is the response of a mind, or rather of an organised body operating through the medium of consciousness, to a definite situation. It is an attempt to attain a certain form of wholeness, and the most formal operation of the intellect is nothing else. The opposition which is held to exist between impulse and reason is false to the nature of both. Both alike are responses of the mind to its world. The difference simply lies in the awareness of a more complex situation to which the response is made, and in the kind of wholeness attained. In the one case the response is to the circumstances immediately presented to the bodily organism; in the other, to circumstances which may be as wide as the world.

Rational organisation, then, and creativeness are essentially the same, and, if that is true, there is no need to suspect that the organisation of the life of the self is repressive of individuality. Individuality is simply a whole of being expressing itself in new "creative" activities. And that is not to be found in its most characteristic form at the primitive level. It begins there, for even at that level there is operative a "nisus towards wholeness." But it grows with the mind's power to make an ordered and complex response. And in the same way we cannot guarantee individuality by arbitrarily cutting short the work of synthesis and preserving the self from contact with the activity of other selves in building an ordered social world. For that, again, is simply a more complex and co-ordinated effort of many selves to express in a more comprehensive form of wholeness the principle of their lives. Whatever oppression the social world lays on the self comes from imperfect synthesis, either in the self or in

society, from elements in the spirit which assert themselves in the wrong way, and which have not yet been caught into a rational order. But the way of freedom and of progress is manifestly not to go back, but to go forward, and let synthesis complete its work.

III.

The issue raised by this first school has, as we have noted, a far wider reference than simply to the State. It concerns the relevance of the whole work of the organising reason to the true nature of the mind: and its outcome, if its doctrine stands, is the elimination or restriction of all organised social life. When we approach the second line of criticism, we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere. The reaction from the main philosophical tradition is far less pronounced. There is no apparent antagonism to organisation as such, or belief that it is somehow hostile to the spirit of man. The only question is as to the kind of organisation which best serves that end. The attack comes against a particular form of organisation—that of the sovereign State—and against the theory which holds that in principle that form of organisation is right.

In relation to this doctrine I want, if I can, to distinguish between what appear to be points of principle and points of detail, and to suggest, if I rightly understand the former, that in so far as there is a divergence between this doctrine and the doctrine of the classical theorists the implications point very much in the direction of Bergson's theory.

I must premise that I find it difficult to be sure that there is a serious conflict of principle between, *e.g.*, Mr. Cole and the philosophical theory even of the Hegelians. But I incline to think, both from Mr. Cole's practical constructions and the emphasis which he lays on certain theoretical points, that there is, and perhaps it will save misunderstanding if I begin by setting down forthwith where I take it to lie.

The point of conflict seems to be not so much the definition of the nature of the State, as the definition of the nature of

sovereignty. Mr. Cole believes that political philosophy has gone wrong in trying to regard the State as the sovereign institution; and he defines the function of the State in such a way as to "particularise" it. It is, or should be, the institution representative of "consumers" or "enjoyers," and it is competent to deal with all matters which, so far as use and enjoyment go, "affect all citizens, roughly speaking, equally and in the same way."* Similarly, Industry is an association of producers; the Church of adherents to a particular form of religion. Our method of social organisation, he holds, should recognise the intrinsic difference and independence of these interests, and the certainty that an institution created to deal with any one of them is bound to be incompetent to interfere in any other. Each of these "functional" institutions, therefore, must be regarded as sovereign in its own sphere. It is more or less of a superstition, explicable no doubt on historical grounds, to regard sovereignty as the peculiar attribute or differentia of any one of them. Once we recognise the "form" which the State is coming more and more to assume, we see how "particular" its interest and competence are; and are delivered from thinking of it as more than an "elder brother" among others with rights equal to its own, and in no sense derived from it.

There is no need to dispute the accuracy of Mr. Cole's view that the State tends to assume, as an important part of its function, the form of an organisation of consumers, and we may grant that it would be an advantage to distinguish clearly between this function and its function of exercising sovereignty. Moreover, philosophers can have no particular objection, though historians and the "plain man" very well might, to confining the term "State" to the institution in the former capacity.† The philosophical problem is as to the nature

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1914-15, p. 152.

† In order to avoid ambiguity, I shall discard, for the moment, the term "State," and speak only of "sovereign."

of the sovereign, whether called State or anything else, and its relation to other organisations. It is here, I take it, that Mr. Cole finds himself seriously at variance with the philosophical tradition. Philosophers, as a rule, have held that sovereignty is capable of being exercised by a single institution which, in virtue of its function as the expression of the unity of a whole area and level of life, and as the guardian of that unity, is sovereign *de jure*. Mr. Cole, on the other hand, thinks that sovereignty is incapable of being exercised by a single institution. It belongs to a complex of institutions; and the nearest we can get to its expression is in a *de facto*, derivative institution. The former think of a single sovereign institution as implied by the form and structure of social organisation: the latter thinks of it, not as in its own right a representative of the whole, but as an expedient designed simply to facilitate, by making certain external adjustments between them, the operation of the institutions which embody the varied interests of life.

Here, if anywhere, is a real cleavage. And Mr. Cole, I think, quite rightly diagnoses that it concerns the nature of the General Will. He holds (agreeing with the philosophical tradition) that sovereignty *de jure* belongs to the General Will, and since there is no single sovereign institution, it must be because the General Will cannot be expressed therein. If, then, we can discover what it is that prevents the expression of the General Will in a single institution, we should understand wherein, on Mr. Cole's view, philosophers have misconceived the nature of that Will and therefore of the sovereign institution.

There are, it is clear, many wills which belong to the same genus as the General Will. "Wherever two or three are gathered together, a common will different from their individual wills may emerge: wherever two or three form a coalition or association, of whatever sort, a new corporate will comes into being." But of all these wills, it is the General Will alone which cannot express itself in an appropriate institution. All

the others can—no doubt with a certain loss of purity,* but effectively enough. Hence, presumably, what prevents the expression of the General Will in a single institution is the feature which distinguishes it from all other corporate wills.

That feature, it seems, is its complexity. All other corporate wills are concerned with a specific interest. They are functional: and there is no difficulty, or at most only a mechanical one, in designing a suitable embodiment for each of them. But the General Will is just the will out of which they all spring: it is simply man's social enterprise in general. It is so infinitely varied that it needs them all for its adequate expression: and hence its only fitting embodiment is just the whole of society—all that complex of the institutions which make up the web of the social world. To take any one institution as the embodiment *par excellence* of the General Will, and therefore to make it sovereign over all the others, is just to mistake a fragment for the whole.

The divergence from the classical philosophy, I suppose, is expressed in the last sentence. No philosopher, I think, has ever held that the State or any other institution itself completely embodies the whole range of human interests. What has been held is that this multitude of institutions is not truly described as a complex. It is more properly called a system: there is a real identity of principle throughout. Hence its nature as a whole, its principle, can be expressed, not fully of course, but certainly without essential travesty, in a single institution. Moreover, it not merely *can*, but *must*, be so expressed if the several functional institutions are to have any stability or permanence of life. That they should belong to a single structure is not a limitation of their freedom, but a condition of it. We misapprehend the nature not only of the whole, but of the parts, if we think of them as, in principle,

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1914-15, p. 156. "All machinery is necessarily imperfect," etc.

separate from one another. This, I take it, is what Mr. Cole denies. He believes that there is no such identity of principle traceable in the functional wills: and though they are all "parts" of the General Will, that Will is too indeterminate* to exercise effective sovereignty over them. Hence we must treat them as independent. The only specific embodiment of sovereignty which our social order requires is in that institution which adjusts the relations of the functional associations to one another when conflict arises. And since there is no determinate form of General Will to which we can appeal directly, our *de facto* sovereign will be only a sort of Conciliation Board, which can hardly attempt to assess the merits of the case, but must proceed by compromise and adjustment.†

I think, too, that Mr. Cole holds that philosophers have been mistaken in arguing from the individual will to the General Will. It is true that the individual will is not just the coincidence of a number of different interests in a single conscious centre. Its principle is that in such a centre all these interests tend to assume a form of unity. They belong to a self, and each of them is tested by its relevance to the interest of the self as a whole. But that seems to be possible in the case of the individual will because it has a single centre of consciousness. The General Will has no such centre, and is therefore incapable of similar individuality. "Man is an individual in quite a different sense from that in which the State can be called an individual. Men have conflicting loyalties, but it is the whole man who is a party to such conflicts."‡

* Cf. *ib.*, p. 159. Mr. Cole describes the relation between the General Will and the particular wills thus: "This General Will consists of a number of lesser wills, differentiated by function, all of which are essential to its fullest possible expression." The whole difficulty of course is as to what is meant by "consists of."

† The metaphor which Mr. Cole uses is that of a "balance of power" (*Self-government in Industry*, p. 88). Cf. Dr. Figgis's remark (*Churches in the Modern State*, p. 92): "Harmony must ever be a matter of balance and adjustment."

‡ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915-16, p. 315.

We cannot assume, then, because the individual will makes some kind of whole of its different interests, that the General Will does the same: and we should not expect to parallel in our social structure the sovereignty which the individual will, as a whole, exercises over these interests.

This, I think, is, as fairly as I can make out, the view on which Mr. Cole rests his rejection of the conception of a unitary social order. There are two points in it: first, that the General Will is so complex; and, second, that it cannot make itself a determinate unity by reference to one conscious centre. In both points Mr. Cole seems to be right. It is clear that man's general social interest requires a great variety of expression and I agree in denying the existence of a "social-consciousness" in the sense of some supra-individual mind. The question is whether, admitting both these points, we can give an account of the General Will, which confers on it a real unity of structure and principle.

I put the question in this way because it seems that, unless we can do so, we are hard put to it to recognise in the General Will (as both Mr. Cole and idealist philosophers do) the ultimate repository of obligation. For in the last resort one's obligation lies always to the idea of a more concrete and universal good of life than one has actually attained, and the obligation varies with the concreteness of the idea. In so far as one is uncertain as to the content of one's ideal, the obligation is less. So that, unless the General Will is determinate and concrete enough to operate in the individual will in this way, it cannot be that towards which our final obligation lies.

It is because this is precisely what the idealist philosophers have taken the General Will to be, that they have held it capable of embodying itself in a sovereign institution. Their view has been that what makes society possible at all is the presence in each individual will of an idea, which is also an ideal, of what life in society is. That idea requires the whole social world to express it; but it requires that world *as a whole*.

And, corresponding to the determinateness of the control of the idea over the individual's social interests, there must be an equally determinate control by the organ of society as a whole over the embodiment of each of these interests. That, I think, is the principle of the matter.

The basis of such a view is that it takes the doctrine that man is *φύσει πολιτικός* in its full sense. That is to say, it regards society not merely as the result of the fact that man happens to need others to help him to attain his ends, but as a condition of there being any ends at all. The ends in the attainment of which the individuality is most concerned, and in which he becomes a "self," are precisely those which society (or his social nature) imposes on him. Hence just as the development of his individual will is through the emergence into the centre of consciousness of his interest in the self as a whole, as against its possession by merely temporary interest or passion; so this interest in the self as a whole becomes the medium of an interest in that whole of society, through which the self has developed. Of course that interest is not fully explicit from the first, any more than is the interest in the whole self. But it belongs just as much to the nature of the individual.

It emerges when he begins to be conscious of the relation of society to his own interests. For then he becomes (or realises that he is) a member of different forms of social grouping in which his interests are secured; and he is aware of the "will" which binds him to these groupings. Yet, these wills are never permanently external to one another; they come to be seen as all forms of the self; and the groupings in which they are expressed take the form of a "world" in which the self as a whole is expressed and realised. Each grouping imposes obligations on him, and assumes importance and permanence in his world, just in so far as it is relevant to the structure of the whole. Of course, it happens often enough, both to the interest in the self as a whole and to the interest in the world as a whole, that they are submerged by sectional interest or passion.

But they seldom fail to reassert themselves, perhaps in the form of remorse in the one case, and of a sense of social estrangement in the other.* And it is just the maintenance of this interest in the whole as such,—the principle of development of individual and social nature alike—that is regarded as the presence and operation in the individual of the General Will.

It may, however, be said that, even admitting this to be true, it still leaves us with a General Will too indeterminate to be embodied in a single institution. For the General Will is just each man's interest in society as a whole; and each man's view of the nature of that society must differ in some degree from every other's. That, I think, is true; and it is the ultimate reason for the organisation of society into different sovereign communities.† But it does not disprove the contention that a determinate General Will is necessary for the existence of any organised society; and that it must express itself in the determinate control of that society as a whole over all its activities.

What I am suggesting is that the determinateness of the General Will does not depend on its belonging to a single conscious centre of its own. It depends on the facts that the individual will is, or tries to become, a whole, and that it wins its unity by sharing in the activities of society. It is because of the priority in the individual mind of the General Will to the functional interests, that that priority must be embodied in the social structure.

The first result of this analysis is to make it clear that the functional wills are not really simple, and that it is not their simplicity which makes their embodiment possible. On the contrary, it is their complexity, their penetration by the General Will, that does so. The particular interest has to be shot through with an interest in the whole before it can be the basis of a stable

* It is significant of the kinship of these two interests, that these emotions are often hard to distinguish.

† See below, p. 314.

institution. If it is not, then the institution makes no enduring call on the loyalty of its members.* Thus, *e.g.*, men group themselves into Trade Unions, not merely to increase their economic strength—if we may do the Unions the injustice of simplifying their “interest” in this way—but because increase of economic strength seems to be a condition of attaining a kind of life which is widely held to be desirable. And if I may be permitted the impoliteness of an *argumentum ad hominem*, what Mr. Cole wants to do with Industry is not to release it from the control of the General Will of society, but to enlighten that will as to what the good life is, and to compel it to make that idea dominant in its industrial organisation.

It is true, of course, that if we compare one individual will with another, in respect both of a particular interest and of a general conception of life as a whole, we may easily discover a greater measurable amount of community in the former respect than in the latter. And this has important consequences, of which I shall say something later.† I have not argued that the idea which is present to the General Will is necessarily more explicit than the idea present to the functional will, but that there must be some determinate idea, and that it is

* Plato pointed out that even a band of thieves could hold together only by practising justice to one another,—which really means that a band of thieves is apt to be very dispersive. For the anti-social attitude of the whole is pretty certain, in the long run, to reflect itself in the attitude of the members to the group. Of course the implication of the General Will in the functional wills leads at times to very irritating results, whether (the instance is Mr. Cole's) on the large scale of the Ulster problem, or on the small scale of the impotence of a village to run a nursing association because of the jealousy of church and chapel. The trouble is due to a confused perception of the relevance of all interests to the interest of life as a whole, combined with the inability to distinguish between what is important and what is unimportant in the forms in which the interests express themselves. Surely the remedy is not to try to divide up the will; but to enlighten it sufficiently to make the appropriate distinctions.

† See p. 313.

logically or morally, prior to the other. And the recognition of a possible greater common measure between two functional wills should not obscure the implications of this priority of the General Will—that any disagreement on the wider question reflects itself in some degree of disagreement on the narrower, and that if the disagreement on the former becomes grave, it becomes proportionately difficult for the two individuals to embody their narrower interest in the same institution. Any attempt to found a social system on the isolation of the common element in different wills is a distortion of the nature of will. For the common element is not thus isolable, and, as has been said, if it were so, it could not serve as the basis of an institution. It can serve as that only if no violence is done to its nature, *i.e.*, if its implication in a determinate individual will is reflected by the implication of its embodiment in a determinate social structure which more or less adequately embodies the principle of that will. Before any social organisation is possible at all, the General Will, or the community of view as to the good of social and individual life, must be real and determinate, and therefore just as capable as any “particular” will of expression in its appropriate institution. And as the General Will is logically or morally prior to the particular, so is its embodiment to the embodiment of the particular. A sovereign institution, then, is implicit in functional institutions, as the General Will in the functional wills. Ultimately, to deny the determinateness of the unity of the functional wills in the General Will is to deny the unity of the individual wills in which both exist.

And, I think, this brings us far nearer to an adequate account of the operation of the sovereign in a developed social order. One function of the sovereign is the adjustment of conflicting claims. If we begin from the assumption of the independence and exclusiveness of the several interests and institutions, the only way the sovereign can work is, as Mr. Cole makes it, by balancing the forces of one institution against another. But on

such a view we are involved in difficulties, both of constitution and of operation. How, *e.g.*, are we to determine which are the *main* functional associations to be represented in the sovereign? Not surely by numerical strength: or at least not by that as such. Our criterion would have to be the relative importance of institutions and the purposes embodied in them. Yet, that involves an appeal to the generality of a conception of the good life, as a determinate operative fact. There seems to be no reason why a General Will which was capable of creating from its particular associations a *de facto* sovereign should not be able to create and sustain a sovereign *de jure* directly expressive of itself.*

And in the second place, the exercise of sovereignty is surely imperfectly conceived as a balancing of forces even when (as might happen on Mr. Cole's view) the members of the sovereign institution were also members of both the conflicting institutions. For the individual, as Mr. Cole properly says, a conflict of obligations is settled by an appeal to "the General Will which is in him."† He weighs the different obligations by their relevance to the interest of the self and of society as a whole. The act of the sovereign is surely then to be considered in the same way as the interpretation of the General Will of society as a whole. The act both of individual and of sovereign is simply that act which we call moral: and if we want a word for the determinate interest of the sovereign, it is just morality. It is for this reason, I take it, that Mr. Bosanquet calls the State "the guardian of a whole moral world." And just because morality is not a particular interest, but the interest of the "wholeness" of life, and the condition of its attainment, the

* Of course there is no reason why, as a matter of mechanism, it should *not* proceed by selection from the chief functional associations. We are not concerned with that. The point is that Mr. Cole's assumption of the independence of the different institutions seems to commit him to this method as a matter of principle.

† *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1914-15, p. 158.

institution in which it is embodied can be refined neither into a "particular" association, nor into a quarrel-resolving mechanism which, for our sins, we have to add to our social structure. It is our virtue, at least as much as our sins, which compels our social organisation to express its determinate unity of form in a sovereign. And that is surely not incompatible with Mr. Cole's view that for the adequate embodiment of our moral interest, *i.e.*, of our interest in life as a whole, we need the whole of life in all its range of interests and variety of relations.

This, then, I take to be the rationale of a sovereign institution as embodying the very principle of our social world. And by way of drawing this argument to a point, I should like to recur to what I said at the outset, and try to show how it seems that Mr. Cole's rejection of this view appears to involve him in a view of the nature of the mind and of its freedom that bears a visible resemblance to Bergson's.

It is not difficult to see that Mr. Cole begins his social construction from an essentially pluralist outlook. The individual as a single conscious centre is his ultimate; and, as I have tried to show, he underestimates all that is implied in the fact that individuality is achieved only by participation in the interests of a social world. It is quite in conformity with this view that he holds that the only prospect of safeguarding individual freedom in our modern world is to introduce some kind of division into the sovereign itself. "If the individual is not to be a mere pigny in the hands of a colossal social organism, there must be such a division of social powers as will preserve individual freedom by balancing one social organism so nicely against another that the individual may still count."* That is, if the forces constituting the sovereign are evenly balanced, it becomes a matter of importance for any institution to secure the adherence even of a single individual. He has a chance to make better terms with it than if there were no competing

* *Self-Government in Industry*, p. 91.

institution to which he might threaten to transfer his support. An individual's freedom then lies more in getting his own way, in making his own will count, than in the wisdom of his way, or the quality of his will; for he is just as free, just as much himself, in imposing a narrow sectional interest on himself and others as in standing for the larger and more social view.

It is not unfair, I think, to doubt whether by this plan we can secure an effective increase of freedom even to do as we like. After all, the denominator of the fraction which indicates the individual's relation to the sovereign will still run into millions, though the millions may be ten instead of forty. The truth is that if freedom lies in the way in which the individual will can assert itself against others, or in which it can force itself into the interstices of our social structure, its prospects in this world of ours are not very hopeful. If that is where we look for it, we had better, as on Bergson's view, go back on our tracks, and instead of seeking a more complex and finely adjusted social world build one of a more primitive sort.

Mr. Cole, I think, has not much sympathy with the idea of going back, for he sees the part which social organisation plays in the development of the individual will. But there is, I have urged, a certain half-heartedness in his acceptance of that principle; and he wants to arrest the synthesis before it is complete. This, I think, is the result of Mr. Cole's imperfect recognition of the implication of the individual in the General Will, and of the dependence of the determinateness of the one on the determinateness of the other. An indeterminate General Will means really a more or less vague and vaguely apprehended social interest; and the General Will can remain so only if the individual will remains simply a felt coincidence of different impulses and interests, and does not assume the form of a conscious unity determining each of these by its relevance to the whole. The development of the individual will is the development of the General Will in it. If that is true, then it is not by leaving a rent in the fabric

of the social world that we can guarantee the freedom of the self. That can be realised only by making the world embody the determinate unity of the mind so that mind is at home therein, and can find itself by accepting its part in the full life of the whole. We progress to freedom by letting the logic of the will work itself out in the world as in the individual mind.

IV.

The point which I have been trying to make amounts to this: that the relation between the sovereign and the functional institutions is precisely the opposite of that which Mr. Cole believes to hold. The sovereign is prior; and, if we must keep the terms, the functional institutions are "creatures"* of it, rather than it of them. Their rights of sovereignty in their own spheres (like individual rights within them or within society in general) are not merely "natural," they are rights enjoyed within a determinate system of rights and duties, defined and maintained by the social structure as a whole, acting through its sovereign institution.†

It would be tempting to examine the reasons which have led philosophers to regard the State as rightfully exercising this function of sovereignty, and their belief that, in the history of that institution, through all its perversion by passion and selfish interest, it is possible to trace the slow emergence of the lineaments of the true sovereign, and of the State's more or less conscious effort to become a more adequate embodiment of that form. But as we have been concerned with the

* Dr. Figgis's phrase (*op. cit.*, p. 8).

† It is hardly necessary to add that I am not criticising the demand of the different functional associations for far greater autonomy. That seems to me thoroughly healthy. I am objecting only to the view that this can be claimed as a "natural right"; or on any other ground than its relevance to the idea of the good of society as a whole. Mr. Cole's social philosophy seems to me much nearer that of Hobbes than that of Rousseau, although I admit his sovereign is less august.

sovereign rather than with the State, that is not essential to the argument. It seems more important to add a brief remark on a point on which I have already touched, and which seems to have had some share in influencing Mr. Cole and others to reject the classical theory. I incline to agree with their contention that philosophers have not sufficiently explored the bearing of this point on the nature of the State,* but I think it can be shown that it does not invalidate the account which they have given.

The difficulty arises from the fact that the State has definite territorial limits, and yet that some of the interests which bind men together into associations within the State are shared by others outside its borders.† This seems to raise an interesting series of complications for the individual, the institution, and the State.‡ That an institution is part of an organisation which extends perhaps over the whole of Western civilisation gives it a strong claim on the individual's loyalty, and is certainly a fact of which the State must take account. For it proves that the interest expressed in it is a fundamental one for any conception of the good life. But it seems to introduce no consideration which operates against the claim or right of the State to adjust the relations of all institutions within its borders, in accordance with the General Will which it embodies.

It is plain, in the first place, that nothing in our theory is at all incompatible with the recognition of the reality and

* Here, and for what remains of my paper, I use the word "State" in the sense of Sovereign-State.

† The difficulty, of course, is not peculiar to the Sovereign-State. Any sovereign must have definite boundaries.

‡ I have said nothing explicitly about the problem of the obligation from the point of view of the individual. There is, in fact, no problem there at all. No one, I suppose, disputes the right and the duty of the individual to follow the best that is in him. The only question is as to the attitude of the sovereign: and I have meant sovereignty to imply not only the right but the duty to compel, if necessary, the individual's (or institution's) acceptance of the sovereign's decision.

importance of these international non-political associations. The reason for the existence of separate States is the fact which philosophers are said both to have ignored and to have over-emphasised, the existence of different General Wills, or different ideas of the good of society as a whole. Yet, that does not preclude a measure of agreement between these wills, which may be sufficient to permit the organisation within it of certain functional institutions. Even if, in our survey of society, we altogether eliminate State frontiers, it still seems to be true, as I have argued, that participation in the same functional will involves some measure of community of General Will. I suppose that the only organisation which covers the whole human race is the economic: and the reason is not only because this end is so obvious and urgent that men can co-operate to secure it on a very minimum of community of will, but because the mere getting of the material means of life is relatively external to the living of the good life. Hence, wherever there is agreement that it is good to live, and better to live in plenty than in scarcity, economic co-operation can begin. But even in respect to this interest it is plain that when any community begins to try to make its economic activities more than an external means to life, the simplicity and universality of the economic system disappears, and will not reappear until there is again agreement in the world as to the good of life, and as to the way in which it can be expressed in economic organisation. In the same way, a Church or a working-class movement, though it may extend over State frontiers, is still confined to an area within which there is a certain amount of agreement in the conception of the good life. Territorially, then, we can trace the rough coincidence of the distribution of certain institutions with that of certain forms of the General Will.

Now, to make a community (as Mr. Cole has pointed out), we want more than a Church or a working-class movement or any one particular institution. We want all of them, and all

of them functioning together. But the community of will which is necessary thus to make them work together is far higher and more intense than that which is necessary for participation in any one of them. So it is not surprising that the higher we put our demands on the General Will, the smaller the territorial area within which we can expect them to be met.

The two facts, then, which seem to lie at the root of national consciousness and therefore of the existence of nation-States, are just that human interests are varied and that they are also one. It is the nature of the mind which requires this multiplicity in its social embodiment, and requires also that this multiplicity shall bear the form of unity. And this seems at once to recognise and define the relation of the State to the international institutions which we are discussing. *Es hypothesi*, with such an institution as a whole, the State *as Sovereign* has no relation, for the only part of the institution with the determination of whose relations the State has to do is that part which falls within its own frontiers. So far as that part is concerned, the fact that it belongs to a wider institution does not affect its character as an organ of the General Will embodied in the State. It neither absolves the State from the duty of effecting the adjustment between this institution and others, nor gives the institution any title to think itself released from the control of the State. On the other hand, so far as the institution falls outside the State (and this applies equally to associations which fall wholly outside the State), the State's relations to it are conducted on the basis of that level of will which is common to both. If, as may often happen, that will is inadequate to sustain satisfactory relations, then either the relations disappear altogether, or the problem becomes one of the relation of an association to its own State, or of States to one another.*

* If I may take Mr. Cole's instance of the relations between the British State and the American Cotton Growers' Association, the possi-

It seems clear, then, that the existence of these international associations presents no new type of problem to our theory. They are not in the least incompatible with the view that a determinate level of a General Will must embody itself in a sovereign institution, as the expression and guarantee of its unity of will. But both they and our whole theory of the General Will seem to be incompatible with the view either that Sovereign-States must necessarily be as numerous as they are now, or that the normal relation between these States is one of hostility. A Sovereign-State is the appropriate and inevitable expression of a genuine General Will; and, conversely, unless there is such a Will, a sovereign is impossible. We cannot create a sovereign merely by making the machinery; our problem of social organisation would be vastly easier if we could. There seem to be two results: that there must be separate Sovereign-States so long as there are separate General Wills; and that wherever a profound enough community of General Wills appears, it is natural that it should organise itself into a sovereign.* Moreover, the General Will

bilities seem to me to reduce themselves to four. (1) Either the relations are defined by certain conventions accepted on both sides, as are the relations between any two institutions whatsoever; or attempts at negotiations break down. In the latter event, either (2) the matter drops, and there are no relations at all. Or, if it is important to one side or the other, the aggrieved party appeals to the American Government. If (I suppose Mr. Cole would say, *per impossibile*) that Government decides against the Cotton Growers' Association, the problem becomes (3) one between these two parties. If, on the other hand, it agrees with them, the problem is (4) one between the two States. There seems to be no difficulty in our theory's taking account of all four relations. I take it to be the point of Mr. Cole's criticism that philosophers have simplified the problem of political relations into either the relation of sovereign to institution within it: or of one sovereign to another. I confess that, on *any* view of sovereignty, these seem to me the two main problems for theory.

* Mr. Cole thinks that wherever philosophy has touched on the problem of "World-State" or "World-Federation," it has been "federationist in tendency." I should have said it had been decidedly the other way.

is an appeal to the universal, to the good of society as a whole. And since (unless we are moral sceptics) we must hold that that good is one for all men, it seems clear that the area of the General Will is thus bound to expand as the Will itself becomes fuller and more enlightened.

That is why, in the main, Nation-States even now correspond roughly to the areas of effective community of will: and why we can trace the beginnings of a wider order.* Hence, too, the great importance of organising common interests, wherever we can find them, in the form of international institutions. The greater the range of such organisation, the greater the chance of extending effective community of will and therefore of effective political organisation, which is at least as necessary for the adequate attainment of the ends of peace as for the prevention or the impeding of war. Perhaps we can never hope to eliminate war from a finite world. But we should at least be able to secure that it is never about anything trivial, or roused merely by the stirring of passion. Yet here, too, it seems, the way of wisdom and of hope is not to weaken the fibre of the General Will, or to hold it incapable of creating a social order which embodies and secures a view of life as a whole. It is to strive for its enlightenment and its more effective expression. There is, indeed, no other security for freedom or progress than just the logic of the will itself. If we cannot look for it *there*, there is nowhere else to look.

* As *e.g.*, in the agreements between Great Britain and America. The outcome of these would seem to be the creation of the supra-national sovereign. Such a sovereign would not attempt to manage all the affairs of the constituent States. But it would be the true sovereign in that it possessed the power and the right of making its decision effective. It is, I think, a misapprehension to suppose that the sovereignty of the State means either that the State must "interfere" in everything, or that it is itself a complete expression of the General Will. It is the most explicit expression of the General Will as such; and, therefore, the guarantee of the wholeness of the life of the community.

XIII.—PRACTICAL DUALISM.

By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

"Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man ; because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated ; but becomes unsuitable if either of those is."—BUTLER, *Sermon III*, end.

I HAVE adopted as motto Bishop Butler's statement of what Professor Sidgwick calls the "Dualism of the Practical Reason," because, although the form in which Butler states it is not precisely that which I wish to support, he was, I believe, the first thinker who definitely formulated such a dualism. We find, of course, in Plato demonstrations (1) that the Good is Virtue and (2) that the Good is Pleasure : yet these demonstrations are not complementary but contradictory, setting forth what were for Plato opposed views of the ultimate Good.

The doctrine which I wish to set forth and to support is briefly indicated in Butler's words. There are, he holds, *two* supreme principles of human action, *both* of which we are under a "manifest obligation" to obey. These are, in his view, Reasonable Self-Love and Conscience. For "Conscience" I would substitute Professor Sidgwick's emendation: "those among the precepts of our common conscience" which we "really see to be ultimately reasonable." This substitution leads to the acceptance of Rational Benevolence as the second of the two "chief or superior principles."

My reasons for bringing up for discussion at the present time Sidgwick's doctrine of Practical Dualism are (1) that this doctrine seems to me to be of unique value in the theory of conduct, the present ethical and political situation of the civilised world tending to emphasise this value ; and (2) that

to the best of my knowledge the doctrine is to a large extent ignored, repudiated, or misunderstood by writers on ethics and politics. This may seem strange in view of Butler's reputation as a moralist, and the fact that Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, in which Practical Dualism is expounded and maintained, has gone through eight editions between its publication in 1874 and the year 1914, in which the last edition appeared. There has been a steady demand for the book, showing that students of moral philosophy cannot do without it. No doubt there is an explanation of this state of affairs, but to go into this is not my present purpose, which rather is to put before the reader as briefly as possible the full case for Sidgwick's doctrine of the "Dualism of the Practical Reason," and the way in which he arrives at it.

In the view of "Common Sense Morality," good conduct for an individual consists in obeying certain definite hard and fast rules, without regard to consequences. No doubt we all as respectable members of society acknowledge that we ought to do justice, to be courageous and temperate, to speak the truth, to act with benevolence, loyalty, and gratitude, to keep our promises.

In all this consists virtue as commonly understood. But when we come to reflect upon these rules of action, we find that they are sometimes tautologous, sometimes vague, sometimes inconsistent with one another. To every rule exceptions are allowed. "The common moral axioms are adequate for practical guidance, but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms."

The search for rules which can be accepted as scientific axioms leads the inquirer from that Common Sense Morality known as Dogmatic Intuitionism to another phase of Intuitionism, which has received the qualification of "Philosophical." This method accepts "the morality of Common Sense as in the main sound," but "attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer; to get one or more principles

more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications."

Sidgwick finds such principles in Kant's Categorical Imperative: Act so that thou canst will the maxim of thy action to be law universal; and in Clarke's Rule of Equity and Rule of Love or Benevolence. The Categorical Imperative gives the *form* of a law or general rule. The Rule of Equity is that "whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should do for him."

The Rule of Universal Love or Benevolence is that "every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the good it can to its fellow creatures, to which end Universal Love and Benevolence is plainly the most certain, direct and effectual means." The maxim of Prudence or Rational Self-Love is that "one ought to aim at one's own good on the whole." These maxims are "practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest."

"Most of the commonly received maxims of Duty—even of those which at first sight appear absolute and independent—are found when closely examined to contain an implicit subordination to the more general principles of Prudence and Benevolence, and . . . no principles except these, and the formal principle of Justice or Equity, can be admitted as at once intuitively clear and certain, while, again, these principles themselves, so far as they are self-evident, may be stated as precepts to seek (1) one's own good on the whole, refusing all seductive impulses prompting to undue preference of particular goods, and (2) others' good no less than one's own, repressing any undue preference for one individual over another."*

If we now turn back to the question "What is the ultimate Good for man?" which Plato answered sometimes by saying "Virtue" and sometimes by saying "Pleasure," it would appear that the answer: *The Good is Virtue*, is excluded. "For to say that 'General Good' consists in General Virtue—if we mean by Virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality of Common Sense, would obviously involve us in a logical circle; since we have seen that the exact determination of these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on the definition of this General Good Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to Good; Benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called *doing Good*"—and so on.*

What, then, is the ultimate Good, since it is not Virtue, seeing that Virtue involves a reference to the Good otherwise determined? Is it Pleasure: or, if not, what else is it among "the objects that men have held to be truly Good or the Highest Good"? ("Good" = desirable or reasonably desired). Sidgwick discusses this question in Ch. IX, Bk. I, of *The Methods of Ethics* and in Ch. XIV, Bk. III, and reaches the conclusion that "nothing is ultimately good except some mode of human Existence," and that "in the view of Common Sense, beauty, knowledge and other ideal goods are only reasonably to be sought by men in as far as they conduce either (1) to Happiness or (2) to Perfection or Excellence of Human Existence."

We have seen that to say Virtue is the Good involves a logical circle, and it is not in accordance with common sense to regard minor gifts and graces, or mere subjective rightness of will as constituting ultimate Good. It follows that nothing can be accepted as ultimately good except desirable consciousness, and this again must be either (1) Happiness or (2) objective relations of conscious minds to, *e.g.*, Truth or Beauty or Freedom.

* *Loc. cit.*

Reflection and reference to common sense lead us to prefer the former of these alternatives, namely, Happiness, as the ultimate Good. Thus the hedonistic or eudaemonistic end is admitted, and Virtue interpreted as conduct conducive to that end, the principles of Rational Benevolence and Rational Self-Love being accepted as supreme and co-ordinate.

We have, accordingly, reached the doctrine of the Dualism of the Practical Reason. I will quote here Sidgwick's summary (in the concluding chapter of *The Methods of Ethics*) of the results of comparing Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. "We have seen," he says, "that the essence of Justice or Equity (in so far as it is clear and certain) is that different individuals are not to be treated differently except on grounds of universal application; and that such grounds, again, are supplied by the principle of Universal Benevolence, that sets before each man the happiness of all others as an object of pursuit no less worthy than his own; while, again, other time-honoured virtues seem to be fitly explained as special manifestations of impartial benevolence under various normal circumstances of human life, or else as habits and dispositions indispensable to the maintenance of prudent or beneficent behaviour under the seductive force of various non-rational impulses. And although there are other rules which our common moral sense when first interrogated seems to enunciate as absolutely binding; it has appeared that careful and systematic reflection on this very Common Sense, as expressed in the habitual moral judgments of ordinary men, results in exhibiting the real subordination of these rules to the fundamental principles above given. Then, further, this method of systematising particular virtues and duties receives very strong support from a comparative study of the history of morality, as the variations in the moral codes of different societies at different stages correspond, in a great measure, to differences in the actual or believed tendencies of certain kinds of conduct to promote the general happiness of different portions of the human race; while, again, the most probable

conjectures as to the pre-historic condition and original derivation of the moral faculty seem to be entirely in harmony with this view. No doubt, even if this synthesis of methods be completely accepted, there will remain some discrepancy in details between our particular moral sentiments and unreasoned judgments on the one hand, and the apparent results of special utilitarian calculations on the other; and we may often have some practical difficulty in balancing the latter against the more general utilitarian reasons for obeying the former; but there seems to be no longer any theoretical perplexity as to the principles for determining social duty."

But we have still to consider the relation of Universalistic to Egoistic Hedonism. "Even if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if Morality is to be made completely rational. This latter view," Sidgwick adds, "appears to me, on the whole, the view of Common Sense; and it is that which I myself hold."

It will be remembered that in Mr. Sidgwick's view no complete reconciliation between Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism can be demonstrated either on the basis of experience or sympathy, or on theological or metaphysical grounds. He points out, however, that, even so, ethical science is in no worse position, as regards its foundations, than natural science is.

Sidgwick's arguments for the acceptance of the principles of Rational Benevolence and Rational Self-Love separately and on their own merits seem to me to be convincing, and the case for the principle of Rational Benevolence (which aims at the happiness of other human beings generally) to be overwhelming, whether as reached by an examination of Common Sense Morality or as an immediate intuition. It does not

seem open to denial that (as Clarke declares) "every rational creature ought in its sphere and station to do all the Good it can to its fellow-creatures" (for Clarke, Good = Happiness). That the Rule of Benevolence is fundamentally equivalent to the "Golden Rule" and the "New Commandment" of the Gospels is also a point in its favour.

I think, however, further, that it is possible to deduce from it alone the maxim of Prudence—that the agent's own happiness on the whole is a reasonable end of his action. According to the principle of Benevolence, we ought to promote the happiness of others—to accept their happiness as our end. But we can only accept it on the ground that each individual's happiness is *to him* ultimately and intrinsically valuable.

Now, a man cannot experience, cannot directly know, any happiness but his own. It must, therefore, be on the ground that *his own* happiness is *to himself* ultimately and intrinsically valuable, valuable in itself, that he can logically regard the happiness of others as ultimately and intrinsically valuable to them. His reasoned belief in the value for others of their own happiness must be based, it can only be based, on his recognition of the value for himself of his own happiness. "It is only if my own consciousness tells me that my happiness is *for me* as an individual intrinsically worth having, only on this condition is there valid ground for holding that the happiness of others is that which for *their* sakes it is worth while for me to promote. Why should I think that another's happiness is any good to him, unless I feel that my happiness is good to me? Can I judge his consciousness except by my own?"* All distress at the pain of others, all hatred of cruelty, all indignation at the "injustice" of undeserved suffering, the irrepressible demand that the "wages of virtue" should not be "dust," that there should be a heaven for the good, is based in the

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1903-1904, p. 37.

last resort on our apprehension of the intrinsic value of Happiness, and this, as we see, must start from the individual's apprehension of the intrinsic value of his own happiness to him. But Benevolence, love of others, is as natural as love of self (as Butler has maintained); and, chronologically, the impulse of Benevolence is often prior to reasonable Self-Love, and a man's own greatest happiness may often depend on the happiness of others, and his acutest misery be caused by the suffering of others. Yet, still his happiness and misery, whatever the *cause*, are *his* in a sense in which they cannot be anyone else's, nor anyone else's his; and the Happiness of any Community can be nothing but the Happinesses of its individual conscious members, untransferable in every case. Mr. Sidgwick has somewhere remarked that "twenty dull people do not make a brilliant dinner party," and applying this idea to the case in hand, we may say also that twenty million unhappy souls cannot constitute a happy nation.

It would thus appear that Benevolence implies Self-Love, and Rational Benevolence irresistibly leads us back to the rationality of Self-Love as our starting-point. Similarly, in the precepts "*Do unto others as ye would (reasonably would) they should do unto you*," "*Love your neighbour as yourself*," it is implied that the love of self is logically prior to, and sets the standard for, love of our neighbour.

If we start with that "chief or superior principle" which is Rational Benevolence, we *have* also that other "chief principle" which is Rational Self-Love. If there is a contradiction between these two principles, it is a contradiction which is implicit in the single principle of Benevolence itself. Thus it would seem that the "Utilitarian" or Universalistic Hedonist is, as such, a Practical Dualist; and not only so, but also the man who accepts, broadly, the morality of common sense, is a Practical Dualist in embryo; if he develops logically, he must become a Practical Dualist.

Practical Dualism is, I think, the only ethical doctrine

which perceives and fairly faces the claims, for the individual agent, of both self *and* others. It gives a clue to the mixture of good and evil in men—it does not leave us hopelessly puzzled either by domestic short-coming or foreign atrocity. Self-Love and Benevolence are recognised as both natural, and both rational. What seems to be a not uncommon procedure in this connexion is that people professedly and theoretically recognise only, or at least emphasize only, the claims of *others*, as “Duty,” “Conscience,” “Virtue,” the “Ten Commandments,” the “New Commandment,” and so on; but, in practice, more than redress the balance by a disproportionate attention to self-interest—which people are always ready to attribute as a motive. This tends to confusion of ethical theory, complete psychological muddle, and practical inconsistency.

For a practical dualist the principle of Rational Benevolence is of fundamental importance in politics, that is, “the consideration of the ultimate end or Good of the State, and the general standard or criterion for determining the goodness or badness of political institutions.”* The relation between ethics and politics is very close—in Sidgwick’s view they are in fact parts of one whole—the science of conduct. “On the one hand,” he says, “individual men are almost universally members of some political or governed community; what we call their virtues are chiefly exhibited in their dealings with their fellows, and their most prominent pleasures and pains are derived in whole or in part from their relations to other human beings: thus most of those who consider either Virtue or Pleasure to be the sole or chief constituent of an individual’s highest good would agree that this good is not to be sought in a life of monastic isolation, and without regard to the well-being of his community; they would admit that private ethics has a political department. On the other hand, it would be generally agreed that a statesman’s main ultimate

aim should be to promote the well-being of his fellow-citizens, present and to come, considered as individuals; so that the investigation of the particulars of this well-being must be an integral part of Politics."

Politics, indeed, is all-embracing: it aims at "the happiness or well-being of humanity at large." All other ends, such as Freedom, Wealth, Science, are subordinate to this. Politics is, for the most part, consciously "utilitarian," and if common sense morality were not unconsciously aiming also at the General Happiness, our ethical and political action would be even more inconsistent than it is, our ordinary ethical and political thought even more confused.

In ethics the individual agent has to combine or co-ordinate the point of view of Self-Love and the point of view of Benevolence. The statesman *as such* is not embarrassed by the dualism in the same way as the private individual may be. "He exists primarily for the good of the governed in the political community to which he belongs. The promotion of the good of his community (with, of course, a due regard to the good of the larger whole of which it is a part) is his *raison d'être*," (compare Sidgwick's *Essays on Public Morality and Morality of Strife*).

"But for him, too, the dualism is, from a different point of view, momentous. Though as statesman he is not liable to be faced with the conflict (which emerges primarily as a conflict of motives) between Interest and Duty, between the Happiness of self and the Happiness of others, yet since the community which he administers consists of individuals who are one and all liable to this conflict, it is his business to reconcile the conflict to the utmost of his power, to make it for the interest of individuals to do that which, if they would do it, would be for the Good of the Whole—to furnish at any moment motives sufficiently strong to induce individuals at that moment to do what is for the General Good. In proportion as the attainment of Happiness for self and the attain-

ment of it for others are—so far as the power of government extends—made coincident in any community, in proportion as they are promoted by the same course of action, in that proportion is the community well organised and well governed, to that extent do the members of the community enjoy what Kant calls the ‘Supreme Good’; they are both virtuous and happy. The great problem for rulers, as for teachers, is to promote this coincidence of Well-doing and Well-being. Herein lies much hope for the future—the reduction for the individual agent of the conflict between Self-Love and Rational Benevolence does seem to be, to a very considerable extent, in the power of rulers and educators.”*

And a similar hope is, perhaps, possible in regard to the region of international politics. “It would be a great gain,” Sidgwick says, “if the whole of civilised society could be brought under a common government, for the purpose of preventing wars among civilised men.” He thought (in 1891) that it would be hopeless to aim at this, but urges recourse to arbitration, and, in the case of armed conflict, the impartial imposition on both parties of “rules limiting the mischief of war.”

All these, and other, devices for improving international conditions are founded on that maxim of Rational Benevolence which furnishes one of the two “chief or superior principles in the nature of man,” and among the most influential means at the disposal of the statesman for carrying its recommendations into effect, here as elsewhere, is the judicious use of the other “chief principle,” Rational Self-Love.

What I have attempted to do in this short paper is:—

- (1) To exhibit Sidgwick’s view of the Dualism of the Practical Reason and the way in which he reaches it.

* Article “Henry Sidgwick,” in *Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

- (2) To state the view which I have formed of a relation between the "two chief or superior principles in the nature of man," namely, Rational Benevolence and Rational Self-Love, according to which it appears that Rational Benevolence implies or includes the Rationality of Self-Love.
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XIV.—THE "MODES" OF SPINOZA AND THE "MONADS" OF LEIBNIZ.

By G. DAWES HICKS.

"LEIBNIZ'S philosophy is a metaphysic, and, in sharp opposition to the simple universal Substance of Spinoza, where all that is determined is merely transitory, it makes fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances." The contrast which Hegel* here institutes between the systems of thought whose relations to one another in some aspects I propose in this paper to consider has become familiar enough in more recent expositions, and I do not deny that it has a certain measure of justification. I believe, however, the antithesis suggested is far more pronounced than any which a careful comparison of the philosophical conceptions in question will reveal, and that, notwithstanding the antagonistic positions from which they start, the results reached and the difficulties encountered by the two thinkers present a surprising amount of similarity. "Spinoza would be right," Leibniz once observed, "if there were no monads," and he meant, no doubt, to imply that the theory of monads had entirely altered the philosophical outlook. I shall try to show that as a matter of fact it did not. But let it not be supposed, on that account, that I am wishful to disparage the work of Leibniz. To most of the branches of philosophy he made contributions of real value and importance, and these retain their significance even though his solution of ultimate metaphysical problems turns out to be one of the numerous ways in which they cannot be solved.

In this connexion another remark may be permissible. Mr. Russell has made himself responsible for the dictum that

"monism must be pantheistic and monadism must be atheistic;*" and he appears to think that a coherent philosophy might emerge from the labour of Leibniz, if from it there were pruned away the inconsistencies due to the retention of the idea of God. This is a view which more than one writer has countenanced, and I am not at present concerned to ask how far it could resist criticism. One thing, however, is certain. A monadism of that sort would have no affinity with Leibniz's monadism. He would have recognised in it little that was distinguishable from the atomism in opposition to which his speculative reflexion was one sustained polemic. The notion of God, as the ultimate ground of things, was no excrescence on Leibniz's system, nor did it play the part there of that convenient receptacle for the difficulties of thought,—the unknown and the unknowable. On the contrary, it was intimately related to well-nigh every one of the general considerations which he brought to bear in his interpretation of the world and human life.

It is, of course, impossible in one paper to do more than indicate in a summary manner the lines of consideration along which, as it seems to me, the two systems may be profitably compared with one another. If, in thus dealing summarily with great conceptions, I seem unsympathetic or even unfair, I plead the exigencies of a limited undertaking; and protect myself by pointing out that judiciously balanced statements of the philosophies of both thinkers exist already in abundance.

I am well aware, for instance, that two opposing ways of regarding substance are struggling for mastery in the *Ethics*, and that to do full justice to Spinoza one would have to take both these tendencies into account. I shall, indeed, have something to say about them later on. But in a short essay it is legitimate to lay stress upon what appears to be the actual effect of his reasoning rather than upon its effect as he himself

* *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 172 and 185.

was sometimes inclined to conceive it. To avoid misunderstanding, however, it is perhaps necessary to state, without attempting to defend, the view I should take upon one or two matters of disputed interpretation. In the first place, it seems to me clear that the guiding principle of Spinoza's philosophical method is the principle of ground and consequent, and that what he calls causation is identical with this relation. It is, so I understand him to mean, only when things are viewed from the standpoint of the imagination that they are conceived as connected in some other manner than that of logical sequence. From the point of view of reason, it is seen that if anything is a cause its effect must necessarily be deducible from it, must follow from it "by the same necessity as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles." Substance, therefore, is not for him a producing cause of the universe, or even of finite things, but the ground or reason thereof, that on which all else must depend, as the conclusion of a syllogism depends upon the premisses. In the second place, I cannot, largely on account of what I have just been saying, accept the representation of those expositors who take Spinoza to mean by "Attributes" lines of force or energy, lying at the basis of the divine activity. The doctrine of "Attributes" is notoriously a difficult doctrine even from the point of view of mere exegesis, but I find it wholly impossible to suppose that Spinoza, at least in the *Ethics*, intended to postulate a number of real powers or potencies, each existing in and for itself, whatever he may have done when he was more immediately under the influence of Cartesianism. That would have been palpably to contradict *ab initio* the very thesis he was setting out to establish. How could a multiplicity of modes of energy each be infinite *in suo genere*? Admittedly, there is nothing in the definition of "Attribute" to support this interpretation. Spinoza I take to be defining "Attribute" as a way in which substance is apprehended. At the same time, I do not think it is implied that the

content of such apprehension is subjective in character. To our apprehension, it is true, substance can present only some of its features, some of its essence, but so far as what is apprehended is concerned, no distinction is to be drawn between the content cognised and the real essence. Strongly as he emphasises the distinction between partial and complete knowledge, Spinoza recognises no antithesis between what is truly known and what is.

So much, then, by way of preface. I proceed now at once to the special themes I purpose to discuss. I propose to consider the sense in which particular things are regarded by the two thinkers as existing, the mode of being ascribed to them, the different stages of development they are thought to exhibit, and the relation in which they are conceived to stand to the ultimate ground.

I.

Essc essentialis and essc existentialis.

A long and intricate chapter in the history of thought remains to be written upon the transformations in meaning undergone by the term "substance" prior to its adoption by the Cartesians. Professor Pringle-Pattison is certainly justified in emphasising the fundamental difference between the Aristotelian conception of *πρώτη οὐσία* and the conception of substance as the self-subsistent.* It is worth while, however, reminding ourselves that Aristotle's use of *οὐσία* is by no means uniform, and that the prototype of the latter conception is also to be found in the *Metaphysic*. After defining *οὐσία* as that to which being (*τὸ εἶναι*) in the strict sense belongs (*Meta.*, 1028, a 31), Aristotle does, no doubt, usually interpret this to mean "that which cannot stand in a judgment as predicate or attribute of anything else." The distinctive mark of a substance then consists in the fact of its being a *τὸδε τι*, a single individual thing with a determinate nature

(τὸ καθ'ἑκάστον). It is not, indeed, the content apprehended by sense at any given moment; it is the individual entity which through all its changes preserves its indestructible form or essence and which can only be truly known by grasping the form or essence which characterises it. All the same, it does not consist of essence or form (εἶδος) merely; it is always an οὐσία σύνθετος, that is to say, the essence or type as realised under conditions peculiar to each individual, conditions which can be summarily expressed by the term matter (ὕλη). Matter is equivalent, in short, to the totality of conditions by which each individual concrete thing (σύρολον) is determined as a unique existent and as finite. Yet, while insisting that in the world of genesis only the concrete individual thing is substance, Aristotle is constrained (in Book xii of the *Metaphysic*) to the admission that there must be an eternal unmovable substance (ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινα αἰδίου οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον), because otherwise the universe would be destructible. And this eternal unmovable substance he takes to be pure essence without matter, and to be complete reality (τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον . ἐντελέχεια γάρ). In other words, the divine being, as a self-dependent, eternally complete and unchangeable essence, is an individual substance, and hence an individual existent, but in a sense totally different from that in which concrete individual things had been defined to be substances and existents. To put it briefly, Aristotle is virtually saying that God is *causa sui* whose essence involves existence, whereas in the case of finite things their essence never does involve their existence. And the irresolvable problem created by these two incompatible positions would be one way of exhibiting the incoherent character of Aristotle's speculative system. Aristotle, it is true, conceived of God as standing outside the whole process which, by his mere presence, he initiates in nature. But the fact that precisely the same irresolvable problem reappears in the speculation of Spinoza should be sufficient to show that the

substitution of the notion of immanence for the notion of transcendence affords in itself no safeguard against the danger which so constantly besets metaphysical construction,—the danger, namely, of finding ourselves stranded with two worlds which persistently fall apart and resist any possibility of rational connexion.

From the commencement of his literary activity Spinoza had resigned himself to admitting a two-fold significance of the term "existence." In the *Cogitata Metaphysica* he defines being (*ens*) as "all that which, when clearly and distinctly apprehended, is found to exist necessarily, or at least to be capable of existing," and proceeds to the assertion that being may be divided into (*a*) being which in virtue of its own nature exists necessarily, or the essence of which involves existence, and (*b*) being the essence of which involves only a possible existence, indicating, at the same time, that this is equivalent to a division of being into substance and mode, not into that of substance and accident (i. 1). Then, in regard to modes, he goes on to explain that *esse essentiale* is "nothing else than the way in which created things are comprehended in the Attributes of God," while *esse existentielle* is "the essence of things considered apart from God (*extra Deum*) and in itself," seeing that "it is attributed to things after they have been created by God" (i. 2, § 3). Later on, in a chapter on the eternity of God, he contends that eternity is not to be conceived as indefinite duration. God's being is eternal in the sense of timelessness: in it *nihil prius nec posterius dari potest*. Duration is an *affectio existentiae*, *non vero essentiae rerum*. No one would say that the essence of a circle or of a triangle, in so far as it is an eternal truth, has endured for a longer period than from the time of Adam. A created thing can be said to possess existence, because certainly existence does not belong to its essence: but God cannot be said to possess existence, for the existence of God is God himself. Consequently, while created things may be said to possess duration,

God can in no wise be said to possess it.* Writing to Meyer, about the time of the publication of the *Cogitata*, Spinoza urges that of the existence of substance we conceive in a totally different manner from that in which we conceive of the existence of modes. Hence arises recognition of the distinction between eternity and duration, for we can explain a certain measure of the existence of modes in terms of duration, but we can only explain the existence of substance in terms of eternity, in terms of the infinite enjoyment of existence or essence (*Ep.* xii, Vloten and Land's ed.). In the *Short Treatise*, the identity of God's existence and essence is laid down at the outset as fundamental. On the other hand, it is asserted that while "the essences of things are from all eternity and will remain to all eternity unalterable," yet as existences particular things are constantly changing. And in several places it is certainly implied that, although the essences of all things are included in God, the existences taken on by particular things are not in like manner included therein. A similar line is followed in the *Ethics*. "The existence of God and His essence are one and the same" (i. 20). "The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence." Consideration of that essence, whether existing or non-existing, discloses that it neither involves existence nor duration. It cannot, therefore, be the cause or ground either of the existence of things or of their duration (i. 24). Essence and existence, that is to say, are to be distinguished as two different forms of being which in the case of God and the Attributes are in harmony with one another, even identical with one another, in the case of the infinite modes are in harmony with one another but not identical, while in the case of the finite modes they evince themselves as throughout in disharmony.

* A follower of Bergson might argue that in strictness the analogy required it to be maintained that God cannot be said to possess duration, because God is duration. But that, of course, is just what Spinoza denies.

Accordingly, it is contended that the being of substance does not pertain to the essence, does not constitute the form, of a man (or of any finite mode), because then the existence of the latter would follow from the existence of the former, which would imply the absurdity of its being necessary existence (ii. 10). Finally, attention may be drawn in this connexion to the proposition (v. 23) that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal." What remains is the essence; as timeless, it cannot be affected by death, which is merely a change in the series of changes: death affects only temporal existence. We feel that our mind, in so far, that is, as it is *mentis essentia*, is eternal. On the other hand, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body can the mind be said to possess duration, in other words, existence limited by a fixed time.

These passages, which might easily be added to, will suffice to bring out the kind of conception with which Spinoza is proceeding. He is trying to work together two ways of regarding the universe of particular things. It appertains to the nature of a finite mode, on the one hand, that it possesses an individual existence, a particular and determinate being, distinct from the being of substance as the ground of this determinate being, distinct, also, from other determinate beings: and, on the other hand, that it is yet substance itself in a determinate condition, and in so far again one with the whole complex of other modes, so that things are not *realiter* but only *modaliter* separate from one another (*Eth.* i, 15 Schol.). Hence it is that a mode is described as "God *in so far as* He is modified in a determinate modification," or "*in so far as* God is affected in a certain manner" (e.g., *Eth.* i, 28); hence it is that an idea is spoken of as "God *in so far as* God is considered as affected by an idea" (e.g., *Eth.* ii, 9), or that the human mind is spoken of as "(God having such an idea *in so far as* God forms the essence of the human mind" (e.g., *Eth.* ii, 11). The observation has often been made that the

full stress of Spinoza's problem comes to a head in the use he makes of this relative particle *quatenus*. (a) In so far as "all things are in God," each particular mode is *in a sense* eternal and infinite. As an "affection" of substance, even its continuance in existence is dependent upon substance; and its essence considered simply as contained in the whole modal system or *natura naturata* involves its existence. But this "existence" is not temporal existence, not duration, not existence "abstractly conceived" (*Eth.* ii, 45); it is the timeless being which the mode possesses as following from the necessity of God's nature; and we are not entitled to assume that, in the being of God, the mode stands out as a *res singularis*. (b) In so far as things have a distinctive nature of their own, each particular mode exhibits characteristics which cannot be traced back to its dependence upon substance. "That which is finite and which has a determinate existence cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any Attribute of God, for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal" (i. 28). Thus "determinate existence," or the existence of modes in the *communis ordo naturæ*, and the "existence" which modes may be said to possess in virtue of their essence in the Attributes of God,—that is, as constituting *natura naturata*,*—these are not only different but fundamentally antagonistic.

The insuperable difficulties which are thus occasioned for Spinoza's metaphysical theory come to light at well-nigh every turning-point of its development. So far as necessary "existence" is concerned, it is, for example, clear that the demonstration offered of the proposition that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (*Eth.* i, 7) is a *petitio principii*. Substance, according to the definition, is "that the conception of which

* Spinoza does not retain in the *Ethics* the distinction he had made in the *Short Treatise* between *natura naturata generalis* and *natura naturata particularis*, and I am following Mr. Joachim's interpretation of *natura naturata* in the *Ethics*. (See *Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 119 *sqq.*)

does not require the conception of another thing." But, in that case, so the proof runs, it can have no cause outside of itself, for "the knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause." And as substance can have no cause outside of itself, it must be *causa sui*; existence, therefore, must pertain to its nature. The argument, however, assumes just that which it purports to establish. For if substance has no cause outside itself, it follows that it must have an inner cause *only* on the assumption that it is existent, and that such existence needs a cause, in accordance, indeed, with the dictum laid down in the Scholium of the next proposition, that "of any existing thing there must necessarily be some cause on account of which it exists." In the immediate sequel, Spinoza appears, in fact, tacitly to allow that, by his proof, he has made no advance, for he proceeds to base the self-existence of substance upon the bare definition (substance is "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself"), and to maintain that he who has a clear and distinct idea of substance and yet doubts whether substance exists, is in the predicament of the man who says he has a true idea, but doubts whether or no it is false. And later on still (*Eth.* i, 20) it is definitely laid down that the existence and the essence of God are one and the same, from which follows that God's existence is an eternal truth. So far as determinate existence is concerned, Spinoza's embarrassment is no less manifest. Particular things, as they appear in the *communis ordo nature*, cannot be regarded as following of necessity from the nature of substance; their existence as such is transitory and limited; the occurrence of any particular thing or event here and now can only be traced backwards from one limited thing or event to another in a chain to which there is no terminus (*Eth.* i, 28). This chain of limited things is, that is to say, somehow in possession of that which can confer upon an essence what it cannot derive from infinite substance. It is true an attempt is

made to save the situation by means of the consideration that each of the causes in such a chain is "God or one of God's Attributes, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence." But, here again, there is obviously being taken for granted the very thing, and, in this context, the only thing, that requires explanation. The question is, how it is possible that existence which is not identical with essence can arise in substance whose existence is identical with essence. To reply that it arises in so far as substance is already infected by an endless series of existences of the precise type about which we are inquiring, is but to ignore the problem and not to solve it. We are left, as Mr. Joachim expresses it, with a world of determinate existences standing over against the world of essences; somehow certain of the essences or potentialities of things have stepped into the actualities of the world of temporal existence; and, although they have thus become less real than those which remain *in posse* as mere essences, they have yet acquired a distinctness and an individuality and a power of activity, of which, as mere essences, they were destitute.*

Turning now to Leibniz's way of handling the problem we have had before us, our object will be to discover whether the theory of monads enables him to avoid the *impasse* just indicated. Leibniz repudiates emphatically enough "the view of Spinoza and of other similar authors, who will have it that there is only one substance, namely God, who thinks, believes and wills one thing in me, but who thinks, believes and wills quite the opposite in some one else" (Gerhardt, vi, p. 537). He reverts to the Aristotelian definition of substance as that which can only be the subject of a proposition and never a predicate. But this definition, he contends, is not sufficient, and is in itself merely verbal. Every true predication must have a basis in the nature of things, and even when the

predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it is still necessary that it should be implicitly contained in it. The content, then, of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that, if one understood perfectly the subject-concept, one would know that the predicate necessarily belongs to it. The concept, therefore, of any individual substance includes once for all everything which can ever happen to that subject; and, in contemplating this concept, a perfect intelligence would be able to discern whatsoever can be truly said about such individual, just as in the nature of a circle it would be able to discern all the properties which can be derived therefrom. Each monad is, in this respect, a substance, and in so far an entire world, or a mirror of the whole world which it represents in its own fashion. "The universe is in a manner multiplied as many times as there are substances." Thus, it may, in a sense, be said that just as Spinoza had maintained that everything can be deduced from the one substance, so Leibniz maintains that everything is deducible from the notion of any one of the multitude of substances. So far the contrast between the two ways of thinking seems to be a marked and decided contrast, although even here it is, I think, more apparent than real. His next step, however, brings Leibniz back, almost at a bound, to the standpoint of Spinoza. For he is constrained to introduce the all-important distinction between primary or original substance and derivative or created substances; and, in so doing, accepts, without recognising the significance of the acceptance, the doctrine of a two-fold mode of existence. The ultimate ground of things must, he argues, be a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only "eminently" as its source; and this supreme substance, unique and universal as it is, nothing being independent of it, must be illimitable and contain as much reality as is possible (*Monad.*, §§ 38 and 40). Derivative substances, on the other hand, are contingent entities, dependent upon the ultimate

ground just as their own states are dependent upon themselves, essentially limited in character, their limitation constituting in one sense their individuality* (*Ibid.*, § 42).

Here, then, we see the water trickling in that is destined to overflow the house. Since the ground of any existing being can only be sought in an existing being, there must, it is contended, be one being which has metaphysical necessity, and whose essence is identical with existence. In other words, there must exist a being bearing in itself the reason of its own existence, and different from that plurality of beings, the world, which has no metaphysical necessity. If, now, it can be shown that such a being is possible,—that is to say, is not self-contradictory,—we are entitled to affirm its existence, because, since the essence of anything constitutes its possibility, it follows that to exist by its essence is the same as to exist by its possibility. And that the being of God is possible can, Leibniz thinks, be conclusively shown. For God is by definition pure affirmation, absolute perfection, without limit or negations; there can, therefore, be no contradiction involved in the notion of his being. Accordingly, for Leibniz just as for Spinoza, a radical difference of kind is to be constituted between existence in an absolute sense and existence in a relative sense. The essence of an infinite being involves its existence because it is unlimited, because there is nothing to hinder that need of existence (*exigentiam existentiae*), or that tendency to exist, which all essence, as he curiously puts it, carries with it. It is, in fact, the prerogative of the divine nature to have need only of a possibility or an essence in order actually to exist, and this is precisely what is meant by *ens a se*. The essence of a finite being, on the other hand, does not involve its existence, because such essence is limited by other essences; and only by adaptation to other essences, so as to form along with them the best possible world, does it involve even the possibility of existence.

In the case, therefore, of the dependent monads, existence implies, in Leibniz's view, something over and above essence. The position may be briefly formulated thus :—

Possibility + a supplement, x , = Actuality.

The supplement is that, whatever it is, which is needful to raise possibility into actuality. What, then, is the nature of this x ? Such answer as can be extracted from Leibniz strikes one as singularly ineffectual. According to his well known doctrine, there hovered before the understanding of God innumerable images of compossible universes, each of them so ordered in point of detail as to be consistent with certain eternal laws of truth. The monads were called into existence by the divine will, which is to be distinguished from the divine understanding, and which is morally determined by the principle of the choice of the best. But how does that account of the matter help us in regard to the vital point we are considering? We need to know what new factor is constituted for God or for the world by this fiat of creation, we need to know what has been added to that world of compossible essences which is now more than a world of images, in order that it should have stepped forth into existence outside the divine mind. The mere empty notion of an act avails us nothing, unless the x which has accrued through the act can be indicated. The contention might, I suppose, be advanced that the supplement in question was for Leibniz precisely the element of activity which he regarded as the fundamental factor in existent reality. I do not, however, envy the task of anyone who undertakes to render explicable the manner in which activity can be added to essences. Nor would the contention be in keeping with Leibniz's own statements. He is repeatedly asserting that "in possibility or essence itself there is a certain aspiration to exist," that "essence by itself tends to exist," so that it would appear that activity is already involved in the being of essence. Moreover, the

choice of the best is, as Professor Latta puts it, "rather a negative release into existence than a positive creation,"* for it is pictured as a liberating of the essences in question from the counteracting influences of opposite essences, as a removal of hindrances to their inherent power of development. In some way, through the act of creation, the monads become "windowless."

II.

Activity as the Principle of Individuality.

"I maintain," says Leibniz, in opposing his own view of substance to that of Locke, "that substances cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, that activity is of the essence of substance in general" (Gerh., v, p. 58). It is a slippery notion, that of activity, and all too easily interpreted in a quasi-psychological fashion, into which fashion, indeed, Leibniz's descriptions of it not infrequently tend to fall. But Leibniz makes, at any rate, the attempt to form a conception of activity as contrasted with a mere picture of it. "By force or power (*puissance*)," he writes, "I do not mean the capacity (*puissance*) or mere faculty, which is nothing but a mere possibility of acting, and which, being as it were dead, never produces an action without being stimulated from without, but I mean something between the capacity (*puissance*) and action, something which includes an effort, an act, an entelechy, for force passes of itself into action, in so far as nothing hinders it" (Gerh., iv, 472). Leibniz's doctrine may be expressed briefly thus. The characteristic feature of every individual substance is unity—a unity which is not conceivable after the manner of a merely presented object. Just as it required more than the notion of extendedness to explain the nature of material fact, so it required more than the notion of being merely an object to explain the nature of an individual substance. We need to call to our aid the very different

* *Mind*, N.S., vol. viii, 1899, p. 347.

conception of power or energy, a permanent principle of change and action, in order to give definiteness to the thought of individuals as substantive realities. Not only so; the same line of reflexion enables us to define more explicitly the kind of force which is requisite in order that an individual substance should maintain its numerical identity. It is not a force in any way dependent for its mode of being upon spatial relations—in other words, it is non-material in character. Moreover, since the unity of an individual real substance must be a unity which connects together the various changes that constitute its states, the activity which is its essential quality must be of a kind that is capable of uniting multiplicity of relations with singleness of being: it must, that is to say, be a one in many, or a many in one. And the only activity which can fulfil a function of that sort is the activity or force of a soul or mental life. Monads are active *per se*, and in them perception implies representation of the external in the internal, of the compound in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, which again involves appetition, or the tendency to pass from one perception to another. If, then, the contention of Dillmann* is to be allowed, that "the most important concept of Leibniz's Monadology is the concept of representation," the proviso must be added that representation is not merely perception but also striving tendency, that it is a spontaneous power of development no less than a reflecting mirror of the universe.

But the other side of the shield must be displayed. Think out the notion of activity, Leibniz argues, and it will be seen to involve what at first sight appears to be diametrically opposed to it, namely, passivity. Activity is the way in which an individual manifests its individuality. It is, however, not only in virtue of this positive quality that individuality is constituted; an individual not marked off from others, not negatively characterised as being exclusive, would be a contradiction

* *Neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monadentheorie*, p. 304.

in terms. Activity which simply flowed forth would give no manifestation of itself, just as little as an elastic force which met with no resistance. Every monad must, then, be at once active and passive; active in order to exist at all, passive in order to exist as distinct from the other members of the universe. Accordingly, passivity in the monad is the element of limitation, of incompleteness, of finitude; and since the position of each monad in the whole system is determined by its degree of finitude, its passivity may be said to be that element which constitutes its relatedness to the other monads. Furthermore, each monad, in so far as it is active, has clear and distinct ideas, and apprehends the true nature of reality; in so far as it is passive, its ideas are obscure and confused, and what is obscure and confused *seems* foreign to it, *seems* other than itself, *seems* to be external and material. Matter, in short, although an essential feature in the life of the monad, is but the phenomenal appearance of that which in truth is non-material.

In all this, it would look, at first sight, as though we had left the "modes" of Spinoza far behind: but, as a matter of fact, Leibniz has been largely engaged in making explicit what is more or less implicit in the *Ethics*. For Spinoza, no less than for Leibniz, the individuality of determinate existences consists in activity. Already in the *Cogitata* (ii. 6) it had been maintained that the principle of life should be attributed to all things, both corporeal and mental. And by life was to be understood the *vim per quam res in suo esse perseverant*,—a force which, although differently represented in different things, each thing may be said to possess in varying degree. But in the *Ethics* the conception is expanded in significance so that it comes to stand for a measure of self-dependence on the part of particular things.

In the first place, it followed directly from the doctrine of Attributes that all *res particulares* are at once corporeal and ideal in character; regarded from one point of view, they are modes of extension, regarded from another point of view they

are modes of consciousness. In fact, were it not for the limitation of our understanding, we might apprehend each particular thing as a mode of any one of the innumerable Attributes which constitute the essence of God. Individual things are all of them *animata*, although in different degrees* (ii. 13). What, therefore, can be said generally concerning the human mind may be said regarding the mind of any other thing. Yet this affords no reason for denying that minds or souls differ from one another as their bodies do, and that one contains more reality than another. In other words, the kind of life or soul animating a particular thing will depend upon the number of qualities characterising it, or upon its power of acting or suffering.

In the second place, particular things are modes of God's Attributes which express those Attributes in a definite and determinate way (*certe et determinato modo*). Each thing, that is to say, manifests God's nature or essence in a manner peculiar to itself, and as no other thing manifests it. All things derive their essence, and in one sense their existence, from God; but, apart from the fact that they thus follow from the necessity of the divine nature, they have, in virtue of their relation to a fixed time and place, a certain relative independence or modal distinctness. The difficulty or impossibility of reconciling this contention with the trend of thought pursued in the earlier portions of the *Ethics* is patent enough. But it can hardly be questioned that at this juncture of his reflexion Spinoza does speak as though there belonged to particular things, even though the negative element which he had taken, formerly, to distinguish them from the Absolute be disregarded, a certain individuality which, as contained in God, is still positive, and can be known through God.

This affirmative, self-assertive, factor which the essence of a particular thing appears to involve is what Spinoza calls its

* Cf. *Short Treatise* (ii. 22). "There can be nothing in nature of which there is not in the soul of that same thing an idea."

conatus, its tendency or striving towards preservation.* Everything strives to maintain itself in existence, and to resist whatever threatens to encroach upon, or destroy, its being. Thus the existence of any individual thing cannot be terminated from within itself; on the contrary, "each thing strives, so far as in it lies, to persevere in its own being" (*Eth.* iii, 6). The *conatus* is, in fact, it is now declared, the given or actual essence of the thing itself; and it is, therefore, not conditioned by time; it is independent, that is to say, of the reciprocal determination of one thing by another. An inorganic thing manifests its *conatus* by resisting and repelling whatsoever would tend to alter its condition of motion or rest. A plant has its own way of striving to maintain itself against ill-adapted surroundings, and of using its environment to subserve the continuance of its growth and life. In the animal the *conatus* takes the form of appetite or impulse (*appetitus*), and in that form new scope for its exercise is provided. Finally, the *conatus* in the case of man becomes, or may become, an object of his consciousness; he not only strives to persevere in his own being, but he may be aware of such striving. *Appetitus* assumes the aspect of *cupiditas*. It is true that Spinoza makes the curious reservation that the presence of self-consciousness makes no difference, for "whether a man is conscious of his appetite or no, the appetite still remains one and the same" (*Eth.* iii. App., § 1). But I do not think we are entitled to conclude from this that Spinoza meant to imply that the *conatus* which expresses itself in man is a blind unconscious force, a mere will-to-live which uses man as its instrument, whilst the consciousness of it is but an accident of its operation. As Mr. Duff points out,† what Spinoza is saying in the passage just quoted is not that there is no difference between appetite in general and human

* Cf. Leibniz's assertion that force is "that from which activity follows when nothing prevents it; it is effort, *conatus*." *Lettre à M. Pelisson* (1691).

† Spinoza's *Political and Ethical Philosophy*, p. 78, *sqq.*

desire, but that there is no difference between a human appetite and a human desire. And I think Mr. Duff is right in his contention that, according to Spinoza, all human striving is *cupiditas*, whether it be called a *conatus*, an appetite, or a volition, and that of every *cupiditas* a man is, or at least may be, conscious.

The activity, then, upon which Leibniz lays such stress as constituting the essence of individuality was equally recognised by Spinoza; and was, in fact, not less strongly emphasised by him. Whether he regarded it as playing the important part in perceptive experience that Leibniz claims for it is not easy to determine. But, at any rate, he leaves us in no doubt as to its unique position in the higher intellectual life. "Whatever we desire through reason is nothing else than the desire to understand. And since this striving of the mind (*mentis conatus*), by which the mind, in so far as it reasons, endeavours to preserve its being, is nothing but the striving to understand, it follows that this striving to understand (*intelligendi conatus*) is the primary and sole foundation of virtue" (*Eth.* iv, 26).

Equally, too, Spinoza had discovered what seemed to him elements of passivity in the development of individual experience. The various *imaginatioes* of vague experience, when the order of their occurrence is not regulated by the conscious subject—so long, that is to say, as the mind perceives things as existing in the *communis ordo naturarum*, or, in other words, is determined from without to apprehend this or that—are *passive* in character; and in describing these as fragments, or as torn, mutilated portions of ideas, Spinoza is on the verge of formulating the doctrine that sensations are confused concepts. And one need do no more than refer to the elaborate analysis of the "passive emotions" in the third Book of the *Ethics*, where the notion of passivity carries with it similar implications.

That Spinoza, on the basis of his view of substance, was

legitimately entitled to make use of the conception of *conatus*, as the essence of an individual thing, may well, indeed, be doubted. Activity is introduced by him *ex abrupto* and no serious attempt is made to justify its introduction. It is true that we are vaguely told at the beginning (*Eth.* i, 11) that to be able to exist is power (*potentia*); but it is in the descent from the realm of the Unconditioned to the realm of the Conditioned through means of the infinite modes that activity first becomes prominent. The infinite modes, *motus et quies* and *intellectus absolute infinitus*, are just the Attributes of Extension and Thought *plus* the element of activity. But as to how this supplementary factor is supposed to emerge from the undifferentiated wholes of Extension and Thought, Spinoza leaves us in the dark. He seems to be taking the notion of "depending on" as equivalent to that of "following from." Obviously, however, the identification of the two notions is illegitimate. Motion no doubt depends upon extension; but in no sense can it be said to follow from extension. Yet it is evident, I think, that Leibniz too, is in the long run confronted with no less obstinate a difficulty. The transition from the pure undifferentiated activity of God to the myriad finite centres of activity in the created universe is hardly easier to render intelligible than the transition effected by Spinoza.

III.

Stages in the Development of Individual Things.

It is impossible here to do more than briefly indicate the various stages recognised by Spinoza and Leibniz in the development of particular existences. The notion of evolution was, of course, more deeply imbedded in the speculation of Leibniz than in that of Spinoza. The general principle of continuity was never for long absent from Leibniz's thought. Though at first formulated by him with reference to the nature of quantitative changes, it was soon extended to the whole range of reality. It led him rapidly to the conclusion that any absolute

qualitative difference between one entity and another, such as was involved in the Cartesian antithesis of consciousness and extension, calls to be rejected. If there are to be real individuals, and if these individuals are to be parts of one and the same system, no differences of kind must be allowed to obtain among them. In its ultimate nature, reality must be continuous. Any amount of difference there might be, provided such difference be difference of degree only. From this to the further determination of the ultimate elements of reality as psychical in character was but a short step for a speculative genius of the subtlety of Leibniz. The step was taken by help of the consideration that an individual being must be conceived as that which unites in itself a manifold, and that in a sphere of mere extendedness a unity of the kind in question was precluded.

The individuals, then, of which the universe consists are mental in nature and distinguishable by differences in the degree of completeness with which the combination of a manifold in unity is represented by them. Taking the human individual as our point of departure, we find on the one hand the lower types of life exhibited in animals and plants, and, on the other hand, we are entitled to contemplate forms of life higher than our own, culminating at length in the life of the supreme Monad. There is one power common to all these individuals,—the power, namely, of representing in various degrees the universe, of mirroring it each from his own point of view. The mirroring activity up to a certain stage may be called "perception," the process of including the many in a unity; beyond that stage it may be called "apperception," that is to say, perception which has become self-conscious. "Life is a perceptive principle: the soul is sensitive life; mind is rational soul." And what distinguishes one stage of representation from another is just the degree of clearness and distinctness of apprehension. At the one limit dim, obscure, confused perception, at the other full, clear, adequate apperception—between these

lie all the stages of psychical development. Naturally, Leibniz's chief obstacles lie at the two extremes of the scale—at the lower, he has to make the leap from the unconscious to the conscious; at the higher, that from imperfect to perfect self-consciousness.

Beginning, then, at the lower end, the principle of continuity has to serve as justification for regarding the unconscious as simply a low degree of the conscious, for regarding unconsciousness as infinitely minute consciousness. The start is made from those "naked monads," as Leibniz calls them, whose condition is comparable to the condition of a dreamless sleep. When the stage is reached where differentiated organs appear, the organic world arises, and in the psychical life of the animals we have something resembling our own life in dreams. The psychical equivalent of an organ of sense is what is ordinarily called sensation. Sensations are ideas in their primitive and most undifferentiated form; they constitute "the vertigo of the conscious life." Flooded with ideas of everything in the world which has any relation to its body, the animal soul has distinct ideas of nothing. Advance consists not in putting these sensations together—thereby confusion would become more confounded—but in distinguishing them, in getting clearness to emerge out of confusedness, in finding out what they mean. The self-conscious monad, having thus acquired knowledge of necessary truths, can represent the universe with more or less adequacy and distinctness. But, looked at from the point of view of psychical development, rational truths are in the long run percepts developed to the full degree of distinctness and clearness; thinking is perceiving clarified and developed.

Now, although Spinoza did not work out in detail his conception of the different stages of *animata*, it needs little ingenuity to see that he was practically distinguishing the stages which Leibniz describes. Starting with the dictum that all the individual things of nature are living, he was clearly committed

to the position that below the level of organic beings there were modes in which consciousness was present in a dull, crude, weak form. Everything had its soul-side. And in regard to organisms, what Leibniz designates "perception" is coincident with what Spinoza designated "*experientia vaga*" or "imagination." In crude experience, as represented by Spinoza, an enormous number of presentations come pouring in; and "running together," they appear blurred and confused, so that the mind is overwhelmed with the multiplicity of impressions and images. Modes entirely at the mercy of these would be at the stage of the animal life as it is delineated by Leibniz. Then Spinoza proceeds to trace the way in which from these vague undiscriminated presentations there come to be formed, in human experience, the first primitive universals which serve to guide the actions of ordinary men. The manner of their formation is through the more or less mechanical process of association, and that process varies according to the level of development attained. When, however, the grade of *ratio* is attained, we acquire knowledge of the kind which Leibniz specifies by the term "apperception." "Universal notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things,"—ideas which are shared by self-conscious intelligences and which express features common to vast numbers of things—come then to be used. The ideas of imaginative experience are inadequate,—that is to say, partial, fragmentary, incomplete, and, therefore, confused and indistinct; the ideas of reason are adequate,—that is to say, contain within themselves the marks of truth, clearness and distinctness, self-sufficiency and consistency of content. Spinoza, as is well known, differentiated yet a further stage which Leibniz hardly does more than hint at, *scientia intuitiva*, "that kind of knowing which proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."

It is true, there is less explicit recognition by Spinoza than by Leibniz that these stages represent differences of degree only.

But I am by no means convinced that Spinoza definitely regarded them as different in kind. Certainly, if he did, it would be difficult to render consistent his account of *scientia intuitiva*. And, on the other hand, it has to be remembered that in one very important respect Leibniz departs from his doctrine of degrees. He finds it hard, he says, to conceive that there is a natural means of raising a sensitive to the rank of a rational soul, and suggests that God has given reason to this soul by a special act, a kind of *transcreation* (*Gerh.* vi. p. 152).

IV.

The Relation of Finite Individuals to God.

Almost all writers on Spinoza have drawn attention to the wavering in the *Ethics* between two radically inconsistent conceptions of substance,—the one abstract, according to which substance is the blank unity, mere being in general, which is the pre-supposition of all that seems to be real; the other concrete, according to which substance is the absolute totality of things, regarded, indeed, as in some sense a unity in which particular existences are contained and subordinated. On the one hand, Spinoza is working with the principle that every determination is or involves negation, and that it is only when the fictitious differences introduced by the imagination are eliminated that substance can be truly conceived. "Substance is considered in itself—that is, truly—when we set aside all its modifications (*depositis affectionibus*).” Along this line of reflexion, the notion is reached of the Unconditioned as simply indeterminate being, which can be characterised only by denying of it whatsoever we may assert of the limited and the determinate. So regarded, no predicate can be applied unequivocally to the absolute and to the relative; the former differs from the latter, not only in existence, but also in essence (*Eth.* i, 17 Schol.). The essence of finite beings is privation, want of being; the essence of the infinite is pure being simply. Evidently from such a

bare abstraction there is no possibility of advance ; from pure affirmation merely to the determinations that are necessary in order that substance should be real there is no road. On the other hand, working rather with the principle that each finite thing expresses God in a definite and determinate way, Spinoza conceives of substance as *ens realissimum*, the collective sum of all possible predicates, a being that cannot be exhausted in any one attribute, and containing all perfection and reality. Obviously, these two conceptions are incompatible; and cannot both be combined into a coherent view. The former, the notion of logical ground, yields no explanation of that which constitutes the difference between the logical ground and the particular; a universal can never be contemplated as in its own nature that from which the concrete individual has proceeded. The latter, the notion of *ens realissimum*, yields no means of reaching what Spinoza was desirous of reaching, an ultimate ground to which the particulars stood in a relation of dependence. The notion of *ens realissimum* has been attained through means of the category of reciprocal determination; and, valuable as this category is in enabling us to systematise the realm of nature, it is inapplicable to the Unconditioned, it has no relevancy when extended beyond the sphere of finite particular things. Viewed either in one way or the other, the notion of substance can in no sense serve as the notion of a matrix from which all determinate differences have arisen, as the notion of the one ultimate being of which every thing else is a partial manifestation.

The nature of the difficulty which besets Spinoza's whole way of thinking comes prominently to light in one portion of his work which has not, perhaps, received the attention it deserves. The human mind is treated by him as the sum of those determinate modes of consciousness, ideas, which unite to form an individual subject, just as a group of determinate modes of extension may unite to form an individual physical object through the relation of action and reaction. But now Spinoza

recognises that the determinate modes of mind involve at once a relation to modes of the body as their objects and a relation to the subject or the self. "The idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body" (*Eth.* ii, 21). When a man perceives (say) a table or chair, there is (i) a certain mode of consciousness having for its object certain affections of the body of the percipient—the sensations of vision, touch, etc.—and (ii) the idea of that perception, for every mode of consciousness has itself also for its object, or involves the idea of itself. Here, however, the question at once presents itself—is this idea of itself, an idea which appears to be thought of as an aspect of each mode of consciousness, the uniting synthetic act whereby self-consciousness is constituted? And does the centre of reference lie in the individual mind or does it lie in God? So far as I can judge, Spinoza wishes to locate it in God (*Eth.* ii, 21, Schol.), while at the same time he is compelled to allow a species of self-consciousness to the individual mind. Yet, whether the centre of reference be located in God or in the individual mind, it is clear that Spinoza utterly fails to do justice to the peculiar fact involved. Throughout he treats all modes, whether of consciousness or of extension, as though they had to one another only the relations of separate, isolated parts—as, for example, the parts of extension have to one another—and hence he naturally looks upon the centre of reference, in this case, as lying external to the elements united. Obviously, however, external relation of that sort is not compatible with the nature of consciousness: and had Spinoza followed out the conception of the human mind as involving a unity, a centre of reference, internal to itself, he must of necessity have been led to see, on the one hand, that the notion of substance was altogether inadequate to render intelligible what here lay before him; and, on the other hand, that it was not possible to maintain the absolute identity of the universe as consisting of entities which were at once modes of

consciousness and modes of extension. For if modes of consciousness are treated after the manner of modes of extension, they are deprived of just that reference to a uniting centre which is essential to their nature, while if such reference be given to them, the conception of whole and part will no longer suffice to cover the relation of the conscious subject to its various states or modes.

In working out his theory of monads, Leibniz made it his aim to rescue philosophy from that destruction of individual existence which seemed to him to be involved in the metaphysic of Spinoza. As against Spinoza, he took his stand upon the position that the individual as such was alone the truly real. But if one scrutinises more closely the conception of individuality, as it was developed by Leibniz, one will soon have reasons for suspecting that the conception will not bear the weight he is wishful to impose upon it. The one characteristic absolutely essential to individuality, as he regards it, is the characteristic of limitation, negation, passivity. Pure unbounded energy or activity seemed, as I have said, to Leibniz incompatible with the notion of real being. Whatever is must be limited. The monad's character is determined by its "point of view": and that "point of view" is dependent upon the passive, privative, negative element in the monad. In truth, that which renders the monads mutually impenetrable or exclusive is matter; without the element of materiality they would be absorbed in the being of God, the supreme substance. Now, matter is, in fact, passivity; matter is the correlative of confused ideas. And with the clearing up of knowledge, matter must tend to disappear: just as, according to Spinoza, that which marks off one thing from another tends to disappear as we pass from imagination to rational knowledge. It becomes, however, straightway apparent that if limitation is essential to individuality, then God is not an individual, not a monad in the sense in which a monad had been originally defined.

We are here face to face once more with the two totally distinct ideas of what constitutes real existence,* but the point I want now to emphasise is the predicament in which Leibniz is thereby landed when he comes to deal with the relation in which God stands to the world of monads. On the one hand, when Leibniz permits the qualifying terms "necessary" and "contingent" to affect the very nature of the existence qualified, he is led to describe the relation in terms that are practically identical with those of Spinoza. The monads are not to be regarded as distinct from God, nor is it easy to see how they can be regarded as distinct from one another. "Everything," we are told, "is in God, as place is in that which is placed"; and, in a letter to Bayle, the assertion is made that "from the creator of all things, all actual forces or perfections emanate by a sort of continual creation." So, again, in the *Monadology* (§ 47), it is affirmed that "God alone is the primary unity or original substance, of which all created or derivative monads are products, and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment." Once more, a similar thought receives expression in the *Discours de Métaphysique*. "Created substances depend on God, who conserves them, and even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, as we produce our thoughts." "From God all individuals emanate continually, and he sees the universe not only as they see it, but besides in a very different way from them." These passages, and there are many others to a like effect, might easily have been written by Spinoza himself. On the other hand, when Leibniz is concerned to emphasise the independence of the monad, he is forced to ascribe to the divine being a position of transcendence. The world of monads is metaphysically contingent, he argues: its notion does not involve its existence. It springs from a choice on the part of

* *Supra*, pp. 340-3.

God. God, therefore, stands to the system of monads in the external relation of cause to effect. That is to say, it is through the very notion of external relation, which had been dismissed as illegitimate when applied to the world of monads, that Leibniz is now compelled to represent the relation between God and the whole system of monads. No ingenuity can help him out of the contradiction into which he has thus fallen. No method is open to him of accommodating within the scope of one and the same view *both* the completeness of God *and* the quasi-independence which is claimed for the world of monads. He appeals, for instance, to the vague principle of the choice of the best, or the tendency of the Divine activity towards perfection. But the difficulties of the situation are rather increased than diminished thereby. For perfection or the good, as Leibniz understands it, is equivalent to the greatest sum of reality, so that God thus becomes once more the *ens realissimum*. Not only is it impossible to effect in this manner a connexion between God and the world of monads, but the notion of God at once begins to fluctuate between that of a totality of positive qualities and that of an indeterminate ground destitute of any distinguishing mark. In short, Spinoza's dilemma reappears again with all its former acuteness. Whichever way be taken, it is impossible for Leibniz to explain, as he desired to do, the limited, passive, negative factor; the conception of the choice of the best avails him not to bring into conjunction the infinite ground and the diversity of finite monads.

It is worth while, perhaps, referring to another point. The life of the monad, the perceptions or phases of consciousness through which it passes, are the ways in which it expresses the universe. But Leibniz insists upon ascribing to the higher monads the power of forming ideas of the Divine nature,—ideas, that is to say, of that which stands to the monads in a relation very different from the relation in which they stand to one another. He is frequently to be found asserting that the development of each of these monads takes place as though

only that monad and God existed. While, then, such monad excludes from itself all influence from the other monads, it is notwithstanding susceptible to influences from God. Yet, how is it possible for the monad thus to transcend its isolation in the one case and to be incapable of doing so in the other? And how are we to reconcile with the finitude and limited character of the monad the possession on its part of ideas of an infinite reality—of a reality, that is, which is not only other than itself but which is other than the whole world of monads? The considerations I am urging are sufficient to show how hopeless it was for Leibniz to preserve such a conception of God as is involved in the two or three passages in which God is described by him as a monad. As *actus purus* without any passivity, God would be what Leibniz once said a monad without matter would be, namely, "a deserter from the general order," and how, in that case, He could be in communication with monads who were not deserters is one of the many enigmas Leibniz has left unsolved.

V.

Conclusion.

The discussion in which we have been engaged is by no means one of merely historical interest. At the present time the questions at issue between Spinoza and Leibniz are reasserting themselves afresh, and in such reference it is not unimportant to inquire how far, as a matter of fact, Leibniz succeeded in surmounting difficulties that Spinoza could not resolve. When it is asked, for example, "whether finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being," the issue, I take it, is once again being raised whether the finite individual is to be regarded as a "mode" or as, in some sense, at least, a "monad." What it is now customary to call the Absolute retains in essential respects the meaning which Spinoza assigned to Substance, and to a large extent Mr. Bradley's philosophy is the philosophy of

Spinoza worked over anew in the light of subsequent science and reflexion. "The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality, and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values"—this, Mr. Bradley tells us, is the "double truth" which he has found to be the "centre of philosophy." That the position is beset with difficulties has been made evident enough by recent criticism. If, however, any conclusion can be drawn from the comparison I have been instituting, it is most assuredly this,—that there is no way out of those difficulties by the simple device of claiming some special efficacy for the notion of "Activity" or "Life" in conceiving of an ultimate ground of things. When so used, the notion in question loses the significance it possesses as applied to concrete individual existents, and becomes at once infected with all the ambiguity of meaning which attaches to the term Absolute itself. We shall seek in vain to form any intelligible conception of how the Whole of things can be said either to live or to act.

One consideration alone I will allow myself at the end. Leibniz's fundamental mistake, as I conceive it, lay not in his insisting upon the active character of all finite existences, but in his attempting to exhibit this activity of theirs as a "fulguration" of, or detachment from, one ultimate source of activity. To postulate a source of that description seems to me to be a contradiction in terms. We can form, of course, a general notion of activity, as of other things; but if we suppose that precisely answering to the notion there is an actually existent reality, we are illegitimately hypostasising the said notion and making an entity of an abstraction. Just as there is no such thing as feeling in general but only specific states of feeling, just as there is no such thing as willing in general but only specific processes of willing, so there is no such thing as activity in general but only specific modes of activity. On the other hand, activity, as specifically exercised by particular concrete individuals, does appear to me to be a characteristic so essential

that any metaphysical interpretation of them which ignores it is bound to result in failure. Whether, following Leibniz, we are entitled to affirm that everything which exists is active, we need not now stay to inquire; our concern, for the moment, is with some existents that admittedly are active. An individual mind, for example, whatever else it may be, is, at least, a continuous succession of acts or processes of the kind called mental; it is only in and through such acts or processes that there is for it awareness of "connexions of content" at all. To assert, therefore, that all finite individual subjects "are in ultimate analysis connexions of content within the real individual to which they belong"* seems to me tantamount to saying that these finite individual subjects *are* what they are aware of, and to leaving completely out of account the acts or processes of being aware. Doubtless *then* that which alone is peculiar to individuals so regarded—their specific "points of view," namely,—is matter of little or no moment; what is of moment is the connexion of content viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. Accordingly, the contention that in the Absolute these limited, imperfect, fragmentary "points of view" must be transformed, transmuted, merged and dissolved becomes explicable; and "because I cannot spread out my window until all is transparent, and all windows disappear." I am clearly not justified in insisting on "my window-frame's rigidity."† But what vitiates the whole argument is, I submit, the unwarranted assumption made at the start. As an *existing* entity, the finite individual subject is *not* what it is aware of. In its regard, as in regard to other matters of inquiry, it is necessary to distinguish that which is important from that which is fundamental. The "connexions of content" are certainly of supreme importance; they give to a mental life meaning, value and significance. Yet, all the same, its acts or processes, its temporal states and modes

* Bosanquet : *Logic*, 2 ed., vol. ii, p. 258.

† Bradley : *Appearance and Reality*, p. 253.

of being aware, are for it fundamental; apart from them, it would have no place at all in the realm of existence, let alone a claim to any independence of its own. And I confess I am baffled when I am bidden to conceive of my individuality, in the latter sense, as included within a wider individuality to which I and other finite individuals belong. I do not, that is to say, see in what conceivable way a state or act of my mind can be part of a state or act of an infinite mind, or the latter state or act be "immanent" in my state or act. I can understand what is meant by "immanence" when that term is used with respect to values in their relation to finite consciousnesses: I cannot understand what is meant by it if it has reference to the relation between one existent individual mind and another.

XV.—THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

By ALBERT A. COCK.

It is over twenty years ago* since Anselm's Ontological Argument was put before this Society in the acute and learned paper by Mr. C. C. J. Webb. Since then, the perpetual philosophical scrutiny of this argument has been augmented by the attention bestowed upon it by a number of writers such as Dr. Bosanquet, Baron von Hügel, and Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison, while it forms the opening section in Dr. Caldecott's *Selections from the Literature of Theism*. Moreover, the current programme of the Aristotelian Society has an unwonted theistic flavour about it, and although the argument has provoked Dr. Schiller† to the scornful epithet "juggling," it seems not inappropriate for the Society once more to give Anselm's position some serious consideration. My concern is chiefly to suggest that the Kantian criticism of the argument is illegitimate (despite Dr. Ward's assertion that Kant "has for all time exposed its fatal defects"); and, further, to suggest an escape from Mr. Webb's contention that what the Ontological Argument demonstrates is an Absolute Reality, but not a personal God, not the God of religion.

I.

The argument is too well known to need more than the briefest epitome. Given that there is in common use amongst men a term "God," and that the reality (or a certain reality)

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, O.S., Vol. 3, No. 2 (1896).

† In his paper on "Omnipotence," *supra*, p. 250.

implied in this term is denied by some "Fool" who says, "There is no God," it proceeds to inquire whether the term and notion itself does not carry its own guarantee with it, independently of any *a posteriori* confirmation, and independently (be it noted) of any particular theory of knowledge—Kantian or otherwise. Is the notion of God a self-demonstrating one? If so, how? It is not Anselm's business to fit in the notion with psychological accounts of its origin, but to show that the notion is itself valid and self-demonstrable. Terms admittedly mean something; here is a term, a significant term to whose meaning reality, existence, is denied. Can the denial be countered *a priori*? Anselm thinks it can.

An agreed definition of God is necessary; the term must not be used equivocally. It will not do, for instance, to begin by thinking of God as a horse, or as having bodily parts, for while some might so figure Him not all would. I refer to this because one of the objections taken by St. Thomas to Anselm's argument is that the definition *quo nihil maius cogitari potest* is not universally understood as expressing God's nature. But surely this misses the point. Anselm wants an argument that shall compel the intellect for all thinkers. Now (he in effect urges), whatever else you may presently include as *proprio* of the definition of God, this at least you must certainly mean by God, that He is "that than which nought greater can be conceived." This holds for every one who uses the term. The Fool, however, denies the reality of this "*quo nihil maius cogitari potest*." He can only do so by setting up an opposition between thought and reality, and hence asserting that God is thought but is not real. Anselm admits that the opposition between thought and reality holds in the case, for example, of a painting conceived but not executed by the artist. Examples of such opposition are easy to find upon condition that they are drawn from the world of space and time, not otherwise.

* Certainly, Mr. Webb seems to think so. (*Cf. his Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, 2nd ed., p. 141.

and to assert that all reality is necessarily subject to space and time is, for the Ontological Argument, an unwarrantable assumption.

Now, for God (as defined by Anselm) such opposition cannot hold, "for if it were only in the understanding, it could then be further conceived to be also in reality, which would be a greater [and a 'better' is implied] thing."* It is this form of the argument which exposes it to criticism. It appears to be a kind of addition with abstruse and ill-defined units. But it is not Anselm who is responsible for this apparent defect. It is the Fool. The latter has asserted that God is *in intellectu* only; Anselm's reply is, *If so*, etc. That is, the apparent method of addition is due to a previous attempt at subtraction. The Fool has attempted to subtract reality *in re*, not from *any* reality *in intellectu*, but from *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest*. In attempting the impossible he has, *ipso facto*, demonstrated the reality. Anselm works this out more fully in his *Liber Apologeticus* or *Rejoinder to Gauvilo*. There he says: "If that being can be even conceived to be, it must exist in reality. For that than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived except as without beginning. But whatever can be conceived to exist, and does not exist, can be conceived to exist through a beginning. Hence, what can be conceived to exist but does not exist is not the *quo nihil maius*. If, therefore, such a being can at all be conceived to exist, it must exist of necessity."† The non-existence of any existent, and the existence of any non-existent, are both conceivable and possible provided the said existents are subject to time and space. Yet, this is not the case with God, for "that than which no greater can be conceived, if it exists, cannot be conceived not to exist. Otherwise it is not a being than which a greater is inconceivable, which is inconsistent. By no means, then, does it at any place or at any time fail to exist

* *Prologion*, c. 2. I follow Dr. Caldercott's translation.

† *Liber Apologeticus*, c. i.

as a whole, for it exists as a whole, everywhere and always." God is the only possibility whose impossibility is inconceivable. He cannot be at once thought to be real and not real. In this way Anselm really reaches (as Mr. Webb has noticed*) the Leibnizian form of the Ontological Argument. The inconceivability of the non-existence of God (as defined) is clearly asserted in the *Proslogion* itself (c. 3): "If that than which nothing greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. And this is an irreconcilable contradiction. . . . So truly art Thou, O Lord my God, that Thou canst not be conceived not to be, and rightly so. For if any mind could frame the conception of something superior to Thee, the creature would be transcending the Creator, which is most absurd. And, indeed, all else that exists can be thought not to be save Thee alone."

The subsequent development of Anselm's definition of God (always in close conjunction with the argument itself) should be noted in two respects. (i) God is not only *maius* but *melius*, i.e., ethical and æsthetic predicates are transcendently included in His nature: "He is that than which nothing better can be conceived, . . . is very life, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness, and blessed eternity, everywhere and always. . . . Thou hast beauty, harmony, sweetness, goodness after thine own ineffable manner."† And (ii) He is "not only that than which no greater can be conceived," but also "a being greater than can be conceived. For, since it can be conceived that there is such a being, if Thou art not this very being, a something greater than Thou can be conceived, which is impossible."‡

Before passing to the Kantian and some more recent

* *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, p. 185.

† *Proslogion*, c. 14, c. 17.

‡ *Ibid.*, c. 15.

discussion of the Ontological Argument, I would emphasise certain points in Anselm's position which (I contend) secure it against assault. He is not claiming to demonstrate God from any contingent considerations or experience whatsoever; he is not claiming that his argument applies to islands, dollars or any other existent in time and space; nor is he claiming to fit it in with any particular epistemology. When Mr. Bradley says* that "by existence (taken strictly) I mean a temporal series of events or facts," either the Ontological Argument is non-suited at the start or it falls entirely outside such a statement. Anselm is not attempting to prove God as a Bradleian existent, i.e., as "a temporal series of events or facts." Nor is he attempting to demonstrate the simultaneous existence of a number of differently defined deities "who are in being and in competition together."† However much theology may subsequently develop into theologies does not matter. Anselm is solely concerned with an initial and a minimum definition of God. All criticism which ignores this will really be beside the point.

II.

I propose now to ask whether the Kantian criticism is really valid and legitimate. Kant overthrows all members of the three proof system. Doubtless he is right in maintaining that the teleological and cosmological proofs both ultimately imply the ontological, and in overthrowing this last he was condemning all three. But is it so certain that he really does "expose their fatal defects for all time"? It was an inherent necessity for the Kantian system to get rid of an argument which, if accepted, would have necessitated jettisoning the whole. At most, only the inferior status of being a regulative "Idea" could be conceded by Kant to God.

The fundamental axiom of Kant's epistemology is that

* *Appearance and Reality*, p. 317, note.

† Schiller, *loc. cit.*, p. 251.

human cognition is limited to the "given, subsumed by us under the forms of space and time, and organised by the understanding through its categories. All phenomena, he insists, are limited and conditioned; and, moreover, man, as the principal phenomenon, is conditioned in the physical and imperfect in the moral order.

Now, the problem of speculative theism is to find or establish deity, and the God of Kant's conception is the free and intelligent author of all things, unconditioned and perfect. The definition is an extension of that with which Anselm begins, but, even so, Kant's epistemology non-suits the definition of God and the proofs at the start. For the "given" is a conditioned and an imperfect given, and, naturally, will not present us with a free and unconditioned Being that is also perfect. But, I suggest, Kant's position precludes him from examining the Ontological Argument. For the problem is, *ex hypo.*, to demonstrate a free, perfect, unconditioned and intelligent Being. We ask, is it pertinent for this problem to be raised in a theory of knowledge which by its fundamental axiom excludes all possibility of an affirmative solution? It is not a question of constructing a deity to fit a theory of knowledge, but of constructing a theory of knowledge to fit (if it be possible) deity. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant emphatically states that we must not attempt to think of God in terms of space and time. To do so is to court disaster. Then by what right does he in the first *Critique* challenge a deity that, by his own definition, is not to be brought within a time-and-space epistemology? It is he who has courted disaster, not the Anselmian argument. I do not think sufficient attention has been given to this—the illegitimacy of any discussion of an *a priori* argument for God, within the restricted range of any metaphysic which, at the outset, limits cogitability to sense-data. The Ontological Argument, being *a priori*, does not come within Kant's theory of knowledge at all. It does not claim to establish anything whatever that will conform to his restrictions.

He has limited cognisable existence to the "given," a given which is necessarily subsumed by us under the forms of space and time, and organised by the categories of the understanding. That reason (as he admits) is dissatisfied with this, and seeks a close in the regulative Ideas; this ought to have made him wonder whether his preliminary exclusion of the unconditioned from human experience was really sound. Yet, because he could not avoid recognising the dissatisfaction of Reason with his account of reality, he proceeds to admit the Ideas under protest. They come in on promise of good behaviour, as it were; they must not meddle with things; they must be regulative, not constitutive.

The Ontological Argument, however, does not profess to establish anything at all that partakes of the nature of the Kantian "given." The only *a priori* factors that Kant admits are the two "forms of perception," the categories of the understanding, the moral law and the aesthetic judgment. All possible knowledge is otherwise limited to the phenomenal. Clearly, the ontological *a priori* is unamenable to the Kantian scheme. He is entirely disqualified by his own conditions from examining any *a priori* which makes no claim to conform thereto.

Kant's attack upon the argument is, indeed, fundamentally circular. By his own definition, God is excluded from the Kantian account of human knowledge, but the argument does not profess to square deity with Kant's position. Rather, taking the Anselmian or the Kantian definition as common ground in speculative theism, it offers an *a priori* demonstration. But Kant's criticism is grounded in a theory of the "given," i.e., in an empirical and *a posteriori* position. It is, therefore, not *ad rem* where the Ontological Argument is concerned. The latter is not bound to accept Kant's definition of cognisable existence. It merely says that that than which no greater can be conceived must *be* or yield its quality to what is. It does not claim to exhibit God as an object "given" under

the forms of space and time. Kant's argument is really this :—

What is not—"given" (*e.g.*, God at least, as conceived by him) is not matter of human cognition :

God is not—"given."

∴ God is not matter of human cognition.

This is surely fallacious. All that Kant does is to assert positively that God is not what by definition He is not, *viz.*, given and subsumed under the forms of space and time. But no theistic proof, least of all the Ontological Argument, says that He is this. We are left where we were, with a theory of knowledge on one side, and, on the other, a definition of God which makes no pretension to enter into that theory of knowledge.

Again, Kant says that, while reason cannot affirm, it may not deny, the existence of God. It must be neutral. In the Kantian school, the Ideas, the regulative Ideas, are neither good boys nor bad boys: they are paralysed marionettes, neutrals. Let us ask, however, whether Kant does not himself violate this neutrality. For :—

All cognisable existences are subsumed under the forms
of space and time.

God is not so subsumed (by definition).

∴ He is not a cognisable existence.

While this is not a denial of the existence of God, it is a denial of the cognisable existence of God; and, therefore, a denial of a possible attribute of an undenied (though unaffirmed) existent. This is "unfriendly neutrality," at any rate. We are again left where we were. Kant only succeeds in showing that in his epistemology God cannot be regarded as cognisable. But Anselm did not maintain the contrary. Neither his definition nor that of Kant places God within the spatial and temporal series. Between Kant's epistemology and his definition of God

there is no *via media*, because none is wanted. Kant's argument is very well as a criticism, say, of early Semitic anthropomorphism, but speculative theism makes no attempt to be anthropomorphic; and the strength of the Ontological Argument lies in just this, that, being *a priori*, it is free from any such taint. Kant seems to have a grudge against God for not being amenable to the forms and categories.

He is not more fortunate in his quasi-rehabilitation of God in his ethics. There he quietly introduces what may be called an ontological argument in ethics. In Book ii, Chapter 2, § viii, of the *Critique of Practical Reason*,* Kant discourses "Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason."† He urges that if a requirement of pure practical reason is based upon duty, its possibility must be supposed, and, consequently, all the conditions necessary thereto, viz., God, freedom, and immortality. He, then, proceeds to insist that the moral law, which is apodictically certain, has this subjective effect of compelling us to strive to attain it, because it presupposes at least that the *summum bonum* is possible. For, he continues, "it would be practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and had no object." But we do strive. Hence the conception is validated. That is, it carries its own authenticity within itself. The possibility of the *summum bonum* is guaranteed by the very conception itself. Is this not what the Ontological Argument really urges? If, as he maintains, the *summum bonum* is self-authenticated, ought not Kant to have applied the same reasoning to "the conditions necessary thereto, viz., God, freedom, and immortality"—particularly to the conception of God, which the mind of man has ceaselessly striven for, and which, therefore, in Kant's own words, "cannot be empty and have no object"? The moral law is independent of the forms

* Abbott's translation, p. 240 ff.

† *Italics mine.*

of space and time, and Kant does not apply any destructive criticism to it. It is a categorical imperative; it cannot proceed from or be created by man, who is a member of both the phenomenal and the noumenal orders. God, freedom, and immortality are the conditions necessary to it, therefore prior, and at least equally real and imperative. If Kant's criticism of the Ontological Argument is to stand, then it must be consistently extended and applied to everything *a priori*, and particularly to that *a priori* which he valued above all else, viz., the moral law. If the concept of a free and unconditioned Being has to go, has to be regarded as merely regulative, not constitutive, then the concept of a free, unconditioned, autonomous moral law must go, or be regarded in its turn as only regulative and not imperative. And this would be to sacrifice all its authority.

Moreover, while elsewhere Kant says the Idea of a Supreme Being is a regulative principle only, he gives us no further reason why just this particular regulative principle *and no other* should be conceived. Had he done so, the answer would have compelled him to admit the Ontological Argument. We can have no other regulative principle because it is the most constitutive, most real, and most necessary. It is regulative for conduct just because it is constitutive for thought: the *terminus ad quem* for conduct, the *terminus a quo* for thought.

But, says Kant, "existence is no real predicate." Does the Ontological Argument really assert that it is? The opposition between thought and reality is possible only upon a previous union of the two. It is, we must recollect, the Fool who has subtracted Being from the *quo nihil minus*. The divorce between thought and reality is possible for the temporal series, but not for the unconditioned God. Yet, argues Kant, "the unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing." Is, then, God a thing? Has He been defined as a thing? Kant urges that no contradiction arises

if both subject and predicate are suppressed in thought. Is it, however, possible so to think away God, the "that than which no greater can be conceived"? Whatever can be annihilated in thought assuredly does not conform to Anselm's definition. It will not be possible to annihilate God (as defined by Anselm) until thought itself is annihilated. No comparison is possible between finite existents that can be annihilated in thought, and the non-temporal existent of the Ontological Argument. The argument does not attempt to *add* existence or reality to the content of the idea, though this is the usual (and Kantian) criticism of it. Rather it shows that for this one Idea the attempt to *subtract* reality from the content fails, for that content *is* reality. The onus is on the "Fool"; by denying God he is attempting to subtract reality from reality, which is impossible. For all other cases the subtraction of objective reality from a supposed given may be effected, and that given thereby reduced to the inferior status of being *in intellectu* but not *in re*. If, then, Kant urges that the Ontological Argument is an unwarrantable, impossible or meaningless *addition*, the answer is that the Fool's denial is the precedent cause; it is the impossible and meaningless *subtraction* which is at fault.* "The possibilities of thought," says Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison† "cannot exceed the actuality of being." Attempted subtraction fails.

Croce,‡ on the other hand, declares that "existence cannot be anything but a predicate: it can only be asked what sort of predicate it is." He adds that "outside the judgment A is not not thinkable but only representable, and therefore without existentiality, which predicate it only acquires in the act of judgment." We could not, however, accept this as meaning

* I fancy that this train of thought is akin to Mr. C. C. J. Webb, when he says (*Problems in the Relation of God and Man*, p. 141) that "proof" of the divine existence is unnecessary.

† *The Idea of God*, p. 241.

‡ Croce : *Logic* (trans. D. Ainslie), pp. 173-4.

that God (as defined by Anselm) "acquires" existentiality in the act of our judgment. Rather, I should say, that in respect of God there is a continuous affirmation of Him by us in all our judgments. The ultimate subject of all our judgments is God, the *quo nihil maius*; perhaps our true judgments are His self-affirmations. And, although Croce dismisses the "myth of a personal God," he perceives that the task of thought is to render the definition of Deus increasingly exact, rich and spiritual. He recognises the importance of the Anselmian argument for "the unity of Essence and Existence," "the reality of . . . the being than which it is impossible to think a greater and a more perfect (the true and proper concept)."*

I leave the Kantian criticism, then, with the contention that as against the Ontological Argument it is not only irrelevant from the epistemological standpoint of Kant, but also destructive of his ethics.

III.

That Mr. Bradley uses the Ontological Argument has already been pointed out by Mr. Webb. On p. 196 of *Appearance and Reality*, we read: "What is *possible*, and what a general principle compels us to say *must be*, that certainly *is*." But Mr. Bradley has objections to the argument. He denies its applicability.† "For if an idea has been manufactured and is composed of elements taken up from more than one source, then the result of manufacture does not necessarily exist out of my thought, however much that is the case with its separate elements." This is the familiar objection to the validity of a concept on the ground of its origin. Yet, origin and validity are not identical; origin cannot invalidate the valid. The tests of validity are to be sought elsewhere. And even if we admitted that the concept of the "*id quo nihil maius*" is a compound, we

* Croce: *Logic* (trans. D. Ainslie), pp. 496, 522, 537, etc.

† *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 149-50.

may reflect that, like other compounds, it has properties and rights of its own, which are not those of its ingredients. Mr. Bradley does not in the chapter (xiv.) tell us in what respect God, as defined by Anselm, is a compound; and, therefore, it seems to me, his objection fails for want of support. Cudworth's sentences are here to the point: "Our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation or conception that was not before, but only variously compound that which is, nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity . . . much less could our imperfect being create the entity of so vast a thought as that of an infinitely perfect Being out of nothing."*

Elsewhere, however, Mr. Bradley non-suits the argument in a manner reminiscent of Kant. He draws a distinction between reality and existence. "By existence[†] (taken strictly), I mean a temporal series of events or facts." Hence, while "the religious consciousness does imply the reality of that object which also is its goal,"[‡] that object cannot, for Mr. Bradley, be an existent. But, as we have seen, the Ontological Argument does not say that the *quod nihil minus* is an "existent" of this sort. And, of course, Mr. Bradley subsequently rehabilitates the argument if applied and confined to the Absolute.§ "The idea of the Absolute, as an idea, is inconsistent with itself; and we find that, to complete itself, it is internally driven to take in existence." We must not, however, identify the Absolute with a personal God, because, for Mr. Bradley, "a person is finite or meaningless."¶ Yet, the Absolute, though non-personal, is "individual and perfect."¶

* Cudworth (*Intellectual System*, (i), c. v), quoted by Caldecott, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

† Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 317, n.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 532.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

It comes, then, to this, that the objections to the Ontological Argument really spring from objections to the definition of God. Yet, though our definitions of God may be (and are bound to be) defective, His reality, as demonstrated by the argument, is not thereby impaired. Mr. Bradley returns to the problem in his last book, where it appears that his inability to bring together God and the Absolute is due to the fact that for him, "self is but a limited construction, more or less ill-defined and precarious, built one-sidedly out of materials which fall within my centre."* This is a somewhat gloomy view of the nature of personality. Again, "a God that can say to himself 'I' as against you and me is not, in my judgment, defensible as the last and complete truth for metaphysics." But supposing God says not only "I" as *against* us but also "we" as *with* us: Anselm's argument does not entail so austere and exclusive a view of what the divine personality could mean. Is there any evidence that personality is only a finite and precarious construction? Has it no constitutive elements? If Goodness, the Good Will, be a constitutive element, how can it be meaningful unless it be personal? The concept of a personal God may be difficult, but the concept of an impersonal or super-personal Absolute which will guarantee for us the constitutive character of the moral and æsthetic predicates is still more difficult. Mr. Webb's commentary on Mr. Bradley's position may here be quoted:—

"If the Absolute reached by the Ontological Proof is not understood, as by Anselm . . . to be the Supreme Good, and, in an intelligible sense, personal: unless the hierarchy of perfections which sees the Greatest in the Best . . . be recognised; then the result is that the true Nemesis of error comes, the Supremely Intelligible, or the Noumenon of Plato, passes over into the Supremely Unintelligible or Noumenon of Kant, and idealism commits suicide."†

* *Essays*, ch. xv, "On God and the Absolute."

† *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, O.S., Vol. 3, No. 2 (1896).

IV.

Mr. Webb, indeed, argues* that the Ontological Argument is not a proof in that it does not "bring any particular fact under a general rule." He regards it as merely an assertion of "the fundamental nature of knowledge as being knowledge of the Real." I have already suggested that it is more than a mere assertion; it is a demonstration of the invalidity of subtracting any perfection from the *id quo nihil maius*. Mr. Webb, then, accepts the argument on behalf of an Absolute, but considers that whether the Absolute is also personal is matter for subsequent discussion: and this he undertakes, fully and admirably, in Chap. 8 of his book, and his final word on the inadequacy of the Absolute as such is that "it implies that nothing is left out: but it does not say what is there." There would appear to be very general agreement with this view of the argument. Baron von Hügel,† for instance, accepting the Kantian objection to the addition of the predicate of existence, yet declares that "at its best, this argument covers three great abiding facts." Briefly, these are that (i) "in all knowledge there is knowledge of reality, a trinity of Subject, Object, and the subject's Knowing which simultaneously includes knowledge of the Object and of itself, the Subject. We do not know the Thing-in-itself exhaustively, but we do know the Thing in our knowledge of it, and that without further mediation: (ii) all knowledge includes a sense of finitude, contingency, and insufficiency, and we only apprehend Succession and Fleetingness as contrasting with the spontaneously awakened sense of Simultaneity and Abidingness; and (iii) this latter sense cannot be explained away as mere subjective projection." And although (for von Hügel) the argument does not prove more than that in all knowledge of finitude a contrasting knowledge of infinite and necessary reality is involved, yet the

* *Problems, etc.*, p. 187 ff.

† *Eternal Life*, p. 152 ff.

Ontological Proof is one far beyond any simple deduction, and consists in an infinitely multipliable tracing of the Religious Knowledge in all our ordinary knowledge and of its ceaselessly elevating operation within our human lives."

A still more recent general approval of the argument comes from Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison in his *Gifford Lectures*.^{*} His commentary is too good not to be quoted in full: "We have most of us," he writes, "as good moderns and children of the light, had our gibe at the ontological argument, and savoured Kant's pleasantry of the hundred dollars. But this fundamental confidence of reason in itself is just what the ontological argument is really labouring to express—the confidence, namely, that thought, when made consistent with itself, is true, that necessary implication in thought expresses a similar implication in reality. In this large sense, the truthfulness of thought—its ultimate truthfulness—is certainly the presupposition of all thinking: otherwise there could be no inducement to indulge in the operation. To that extent we all believe, as Mr. Bradley puts it in a rather incautious phrase, that 'existence must correspond with our ideas.' When I say 'we all believe it,' I mean that it is the first and natural attitude of the mind to the world, that it never ceases to be our practical assumption, and that, although a little philosophy may lead us for a time into the wilderness of scepticism and relativism, depth in philosophy brings us back with fuller insight to the sanity of our original position. And Mr. Bradley's confidence that 'the main tendencies of our nature' must 'reach satisfaction in the Absolute,' or Professor Bosanquet's readiness to 'stake [his] whole belief in reality . . . on the general "trueness of being" of whole provinces of advanced experience such as religion or morality or the world of beauty or of science,' is, in effect, an extension to our nature as a whole of the fundamental confidence expressed in the onto-

^{*} *The Idea of God*, p. 240 ff.; cf. also Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 669 ff.

logical argument. . . . The claim is made by modern philosophy in a more general form, and because it has been more critically sifted, it is no doubt vaguer in its outcome than the old intuitional argument used to be. Fundamentally, it is the conviction that 'the best we think, or can think, must be'—a form of statement which perhaps enables us to see the real intention of the old scholastic argument that 'a perfect being necessarily exists.' In other words, the possibilities of thought cannot exceed the actuality of being; our conceptions of the ideal in their highest range are to be taken as pointing to a real Perfection, in which is united all that, and more than, it has entered into the heart of man to conceive. Admittedly, however, such a conception transcends the empirical reality of man's own nature or of the factual world around him, just as the perfectly coherent intellectual whole transcends the achieved results of knowledge. And, so far, the argument seems parallel in the two cases; in both there is an aspect of faith, and in both a similar claim to objectivity. But it is idle to deny that, although the belief in ultimate Goodness and Perfection at the heart of things may be held with a more passionate energy of conviction than the more colourless postulate of the intellect, it does not present itself to most minds with the same impersonal logical cogency. . . . It has been treated as not in the strict sense a conclusion of the intellect at all, but a decision of character, given out of a man's own moral and religious experiences."

This lack of conviction appears to be a common occurrence in first meeting the Ontological Argument. Mr. Webb, even, thinks that the simplicity of Anselm's discussion suggests to the mind a trick. I am not certain that this is either necessarily or invariably so. Rather, what appears to occur is that the mind confronted with this argument is like Rossetti when he saw "Beauty enthroned:

"And though her gaze struck awe,
I took it in as simply as my breath."

The defect is that it attempts to prove Deus exclusively by the intellect and defines Him in intellectual terms. Can we expect one function of mind (thought) to demonstrate Deus for mind in its integrity? Must we not demonstrate Him as "the heart's desire," in every function of mind, in aesthetic and moral activity as well as in intellectual predication? * Our dubiety, then, is due not to suspicion of a trick but to the *whole* mind's dissatisfaction with any purely intellectual argument for this thesis. Deus cannot with dignity be demonstrated so. "The mind is aware that the real contains more than the intellect can supply." * The dubiety is not a doubt but an awe: in the Ontological Argument we are on holy ground.

In reply, then, to the contention that the argument stops at the demonstration of an Absolute and does not reach to a personal God, I would urge that if the Absolute and God both be "that than which no better can be conceived" yet Deus need not be only this, not only an abstract, intellectually conceived Absolute. Anselm expressly develops as *proprio* of his definition the personal characteristics, the moral and aesthetic predicates of the *id quo nihil*, etc., and it seems illogical to accept the demonstration of Deus as defined, and then to refuse the *proprio* thereof. Moreover, if the Ontological Argument proves an Absolute it does prove a personal God; for if the Absolute be not God, then God is either "less" than, "greater" than, or "equal" to the Absolute. But the argument cannot apply to two entities than which nothing greater can be conceived. It applies only to one, and the Absolute thus reached is best characterised under the category of personality.

V.

There is, however, another difficulty with the argument. It demonstrates an upward limiting notion for thought. Does it not similarly demonstrate a downward limiting notion? If it be accepted as demonstrating a God, must it not

* Cf. Professor Baillie's paper in this vol., pp. 210-11.

equally be accepted as demonstrating a devil? It seems possible to apply Anselm's reasoning in strict parity. A "Fool" has said in his heart, there is no devil. Is there then nothing real that can be so described? Of a truth, the devil, as a significant term, signifies that than which a lesser (or a worse) is inconceivable. The "Fool," then, is certain that there exists, at least in his understanding, that than which a lesser (or a worse) is inconceivable. Surely, that than which a worse is inconceivable cannot exist only in the understanding. For if, indeed, it exist only in the understanding, it can be further thought to be also in reality, and this is worse than a thought evil being. If, then, that than which a worse is inconceivable exists *in intellectu* only, then it is that than which a worse *can* be conceived, viz., a worse *in re*, but this is impossible. Therefore, it is certain that something than which a less (or worse) is inconceivable exists both in the understanding and in reality.

The Ontological Argument, therefore, really covers two limits, an upper and a lower. It might appear, therefore, that if it be received as pointing to a personal God it also points to a personal devil. It is not so alarming as that, however. For just as Anselm develops *propria* for his definition of the upper limit and those *propria* include the predicates of personality, so we may develop *propria* from the definition of the devil, and these would be found to exclude the predicates of personality. An impersonal devil is a great relief. We could not say that not to be is worse than to be, and, therefore, no devil at all, for it is clear that to be a devil is worse than not to be one. Whether Anselm contemplated the dualism of God and a devil as a result of his argument or not, I suggest that by parity of reasoning it really does involve this, strictly *a priori*. That the impersonal devil or evil thus reached is eternal follows equally, for a finite evil is not so bad as an infinite. Dr. Bosanquet* would appear to have to accept this conclusion,

* *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 80, n.

for "the truth of the Ontological Argument is conceded in principle, and the value of the knowledge to be obtained under it is only a question of degree, *i.e.*, of the reservation under which any predicate truly qualifies Reality." And since (he has told us) every predicate has a place, and there is a place for every predicate, the devil, as demonstrated, must have his.

This is not frivolity. It does matter, as von Hügel shows* when treating of Feuerbach, whether we affirm or deny an eternal personal subject of moral predicates. Denial of this, he says, leads to disaster. What will be the consequences of affirming an eternal subject of immoral predicates? I confess to being uncomfortable over my deduction from Anselm's argument; but, perhaps, my critics will show that the reality of the devil is, after all, only a pseudo-reality, and that its place as the downward limiting notion is merely regulative, whereas the upward limiting notion is truly constitutive of reality. Mr. Webb entertains the supposition of a devil (or devils), of non-human wills, in his chapter† on the personality of God, but it does not appear there as a consequence of the Ontological Argument, but as an hypothesis to account for the observed facts of suffering and sin.

VI.

To sum up, then, I urge that—

(i) The argument is wrongly represented as implying the addition of existence as a predicate. It is rather a demonstration of the invalidity of the subtraction thereof, of the unity of thought and reality in respect, and only in respect, of that which comes within the definition. "Mere existence is not a predicate, but specifications or determinations of existence are predicable."[‡]

* *Op. cit.*, p. 243-4.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

‡ R. Flint, *Theism*, 278 ff.

(ii) The question at issue, therefore, is a matter of the definition of God, the Absolute Reality. The Ontological Argument, having *a priori* demonstrated the reality of the *id quo nihil maius*, leaves it to subsequent deduction, based upon experience, particularly religious experience, to fill in the characterisations of God. It will do this in the progression of experience in the great historical religions.

(iii) For Anselm, the characterisations of God which follow from the definition, include the predicates, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual, of personality; but since the *id quo nihil maius* is absolute, these predicates make no claim to be exhaustive; and they may even be absorbed in others, at present beyond our ken, in such a way as to unify a fully abstract view like Mr. Bradley's with a fully concrete view like Anselm's.

(iv) When it is said that the argument is an assertion, not a proof, this means not so much that it is the assertion of the reality of a perfect Being by an imperfect, in virtue of the presence of the concept in his mind, but rather that it is the assertion or self-affirmation of that perfect Being, to an imperfect, of His own reality and His own perfection. The "argument" is an intellectual Epiphany: God with us.

(v) It is a confusion of the issue to refute or attempt to refute the argument by means of any illustrations drawn from the temporal and spatial series of finite existents; the Kantian criticism, in particular, is irrelevant, impertinent; and further, if admitted, is fatal to the Kantian ethics. For the Kantian ethics regards the Good Will as self-authenticated, yet denies the constitutive authenticity of the good willer, that can be but God, since finite wills and willers are admittedly imperfect.

(vi) Yet the Ontological Argument, if it is valid for the upper limiting notion and reality of God, is logically also valid for the lower limiting notion and reality of devil; and this is implicative of an unresolvable dualism.

(vii) It is not a trick or piece of juggling, but it fails to satisfy the mind because it is exclusively intellectual. It is not

deficient in validity, but it is deficient in value, in emotional value in particular. It constrains the intellect but does not constrain the will or the emotions; and it cannot do this until the definition with which it begins is amplified. Nevertheless, its supremacy over the *a posteriori* proofs is that it alone can really coerce the intellect, and Kant's treatment, by giving it pride of place amongst the proofs, is a realisation of this.

(viii) That (as against Mr. Webb) the argument *is* valid for a personal God: its failure to awaken a worshipful attitude in us arises because, by appealing solely to the intellect, its appeal is relatively impersonal and only a whole person can worship. Yet, it does not altogether fail even in this respect, as Anselm's perorations show.



XVI.—THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THEISM.

By W. R. MATTHEWS.

THOSE facts and experiences which we sum up under the name "morality" may be studied from more than one standpoint and with more than one purpose in view. It is convenient to distinguish three possible approaches to the data of ethics: the historical, the psychological, and the distinctively ethical. In pursuing the first, we are engaged in the attempt to trace the rise and development of the moral ideas of mankind; in the second, we may seek to analyse the moral consciousness as it exists in individual experience; in the third, we strive to formulate the ultimate moral law or to define the nature of the good. It would, indeed, be false to suppose that these three lines of investigation are completely independent of one another, since it would be strange if the progress of moral conceptions should throw no light upon the moral ideal, or, again, if our views upon the ultimate problem of ethics should not affect our treatment of the moral consciousness of the individual. But though not independent they are distinct. They propose different questions and pursue different methods.

In each of these inquiries we may, if we choose, stop short with the answer to the immediate problem which we have set ourselves. We may be content with a description of the variation and evolution of moral standards, with an analysis of the moral life, with a statement of the view of the good which commends itself to us. But in each case there arises a further question. When we have traced the moral development of mankind we may ask,—what light does it throw upon the nature of the universe of which it forms a part? We may

ask,—on what grounds can we justify the validity of that sense of obligation which is the form of the moral consciousness? We may ask,—what are the implications of our conception of the good with regard to the structure of the universe? In each case it will be found that theism furnishes us with a more satisfactory answer than any rival theory. It would be too much to maintain that the facts of morality furnish us with data from which we can by a necessary process deduce God; but we may reasonably maintain that they afford a cumulative argument by means of which we may establish His existence with a high degree of probability.

Clearly, however, the degree of probability which we shall attach to any such argument must depend, to some extent, on the weight which we allow to this aspect of our experience. That we form judgments of value is a fact, but very different degrees of significance may be attributed to this fact by different minds. Yet we may surely at least take it as agreed that this fact cannot safely be excluded entirely from consideration. If the universe is of such a nature that in it minds perceive objects and discover uniformities, it is also of such a nature that in it minds form ideals and acknowledge themselves to be under moral obligation. But the claim of the moral aspect of our experience to be considered in forming our general view of the nature of the world must be put much higher than that of mere equality with others. There is no other aspect which has *prima facie* so much right to be considered. The aim of philosophy is nothing less than to grasp the whole, to rise above the partial and limited standpoints of the special sciences, and to present to itself reality as a rational and coherent system. That such is the ideal which hovers before philosophy is as evident as that it has never been achieved, and, moreover, never can be achieved. The disparity between the mind and its object is too great to allow us to hope that the human intellect will ever succeed in gaining a complete and detailed knowledge of the universe as a coherent whole. If we insist on waiting until we

can start with the whole data, we shall never start at all. We are therefore driven, unless we abandon the business of philosophy in despair, to select some aspect of our experience, and to treat it as a clue to the nature of reality. This is, in fact, what every philosopher does. He takes hold of the world, so to speak, by one point. He may begin with the problem of knowledge, or the ultimate questions of biology, or with mathematics. Always he takes one aspect of experience as his starting-point, and he hopes that, with this thread in his hand, he may safely tread the labyrinthine wanderings of reality. Now, if we needs must have a clue drawn from a partial aspect of our experience, it seems that the clue of our moral experience not only has as good a claim as any other, but has the additional advantage of being the only one which promises to lead us to the centre. It alone, if it can be successfully followed, holds out the hope of showing that the world is completely rational. We might be shown with sufficient cogency that the world was throughout a delicately adjusted machine, and yet remain unsatisfied if we could suspect that it was an "infernal machine." It might be shown that it was one vast life-impulse, and yet we might wonder whether the life was worth living. Or, again, the universe in all its multifarious variety might be shown to be the infinite exfoliation of an idea, and yet we might wonder whether the idea was a good idea. As Professor J. S. Mackenzie has recently said, constructive philosophy must fall short of its aim unless "the Moral Order, or the Order of Value, is to be taken as the interpretation of all the others. It certainly seems that the subordination of everything to the realisation of what is intrinsically good or beautiful is the only way in which we can definitely conceive of a completely ordered system."*

We must, indeed, admit the possibility that the universe is of such a character as to frustrate the demands which our

judgments of value would make upon it, that the clue instead of leading us to the centre should carry us to an impasse. If it were conceivable that sufficient evidence should ever be accumulated to prove in this matter a negative we should be forced to confess that the world was not in the highest sense rational, and that, however greatly our insight into the "how" of its events were enlarged, its "why" must remain a question without an answer.

It is perhaps advisable at this point to state with some precision what is meant by theism; and this is most conveniently done by placing it in relation with rival views. Without attempting to set limits to the fertility of the speculative mind, we may say with some confidence that any possible view of the nature of reality must fall under one of five heads: (1) atheism or naturalism: (2) pantheism or pure immanentism: (3) pluralism: (4) deism or pure transcendentalism: (5) theism. It is, of course, possible that we should find a difficulty in placing some individual systems in this scheme; Lotze and Royce, *e.g.*, would probably give rise to some perplexity, but it might be argued that in these cases two inconsistent views were really contained in the writings of the thinkers in question. At least this division has sufficient exhaustiveness for our purpose. In opposition to naturalism, theism maintains that the world has a spiritual ground and end. In opposition to immanentism, it holds that this spiritual ground and end is not wholly confined to, or disclosed by, that fragment of existence which is open to human experience, and, moreover, that its nature is not lower than personal. In opposition to deism, it conceives God as immanent in the world as well as transcendent. In opposition to pluralism, it rejects the view that the spiritual ground and end can be adequately conceived as a collection or society of finite spirits.

I.

Probably the most important contribution of the nineteenth century to philosophy has been the concept of development.

Henceforward it should be as impossible as it is certainly unsafe to discourse of the moral consciousness without taking account of the long history that lies behind its present stage of evolution. That our moral ideals have sprung from a humble and even ludicrous origin is a fact which is not only useful as a reminder that, as we do not stand at the beginning, so we have not arrived at the end of the moral development of mankind, it is also an essential part of the phenomenon with which we have to deal. It is no longer permissible to treat all our judgments of value as if they were fixed and unalterable. It may still be reasonable to regard, with Butler, the conscience as the "candle of the Lord," but we must allow that the candle has taken a long time in burning up. A common opinion is that theism has some interest in denying the development of moral ideas. Whatever may have been the attitude of some theists, that is so far from being true that we shall find in a consideration of the evolution of morality a certain amount of evidence for a theistic view of the world.

The discussions of the last century did something more than stamp the idea of development deeply into the general mind, they revealed the bankruptcy of that conception of evolution which is the only one compatible with the naturalistic hypothesis. The characteristics of this false evolutionism are the confusion of description with explanation, and the delusion that you have sufficiently accounted for complex and characteristic wholes when you have analysed them into their primitive parts. Under the dissection of this method morality becomes merely a complex system of taboos, and the sense of obligation an inherited and irrational instinct of fear; religion becomes an etherialised fetish worship; and, since science has also evolved, men of science, we must suppose, medicine men who have acquired some vastly mysterious incantations.

Yet, unsatisfactory as we must needs hold such writers as Herbert Spencer to be, we should be wrong to deny that they were trying to grapple with a real problem. The question

remains: How, without evacuating our moral ideals of all authority, are we to account for their development?

The explanation of this development which seems most consonant with the naturalistic hypothesis is one based upon the idea of "survival value." It may be urged that those codes of morality and ideals of life have persisted which have conferred biological advantage upon those who held them. That the existing moral standards of civilised races have had survival value is clearly true if the assertion means no more than they have actually survived. Nor need we be concerned to deny that, from a purely biological point of view, those communities which have been most deeply affected by such ideals as the ideals of justice and co-operation have acquired certain advantages of cohesion and stability which must have tended to perpetuate them. But any such external view of the evolution of moral ideas is clearly inadequate to explain even that limited portion of the facts which it recognises. So far is it from being obvious that a life of love and unselfishness brings an added chance of survival, that it is clear that the tendency must in many cases be in the opposite direction. It is an old topic of ethical argument that, on a naturalistic view, the appearance of virtue is more useful than the reality, and the purely biological conception of evolution appears to throw far more light on the persistence of hypocrisy than on the advance of ethical ideals.

This, however, is the least of the difficulties in which naturalism is entangled. Just as in its account of the origin of species the theory of natural selection must take for granted the fact of variation, so in its account of moral progress it can give no explanation of the emergence of moral ideals, which is precisely the point which we are most concerned to have elucidated. No one, it is to be presumed, will assert that ideals of justice and brotherhood take shape in the mind as excellent dodges to preserve the species, and no one, it may be hoped, will think that he has solved the problem by pronouncing the

mysterious word "instinct." The naturalistic hypothesis remains impotent in face of the facts of moral evolution.

But the most serious count in the indictment against naturalism has yet to be stated. If it were true, which is, in fact, most false, that a purely biological theory of evolution could give a plausible version of the progress of ethical ideas, we should still be driven to seek some further ground for them on pain of divesting them of all authority. Naturalistic evolutionism leads to scepticism in the theory of knowledge. If we can say of true judgments no more than that they are those that aid the survival of those who form them, we have evacuated the term "truth" of its significance. Just as certainly naturalistic evolutionism involves ethical scepticism. If we can say of judgments of value no more than that they tend to preserve those who hold them, we have reduced moral authority to the level of mere convenience. They can persist in rational minds only so long as the dogma is held that the race is worth preserving (or that an undefined part of the race is worth preserving, or that this individual is worth preserving, for the dogma is as ambiguous as it is unsupported), and that some intelligible meaning can be assigned to the word "worth" in this statement.

There is an element of impiety in dwelling on the shortcomings of naturalism, as if one should recount the errors of the dead. Nor, since Mr. Balfour's *Gifford Lectures*, can it be said to lack an incisive epitaph. But our purpose is not to rake up old scandals or merely to eliminate a departed hypothesis. Certain positive results seem to follow from the breakdown of the atheistic method. For our original question remains: How, without evacuating our moral ideals of their authority, can we account for their development?

It is easy for defenders of theism to assume that when they have refuted naturalism they have established their own case, and even Mr. Balfour is perhaps not wholly uninfluenced by this assumption. But we have seen that constructive

philosophies do not lend themselves to this dichotomous division, nor can it be claimed for theism that it is the only view that offers a plausible account of the problems of moral development, nor even that it has a clear solution for them all. Nevertheless, it may be asserted that no other view is in so favourable a position for dealing with them. The world possesses the characteristic that in it moral ideals are formed, go through a process of development, and, as we are compelled to believe, on the whole, the higher and more valuable ideals tend to prevail and survive. Yet, so long as we conceive of the environment of man through physical and biological categories, we can see no reason for this development and no ground for our belief. Yet it would be a desperate remedy to deny that survival depends upon adaptation to environment, for the denial would remove a principle of explanation without leaving any obvious alternative, and one, moreover, which has proved fruitful in other fields. The remedy is clearly to amend our view of the environment. It is true that man survives only by adjusting himself to his environment, and his ideals survive or perish, flourish or decay, along with him, but it is an environment which presses upon him satisfactions above those which are purely animal, which encourages him to pursue ideal ends hardly capable of realization in the present order. It is difficult to see what this can mean except that the universe is wrongly conceived simply as matter or life. Those are aspects of it. But, as well, it has characteristics which can only be described as spiritual.

Still more clearly does a theistic hypothesis fit the facts as regarded from the point of view of the emergence and gradual elevation of moral and social ideals in the life of humanity as a whole. The process presents itself as a continued effort towards self-transcendence, a sustained, though not unchecked, impulse to set the individual in wider and more harmonious and more complex relations with all other individuals. The development of the moral life of humanity suggests the presence of a

spiritual life becoming more and more fully developed in humanity—"dass etwas übermenschliches im Menschen wirkt."

Such an interpretation of moral evolution would remove the difficulty which we have felt with regard to the authority of ideals which have evolved and are still in process of evolution. If we can regard the development of moral ideas as the progressive expression of a *λόγος ἐνδύητος*, of an immanent spirit, and if, moreover, we have seen reason to believe that the moral ideals thus developed must be in a harmony, though a somewhat mysterious harmony, with the environment in which man lives (in other words with the rest of the universe), we have some ground for supposing that the developing moral consciousness is a revelation of the purpose of the world as a whole. Such a view at least would give us a standpoint from which we could allow full weight to the undeniable facts of moral evolution while maintaining in full force the authority of our own moral ideals. And I confess that I can see no other theory which would have the same advantages.

I am far from asserting that this conclusion leads us straight to a complete theistic doctrine, but at the same time it may be argued that theism is free from certain difficulties which attach to rival hypotheses. At first sight a doctrine of pure immanentism might seem to be most plausibly suggested by the facts. But such a view will have great difficulties in explaining how a development is possible at all. Moral evolution is more compatible with the hope that "God shall be all in all" than with the assurance that He is all in all already. Again, the unity of moral development seems to tell against pluralism. It appears to be a fact that the ethical evolution of widely separated portions of the human race tends in the same direction: with wide diversity of detail and emphasis, the same virtues and kinds of character appear to be venerated and desired by the higher minds of very various historical periods and races. It would, of course, be easy to argue against this, and to dwell upon the admitted divergence of moral types, but it is not

easy to escape the impression that moral development is in the main converging on a common ideal, and this fact, so far as it is a fact, is clearly more suggestive of theism than pluralism.

If we now pause to sum up our results so far, we may say that an attempt to interpret the historical facts of moral development reveals the impossibility of any purely atheistic or naturalistic view of the world. We have seen good reason to adopt some form of spiritualistic philosophy. In addition there exist some indications, which are far from amounting to proofs, but which have some weight, that a theistic form of spiritualism will present fewer difficulties than any other.

II.

We must now proceed to consider the moral consciousness as it exists in individuals, with the object of discovering whether the moral life appears to rest on any implicit assumptions about the nature of man and his relation with the world as a whole, and, further, of enquiring on what conditions those assumptions can be justified. It will be sufficient for our purpose to call attention to two familiar principles, the authority of moral ideals, and the objectivity which we naturally assign to the Moral Law.

The feeling of obligation, the ought, is the form of the moral life. Without it we should not judge that moral experience in any true sense existed; and, on the other hand, wherever there is a form of experience in which there is a recognition of obligation, we should give it the name of "moral." That this element in moral experience co-exists with many various conceptions of the law which ought to be obeyed or the end which ought to be pursued is obvious, and it is equally obvious that it varies indefinitely in intensity and explicitness. At the lowest it is a dim and half-recognised feeling that certain aims have more worth than others; but in its developed form it emerges as a conscious judgment that there are some aims which ought to be pursued and others which ought not, and, further,

that, in disregarding this judgment, I shall be violating that element in my nature which has most clearly a right to my obedience. Whatever may be thought of the accuracy of this description, it can hardly be denied that the feeling of obligation exists or that Butler was right in saying that a claim to "authority" was the fundamental characteristic of conscience.

Two methods of dealing with this fact of moral experience have to be rejected before we are able to build any inference about the character of the world upon it. We must first reject any view which would be satisfied with a purely psychological or "evolutionary" account of it. After what has been said already there is no need to labour the point that to resolve the sense of obligation into other and lower elements is to destroy it. If moral obligation, for example, is no more than inherited irrational fears, it will be the part of every sensible man to rid himself of it. Yet, it has been held by some that this fact of obligation must be accepted as ultimate. It is true indeed, so it is argued, that I ought to seek the good and that I so judge, but this fact has no significance for metaphysics. I confess I do not see how one who takes this position can be compelled to go beyond it any more than a man who has determined not to go more than fifty yards along a road can be compelled to go a hundred. But at least we may point out that the road exists, and that possibly a further effort may lead to things worth seeing. And it is certainly possible to ask the question, On what conditions can the sense of obligation be justified? Assuming that I believe myself to have true judgment on the nature of the good and that I believe myself to be under an obligation to pursue the good, what kind of universe is required to justify this belief?

Clearly we may eliminate at once any view which would give a purely external derivation of the moral law, whether that view be atheistic or deistic. A moral law which is collected by mere observation of external nature can have no

authority over a self which can distinguish and oppose itself to externality. In the same way the arbitrary fiat of a purely transcendent Deity can have no moral authority for me, but will possess merely that compulsory force which this Deity may exercise by an appeal to selfish hopes and fears. The only moral judgment which can have authority is one that springs from the nature of the personality. We are thus led to a position akin to that which was expressed by Kant as the "autonomy of the practical reason," or, in simpler and more accurate language by St. Paul and Butler, by saying that "man is a law unto himself."

Modern idealistic ethics has adopted a mode of expression for this truth which is worth attention both by reason of the accuracy with which it describes an aspect of moral experience, and also by the impossibility of interpreting it in any exact sense. It is said that the moral life consists in giving expression to the "true" or "real" self. Now, it is not my purpose to deny that the criticisms of Dr. Rashdall and Dr. Moore have great weight, and indeed it is difficult to see how I can be greatly concerned with making more real that which is already most real. But at the same time this way of putting the case is an admirable description of our attitude towards our ideals. The moral effort is not thought of as an attempt to destroy our personality and to become someone else. It is most naturally conceived as an attempt to be oneself, to enter into possession of one's full being, to express a character which is immanent, latent, waiting to be born, but which has more right to exist than that empirical self which, in one sense, has more reality. I will not deny that there is an element of paradox in all this. Yet, I assert that this is the verdict of moral experience, and I hope to show that theism alone can remove the paradox.

The second assumption which we make when we act as moral beings is the objectivity of the moral ideal. If there were no ground for judgments of value beyond the passing

and irrational preference of individuals we should, I imagine, agree that morality in the ordinary sense would be impossible. But it is possible to go beyond this and claim that a derivation of the moral law from even the most permanent and "real" elements in my personality falls short of the character which we ascribe to it when we are soberly considering the authority of conscience. Nor again would any consensus of human judgment in questions of value, if that were possible, fulfil the demand for "objectivity." The very fact which we take for granted, that it is possible to discuss problems of conduct and to compare ideals of life, reveals that we do, implicitly or explicitly, assume an objective standard and refuse to decide such controversies on the ground of individual taste or the vote of a majority.

Now, if it be agreed that these two assumptions do, in fact, lie at the root of the moral life, we shall have little difficulty in showing that they can only be justified on a theistic view of the world. Let us begin with the objectivity of the moral ideal. It is asserted that the moral ideal has objective reality, that its nature is unaffected by the apprehension of it possessed by me or by any human intelligence. But it is surely important to observe in what sense this objective existence of a moral ideal can have any meaning. Clearly it exists in a different manner from a "real" chair or table, or, again, from the properties of a triangle. It is to have objective existence, and yet retain its nature as an ideal. Now it is the essential nature of an ideal to be a mental content held over against a discrepant actuality. If the ultimate standard of value exists in the same manner as a chair, it has ceased to be an ideal, and has become an achieved actuality; if it exists in the same manner as the properties of a triangle, it has no relation with the temporal order in which the moral life is lived. The objectivity of the moral good, therefore, is only intelligible when it is regarded as a completely conceived, but as yet unrealised, purpose, and the only view of the world

which will make that possible is one which allows a transcendent teleology.

So far, what we have concluded might be compatible with a deistic doctrine of pure transcendence, but we have yet to account for that aspect of the moral life which emerges when we consider the fact of obligation. It is clear that a merely transcendent teleology can give no satisfactory basis for this. That the world should have a purpose is doubtless, on any view, an interesting and even important piece of information, but if that purpose is wholly external to me, if I can know it only by a revelation which is based entirely upon external evidence, if I can co-operate with it only by conforming to rules which have no ground in my own nature, such a purpose can never command my allegiance with that authority which we attach to the demands of conscience. If, on the other hand, I am justified in assuming that by furthering the common end I am also furthering that end which is immanent in my own nature, that by taking thought for the ultimate good I am considering also my own good, that by obeying the objective moral law I am developing that element in my personality which has most importance, which is most truly myself, then the sense of obligation is abundantly justified. Who can doubt that theism is the view of the world which most adequately allows for these diverse presumptions of the moral life? It holds that the Deity transcends the temporal order, and therefore that the moral ideal is completely objective, and objective as an ideal. But, at the same time, with its doctrine of the immanent Word or Reason, it enjoins us to hold that the apprehension whereby we discern the good is the reflection of the Divine Knowledge, and the will whereby we attempt to realise the good is not unrelated with the will whereby God seeks to realise His own End.

We shall fail to do justice to the strength of this argument if we omit to observe the remarkable havoc which all rival theories make of the moral life, or, rather, which they

would make if anyone were prepared to act as if they were true. To pursue this topic at any length would make larger demands on the patience of the reader and the knowledge of the writer than either can be called upon to supply. It will suffice to notice some salient facts. Pure immanentism has the first claim to be considered, because its most distinguished exponents have made strenuous efforts to deal with ethical problems. Spinoza stands as the great representative of "static" immanentism. It is an old, but none the less true, remark that the first part of the *Ethics* is really an elaborate demonstration of the impossibility of ethics, and that it is only by the inconsistent introduction in Part III of the *conatus in suo esse perseverare* that the appearance of any ground for recognising the rationality of moral effort is saved;* and, indeed, it appears evident, without unduly labouring the obvious, that if we accept Spinoza's view of the world and regard all existence as flowing, by a timeless necessary and logical process, from the perfect and infinite Substance, the desire to promote good and abolish evil must be a senseless impertinence, a baseless illusion, which confronts us simply with the problem of how it could possibly have arisen. It may be doubted whether Mr. Bradley's doctrine should be described as pure immanentism, and it may be argued that his principle of the degrees of reality saves him from some of the most disastrous consequences of pantheism: but nevertheless, if we are to take seriously his statements about the place of appearances within the Absolute, we shall find it difficult to avoid drawing a similar conclusion. Mr. Bradley's famous epigram on the subject of "Heaven's design" must be taken as a literal statement of fact, except that no one has ever explained how, on Mr. Bradley's principles, "Heaven" can have any design at all.

* Cf. Barbour, *The Ethical Approach to Theism*, p. 29, and G. Dawes Hicks, *The "Modes" of Spinoza and the "Monads" of Leibniz*, in this vol., p. 329 ff.

When we pass to consider "dynamic" immanentism we are conscious of a lamentable lack of guidance. It is to be regretted that M. Bergson has as yet given no attention to ethical problems, for it seems likely that by so doing he would be led to develop his thought in a theistic direction. It is clear that he rejects "radical finalism" in the sense that all events are predetermined by a preconceived end, but I do not understand that he has rejected transcendent teleology in the sense which we have found it to be no less a postulate of ethics than a fundamental doctrine of theism. If, however, we take his philosophy in its present incomplete state, we shall find it very difficult to discover any basis for ethics. The most obvious suggestion is that we might look for a further exploitation of the idea that life is the good along lines which are already familiar in the pages of Spencer and Guyau, with the addition that mechanism is the devil. The difficulties of such a position are too numerous and too well known to need more than a bare mention. Chief among them is the fact that the theory in question is directly opposed to the judgments of value which we actually make. In them we are concerned not with amount of life but with quality of life, and the theory gives us no ground for distinctions of quality. Further, it is evident that dynamic immanentism cannot succeed better than static immanentism in giving any intelligible meaning to the objectivity of the moral ideal. Indeed, so far would this hypothesis be from affording us any ground for asserting the universal validity of any moral principles, that there is, so far as I can see, no reason for supposing that they will be common to any two individuals. It is, perhaps, worth while to add that, just as the syndicalists have, with some show of logic, deduced from M. Bergson's philosophy the conclusion that the trammels of the State are hostile to the free development of the life-impulse, so the anti-social individualist might maintain that the impalpable restraints of morality "mechanise" and restrict the life which seeks expression in him.

Of radical pluralism it is sufficient to say that it seems able to justify neither the "ought" nor the claim for objectivity. Among the monads there can be none that is able to envisage the complete ideal for all, nor can there be one whose life, immanent in all the others, forms the most significant element in their nature. If a form of pluralism is held in which both these assertions can be made about one of the monads, we have passed from radical pluralism into theism.

To sum up the argument of this section. We have found that the moral consciousness makes two postulates—(1) the objectivity of the moral ideal, (2) that the moral law should be based on the fundamental nature of the self. We argued that both these postulates are consistent with a theistic hypothesis. We then turned briefly to notice the position of rival hypotheses in this matter. It appeared that each of them was confronted with insuperable difficulties in dealing with morality, so much so that it was difficult to resist the impression that anyone who seriously accepted one of these rival views might be forced radically to revise the attitude which, as a plain man, he had been accustomed to adopt towards moral ideals. It is probably unnecessary to point out that the difficulties to which I refer did not arise from any individual peculiarity of the thinkers whom I have used as illustrations, but are the direct outcome of their general principles and must inhere in any system which has the same general character.

III.

We must now turn to the content of the moral consciousness as it exists at the present stage of its development and in that portion of the human race which we may perhaps regard without undue self-complacency as the most advanced. We shall not fall into the error of thinking that we have attained to a knowledge of the final ideal or that it is incapable of enrichment or even of considerable alteration. But there are certain principles which are so firmly established and so

universally admitted among us that we could hardly contemplate the possibility of a moral development which would deny their validity. The most important of these principles is that which has been called "Rational Benevolence." Passing over some differences of interpretation which are unimportant for our purpose, we shall be safe in saying that this principle has as its minimum significance the statement that it is reasonable to promote the good of all human beings.

Now, a question at once suggests itself as to the ground of this assertion, and it must be confessed that writers on ethics have not done very much to elucidate this question. We need do no more than refer to J. S. Mill's heroic defiance of logic in the attempt to deduce Benevolence from self-interest or to Spencer's laboured and irrelevant demonstration that if egoism and altruism do not coincide for us they will do so for some limited period in an indefinite future. These things belong to the curiosities of literature. A far more respectable view is that which is associated with the name of Professor Sidgwick, and has recently been restated in an interesting paper by Miss E. E. Constance Jones. According to this theory, as I understand it, the principle of Benevolence is self-evident, and therefore neither needs nor is capable of any further justification. Yet, it is hard to discover on what ground this claim for self-evidence is made, and not easy to exorcise the doubt whether it means anything more than that a considerable number of people do agree, as a matter of fact, in accepting the principle of Benevolence without feeling the need of any further inquiry, just as many people have accepted with unquestioning faith the belief that the sky is an inverted crystal bowl. It is probably true that there are no persons who would deny that it appears rational to them to pursue their own good, however widely they may differ in their conceptions of the nature of the good; but so far as the evidence goes, it appears that there is a large number of rational beings who do not consider it rational to pursue the good

of all other persons. It may, perhaps, be said that these people have not understood or reflected upon the principle. It may be so; but, if experience is to count in this question at all, it seems improbable. And we are not left to the limited field of our own personal acquaintance. If men are to be supposed to attach any meaning to words which they deliberately write and publish in serious books, it is certain that Nietzsche, in the final phase of his development, both understood the meaning of the principle of Benevolence and rejected it.

But further, even if there were good reason for supposing that the principle of Benevolence is self-evident, it would remain sterile as a practical maxim unless we were allowed to make another assumption. If we agree that it is rational to promote the good of all other persons, we shall not be able to begin to act upon this principle unless we can assume that we have some knowledge of their good. We must have some means of transcending ethical atomism. It is certainly a question which deserves attention: on what ground do I assume that the judgments of value which I myself make are valid for those others whose good I am told I ought to promote? It may probably be said that this again is a self-evident proposition; and again it may be doubted whether its self-evidence consists in anything more than that we should feel it to be unfortunate if it were untrue. We are compelled to conclude then that the principle of Rational Benevolence is not self-evident, since it is rejected by many who understand its meaning: and also that to become anything more than an abstract proposition, to become fruitful, it needs the help of another principle which seems equally devoid of any title to be called self-evident.

Yet we cannot be content with this conclusion. We have agreed that some principle such as that of Rational Benevolence is, for us, an essential element in the content of the moral consciousness. Without it we should feel that morality, as we understand it, had hardly begun, its august counsels would have

shrunk to a banal collection of prudential maxims, based upon empirical evidence. But if the life which we call good is based upon a principle which is a mere dogma neither self-evident nor capable of other support, it would surely be a remarkable abuse of language to call such a life rational, and a remarkable example of the divorce of theoretical conclusions from practical action if it should continue to be lived. If, however, we continue to affirm, as I suppose we do, both that the good life includes Benevolence and that it is rational we must do so on some metaphysical ground, it must be because, implicitly or explicitly, we hold some view of the world on which the principle of Benevolence can be securely based.

It would be wearisome and unnecessary to recapitulate once more the various possible theories and to examine them with this special intention. It must be sufficiently obvious that, to say no more, a theistic type of metaphysics is in a more favourable position than any other for dealing with this problem. It must hold that all persons are of the same nature, since they proceed from a common spiritual source. It must hold that their judgments about the good are not merely personal, since it believes in a pervading immanent Spirit whose activity is most clearly manifested in our moral ideals. It must hold that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the good of one individual and the good of others, since it believes that all spiritual beings move to an inclusive end towards which they are drawn but not compelled. I do not say that theism leaves no problem in connexion with the relation between self-interest and Benevolence, in particular I do not assert that it will do anything to reduce the number of cases of practical perplexity which form the subject-matter of casuistry. But we may say that it removes the chief theoretical difficulty. If theism is true, I am justified in believing that, if I rightly judge my own good and pursue it, I am thereby pursuing the good of all other persons, and, conversely, if I rightly judge the good of others and pursue it, I am thereby pursuing my own good.

It will now be instructive to turn our attention to another principle which has become deeply interwoven in the moral consciousness of Christendom—the principle of rational progress. This is, of course, strictly, a special form of the principle of Benevolence and raises the same problems. If it is somewhat difficult to say why it is rational for me to promote the good of others who are contemporary with myself, it is at least equally difficult to say why I should think it rational to promote the good of generations which I can never hope to see. But there are some special problems in connexion with the idea of progress to which I wish to direct attention.

A great part of the activity which we should call distinctively moral is governed by the ideal of progress. But in devoting ourselves to this aim we assume that we have some idea of what is meant by progress. Few people would seriously argue that change as such and for its own sake is a worthy object of endeavour. We do take for granted that one state of society is better than another and that some criterion of progress is available.

Now, this criterion can only be expressed in the form of a social end; it implies the conception of a common good. Particular states of social development must be judged in relation to this end. Perhaps, this way of putting it is open to the objection that we may judge that one social state is better than another without having any definite conception of a perfect society. It must be admitted that we may have correct judgments of value on social matters without any definite concept of an ultimate social good, and also that the construction of utopias is sometimes the enemy of real progress. But this is not the point. The essential fact is that, when we reflect upon the idea of progress, and on the criterion of progress which we employ, we are led to form an idea, if only as a limiting concept, of a social state beyond which progress is impossible. That we should be able to present this to our minds, in any precise detail, is, of course, impossible; but it is

equally impossible that we should have no idea of it at all, for if we take for granted, as we must, that we have valid tests for progress, we must assume that, whatever else it may be, the ultimate social end will be one in which these tests are completely satisfied.

It follows that there can be no difficulty in describing in outline the ultimate social good. Essentially, it must consist in perfected intercourse. Negatively, it requires us to conceive the removal of all those impediments to harmonious and creative fellowship which seem to be inherent in the present order; and also the abolition of those restrictions and defeats which, in human intercourse, are imposed by one person on another. Positively, it involves the thought of an intercourse through and in which all who participate in it enjoy the full, free, and unimpeded exercise of their natures. The highest and purest love between two persons, in which neither is absorbed or dominated, but which evokes continually in each the highest and noblest thoughts and actions, is a faint adumbration of the nature of that intercourse which would be the fundamental characteristic of the ultimate social end. But however completely this ideal of intercourse had been attained, we should not judge that the end had been achieved unless it included all persons. So long as some persons remained outside the community or imperfectly incorporated within it, progress would remain possible. We must add, therefore, to our description of the social end that it will be inclusive.

We must now raise the question, is this social end attainable, and, if so, on what conditions? In order to bring the discussion within reasonable limits I must venture to rule out in a somewhat dogmatic manner any view which would find the realization of the social end in the "absorption" or "transmutation" of persons in some Absolute Experience. I do so on the ground that we are in search of a "human" good, at least in the sense that in realizing

it we retain our characters as finite persons. An end in which intercourse is abolished is one which I think we neither desire nor have any ground for regarding as a possible criterion of progress. Admitting, then, that the social end cannot be non-social, we have still to ask whether that end is attainable. It seems clear enough that so long as we work merely with conceptions of idealized society and intercourse the end is beyond the possibility of achievement. I do not refer to the obvious inhibitions which are imposed by the conditions of the present order. The difficulty lies deeper. It is inherent in the nature of the end itself. Any conceivable order in which we retained our nature as finite persons would be one in which the end could not be realized. For the end requires perfected intercourse between all persons, and this is impossible so long as they remain finite and equally impossible if they become infinite. Undoubtedly, it is true that all persons are in some relation to all others, but they could not be in that conscious free and creative relation which we have found to be necessary, without losing their character as finite persons.

There is, however, one hypothesis on which the realization of the social end does not seem inconceivable. Theism holds that there is a great Focus and Centre of spirits, a Mind and Character wide and pure enough to engage the love of all persons, in loving whom we love all that is worthy of love in all finite beings. It holds that the end of the individual is not to be absorbed or abolished in Him but to attain a condition of will and affection in which God can be said to pervade the finite person. If this hypothesis were true, the realization of the social end would be possible, not indeed in the precise form which we were led to give it when we considered a purely human society, but still in its essential features. The theistic hypothesis allows us to conceive of the possibility of a perfected intercourse which is all-embracing, including all persons, and at the same time preserving and perfecting their individual being.

It may be objected that, even admitting that the realization of the ultimate social good implies a theistic view, what ground have we for supposing that that good is realizable? It must be admitted that the argument here depends in the last resort upon an act of faith or choice. The conclusion is no more than that if I affirm that the world is in the highest sense rational, I shall be compelled to adopt a theistic hypothesis. But this affirmation of the complete rationality of the world does not appear to be more dependent upon faith than the affirmation that it is rational in a more limited sense. The assumption that reality is throughout intelligible is one which we shall not lightly abandon, yet it must remain an assumption until the work of intelligence is complete; meanwhile it rests upon the two facts that we are intelligences, and that a certain limited degree of success has attended the effort to apply the categories of our intelligence to the infinite mass of experience. In the same way, I would urge, we should not lightly abandon the faith that reality is also rational, for that also rests upon two facts, that we are beings capable of forming ideals, and that the effort to realize those ideals has not wholly failed.

Finally, we must notice the obvious objection that we have not explained why a process should be necessary. Would not the world be more rational if there were no struggle, no painful progress, if the end were attained at a stroke? I do not hold that theism has any complete answer to this question, but in this it is not singular. No philosophy has succeeded in accounting for the world of "becoming" or in showing that change and progress are necessary consequences of its fundamental principles. Theism has some suggestions to offer which are too familiar to require restatement. It may be sufficient to remark that if we cannot agree that "to travel is better than to arrive" it is at least arguable that to travel and to arrive, enriched by the experiences of the journey, may be better than effortless possession, that in fact the travelling" may be a subordinate element in the good.

If we may now briefly sum up the results of this section we may say that we have found two principles to be deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of the most advanced societies, rational benevolence and progress. We have seen that there is little ground for regarding either principle as rational unless we adopt a theistic hypothesis, while, at the same time, we should be reluctant to describe them as irrational. Again, we argued that the complete realization of the ideal implied in social progress is only conceivable on the same hypothesis, but that, unless the social end can be achieved, it is impossible to regard the world as in the highest sense rational.

IV.

We have thus examined the phenomena of morality from three different standpoints, and in each case we have found ourselves led more or less directly to a theistic view. The discussion might be extended almost indefinitely, but perhaps this review is sufficient to indicate the culminative force of the argument. For any mind which is not prepared to omit the facts of the ethical life in its estimate of the universe it must have considerable weight, but to one who is inclined to give to these facts a predominant importance it will have almost overwhelming force.

If this survey pretended to completeness it would naturally be required to consider those objections which seem to rise from the existence of evil. I will content myself with saying that the problem of evil does not seem to me to be in any special manner an objection to theism, in fact, that, when rightly interpreted, it may be used as an argument in its favour. But this, if not precisely "another" story, is at least a long one, upon which at the conclusion of a paper it would be unfitting to enter.

XVII.—SPACE—TIME.

By S. ALEXANDER.

(Abstract.)

THE problem I propose to deal with is not what Space and Time are but how they are related to each other; and the inquiry is to be entirely empirical. That is to say, I put aside all questions as to how we are able to know them or whether they are real in themselves. I take them as empirical realities, with the characters they present to our experience, and I shall confine myself to physical or external Space and Time, without raising the thorny question of whether the mind is not also in Space and Time. In other words, I am dealing with contemplated Space and Time. For our experience they are the media in which bodies move and events occur, and are equivalent to Extension and Duration (that duration being itself continuity of succession). They are sometimes regarded as consisting of relations between bodies and events, Space as the order of co-existence, and Time as the order of succession. But this is a philosophical theory about them and does not represent our first-hand acquaintance with them. Further, I shall consider them apart from the bodies which occupy or the events which occur in them. This is not a process of vicious abstraction, but merely an empirical, or, if you like, simple-minded, way of considering in a material extended body its simpler features of extension or duration before its less simple features, such as its colour or even its materiality. I shall try to show that neither Space nor Time is a reality without the other, and that instead of the two empirical realities Space and Time there is but one reality, which is Space-Time. I shall indicate, in conclusion, the

kind of metaphysical theory which is suggested as the result of the inquiry.

In dealing with Space and Time empirically we are not, however, confined to what we learn of them through the senses, for the objects of experience are not exhausted by the objects of the senses. We are free to use conceptions like those of points and instants, which are not sensible objects but represent the ideal elements into which Space and Time can be resolved. Like experience of everything else, that of Space and Time includes ingredients derived from reflection. We are only concerned to handle Space and Time as we should any other objects of scientific examination.

Now, when we do so, we find that Space and Time imply each other mutually. Given the empirical characters with which they are invested in our experience of them, and in particular the feature of continuity, we can see that neither of them taken by itself can subsist without the other. For Time is essentially successive, and at the same time it is duration or continuous succession. But, if it were self-subsistent, each instant or other portion of Time would, in virtue of the very successiveness of Time, cease to be. There would be only a now and no past or future; each now would be created afresh. But since Time, in fact, is continuous, the instant is sustained by something other than Time. Look to experience, and you find this something, which gives sustainment and continuity to what would otherwise be a perishing succession, and it is Space. In like manner, if Space were self-subsistent, it would fail to be continuous, because it would admit no distinction of parts and would be a blank. It would contain no here or there such as it does contain in experience. Thus Space or Time, each for different reasons, needs the other in order to account for the properties which empirically each possesses. Time makes Space a continuum by securing its divisibility, and Space makes Time a continuum by securing the connection of its parts. Time is thus intrinsically spatial and

Space temporal. There are no points or instants, but only, in fact, point-instants, or pure events. Every point has its date, without which it would not be a point, and every instant its place, without which it would not be an instant. The real parts into which Space-Time is resolved are thus motions, for any motion through a space is the change of dates of the points in that space. The whole infinite Space-Time might be spoken of as Motion, were this manner of speech not so foreign to the usage of ordinary language.

This, then, is the essential point: that if you take either Time or Space and realise what is meant by their being duration or extension, you see that neither of them would be what it is except for the other, and that to separate them from each other as if either could exist separately is an abstraction. The abstraction is not made in practice, because the Time we speak of is taken with what it owes to Space, and *vice versa*. And it is perfectly legitimate to separate them for consideration, so long as we do not assume them to be actually independent.

Yet, the connection of them is more intimate than appears from this simple statement. In the first place, empirically, each point is repeated in time, that is, occurs at many times, and each instant is repeated in space, that is, occupies many places; many events are simultaneous, and the same thing or body lasts through many instants. (This empirical fact underlies the structure and permanence of things.) Now, it is not difficult to see that this repetition of instants in Space and places in Time is involved in the essential characters of extension and duration. The connection of Time and Space was incompletely stated above. For suppose that each instant occupied only one point, Space would not then sustain Time and save it from being a series of perishing instants. The instant would "infect" the point with its own perishing character. The point would not be independent of its instant in respect of successive-ness and would not sustain its instant. But since the points of an instant recur, Time can linger. Similarly Time would be

infected with the distinctive character of Space, its bare extensiveness, and would cease to be succession, would be only a blank duration. In order that Space should contain parts, the point must occur at more than one instant. Or, to speak more strictly, and avoid the use of the word "must," the occurrence of a place at more than one instant does, in fact, secure for Space its being more than a blank.

In the next place, Space is three-dimensional and Time is one-dimensional. But besides being a one-dimensional succession, Time possesses two other empirical properties: it is irreversible (an instant which is before another is not after it), and it is transitive or has "betweenness" (if *A* is before *B* and *B* is before *C*, *A* is before *C*, or, in other words, every instant is between two other instants). Now, it may be shown, I believe, that these three features of Time, its successiveness, its irreversibility and its betweenness, correspond to the three dimensions of Space. I do not, of course, mean that we can demonstrate that Space must have three dimensions. It is an empirical fact that Space has them. I mean that the three dimensions of Space secure for Time the empirical characters named, and that they in turn secure the three dimensions of Space; or, to put it shortly, Space has three dimensions if Time is to be a transitive irreversible succession. I will give only one instance from this rather intricate matter, by way of illustration. Begin with the fact of irreversible, that is, determinate, order in time. A one-dimensional Space would not secure it. Let *Aa* and *Bb* be two point-instants (the capitals designate instants and the small letters points). The places *a* and *b* suffice to distinguish the instants *A* and *B*, but not to determine whether *A* is before or after *B*. For the instant *A* is repeated in Space, say, at *c*; and if there were only one dimension in Space, and we take the line *ab*, as we may, to represent the Time dimension as well, there would be nothing to distinguish *a* from *c*, which has the same time *A* as *a*. But *c* might be on the other side of *b* from *a*, and thus *A* might be

either before or after B. Hence, if time order is irreversible, the instant A cannot be repeated in the one-dimensional line ab . For it is clear that A cannot be repeated at two points a and y on the same side of b , since in that case these points would both be before b at different dates and not at the same date. With a second dimension of Space A can, however, be repeated outside the line ab ; and thus, though repeated, retain its beforeness to B, and the possible contradiction is removed. The point a is before b so far as one dimension is concerned, and the point x before b so far as the other dimension is concerned. The second dimension is accordingly not only necessary for irreversible order in Time but is sufficient.

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} & A & & A & & B & & A \\ \text{---} & \frac{}{y} & \text{---} & \frac{}{a} & \text{---} & \frac{}{b} & \text{---} & \frac{}{x} \end{array}$$

It would follow if the considerations are correct, of which the above are a sample, that the time co-ordinate of a point is not, in the metaphysical sense or in reality, a fourth co-ordinate to the three spatial ones, as it may rightly be treated as being for mathematical purposes, but, though one-dimensional, Time has characters which correspond to and in a manner cover the three dimensions of Space. It will have been observed, indeed, that this inquiry is non-mathematical, and purely metaphysical. The question of how mathematical treatment is related to metaphysical treatment has not been raised.

Thus, Space must be regarded as generated in Time, or, if the expression be preferred, *by* Time, since Time is the source of movement. It may be imaged as the trail of Time, so long as it is remembered that there could be no Time without a Space in which its trail is left. We cannot, without ineptitude, say that Time is the trail of Space, but only that Time, as it moves from past through present to future, is the occupation of a stretch of Space. Accordingly, the common habit of representing Time spatially is not, as has been supposed, a

weakness of our imagination, but expresses the intrinsic character of Time. Further, if we take the world of things in its simplest features, which are spatial and temporal, the world is seen to be historical through and through. But its history is not to be thought of as one in which fresh spaces are generated or swept out by Time, but as a perpetual redistribution of motion, or, in exacter phrase, a perpetual redistribution of instants of time among the points of Space within the one infinite Space-Time. The world grows, not by addition, but by internal distribution, comparable in a figure to the movements in a disturbed ant-heap.

If we are to do justice to the historical character of the world, we must draw a distinction of importance between *perspectives* and *sections*, as I shall call them, of Space-Time. In our ordinary conceptions, not only do we think of Space and Time as independent of each other, but we think that at any moment there is a whole of Space which is filled with events occurring at that instant, or that the whole of Time streams through every point of Space. In technical phrase Space is the assemblage of events occurring at any one instant, and Time the assemblage of events occurring at any one place. Now, these conceptions are perfectly legitimate, as I shall indicate presently, but they are highly artificial. They represent sections of Space-Time through any instant or point. But Space-Time as a whole is not resolvable into such sections, and in its historical character is not composed of them. The world of Space-Time (that is of physical things considered in their spatio-temporal character) is not in reality generated through a synthesis of such sections. A succession of Spaces filled entirely with contemporaneous events would have no continuity. It would be (equally with mere points) a series of perishing nows, and the world so conceived would need to be recreated at each instant, as Descartes, rightly from his point of view, held. The reason is that the points of Space are taken as purely spatial and not as point-instants. Space-Time is, however, a system of

point-instants, that is of lines of motion connecting points or instants. If we are to know into what elements or phases Space-Time as a historical reality can be resolved we must consider the perspective of it from any *point-instant*. I mean by a perspective of Space-Time the state of the whole Space-Time in reference to any point-instant, exhibiting the lines of advance which directly or indirectly pass through that point-instant, just as the perspectives of a solid object are selected from the whole object by reference to the point from which the perspective is taken. Now, a perspective of Space-Time from a point-instant does not give us a Space in which all the points are simultaneous, but one in which they have different dates; nor a Time in which all the instants are in the same place, but one in which they have different places. In such a perspective taken with reference to the time of a point-instant, some of the points are contemporaneous with the point of reference: these are the points in which the instant of the point of reference is intrinsically repeated. Yet, all the rest is of different dates, earlier or later. Perhaps, the distinction of perspectives and sections may be clearer from a simple illustration. When a tree is sawn across, the surface is for the carpenter a simultaneous one: but for the botanist the concentric rings have different dates in the history of the tree. Similarly, a time perspective of Space-Time gives us the whole of Space filled with events of different dates, and a space perspective gives us the whole of Time filled with events at different places. Now, of these perspectives the whole Space-Time is a synthesis, just as a physical object is the synthesis of all the perspectives which it presents to the observer. And I do not mean that Space-Time is artificially synthesised by us from these perspectives or artificially resolvable into them, any more than the physical object is synthesised by the observer out of its perspectives. The perspectives are all connected together or grow out of one another in Space-Time itself, and they really exist in it.

On the other hand, the *sections* of Space-Time are artificially

obtained by selecting from the total of point-instants those points which have the same instant or those instants which have the same point. But the selection is made without reference to the lines of movement which connect places with one another or instants with one another. Thus, a section does not represent the real constitution of the world of Space-Time at any one instant or place, because the connections are disregarded. At the same time, these sections are legitimate conceptions. They give us the notion of the whole of Space as a framework in which events occur, or of the whole of Time as a framework occupied with events. The space of the sawn surface of the tree is the same whether considered as filled with contemporaneous points as by the carpenter or in its history as by the botanist. Sections are the representations of Space and Time taken by themselves. They are the familiar conceptions of Absolute (or as I prefer to say Total) Space and Time. They are only illegitimate if Space is thought to exclude Time or Time Space—if, for instance, Space is thought to be stationary or composed of resting places. As the framework of spatio-temporal events, they have their sufficient justification. If they are taken to be the elements of Space-Time with merely provisional omission of the other element, they are not only intelligible but in their character of framework real.

I shall do no more than indicate barely the metaphysical hypothesis which is founded on this descriptive analysis of Space-Time. The hypothesis is that Space and Time may not merely be considered apart from the bodies or events which occupy or occur in them, but that they really exist apart or are realities simpler than these bodies or events. The hypothesis is, then, that Space-Time is the stuff out of which all existents are made. Existents are complexes of Space-Time, that is, of motion; they are, as it were, crystals within this matrix, or eddies within this vast whirlpool. As Time goes on, higher and higher complexes of the spatio-temporal stuff emerge with qualities, the scale of such qualities, *e.g.*, materiality, colour,

life, mind, whether it begins with materiality or at a simpler stage, being itself unending. Upon this hypothesis the relation of Time to Space, which has been described above on its merits, may be described so as to bring Space-Time into comparison with the things it develops by representing Time as the mind of Space, or, to be more accurate, by representing mind as the time of its neural equivalent. But I content myself with this bare indication, in order not to divert discussion from the immediate topic.



XVIII.—SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

By J. S. HALDANE, D'ARCY W. THOMPSON, P. CHALMERS
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1.—*By* J. S. HALDANE.

THE subject of this discussion, as I understand it, is whether the general conceptions or "categories" ordinarily used in interpreting physical, biological and psychological phenomena are essentially different and irreconcilable with one another. In approaching this question, I think we must carefully distinguish between the conceptions, or, as I should prefer to say, working hypotheses, which we commonly use in interpreting reality, and that reality itself. The discussion applies to our working hypotheses or categories; and I propose to maintain that our ordinary working conceptions of what we regard as physical, biological and psychological phenomena are not only different, but irreducible to one another.

I will deal first with the difference between physical and biological interpretations of experience. The theory which aims at interpreting the phenomena of life as nothing but physical and chemical phenomena, accompanied, it may be, by consciousness, is generally known as the mechanistic theory of life. The theory which, on the contrary, interprets biological phenomena in terms of a special conception based on the observation of life itself may be called the biological theory.

Of these opposing theories each seeks to interpret the same facts in its own way, and the one way is completely different from the other. But there is also an intermediate theory—that known as vitalism. The vitalists accept as true, so far as it

goes, the physical and chemical interpretation of the phenomena connected with living organisms, but maintain that in living organisms we must in addition assume the existence of something quite distinct which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions. This something has been called "vital force," "the vital principle," or, to use Driesch's expression, "entelechy." So long as the vitalists confine themselves to merely pointing out the deficiencies of the purely mechanistic theory, the evidence which they bring forward is so strong that it seems to me to be unanswerable. When, however, they try to define vitalism on its positive side the result is quite indefinite. The something which was supposed to interfere from without in the physical and chemical reactions can always be shown by experiment to be dependent on what were admitted to be physical and chemical conditions, though there is no explanation of how these conditions bring about the actual results. Vitalism thus represents no clearly definable working hypothesis, and for this reason I do not propose to consider it further. The same considerations apply to the corresponding animistic theory in psychology.

I shall now try to present shortly the mechanistic argument and what seem to me its fatally weak points. The conception of a living organism as a mechanism is in some respects quite natural and very useful. We can, for instance, understand up to a certain point the movements of the limbs if we regard the bones as levers acted on by the contractions of the muscles. It is equally natural to seek for corresponding mechanical explanations of the contraction of muscle; and though definite progress in this direction has hitherto been limited I feel confident that we are on the eve of such progress. When we turn to any other form of bodily activity we find similarly that physical and chemical explanations will carry us a long step forwards. Thus, the chemistry of the blood enables us to see exactly how oxygen is carried from the lungs to the tissues, and carbon dioxide is carried from the tissues to the lungs; the

chemistry of the digestive secretions enables us to understand the chemical changes in digestion ; and the structure of the eye and the laws of optics show us how an image is formed on the retina. At first sight, therefore, it seems justifiable to assume that, if our knowledge of the chemistry and physics of the living body were sufficiently complete, we could explain completely all the phenomena occurring in living organisms.

It used often to be stated confidently that the development of physiology shows a continuous advance towards a mechanical explanation of life ; and this statement is at present widely accepted. It is certainly true that physical and chemical explanations are being profitably applied to more and more of the phenomena associated with life. It is, however, equally true that more and more of these phenomena are being found to be quite insusceptible of the simple mechanical explanations which were formerly given of them. Fifty years ago many physiological processes which, from a physical and chemical standpoint, are now seen to be extremely complex and obscure, were regarded as quite simple. I need only refer to such activities as the oxidative processes in living tissues, the processes of secretion and absorption, or reflex action. There is a prevalent idea that the progress of chemistry, and particularly of physical chemistry, has helped towards an explanation of these processes. This is most certainly not the case. What physical chemistry has helped us to do is to obtain measures of the processes in the living body ; but the results of the measurements have been to show with ever-increasing clearness that the processes in the living body do not correspond with our conceptions of those in non-living structures, and that we are not remotely in sight of mechanical explanations of the former.

As an example, I need only take the case of the exquisitely thin and delicate living membrane which separates the blood in the lung capillaries from the air in the alveoli or air-cells of the lungs. A short time ago it was assumed that this membrane

plays only the passive part which we regard a non-living membrane as playing, and allows oxygen to diffuse through just as a non-living membrane would. On applying accurate methods of measurement we found that, whenever there is need for an extra supply of oxygen, as, for instance, during muscular exertion, the membrane assumes an active rôle and pushes oxygen inwards, without regard to the mechanical laws of diffusion. In this respect the alveolar epithelium acts just like epithelium of the swim-bladder, or that of the kidney or any other gland, or the alimentary canal. The progress of physical chemistry is enabling us to distinguish sharply between physiological activity and the processes occurring in non-living structures; and the establishment of the distinction is sweeping away the easy-going mechanistic explanations which became current during the latter half of last century.

On the whole, there is no evidence of real progress towards a mechanistic explanation of life; and those physiologists who still believe that the mechanistic line of attack is the right one are compelled to justify their belief on general philosophical grounds. We ought, they say, to advance from the simple to the complex; from the sure and familiar ground of physics and chemistry to the unknown ground of biology. Practically speaking, they argue that life *must* be a mechanical process, although at present we cannot understand the mechanism.

Now, I wish to go straight to the point, and explain why, as it seems to me, life cannot be regarded as a mechanical process. A living organism differs in this respect from any mechanism which we can construct or conceive, that it forms itself and keeps itself in working order and activity. Bearing this in mind, let us look again at the various apparent mechanisms previously referred to. The bones and muscles involved in limb-movements have not only developed into the particular arrangement which renders them efficient, but from hour to hour and day to day nutritive activities are occurring in them which keep this arrangement intact. More-

over, the actual movements are, apart altogether from conscious interference, guided and controlled at every point. These are facts which the mechanical explanation does not account for.

When we look closely into the changes occurring in a muscle doing muscular work we see that reproduction of the muscular substance is an integral part of these changes. The wonderfully beautiful balance of chemical composition which enables the blood to perform correctly its work in carrying oxygen and carbon dioxide depends no less evidently on constant and minute regulation. The formation and liberation of the digestive ferments is likewise minutely regulated; and the same is true of the exact form and optical properties of the refractive structures of the eye. Moreover, the whole of these wonderfully delicately balanced mechanisms have originally developed from a single cell containing no trace of the future structures.

It is thus evident that, although we find within the living body many phenomena which, so long as we do not look closely, can be interpreted satisfactorily as physical and chemical mechanism, there are side by side other phenomena for which the possibility of such interpretation seems to be absent. The mechanists assume that the bodily mechanisms are so constructed as to maintain, repair, and reproduce themselves. In the long process of natural selection, mechanisms of this sort have, they suggest, been evolved gradually.

Let us examine this hypothesis. When we state an event in mechanical terms we state it as a necessary result of certain simple properties of separate parts which interact in the event. Thus, it is through the interaction of rigid bones of a certain configuration with contractile muscles attached to them at certain points that we explain the movements of a limb. Similarly, it is in terms of the interaction of oxygen molecules with the molecules of hæmoglobin

and other substances in blood that we explain the taking up of oxygen by venous blood. The essence of the explanation or re-statement of the event is that after due investigation we have assumed that the parts interacting in the event have certain simple and definite properties, so that they always react in the same way under the same conditions. For a mechanical explanation the reacting parts must first be given. Unless an arrangement of parts with definite properties is given it is meaningless to speak of mechanical explanation.

To postulate the existence of a self-producing or self-maintaining mechanism is, thus, to postulate something to which no meaning can be attached. Meaningless terms are sometimes used by physiologists; but there is none so absolutely meaningless as the expression "mechanism of reproduction." Any mechanism there may be in the parent organism is absent in the process of reproduction, and must reconstitute itself at each generation, since the parent organism is reproduced from a mere tiny speck of its own body. There can be no "mechanism" of reproduction. The idea of a mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure is self-contradictory. A mechanism which reproduced itself would be a mechanism without parts, and, therefore, not a mechanism.

Let us try to get nearer to what the self-reproduction and self-maintenance of an organism implies. Perhaps, the clearest analogy in the inorganic world to the reproduction of an organism is the reproduction of a crystal. By increasing the external pressure, or adding heat, we can cause a crystal of ice to waste away by melting. If, however, we remove the pressure, or the heat, the crystal re-forms and grows to its former size. We can also, with proper precautions, cool water to below the freezing-point without any ice forming. But if to the supercooled water we add the smallest crystal of ice it rapidly grows into a larger crystal, just as the germ of an organism grows. The molecules of water possess the property

of attracting one another in such a way as to produce mutual orientation or arrangement, in which they take up more space than when they were present as a mere mobile crowd in the liquid state; and in the starting of the process of orientation some initial hindrance has to be overcome, so that crystallisation occurs far more readily if it is given a start. We must assume that each molecule possesses the property of so attracting each other molecule as to produce the mutual orientation if there is no hindrance from pressure or from the molecular agitation due to heat, or from other causes. An organism maintains itself through a balance between constant loss and gain, whereas the crystal of water seems at first sight not to change except by growth or melting away. When we look closer, however, we find that the crystal has a vapour pressure. It is, therefore, constantly giving off, and must be equally constantly taking up, water-molecules from its environment. Hence, in this respect also, it resembles an organism.

Where the resemblance fails is that the arrangement of the molecules in the crystal is mere repetition, whereas in the organism there is individual variety of detail, and yet perfectly definite and specific unity of plan. For the formation of the crystal it is necessary that each molecule of water should have the property of tending to orientate itself to any other in a certain definite manner. Mere central forces of attraction do not explain the formation of a crystal from molecules or of a molecule from atoms. Similarly, in the development of an organism we seem bound to assume that the germ has the property of tending to orientate towards itself certain surrounding molecules in the specific arrangement of the fully developed organism, and that these surrounding molecules have corresponding properties.

It may be pointed out that this is no explanation. Nor is it meant to be an explanation. It is a mere general statement of what appear to be the facts of observation. In mechanical

physics we have become accustomed to think of molecules or atoms as quite simple things with easily definable properties, such as mass, extension, and central forces of attraction. For biology, the properties which must be assumed in a unit of living structure are enormously more complex, and are only capable at present of statement in general terms. It is solely from previous actual observation that we can predict how the living structure will behave, and we can only do so if the environment is about the same as in the previous observation.

Practically, therefore, we must look upon organism and environment as one interconnected whole, in which, as a matter of empirical fact, the organism tends to maintain itself, just as a crystal in its mother-liquor does, or a molecule in the solution in which it has formed. From no elementary mechanical principles can we deduce the behaviour of even the molecule of water in crystallisation; and similarly, from no elementary physical or chemical principles can we deduce the behaviour of the organism. It is owing to this empirical fact that the ordinary working hypotheses of physics and chemistry are irreconcilable with those of biology.

The tacit assumption is often made that in mechanical physics we reach a definition of the ultimate reality of which the visible world consists. For many practical purposes this definition, it is true, suffices. But even in connection with heat, light, and electricity, the definition is insufficient. In chemistry it breaks down still more, and in biology the breakdown is complete. Like pure mathematics, mechanical physics is only an abstract science. We can use it for certain practical purposes, but it tells us only a very little about reality, and in only a very imperfect form.

Let me illustrate my meaning by reference to the kinetic theory of gases—a subject which has been specially engaging me lately. For the kinetic theory of gases, a gas is an assembly of molecules kept in motion by heat, with the necessary consequence that each molecule, whatever its mass may be, possesses

on an average the same amount of kinetic energy. Hence, an equal number of gas molecules will always produce the same bombardment pressure at the same temperature, and from this pressure we obtain an absolute scale of temperature. In this way we can predict from the theory the three well-known "gas-laws," called, after their discoverers, Boyle's, Charles's and Avogadro's laws. These laws are embodied in the equation $PV = RT$, where P = pressure, V = volume, T = absolute temperature, and R is a constant for each gas, but varies for different gases in inverse proportion to their molecular weights.

Now, it is evident that this equation can only hold good if molecules are regarded as points with mass, but without extension. Some mathematical physicists have clung tenaciously to this idea and to the equation. There we must leave them, because we are not dealing with mathematical figments, but with reality in so far as it is revealed to us in experience. As a matter of fact, the equation $PV = RT$ has only the appearance of holding within certain limits of temperature and pressure. If the temperature falls or the pressure increases sufficiently, the value of PV becomes, or may become, greater than RT , because the volume of the molecules themselves begins to count. Hence, if we call c the volume occupied by the molecules, we must alter the equation to $P(V - c) = RT$.

If the molecules were simply indifferent to one another, so that they merely repelled one another on contact, we should now have an equation expressing the behaviour of a gaseous substance. But, as a matter of fact, even the amended equation does not express the behaviour of actual gases, for, with sufficient cooling, gases condense to liquids. The molecules attract one another, and with progressive cooling their kinetic energy is so much reduced that on an average a constantly increasing proportion of them remain within their mutual spheres of attraction, like the planets in the solar system, and hence exercise no external pressure. We must, therefore, alter the significance of P , so that it means, not external, but

intermolecular pressure. We can, then, as I have recently endeavoured to show, extend the gas-laws to liquids, and by means of them predict with great accuracy a very large number of facts.

There remain other facts, however, which we cannot predict, for with sufficient further fall of temperature a liquefied gas crystallises. It doing so it may, like water or molten iron, increase in bulk. Now, the simple assumptions on which the kinetic theory of gases and liquids is based are insufficient to explain the phenomena of crystallisation, with the accompanying abrupt change of volume and of other properties. We must, therefore, assume, not merely that the molecules attract one another in the directions joining their centres, after the manner of gravitation, but that they tend to assume a definite position, pole to pole, in relation to one another, and actually assume this position as soon as their mutual movements, due to heat, are insufficient to prevent them from doing so. The liquid thus crystallises at a perfectly definite temperature, unless its enormous intermolecular pressure is sensibly increased by added external pressure.

This shows us that when we look closely at actual molecules we are forced to the conclusion that the tendency to take specific form or arrangement is always present in molecules, and, therefore, in what we call matter. We cannot sum up the properties of molecules in the conceptions of mass, extension, and central forces proportional to mass, in accordance with the fundamental physical conceptions of Newton. The actual properties of molecules can only be expressed in terms of their potential orientations to various other kinds of molecules; and, when we pass beyond the comparatively simple empirical facts relating to crystallisation, when we consider also the limitless empirical facts of chemistry, we can see that the physical conceptions of extension and central forces connecting masses are nothing but imperfect representations of reality, however useful these imperfect representations may be within

certain limits. The reality is far more than these conceptions can express.

From yet another point of view the abstract mechanical conception of a molecule is unreal. We now possess abundant evidence that molecules, just like crystals or other gross molecular aggregates, are in a state of constant decomposition and recombination. So far may this process go in very dilute solutions of what are distinguished as electrolytes, that for all practical purposes their molecules hardly exist as such, and only the dissociated fragments are present. Thus, a very dilute solution of sodium chloride or hydrochloric acid contains, practically speaking, only the ions formed by the dissolution of the molecules of sodium chloride or hydrochloric acid. I need, perhaps, hardly refer in detail to the very great significance of the conception of ionisation first introduced by Faraday, and the manner in which this conception has developed until it has transformed the whole outlook of both chemistry and physics. It is now evident that not merely gross aggregates, but also molecules and atoms, are in a state of constant decomposition, recombination, and internal action. Their mass and extension appear to be nothing but an expression of this action; and, if so, the distinction between matter and energy, or between structure and its activity, becomes only an imperfect representation of the actual world.

There are, thus, no real grounds for the contention that life must, in ultimate analysis, be capable of interpretation as a mechanical process. We must base our working conception of life on actual observation of living organisms, and certainly not on mechanical conceptions. Even from the purely physical standpoint, these are no longer adequate, but only provisional working hypotheses, useful for certain limited practical purposes, like the gas laws in either their original or amended form.

Empirical observations with regard to the behaviour of living organisms point clearly to the conclusion that in each detail of organic structure, composition, environment, and

activity there is a manifestation or expression of the life of the organism regarded as a whole which tends to persist. It is this manifestation which distinguishes biological phenomena; and, through all the temporary variations of structure, activity, composition and environment, it can be traced more and more clearly with every year of advance in biological investigation. We can trace it through the ordinary metabolic phenomena in living organisms, as well as through the phenomena of senescence, death, and reproduction. As it seems to me, it is only through the central working hypothesis or category of life that we can bring unity and intelligibility into the group of phenomena with which biology deals; and it is because the biological working hypothesis is for the present absent in our ordinary conceptions of physical and chemical phenomena that we must treat physical and biological categories as radically different. The popular and completely natural distinction between the living and non-living is thus wholly justified on the ground that biological observations cannot be expressed or described in terms of ordinary physical working hypotheses. For a more detailed discussion of this position in the light of the empirical facts of physiology I may, perhaps, refer to my recent book, *Organism and Environment*.

I must now pass to the question whether biological and psychological categories must also be treated as different. To this question it seems to me that there are still clearer reasons for returning an affirmative answer.

When we examine the organic wholeness and persistency which shows itself in the life of an organism we see at once that life is limited on all sides by what we can only interpret as physical and chemical conditions. If the oxygen percentage in the air breathed falls low enough, or the external temperature rises or falls sufficiently, life no longer dominates the phenomena. In every direction we see similar limitations. A plant may be regarded as the type of what appears to be

a mere organism. It is very sensitive to changes in its environment, and is helpless against numerous accidental changes, though human foresight can often quite easily guard it. A conscious organism is distinguished by the manner in which it overcomes these hindrances. It is aware of, and avoids, neutralises, or even takes advantage of them. It adapts its behaviour in such a manner as to maintain itself in the presence of what is outside the mere organic unity of its life. But in so doing the organism shows itself to be more than a mere organism; it includes within the unity of its life what seemed to be independent. In other words, the biological interpretation of the phenomena of organisms is only a partial interpretation, just as the physical interpretation is a still more partial interpretation.

The reaction between a conscious organism and its environment is wholly different from the immediacy of what we interpret as physical or physiological reaction. In physical or physiological reaction one object reacts directly with another in space, but only in space; the reaction is immediate or "blind." Into conscious reaction, both the actual past and the potential future enter also. Conscious reaction determines future reactions directly, and also directly modifies what, apart from consciousness, would have been the effects of past reactions. A psychological object has thus a dynamic influence on other objects surrounding it, not merely in space, but also in time. It has thus an element of timelessness, inasmuch as it directly modifies the influence of not only present, but also future and past objects. It represents action at a distance, not only in space, but also in time.

The physical world which we seem to see so plainly around us is reality as it appears in our consciousness. It is a reality of objects of consciousness, the constant presence of which guides all our conscious actions. What guides us is our *knowledge* of objects. This knowledge is there and constantly active, though the objects as physical or biological objects are

out of sight or contact, so that their immediate influence is entirely absent.

It has already been pointed out that the world of mathematical physics is a very imperfect presentation of reality, and that in the biological world much more of reality is presented. In the world of psychology still more of reality comes before us. The real world is not merely a physical or biological world, but also a *known* world. In identifying it as a known world we are making use of an additional category or working hypothesis. What makes this necessary is simply the nature of the empirical facts. A world which is not a known world means as little to us as a world in which the equation $PV = RT$ holds good absolutely, or a world of atoms indifferent to one another. Such worlds are mere figments of our imagination, though the figments are often useful for certain limited purposes. In judging of the nature of reality we have no right to exclude the facts which emerge in either biological or psychological observation. It would be just as reasonable to exclude from physics or chemistry all the facts relating to ionisation. Conscious activity is a part of our objective universe, and must be taken account of in our judgments of reality.

Consciousness has been looked upon as a mere accompaniment of physical and chemical changes in nerve-cells. As has been already pointed out, the active changes within the living body cannot be interpreted as mere physical and chemical changes.

An alternative view is that conscious activity is a subjective accompaniment of what we interpret as vital activity. To me it seems clear that this view is not possible. Vital activity is "blind." This means that the organic unity which we can always identify in vital or biological activity is immediate in character. An unconscious organism adapts itself to new conditions, but only through a process which appears to be essentially as blind as the action of gravitation. In the process

of reproduction the germ might seem as if it were realising a conscious plan of the fully developed organism. Embryological investigation indicates, however, that each step in development is the immediate outcome of the conditions existing at the moment. If these conditions are abnormal the development will also be abnormal, so that all sorts of monstrosities are possible. It is true that for a mere organism the past lives on in the present, and there is a sense in which we can speak of organic memory. But we might equally describe this organic persistency as of the same nature as inertia. It does not present the character of conscious memory.

In perception and conscious reaction to it we are in contact with phenomena which we cannot interpret in terms of either physical or biological conceptions. An object which has been perceived is present to, and directly influences, both future and past objects of perception, so that their influence on conscious action is altered. When Faraday pointed out the existence of ions in solutions he made a discovery which has gradually exercised a more and more wide-spread influence on scientific and practical activity, and has at the same time given a new significance to previous discoveries. In every new act of perception, however unimportant, there is a similar influence on the reactions to future, present and past perceptions. To what we regard as mere organism the past is simply a dead weight on the present, and the present on the future, just as in the case of what we regard as mere physical existence.

It has been assumed widely that, while we can directly perceive physical or biological phenomena, we cannot perceive psychological phenomena directly, since they have no "objective" existence, and are only subjective accompaniments hidden behind, and possibly determining, objective physical and physiological changes. This assumption is baseless. The objective behaviour of a conscious organism or person is quite distinct from that of an unconscious organism, although at the lowest stages of consciousness the distinction may be so

faintly marked that we are left in doubt, just as at the lowest stages of life we can hardly distinguish the living from the non-living. When we perceive a person it is most certainly a person, and not a mere organism, that we perceive. It is only by a process of abstraction from the full objective reality that we can regard him as a mere organism. The doctor or physiologist is constantly performing with great pains this act of abstraction, and the engineer or economist performs a still more violent act of abstraction when he regards the man as a motor or working unit, or as a weight to be carried. By a similar effort we can abstract from the objective reality of what is beautiful.

It is, of course, only by interpretation of our experience that we perceive psychological phenomena. But exactly the same is true of biological and physical phenomena. The physical realities which seem to lie so clear and solid in front of us are only bundles of interpretations in the light of previous and co-existing and anticipated experiences, all determining the existing experience. Even if, following Hume, we seek to disentangle the sensations forming the crude basis of these interpretations, we are no better off. The simplest sensation carries interpretation with it, as Kant showed. The "objective" world is nothing but the world as interpreted in knowledge, and the physical or biological worlds are only abstractions from this objective world. Not only when we are observing psychological phenomena in other persons, but when we are studying natural phenomena of all kinds, is our world a psychological or spiritual world. Perhaps, we realise this best when the progress of experimental science leads to a reconsideration of fundamental physical interpretations which, like those of mass, energy, or unchangeable atoms, have been employed without question for long periods. We have to go back to what was in the minds of those who established these interpretations.

I will now try to summarise the argument of this paper.

When we make use of physical categories, we are employing simplified maxims or principles which, on account of their simplicity, are very convenient for purposes of prediction, but which can only be used over a limited extent of our experience without gross error. When we attempt to apply them to biological or psychological phenomena, the error becomes apparent; we cannot express biological or psychological experience in terms of physical conceptions. In other words, we cannot reduce biological and psychological to physical categories.

Similarly, in biology we are also employing relatively simplified maxims which enable us to predict another large class of phenomena, but which cannot be applied to what we distinguish as psychological phenomena without gross error. Hence we cannot reduce psychological to biological categories.

We may ask why, in interpreting the physical world, we make use of schematised conceptions which biological and even physical and chemical observations prove to be untenable. The reality behind atoms and molecules, for instance, is evidently far more than the schematised atoms and molecules of ordinary physics and chemistry. The answer is that for a large number of purposes the schematised conceptions are practically sufficient, and give us a short cut without which we should be helpless in practical affairs, since we have not the data for framing more adequate conceptions correctly. For biological phenomena the schematised physical conceptions are insufficient practically and we must, therefore, make use of special biological conceptions, the relation of which to the physical conceptions must for the present remain more or less obscure for lack of data. It is the same as regards the relation of psychological to biological conceptions. For certain ordinary practical purposes we treat the biological and physical worlds as objective and independent of our knowledge of them; but this is only a convenient figment.

From the point of view of each individual science there is a conflict of categories or fundamental hypotheses with those of

other sciences; but from the wider standpoint of philosophy these categories are only provisional working hypotheses. The world of our experience is a spiritual world, as already pointed out above; and this being so we must regard categories as only forms which the riches of this spiritual world pass through in the course of their ever fuller manifestation.

II.—By D'ARCY WENTWORTH THOMPSON.

THE great astronomers have given us a "*Mécanique Céleste*," and the great physiologists have sketched for us a "*Mécanique Humaine*." The one was drawn, by Newton and Laplace, to a strict mathematical scale; the other, more complex and specific, is traced with a freer hand, on lines laid down by the physicists and by the chemists. If neither gives us a consummate and ultimate explanation of things, or even a complete *ratio efficiendi* of the working of its particular machine, both alike give us an admirable *ratio cogitandi*; they serve the purpose of ordering our thoughts, of correlating our knowledge, of anticipating phenomena, of climbing slowly but steadily (not without many a false step here and there) up the pathway of discovery.

But now Dr. Haldane throws down a challenge to the naturalist, and in particular to the physiologist: for he tells us, in effect, that we have mixed up alien concepts, that in applying the "mechanical" laws of chemistry and physics to living things we have confused our categories, and that "biological observations cannot be expressed or described in the terms of ordinary physical working hypotheses."

It is with some reluctance, I confess, that I enter on this discussion. The naturalist has his hands full of relatively simple problems; he approaches them in his own way, he solves, or tries to solve them, by his own accustomed methods. But he is afraid, generally speaking, of the larger problems which lie beyond; and his fear may be justified, or at all events pardoned,

or at least condoned. When we speak of Life itself, we know that we speak of a great mystery. We seem to have stepped unbidden upon holy ground. Ignorance beclouds our thoughts, traditional beliefs disturb our minds, and ineradicable preconceptions interfere with our endeavours to ratiocinate. We confess our ignorance, we admit our failure, we seek refuge in "intuition," or we are lost in wonderment. Yet, now and then we take our courage in both hands, lay aside our comfortable intuitions, endeavour to face the facts, acknowledge our difficulties, and open to review and criticism our half-formulated creeds.

If these things are to be discussed at all, let me at least attempt to narrow the great issue. Dr. Haldane sets out to prove that, for the three several sciences, or disciplines, of physics, biology and psychology, the general conceptions with which we should approach them, the categories by which it behoves us to interpret them, are essentially different, incompatible, irreconcilable, irreducible. At once and willingly, I grant the point as regards psychology. That matter and mind are incommensurables seems to my judgment so obvious that it needs no argument and risks no serious denial. It involves, doubtless, an uncomfortable dualism, an awkward breach in the continuity of our thinking. I must leave it at that; and be content to state rather than to defend my dualistic attitude. Biology, then, for the present, I take to mean the study of the forms, whether gross or molecular, assumed by matter in the fabric of living things, and all the changes, processes, activities associated therewith, so far (and it seems to me a long, long way) as we can study them apart from consciousness, or "conscious reactions." I am not without some lurking fear that I may here be charged with a *petitio principii*. Professor Ward has told us (for instance) that "if we begin from the material side we must keep to this side all through; if Matter is to explain Life at all, it must explain all life." And the converse

is also maintained by many; that, if a psychical element be admitted in Life at all, it must be admitted in all life; if by means of it we interpret the behaviour of some living things, so must we explain them all; if some actions of living things, then all actions; in short that, apart from psychology, there is no biology at all.* Howsoever this may be, in the meanwhile Dr. Haldane spares me the trouble of deciding. I am applying myself to his brief: and he discriminates very explicitly between the psychological and "biological" categories, declaring that "the reaction between a conscious organism and its environment is wholly different from the immediacy of what we interpret as physical, or [even as] physiological reaction."

In another very important way Dr. Haldane himself narrows our issue, by setting wholly aside that "intermediate theory" of "vitalism" which lies (as he says) between the physical or mechanistic interpretation and what he designates *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, as the "biological theory." That is to say, he will have no dealings with any of those who "accept as true, so far as it goes, the physical and chemical interpretation of the phenomena connected with living organisms, but maintain that in living organisms we must in addition assume the existence of something quite distinct, which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions."† Such views seem, in Dr. Haldane's judgment, to be neither fish, fowl, nor good red herring. "Vitalism," he says "represents no clearly definable working hypothesis, and for this reason I do not propose to consider it further." I am not sure that I understand him. But I take him to mean that vitalism is but a perverted mechanism,

* So, for instance, Dr. James Ward says, in *Heredity and Memory*, "We find then no ground for separating organic life from psychical life; for us all life is experience, etc."

† I fear that Dr. Hobhouse is introducing something quite indistinguishable from the ordinary hypothesis of vitalism as, described above, when he speaks of a living being as a "psychophysical whole" containing elements—"forces if you will"—which hold its parts together and correlate their action.

a theory which would still explain the whole in terms of its parts, and which merely superadds to the known (and seemingly inadequate) parts of the mechanism a new, nondescript kind of part, to wit, *entelechy*. At all events from our immediate discussion the hypotheses of the vitalists are withheld, and they trouble us no more.

I take it that all this clears away many things from our immediate field of debate; among other things, that it sets aside that subconscious or unconscious memory, that "*Mneme*," to which Hering introduced us some 50 years ago, which Samuel Butler has so subtly analysed, and which Dr. Ward has of late so warmly championed. I part with it with regret; almost the first little paper I ever wrote—I wrote it well-nigh forty years ago, when I was a Cambridge undergraduate—was an attempt to expound and to advocate that fascinating but (as I think now) that elusive and slippery doctrine.

There is still a lion in our path, and it is a formidable one; for it is nothing less than the great metaphysical concept of Reality. This lion, however, is chained. For Dr. Haldane, at the very outset of his paper, tells us that "we must carefully distinguish between the conceptions, or, as I should prefer to say, working hypotheses, which we commonly use in interpreting reality, and that reality itself." And then he immediately assures us that this "discussion applies to our working hypotheses or categories." Reality, it is true, appears again, and yet again, in Dr. Haldane's paper; and now and then we begin to be afraid of it, and once at least it seems to "straddle quite across the whole breadth of the way." Dr. Haldane makes much of the fact that, "like pure mathematics," mechanical physics "tells us only a very little about reality, and in only a very imperfect form." (I might demur, and demur strongly, to the inclusion of pure mathematics, but let that pass.) He denounces the "tacit assumption that in mechanical physics we reach a definition of the ultimate reality of which the visible

world consists"; he shows that the definition is insufficient; he then, this being so, has no difficulty in maintaining that the same insufficiency extends also to chemistry and to biology. I do not question it. I accept the metaphysical position. I have no quarrel with metaphysics: I have no wish in the world to contend that the great concept of ultimate Reality is but a toothless lion, or, worse still, a chimera with a lion's head. *But*, it belongs to the metaphysicians, and in our present argument it is chained. We are to deal with working concepts, or working hypotheses or categories, with the interpretation of "phenomena," and not with ultimate reality. It is here, precisely on this narrow ground, that we have to consider whether or no the same working hypotheses or categories will avail us both in physical and in biological science, and all metaphysical speculation is out of bounds.

And yet, after all, we must not too hastily exclude Reality from our scope, as we have dismissed vitalism; for our lion is brought upon the stage, he has a speaking part in the play, and "let not him that plays the lion pare his nails, for they shall hang out for the lion's claws." The concept of Reality is not something wholly outside of our phenomena, but they themselves are part, though it may be a small part, of it; and all our group of sciences, physical, chemical, and biological, strive to interpret those "bits of reality" which are within their reach and appropriate to their categories. Pure physics, essentially quantitative, deals with such concepts, or such aspects of matter, as extension and mass; chemistry, essentially qualitative, deals with matter analysed and distinguished according to its kind. Chemistry, therefore, makes a nearer approach to, or seems to give a somewhat closer insight into, reality than physics does; they are successive approximations to reality. The physical hypotheses are intended to deal with very general characters of reality, and they have the abstract form and character appropriate to that purpose. Chemical hypotheses and certain of those of applied physics apply to things, to

kinds of matter or forms of energy and modes of force, which are regarded as specific ; and, hence, they are necessarily less abstract and less general, more direct and more specific.

It is obvious that biology, when we include under it *all* the phenomena attendant upon or associated with life, goes further still. But our particular question is, whether biology regarded under certain definite limitations, to wit, a biology apart from the manifestations of consciousness, need necessarily involve a higher range of categories, incommensurate with mechanism. And so, while metaphysical speculation is undoubtedly out of bounds for the time being, I am prepared to agree that in a fuller treatment of the theme the nature of reality *might* be found to be at the bottom of the whole case ; and especially if it be conceded that reality is a something which can be dealt with piece-meal, and whose "pieces" or several aspects can be analysed into *grades*.

But now let me come at last to discuss, with all possible brevity, Dr. Haldane's attitude to the "mechanistic hypothesis." He gives us, by the way, so slight an inkling for the moment of his own "biological hypothesis," that I find little to say about it in the way of Yea or Nay. The main question is, Is it required at all ?

To begin with, I am inclined to demur to Dr. Haldane's *general* treatment of the "mechanistic theory." He talks about the "easy-going mechanistic explanations, which became current during the latter half of last century." There may be some ground here and there for the aspersion ; but the phrase sounds to me prejudicial. Rough and ready indeed seem to us the first mechanistic theories of Descartes ; but even they were not "easy-going." Generations of "mechanistic" physiologists have tried, by no easy road, to use, as Dr. Haldane himself has done, every stepping-stone that advancing physics and advancing chemistry supply towards an elucidation of the bodily mechanism. Where is it, precisely, that they have failed ? And

where is it (I do not know) that an alternative method has yet succeeded better? Upon my word, Dr. Haldane gives us no clear and sharp answer to either question. He tells us, on the one hand, that it is natural to seek for "a mechanical explanation of the contraction of muscle, and though definite progress in this direction has hitherto been limited, I feel confident that we are on the eve of such progress." "Good," one is apt to say, "he is evidently sound in his appreciation of the efforts of the orthodox physiologist." Yet, on the next page one reads, "on the whole, there is no evidence of real progress towards a mechanistic explanation of life." It may be that the apparent contradiction is removed by the last two little words, and that Dr. Haldane would welcome a mechanistic explanation of isolated phenomena, though he does not recognise, or countenance, or even anticipate, its possible extension to the whole. But we have already seen that we have nothing to do with "the whole," for not only the great metaphysical concepts but also the great problems of psychology are ruled out; and, surely, the contraction of a muscle is a fair sample of the unconscious and non-psychological problems of physiology.

If we can progress, and progress continually, in our biological studies towards a physico-chemical explanation of such phenomena, can we reasonably say that the categories of these physical sciences are alien to or irreducible with our own? And as for "easy-going explanations," I venture to think that the "easy-going" attitude is on the part of those who, when they come to a perplexing and entangled problem, one (for instance) where chemistry and physics are manifestly concerned, and when their knowledge of these subjects does not suffice to solve it, would too readily abandon the ship, and pray to the *deus ex machina* of a new philosophy.

And lastly, for that matter, the phrase would seem to suggest that the physicist himself deals with "easy-going mechanical explanations." Now, not only do I think that this is not the case, but it seems to me that a study of some

of the commonest and homeliest of natural phenomena would teach us that it is by no means so. In many cases the mechanism involved is yet unknown; in others it has been only recently elucidated; in all it is and has been the subject of anxious care and hard thinking. The formation of dew, of mist and fog, of rain itself, are all instances which come quickly to my mind, and satisfy me in my contention that easy-going mechanical hypotheses will never do, will never last long, but give place in due time to infinitely more refined explanations, without, however, ever leaving the old level of concepts, the established class of physical categories.

Dr. Haldane's chief illustration is drawn from the phenomena of respiration, a part of physiology where he is peculiarly at home. He tells us that here, for instance, we have a series of phenomena quite insusceptible of the simple mechanical explanations which were formerly given of them. I do not wonder: the same is true, word for word, of a multitude of phenomena in ordinary physics and ordinary chemistry: is not "solution," for instance, a very different thing to the modern chemist from what it was much less than fifty years ago? Fifty years ago many physiological processes which, from a physical and chemical standpoint, are now seen to be extremely complex and even obscure, were regarded as quite simple. Again, word for word, this is true of chemistry and of physics: for instance, the whole of modern physical chemistry goes to show how inadequate were the loose non-mathematical ideas of a previous generation of chemists.

Dr. Haldane's crucial instance (or that which I take to be so) lies in the phenomenon of "regulation," whereby the passage of oxygen through the living membrane of the lung is increased when the needs of the organism become greater: "wherever there is need for an extra supply of oxygen, as for instance, during muscular exertion, the membrane assumes an active rôle, and pushes oxygen inwards without regard to the mechanical laws of diffusion." I am shy of entertaining, and

shyer still of expressing, a doubt regarding Dr. Haldane's physiology. But I do venture to think that, in our admittedly incomplete knowledge of the phenomenon, this statement seems a trifle too specific. More oxygen undoubtedly goes through, but are we certain that it is pushed through, rather than pulled? And in any case, if it be pushed to the one side, it must surely be first pulled from the other. I fail to see that we are here transcending the powers of mechanism. Many a machine is constructed to oil itself the more copiously when it works the faster, and the printing-press, as we urge it to put out more newspapers on the one side, pulls in more blank paper on the other. These illustrations are crude, admittedly, as are all instances drawn from machines constructed by the hands and designed by the mind of man. But in nature herself, if we look at her larger handiwork, self-regulation and self-maintenance become paramount attributes and characteristics of her machines. The solar system, *quæ* mechanism, is the perfect specimen, the very type and norm, of a self-maintaining, self-regulating mechanism: and so also, grade after grade, are its dependent mechanisms, such as the world-wide currents of the atmosphere and of the sea.

Let me try to choose with greater care a case which shall illustrate the temporary inadequacy of a mechanical explanation, and the successful mastery of the problem by the elaboration of new hypotheses, or the discovery of new "laws."

The phenomenon of "sedimentation," by which sand and mud settle to the bottom of the sea, is at first sight one of the simplest of mechanical phenomena. The particles gravitate to the bottom, by virtue of their greater density; while doing so and after doing so they are disturbed by currents and other motions of the fluid; the small and light ones are carried on, the large and heavy are left behind; the finest particles settle down at last in the calm centre of an eddy or at the termination

of the stream. It is by dint of this explanation, so far as it goes, that we may map out roughly the currents of a shallow sea by charting the distribution of the muds, sands and gravels on its floor. But it is found that this is by no means the whole story, and that it fails in the light of a closer study of the experimental facts. It is a "working hypothesis" which, by itself, will not do. And now Dr. Joly has shown that the phenomenon is far more complex than we had thought; that it is qualitative as well as quantitative; that chemistry is involved; that complicated surface-actions have to be considered, and that ionisation enters the field. Apart from ordinary chemical action, decomposition or disintegration of any kind, the little particles will be influenced in their fall by the "valency" of the chemical salts dissolved in the surrounding fluid; and they will fall at very different rates in solutions of equal density, but of different kinds. And the new hypotheses are, for the present at least, adequate to the case: they bring our experiments into harmony, and enable us to foresee their results. It is just another illustration of the fact that science not only "flows," like everything else, but flows in *waves*. A subject is obscure to-day, when we know little of it; it is easy to-morrow, when we have learned more: but we have only to learn yet more, and we feel ignorant again.

I lay stress upon this illustration. I think it safe and fair to assert that it is very much on all fours with Dr. Haldane's case. A certain physical explanation of a physical phenomenon is found to be inadequate; a mechanical explanation, simple and for a long while acceptable to all, is no longer satisfying. But a wise man finds a certain key at his girdle, a new key of the old bunch, and unlocks the gate, and pursues his journey. I draw the simple lesson that, when a closed gate confronts us in our way, we had better wait and search for a key, and that we should be very loath indeed to forsake the pathway for the open fields.

But a very curious thing to me is that, while Dr. Haldane shows so great a readiness to break away from the old road, to abandon the old working hypotheses, and to devise new categories for the biologist, yet at times he seems to say precisely what I would have him say, and to accept just the lesson, or at least a part of the lesson, which I think the foregoing illustration is fitted to teach. For, on p. 429, he says that, when Faraday pointed out the existence of ions in solutions, he made a discovery which has gradually exercised a more and more widespread influence on scientific and practical activity, and has at the same time given a new significance to previous discoveries. Precisely so; and who is he that should set bounds to such an influence, or who should despair of other such discoveries? They give, indeed, a new significance to our old knowledge, but they do not depart one bit from the old pathway: they refine and improve the old categories; they create new ones perhaps, but these new ones are of the same nature and are commensurate with the old; the *general* and fundamental working hypothesis is unchanged, save that it is better spelled, and is somehow found to be more convincing and satisfactory than before.

Dr. Haldane lays stress upon several points which he asserts to stand in open contradiction to our concept of a mechanism. He says, for instance, that "a living organism differs in this respect from any mechanism which we can construct or conceive, that it forms itself, and keeps itself in working order and activity." We might, I think, show not un-usefully that many a machine improves, up to a certain point, as it goes along. The ship finds herself, as Kipling says. My typewriter works more easily and writes better than when it was brand-new: bearings work easier, springs are slightly and advantageously relaxed, the thing is decidedly in better "working order." A spade sharpens itself as we dig with it, as "iron sharpeneth iron." All this is very true "up to a certain point," and surely of the body the same restriction

holds. It is, alas, not true at all that the body "keeps itself in working order and activity." I am old enough to be assured of the contrary. Like all other machines, the bodily machine grows old, and wears out, and works itself down.

Again, Dr. Haldane tells us (for example), that "the existence of a self-producing or self-maintaining mechanism" is something to which no meaning can be attached, for the idea of "a mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure is self-contradictory," and this is all expanded into the assertion that "a mechanism which reproduced itself would be a machine without parts, and therefore not a mechanism"; and, again, that "in each detail of organic structure, composition, environment, and activity there is an expression of the life of the organism regarded as a whole which tends to persist." The parent organism is, indeed, "reproduced from a mere tiny speck of its own body," but that tiny speck does not stand alone, to live of itself, to work out its own destiny, and to make or to *maintain itself*. When the parent tissues have ceased to nourish it, it is not left alone. All the forces of nature impinge and react upon it; together they nourish it; they mould and conform it: the sun shines upon it: the air bathes it; it is a mechanism, but only part of a greater mechanism, and the mechanism of which it is a portion is the world.

The fact is, that the whole argument, as Dr. Haldane puts it, together with a few of the other points by which he strives to show the inadequacy of mechanical explanations, is not a very novel one; I seem to have read the same thing, or just the same sort of thing, in Driesch, and in Bergson too, and in the books of many other of those who shrink from mechanism, and introduce those very concepts of vitalism, those more or less shadowy entelechies, which Dr. Haldane for his part rejects and repudiates. The alleged phenomena of self-production, self-maintenance, and self-regulation are the common currency of those who, finding the mechanistic theory

difficult and unsatisfactory, are content to postulate a something "which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions."

After specifying many important points wherein the growth of the organism is comparable to that of a crystal, Dr. Haldane tells us that "where the resemblance fails is that the arrangement of the molecules of the crystal is mere repetition, whereas in the organism there is individual variety of detail, and yet perfectly definite and specific unity of plan." Let me take another illustration, crude perhaps, but not cruder than that of the crystal. Imagine a bowl of soap-suds, into which you blow. The simple mechanism consists, apparently, of a bowl of water and a stream of air; in truth it is more complicated than that, but it is exquisitely simple after all. But whether or no, in a few moments it develops into a very wonderful thing—a mass of froth, a shapely heap of very beautiful bubbles. The resultant whole is a very elaborate and a very perfect thing; and in no single bubble of it all is there a single free surface, or point or line or surface of contact, which is not absolutely definite, and (what is more) which our present knowledge cannot satisfactorily explain. There is "perfectly definite and specific unity of plan." Moreover, there is almost infinite "individual variety of detail"; for no two bubbles are precisely the same, and repeat the experiment, and no single bubble in the first corresponds individually to a single bubble in the second. Pour a little of the water into another dish, and the whole complex structure will reproduce itself—or rather it can be made to reproduce itself. For, again we must blow; the forces are not inherent in the soapy water (any more than the forces of growth and reproduction are all inherent in the protoplasm); the system is a larger system—it is a portion of the world.

Let me say before I leave Dr. Haldane's paper, and say in perfectly frank and candid words, that I find him difficult to

understand, and that for this I am not inclined to shoulder all the blame. I find it hard to reach a clear definition of all his terms, and hard even, in some cases, to follow the thread of his argument. I shall be disappointed, but I shall not be wholly surprised, if he tell me that I have failed to follow him and that he and I are talking about different things. Let me try once more to reach his standpoint, and, if possible, to meet, his argument.

One of my chief difficulties arises, I think, from the fact that, on the one hand, Dr. Haldane talks of a distinction between "physical" and "biological" categories, as though this were, by the nature of things, the one place in which to look for a sharp distinction. One is hereby invited, to all appearance, to interpret "physical" by physico-chemical or even "inorganic" science, and to draw our one and only essential contrast (in this portion of our subject) between the study of the living and the study of the dead. But, on the other hand, Dr. Haldane recurs again and again to the special department of chemistry, he draws some of his chief illustrations from it, and it is plain that he recognises to the full the undoubted fact that its categories include much more than is contained in the working hypotheses of ordinary physics. In short, there is a gap between the categories of physics and of chemistry, whatever there may be or may not be between these sciences and biology. Yet, while there is a categorical difference between our present-day physics and chemistry, it may be admitted that this difference is not of the first order of magnitude; it is even a possible and a plausible anticipation to look forward to a day when this breach of categories may be removed, for not a little has already been done to narrow it. At present, the "working hypotheses" of chemistry and physics are manifestly different, and "for practical purposes" they will always, in all probability, remain so. Were, however, the transmutation of the well-known elements to become an accomplished experimental fact, were we to succeed at last in reducing the qualitative

differences of chemistry to differences in the number and arrangement of qualitatively similar elements (such as electrons), and to find them obeying a single set of rules, then the distinction would have disappeared, and we should have in truth reduced the categories of chemistry to the "simpler categories" of physics. Dr. Haldane must be fully awake to the possibility; I take it, therefore, that he does recognise the narrowness of the gulf between these two sciences, and that it is a much wider gulf which he sees between them both and the science of organisms—even of the "non-conscious" organism. Still, he does not tell us as clearly as one would like how he recognises it, or of what nature he believes it to be.

Nor does Dr. Haldane define what he really means by the "working hypotheses or categories of biology," and I remain in some doubt as to what they precisely are. That they are very ill-defined in general is pretty obvious to me; and it is precisely to Dr. Haldane, and it is just for the purposes of such a discussion as this, that we might look for a new and clear expression of them. For the "ordinary naturalist," the ordinary student of beast and bird, specific difference, if not all in all, is the cardinal concept; for all he cares, for all he sometimes knows, the tissue and the cell are concepts which might never have been devised. The comparative anatomist or the morphologist deals with larger units, and cares little about the difference between a blackbird and a thrush, a robin and a wren. The physiologist deals with still larger groups; the cell and the tissue are his especial themes, and most (though of course not all) of the lessons which he learns are lessons common to and taught by the study of a very few "types," such as man, the rabbit, and the frog. The working hypotheses of (say) the ornithologist are certainly not mechanical, they are very largely teleological; the ordinary working hypotheses of the physiologist are, in the great majority of cases, distinctly mechanical, and include and practically coincide with those of the physicist and the chemist.

And here we may at least note in passing that there is one common concept or working hypothesis of the biologist, which occupies a very peculiar position; it is the working hypothesis of heredity, regarded as a definite impulse, or "force," leading to hereditary transmission. It is an everyday statement of the morphologist that this or that structure, often apparently functionless, is "due to heredity"; it is prefigured as a kind of "Mneme"; it is (commonly at least) a purely vitalistic hypothesis. I for my part look forward, in faith and hope, to the ultimate reduction of the phenomena of heredity to much simpler categories, to explanations based on mechanical lines, and on the peculiar and strict limitations which physical and mathematical laws set to what are at first sight the endless and unlimited possibilities of variation. Yet, this is but an opinion, and it may be maintained by others that heredity is an independent concept, *sui generis*, indispensable to the biologist; that it is a phenomenon, or group of phenomena, within a category all its own; and that the special science which deals with it has at least found, in Mendel, its Kepler, and only waits for its Newton.

I take it that it is in the main of biology, as it is considered, or as it ought to be regarded, by the physiologist that Dr. Haldane speaks, not forgetting those formal, or morphological, or histological, and of course also embryological, problems of the tissues and of the cell with which the physiologist's work is interconnected. It must be largely for his own use and guidance as a physiologist that Dr. Haldane seeks for a definition of the biological category or categories, and it is from his own experience as a physiologist that he maintains them to be irreducible to the physical. I hope to learn from this discussion, but I do not yet easily or fully comprehend, precisely where he stands.

I can understand clearly enough a cardinal distinction between the categories of teleology and of mechanical causation;

though even here there are not lacking certain risks of confusion, as in the case, for instance, of the man-made machine. But I do not think somehow that this cardinal distinction, between a final and an efficient cause, is what Dr. Haldane asserts to lie between the phenomena of the living and of the dead; it would be so easy to say so if it were!* Moreover, in one or two places, Dr. Haldane seems actually to reject it, as, for instance, where he not only denies that the phenomena of the reproducing germ are such "as if it were realising a conscious plan of the fully developed organism,"—a theory which, by the way, or something extremely like it, certain embryologists have actually upheld,—but, on the contrary, tells us that "embryological investigation indicates that each step in development is the outcome of the conditions existing at the moment." Here surely is the "efficient cause," and the description looks very like a "mechanical" one to me.

I am led, then, to suppose that Dr. Haldane demands for the living organism, or for "living matter," some difference, as compared with dead matter, which endows it with wholly novel properties and capacities, now limited by, but anon transcending, the physical conditions, and conferring peculiar potentialities, such as those of self-regulation and the rest. If this be so, new categories are indeed required; but in what sense, or why, are we to look upon them as permanently and necessarily irreducible to those of physical science? If they be irreducible, they are (for the time being) mysteries;† our current theories and explanations crumble and vanish

* Dr. Hobbhouse faces this cardinal distinction, boldly raises an hypothesis upon it, and expresses the same in the plainest of words. "We now suggest," he says, "that the organic system is in a general sense purposive, *i.e.*, at least conational, becoming purposive in its higher removes. The purposive and the mechanical, on the other hand, remain fundamentally distinct categories."

† And mysteries they emphatically would be, if attached to, or intrinsic in, them were the least tinge of conation, such as Dr. Hobbhouse suggests.

away; and we need another Archimedes, another Galileo, another Newton, to discover the elementary laws, and to write the *Principia*, of biology.

But even were these new categories necessary in the present, in order to avoid confusion and error and to amend our *rationes cogitandi*, it would still have to be proved that they were something more than a mere present help, and that they were for ever irreducible to the categories of physics. And such categories may not be "mechanical" in the ordinary sense, but may yet be mechanical in an extended sense. For mechanism is not a stationary concept but a growing one. What it meant to Aristotle is not what it means to us. Chemistry has opened our eyes, and electricity (for instance) has strained them to keep the nature and significance of a "mechanism" in view.

And that Dr. Haldane recognises a "continuum" in the grades of mechanism, a succession of advancing categories, is indicated to my mind by a certain paragraph which at first sight perplexed me mightily. On page 426 he says, "From no elementary mechanical principles can we deduce the behaviour of even the molecule of water in crystallisation; and similarly, from no elementary physical or chemical principles can we deduce the behaviour of the organism. It is owing to this empirical fact that the ordinary working hypotheses of physics and chemistry are irreconcilable with those of biology."

I do not quite follow the statement about the behaviour of the molecule in crystallisation. I should have thought that the labours of the mathematical crystallographers, all they have taught us about the partitioning of space, the methods of close-packing, the large but strictly limited range of possible crystalline forms, etc., all the labours, in short, of Kelvin, Fedorow, Schoenflies, Tutton and the rest, had vastly increased our knowledge, and helped our deductions, as to the behaviour of the molecule of water in crystallisation. Whether or no,

it is certainly more than a matter of *elementary* mechanics, but it is reconcilable with the most general and fundamental principles which the physicist and the mathematician lay down. Can it be that Dr. Haldane is here only emphasising the poverty of our *elementary* mechanical principles, and of the *ordinary* working hypotheses of physics and chemistry, and again of the ordinary working hypotheses of biology? If this be so, then, in this particular, he and I are not far apart. There is a principle of "economy," doubtless, in science, as I am told there is even in theology; there are exoteric and esoteric doctrines even in the concrete sciences, there are categories sometimes to be considered and sometimes silently passed by—as every teacher of elementary students knows. The simpler setting consists of those "schematised conceptions" of which Dr. Haldane speaks, and which are "practically sufficient for a large number of purposes." But behind these lie many more recondite concepts and hypotheses: and on these the working chemist or physicist knows that he can draw at need, without fear or risk of outstepping the fundamental categories of physical science.

And now to summarise my own position, so far as in a few words I can.

I believe that the material body of a living thing (apart from consciousness) is a mechanism. I see no other way of investigating in detail its material structure, its form and its activities. I know no way of studying its material aspect otherwise than by the help of physical and chemical methods, and of the mathematical laws on which these sciences rest in their turn. I set out provided with the physical concepts of matter and of energy, and the mathematical concept of force. I know that change of form in a concrete material body involves the movements of matter, and that the movements of matter are to be symbolically ascribed to the action of force, and actually to the transference of energy. The body consists

of matter; it is set in a material world; it has its store of energy within, it has its share in the great store of energy without. It is a part of a physical system; I study it, as well as its environment, according to the working hypotheses, or categories, of physical science, with all my might and without either hesitation or fear. It is its physical or material phenomena, admittedly, that I am studying. What more, outside of psychology and outside of metaphysics, can I do?

There is one thing more that strengthens in a high degree my belief in the applicability of physical methods to the organism and in the community of principles in the two classes of machines. And that is the simple but most instructive fact that, while the biologist has been trying to learn of the physicist, the physicist has also found his own science vastly enriched through the labours of the physiologist and by a study of the phenomena of the living body. That identical phenomenon of osmosis, which Dr. Haldane finds so difficult to understand as it is exemplified in the human body, was actually introduced (under its modern aspect) to the physicist by a botanist, who drew the lesson from his plants. And no small number of corollaries, experimental and theoretical, to Pfeffer's original discoveries have found their way into the sciences of physics and chemistry from the same biological starting-point. Furthermore, we all know that one at least of the great men for whom is claimed the first enunciation of the principle of the conservation of energy was a physiologist, who had learned his physics from the study of the physiological machine; and I am inclined to think that to that great physiological physicist the verdict of history is more and more freely ascribing the credit of this epoch-making discovery. I think the fact of the obvious benefit to both sides of the interchange of ideas, this reaction and interaction between mechanical physiology and ordinary physics, one with another, goes far to convince us that the processes are fundamentally identical, and that the

mechanical hypothesis is not applied to the organism falsely or in vain.

Again, choosing rather the morphological side than the physiological side of the common field of biology, I would illustrate my own position by such few facts as these: When I regard the minute and simple organisms, whether unicellular or multicellular, I see among their multitudinous forms a large number which are easily described and classified in physical terms. They consist, for the most part, of tiny spheres, of tiny cylinders, and these latter are capped by portions of tiny spheres: others, again, are, so to speak, wavy or beaded cylinders—we call them “unduloids,”—and others, closely related to these, are shortened unduloid with spherical bases, exactly like the Florence flask that a glass-blower so easily blows. In short, every one of these figures is most easily reproduced by the glass-blower, and for the simple reason that, like his molten glass, they have assumed the known and well-understood configurations of a fluid film, or fluid surface, according to the simple mathematical conception of “surfaces of minimal area,” under this or that simple condition of restraint. The words which describe, or the so-called “laws which govern,” a soap-bubble describe and “govern” them. Precisely analogous principles evidently extend, the general law of surfaces of minimal area evidently applies, to other less simple but equally minute organic configurations, including spirals or helicoids of various kinds. Without the mathematical or physical concept I am lost or mystified in considering them, and in classifying this mazy congeries of forms; by the help of it, my observations are co-ordinated, and my facts “explained.” And, mark you, this “explanation” is not a mere matter of nomenclature, a mere symbolic terminology, or juggling with words. It presupposes a definite acquaintance with somewhat abstruse laws of statics, and the definite assertion that the precise conditions under which the results and consequences of

these laws are displayed are common to the living and to the dead. And if it be only in the minute living things and minute parts of living things that they are openly displayed, a simple and adequate reason is at hand. For it is only in them, by reason of their little mass and relatively extensive surface, that the force of gravity is overwhelmed by the molecular forces immediately concerned. If there be a few such forms, and they are very few indeed, to which the same principles do not obviously apply, I wait in patient expectancy for more light, but I do not hurry to exchange my old lantern for a new.

Let us take a little multicellular organism, and let us by no means be ashamed to choose a simple one; for it is an essential part of the method of physical science, and of mathematics itself, to deal with simple, even simplified, cases, and thereby to avoid a confusion of issues, a conflict of causes. How does the first cell divide? In what way, or under what sort of configurations, do its products of division divide again? Generations of microscopists have depicted and described the configurations of the subdividing cell without ever dreaming that they were aught else than a specific biological phenomenon. But Berthold and Errera, and others, have shown, or helped to show, that they are, point for point, line for line, and surface for surface, capable of interpretation by the same mathematico-physical principles—that they are neither more nor less than exquisite illustrations of fluid surfaces in complete or partial equilibrium. I can take an imaginary discoidal mass of liquid, represented by a circle, and inquire on purely mathematical principles how, were it to divide into drops or fragments and the fragments to remain in contact, the partitions between them, the cell-walls, would be arranged, and in what order of succession they would appear. The question is not a very easy one; it involves no little calculation, and the result is more complicated than one might perhaps expect. Yet, it is a literal fact that, when we have sought and found a little organism of just such a simple,

flattened, discoid form, and when we have watched its first little cell divide and divide again, the resultant configuration, complicated as it is, and the successive stages in their orderly succession as they severally appear, agree in every essential particular with the scheme which our physico-mathematical principles had enabled us to foretell.

Dr. Haldane has referred you to a book of his; may I say that I have written a book too? And in it, from beginning to end, I have sought to show that the phenomena of Growth and of Form in organisms are phenomena to which the working hypotheses, or categories, of physico-mathematical science strictly, and even adequately, apply. They are not the same physico-mathematical laws, by any means, that apply to and explain the crystal. But the difference between them is not a difference between physics and biology, between the living and the dead; it is merely the simpler difference, or series of differences, between the solid crystal and the drop of water, between the symmetry of a solid and the symmetry of a liquid drop or liquid film, between the condition of equilibrium (or minimum potential energy) in a growing system whose particles, as in the fluid drop, are mobile, and one whose particles, as in the growing crystal, fall one after another, and once for all, into their places, and are free to move no more. That is, in itself, a very important difference; it leads by simple steps to many very important results; it reminds us of several important things—among others that “this too, too solid flesh” of ours is not a solid at all, and that (apart from our teeth and our bones) even the contours of our own bodies are not those of solid bodies, but of elastic membranes or fluid films.*

The material structure of our bodies, like those of all other organisms, is styled a fabric, and is regarded by many or most

* In short, the analogy of the crystal is essentially illegitimate, and that of the froth is legitimate.

students of biology as a mechanism. One may be, I hold, a consistent "mechanist" without being by any means a "mere materialist." I am neither afraid nor ashamed to uphold (to the great length that I have gone) a mechanical theory of the organism and its activities, or rather of its reactions with the outer world. I do not admit that in doing so we degrade our conceptions, or belittle our notions, of the organism. The mechanical concept is no base one at all. The earth itself and the sea, the earth with her slowly changing face, and the sea multitudinous with all its tides and currents and great and little waves, constitute a mechanism; the heavens themselves, the sun and moon and all the little stars, are a glorious mechanism. The whole material aspect of the universe is a mechanism; we know not how it has its being, but we know that it lives and moves obedient to everlasting laws; and the same *Benedicite Dominum* is addressed to the Showers and Dew and to the Winds of God as to all that move in the waters and all that move in the air, and to all Beasts and Cattle, and unto the Children of Men.

Yet a word, ere I am done, about the teleological side of our phenomena, or about our interpretation thereof. I am no friend of that aspect of teleology which professes (or presumes) to find an end or purpose in this structure, this action, or in that. It is but a petty "teleology," a poor philosophy, an unsafe attempt on the part of science, to seek to find a "final cause" in every isolated detail—in the shape of a leaf or the coloration of an egg-shell.

But with this subject, and especially with some of the grosser exaggerations to which the method has led, I have dealt sufficiently in my book. As a heuristic method, that of the final cause was much in vogue in physics in the days of Euler and of Maupertuis, and in the hands even of Leibniz himself; it has been abandoned by the physicists long ago. I do not think it is to be commended in biology, and the old

Baconian arguments are, to my mind, its proper condemnation still. It gives too often the easy answer to those who are only seeking after a sign. It is full of traps set for the unwary and baited for the credulous. It attracts us to the particular case, and blinds us to the general. It "angers me," like Hotspur, and I would argue with it (if I could) as Hotspur with Owen Glendower.

Yet there is a higher and broader teleology, which is a vastly different thing. It is involved in our faith that the world itself is good, and that for good and not evil do the parts of its vast machinery act and interact among themselves, in ways of which we have often little understanding, and in things that we see as through a glass darkly,—if at all. If we get one little glimpse of it better than another, I think it is again through mathematics. For there is a profound and lasting lesson (I have quoted it before) in what Colin Maclaurin said, after studying the cell of the bee, that "whatsoever is most beautiful and regular is also found to be most useful and excellent." At least let us recognise, if we venture to apply ourselves to the teleological argument at all, that teleology never stands alone, but that the final and the efficient causes are combined, or to be construed, together. It is difficult to serve two masters, but it is also difficult in this case to understand that the Master is One. There is a certain castle among the famous castles of Touraine, and in it a great artist fashioned a staircase—a marvel, a very jewel of a stair. Round the central newel of the staircase wind side by side two separate stairs; the climber by the one stair sees nothing of those who pass or cross him on the other; there is no passage-way between—*until you come out at the top*. So is it, I suppose, with the teleological and the mechanical categories; and my path lies by way of these last. I know that there is another ladder towards reality, but I am contented with my own. I have been told that Galileo and Newton were at the building of it; and I am heartened by the sight of great names scribbled on the wall.

But last, and last of all, let me repeat again that in the concepts of matter and of energy, whether quantitative or qualitative, the Whole is not enshrined, and that mechanism is but one aspect of the world. These are the proper categories of objective science, but they are no more; the physicist is, *ipso facto*, a mechanist, but he is not by implication a materialist; nor is the biologist of necessity a materialist, even though he may study nothing but mechanism in the material fabric and the bodily activities of the organism.

It is not merely that in dust we had our first beginnings and that to dust we shall at last return. Our bodies are dust all the while, as is the grass that withers and the flower that fades; and the laws by which our bodies are governed are the laws by which earth and dust are ruled. To this same purport the greatest of the Schoolmen, the Angelic Doctor, spoke (in words which I set in the forefront of my book), telling us across seven hundred years, that, inasmuch as the material and corporeal forms of the body *non excedunt virtutem et ordinem et facultatem principiorum agentium in natura, nulla videtur necessitas eorum originem in principia reducere altiora*. And so also a greater than he spoke, saying earth to earth, and dust to dust. But there is a something that is not dust at all, though as in all things else it is found therein; something that is the order of the Cosmos and the Beauty of the World; that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man; something not fulfilled in physics, and which vivifies the dust and makes the dry bones live. You may call it what you please, but it is always the same. You may call it entelechy, you may call it the harmony of the world; you may call it the *élan vital*, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or, you may call it, as it is called in the Story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men,—you may call it the Spirit of God.

III.—*By* P. CHALMERS MITCHELL.

THE question set for our symposium presents one aspect of an enduring dispute. There have been, are, and always will be, dispositions reluctant to picture a universe unsustained by creative will. "Creative will" assumes many phases, philosophically indifferent. It may be presented as God or gods, entelechy, or vital spark, but is something beyond prediction or control, the subject of observation, not of experiment. Belief in it is an expression at once of man's humility and of man's pride; an admission of the limits of our intelligence, and a soothing exaltation of what is beyond our intelligence. There have been, are, and always will be, dispositions reluctant to picture a universe any part of which is not a possible subject of prediction, control and experiment. A part, continually increasing, of the universe has been subjected to prediction, control and experiment, and, although each accession of human power has revealed a wider horizon of the unknown, many reject the idea that the unknown is different in kind from the known.

The assumptions necessary to the logical completion of either view are enormous and familiar. The second view is plainly hopeless; inasmuch as success in the intensive or extensive investigation of any bit of nature always discovers new difficulties, always extends rather than contracts the problem, the naturalist, for so, as a matter of temporary convenience, I may call him, is a ready prey for the glibbing supernaturalist. His carrot dangles from a pole fixed to his own forehead, and like the donkey in the story, however fast he may run, he never reaches his objective. But the supernaturalist is in little better case; he has a craving for the incarnation of his principle, observing it in time and place, now in the plains of India, now in Galilee, now in the secreting epithelium of the lungs, and in due course, to the great content of the naturalist, bumps up against the evidence.

I believe that the naturalist and the supernaturalist are the exhibitors of two dispositions, and that there is as little chance of coming to a just decision between them, did an impartial judge exist, as there would be in the cases of the agorophobic eel, which, when disturbed, dashes into a drain-pipe, and the claustrophobic mackerel which dashes into the open.

The wording of the problem I am invited to discuss forms a trap for the unwary, and, indeed, might have been designed to land even so small a philosophical fish as myself, and to show how a naturalist, gasping out his life in the rare metaphysical medium, assumes the hues of the supernaturalist. Let me restate the problem in terms that are more familiar to me. It becomes threefold. Is it possible, with our present knowledge, to explain or state the observed phenomena of mind in terms of the observed phenomena of anatomy and physiology, and the observed phenomena of biology in terms of those of physics? If it be not possible at present, is the trend of science towards such a set of syntheses? Do our observations discover differences in kind justifying the assertion that the syntheses are impossible?

To the first phase of the problem an answer can be given with assurance. At present, mind cannot be interpreted or stated in terms of anatomy and physiology, nor biology in terms of physics and chemistry. Let me insist, however, on the crude fact that mind cannot be interpreted without anatomy and physiology, nor life without chemistry and physics. We can make no observations on any mind or on any mental phenomenon isolated from and independent of structure and physiological function. Even God always speaks through His prophets. Logic and imagination clarify thought, but so also do cascara and bismuth. I cannot explain the reactions of protoplasm by the properties of solutions and the qualities of chemical elements, but I cannot observe them apart from these properties and qualities. It is a commonplace of polemics that life escapes under the scalpel, that the protoplasm which the chemist

analyses is dead. True; yet not only life, but blood escapes under the scalpel, and the protoplasm in dying has changed its chemical reaction.

To the second phase of the problem, the trend of science, it is difficult to give an answer uncoloured by disposition. For the answer must be interpretation, not mere observation. Some forty years ago, the categories of science were clear-cut and glittering abstractions; in physics what Dr. Haldane calls "mechanism" reigned; in biology function was believed to depend on structure; in psychology, instinct, intelligence, and emotion were thought to be independent of one another and of structure and function. None the less, there were confident naturalists who believed that biology could be explained in terms of mechanism, and psychology in terms of a function-structure complex. And even within the limits of these categories, progress was made towards synthesis. I need recall only illustrative examples. Many organic compounds have been made in the laboratory from inorganic materials; the attempt to evade this breaking down of the barrier between organic and inorganic by the suggestion that vital action was still involved, to wit, the vital action of the chemist in the laboratory, is only silly, for water is equally inorganic whether it be found in nature or synthesised in a laboratory. Many of the observed phenomena of living protoplasm have been copied by artificial non-living preparations. The fertilisation of the egg-cell, which seemed a supreme case of the action of life upon life, has been achieved by the action of an inorganic salt on the ovum. The direct dependence of psychological differences on differences in structure has been demonstrated at least in pathological cases, and indicated in comparative anatomy.

These are notable achievements; and, if the categories of science had remained unchanged, I should claim that an advance had been made in the direction of naturalistic monism,—an advance which had given the naturalists a sure entrance into

forts that supernaturalists had asserted to be impregnable. But the categories have shifted, and the advance of knowledge has opened up new vistas of the unknown. I agree with Dr. Haldane that what he calls mechanism no longer satisfies the chemist and the physicist. I will go further, and say that we have learned to see, or to think that we see, function determining structure in biology, and, perhaps, even the mind creating its own organs in psychology. Yet, I do not share his apparent triumph. If what we call matter be energy that waxes and wanes, if we have to deal with ions rather than with molecules, if the material fabric of the universe be alert rather than inert, then the categories of physics and chemistry are moving towards the categories of biology. If we have to think of function as determining structure, then our conception of the process of evolution shifts from the hard conception of the origin of adaptations by selection of chance variation, shifts from it nearer to our observation of the triumphant ascent of life. And precisely as the categories of physics and of biology have become less mechanical, they seem to me to approach, not to recede from, the categories of psychology.

In another respect I agree with Dr. Haldane's presentment of his case, but dispute the conclusion towards which he seems to proceed. I agree that organic chemistry must be observed as chemistry of an organism rather than as chemistry in an organism. The subject of observation is a living organism, its parts in relation to the whole, acting as parts of the whole, the whole dominating and determining the parts. And so, in psychology, what is being observed is this or the other mental quality of a living body, the living body in reaction with a living and a non-living environment. We can, in a sense, study the inorganic isolated from the organic; we cannot study the organic isolated from the inorganic. We can, in a sense, study the organic isolated from psychology, but not psychology isolated from the organic and the inorganic. In such a sense the working categories of physics, biology, and psychology, are

different in kind. The properties of 1, 2, and 6, may, for convenience, be studied independently, and 1 can be studied without considering 2, and 2 without considering 6, but we cannot go far with 2 unless we realise that it is two ones, or with 6 unless we realise that it is six ones. I am disposed to believe that the properties of 1 must explain those of 2 and of 6, although in the case of 6 an apparently new factor, 3, has appeared. But I do not suppose that if we had only ones we could infer twos, or only ones and twos that we could infer three and sixes.

Even within what Dr. Haldane would agree to be mechanism, an apparent difference of categories is a matter of observation. It is convenient and necessary to observe watches and motor cars as wholes, and not as compounds of wheels and levers composed of metals and oils. The machine has qualities of its own, modes of influencing its parts and being influenced by them, which no doubt depend on the properties and qualities of the parts and constituents, but which in practice cannot be inferred from them. Two machines, built by the same mechanics from standardised parts to the same specification, behave differently as wholes, get different work out of their parts, react and adjust themselves differently. In a very practical sense there is a *deus ex machina*, and His level in the celestial hierarchy is inversely as the knowledge of the observer. These are commonplaces, and yet watches and motor cars are designed on strictly mechanistic principles. The simplest living organism is more complex than the most elaborate machine, and in every detail of its structure avoids the rigidity of mechanism. Clearly, it must be studied as an organism and not as a compound of certain chemical and physical properties. But this apparent difference in categories is certainly an empirical convenience, and far from certainly a philosophical distinction. I must suppose it to be possible that if a human mind could retain and combine all the independent variables in a motor car, he would dethrone the god from the machine,

and predict the conduct of the whole from knowledge of its parts without testing it practically. Yet, we take the easy, probably the inevitable way, even in the case of machinery, and observe. In biology, and still more in psychology, the easy way is the inevitable way. Unabashed, therefore, by Dr. Haldane's facts, which I am not concerned to dispute, I follow my disposition, and declare that the trend of science is towards synthesis of the categories.

There remains the last phase of the problem. I can see no ground for the tremendous assumption that the categories of physics, biology, and psychology are irreducible, if by the phrase more is meant than that it is convenient to observe the phenomena independently, in so far as independence is possible, and that, therefore, we can go a long way in observation whilst using different working hypotheses, laws, or generalisations for the three subjects. But in my own picture of the universe, the problem as set for us has only a dubious relation to reality. By reality I mean what can be explored but not exhausted, the bottomless well of surprises, that which appears to be outside us and from which the new is always coming into us. Our categories are arranged abstractions of what has come into us, simplified and codified in our endeavour to recreate the external world. In observation of the secreting epithelium of the lung we are nearer reality than in the physiologist's description and explanation of what he has observed; and the physiologist *qua* physiologist is nearer reality than when, as metaphysician, he abstracts his physiological abstractions. Lord Morley once described the universe as a "sovereign wonder of superhuman fixedness of law." In my picture of the world, man, and not the superhuman, is the maker of laws, categories or what it may please us to call our abstractions. He achieves fixedness only inasmuch as he departs from reality. If observation were to cease, I not doubt but that we should come to achieve a synthesis of our categories, a logically complete and completely anthropomorphic unity. I admit that the effort towards a

logical and coherent arrangement of categories is an exciting pursuit. It is, however, the manufacture and worship of a graven image, and the temple of reality is a house not built with human hands. If the real goal be to answer the question, Are matter, life and mind different aspects of the same reality? then I am more encouraged by observation than by thought. The detection of the same element in a distant star and in the fabric of the brain, the analogies between the effect of a cylinder of oxygen on a dull flame, a torpid muscle and a dying mind, lead my imagination further towards a conception of the unity of reality than the subtlest rearrangement of categories. And I have a closer vision of the realness of reality given me by the surprises of matter than by the syntheses of thoughts. Perhaps, it is as well to add that I do not forget that matter is a thought of the individual as much as is a category. Yet, there are thoughts that are of the earth earthy, and thoughts that are of categories categorical. All the wonder and the hope and the new knowledge are in the earthly thoughts; all the failure and the despair in the metaphysical thoughts.

IV.—*By* L. T. HOBHOUSE.

THE living body in general, and the human body in particular, obviously acts in some respects like a mechanism, while in other respects it appears to act differently. About the differences two questions may be raised. First, taking them at their face value, are they all of one kind, reducible to one formula, or of two or more kinds, such as the organic and the teleological? Secondly, are they to be taken at their face value, or are they to be regarded as mere appearances due to some subtle complexities of mechanism not yet adequately laid bare?

To answer these questions we must seek first a definition of the mechanical, the organic, and the teleological. We must,

then, look at the actual behaviour of living beings, and ask to which of these they conform.

The term mechanism seems to have established itself in philosophy as antithetic to the term teleology. It is an odd usage, since a machine is as clearly something contrived with a purpose as anything can be. But perhaps it is the contrast between the purpose which contrived the machine and the blindness with which it acts that has given the term its currency. Be that as it may, the characteristics of mechanism can be seen in a man-made machine, if we look at the details of its action, readily enough, and they are these. In a machine, though all the parts are so compacted as normally to act in relation with one another so as to produce a certain joint result, yet each several part acts uniformly without relation to the rest in response to the forces operating upon it, whatever they may be. The chain of the bicycle is pulled by the teeth of one wheel and pulls the teeth of the other wheel. Normally, in its complete fitting, this serves to propel the bicycle, but if either wheel is in some way out of gear it makes no difference to the chain. Pull it by hand, and the pull will be propagated along its links in just the same way, and will move the wheel into which it fits in just the same way. The action of the part does not depend on the action of any other part as such, but only on the pull or push affecting it, whatever the source of that pull or push may be. Similarly, the action of the part does not depend on any result accruing from the action. Given the pull or push, the action is just the same, whether the result is the normal one of propelling the bicycle, or is simply to whirl the hind-wheel round in the air, or to create a jam and a wreck. In a mechanical whole, then, each part acts uniformly in response to a given force independently of the condition of other parts,* and independently of the results of its action.

* So far as the past condition of other parts has gone to determine the push or pull upon the part considered, it is of course relevant to its

Part of the behaviour of living beings exhibits a similar independence. A reflex action, for example, like blinking, appears to be the response of a specific structure given uniformly to a specific stimulus. The blood flows along the arteries projected by an impulse from the heart, much as it might be forced along the dead arteries by a pump. Fluids and gases are interchanged through membranes of the body as outside the body they are interchanged by osmosis. In such processes the body appears to be acting mechanically, but, as Dr. Haldane has shown, when we come to look into each process more narrowly a divergence from the mechanical model appears. The interchange of gases and liquids in the living tissue does not correspond precisely to the diffusion in inanimate tissue. The reflex may be inhibited and varied in greater or less degree, and the variations are all in one direction. They are such as to serve the requirements of the entire body as a structure maintaining itself in and through changes. Thus, *e.g.*, the respiratory system works normally like a mechanism for the supply of oxygen and the elimination of carbon dioxide. But the needs of the organism frequently vary, more oxygen being required at one time and less at another, more carbon dioxide needing elimination now and less a little later on. The respiratory system shows a delicate responsiveness to these needs. Thus, on the face of the facts, it does not act like a bit of a machine, independently of the rest, but in some correlation with the living structure as a whole.

Now, it may be that this adjustment is in reality effected by a more subtle mechanism. We can in our machines introduce contrivances, like the gyroscope, which adapt their actions to the requirement of the whole going concern. The mechanical theory of life is that all adaptations in the living body are the

action, but the simultaneous or future state of other parts is not relevant, and even the past state is not essentially so, as a pull or push from any other source will have the same effect. Briefly, the action of any one part does not depend on that of other parts as such.

work of such contrivances, so that, just as there is a gross mechanism of respiration in general, so there are subtler, more cunning, mechanisms which adapt variations in respiration to varying states of the body, but all by an indirect process which preserves the independence of each several part. The arrangement, it is suggested, is such that the force operating on the part does in general vary in consonance with the organic requirement. This is planned out beforehand. But there is no method by which the requirements arising here and now act directly on the part which serves them, *i.e.*, are themselves the forces stimulating the part. Now, the existence of such mechanisms is a question of fact, but for the moment we are concerned with the definitions suggested by a certain view of the facts, and worth clearing up even if it should turn out at the end that there is nothing in nature corresponding to them. The definition suggested by the facts, then, is that in organic activity* the parts do not act quite independently of one another, but the requirements of the whole or, perhaps, of some other part are operating influences upon each part. The definition raises questions which I will return to later, but I would look first at certain other aspects of the activity of living beings.

I want to light my pipe, and feel, mechanically as we say, in my pocket for the match box. Then I remember that in this year, called of grace, 1918, matches are scarce, and I resign myself to the use of a clumsy spill, which I twist and turn about till a light is secured. There is here a little series of actions apparently determined by the end which they subserve. The expression is difficult because the end said to determine the acts does not exist when the act is performed, but the difficulty is, I think, removed if we so far alter the phrase as to

* The definition suggested is a definition of organic activity not of an organism or organic whole, which would require a somewhat more general formula. For our purpose, however, which is to contrast distinct modes of action, the definition, which indicates an essential character of organism, will be found convenient.

say that not the end, but its own tendency to produce the end, brings each successive act about. The various acts form parts of a whole which, as a whole, has a certain culminating result, the lighted pipe, and their causative relations to this result are the true determinants of the acts. They are initiated, dropped, maintained, varied, combined,—all in such ways as from moment to moment tend to the result. Thus, the purposive act is caused, so to say, by its own effect or, more strictly, by its tendency to produce the effect, and this causation brings each step into an organic relation with the other steps that are equally necessary to the effect. It may be said that this is not an ultimate analysis. A particular movement, *e.g.*, a twist of the spill, is made because it will bring the flame into closer contact with the tobacco, but it is made by my will as a consequence of knowledge and expectations left by antecedent experience in my mind. The movement of the spill, then, is not determined by its effect, nor even that of the hand by its effect, but both by my mind, its equipment, and the present trend of its impulse. True, it is within the mind that the real purpose lies, but here in its true home the essence of purpose will be found to be just what we have described. Ideas, perceptions, efforts, are taken up, pressed, discarded, varied, brought into relation in such a way as to serve the result, so that the purpose is an organisation of elements determined by relation to the effect which it produces, and if we look to the centre of this organisation, in the case instanced a desire, we find its very nature unstateable except by an inclusion of reference to the result. It is nothing if not an impulse towards an end. The tendency to bring something about does not merely determine but rather constitutes it.

Now, purposive activities, as we know them, rest on a central impulse of this type, and, certain obscure and abnormal cases apart, involve awareness of what we are doing and anticipation of what is coming. But an intelligent observer from another planet, knowing nothing of human organisation, would,

I suggest, infer logically from the behaviour of human beings that here were curiously constructed bodies determined in many of their operations by that which comes out of those operations, though by what means he might not be able to tell. His conclusion would be that there was something in those beings which secures that their actions are conditioned by their own causal tendency, and are thus differentiated fundamentally from other actions which do not vary in accordance with any results that emerge from them, but are, so to say, complete in themselves.

We have, now, three definitions before us. A whole is mechanical when and in so far as its parts act uniformly in response to the forces operating on each of them, not varying in relation to the results of their action or to the state of other parts. A whole acts organically when and in so far as the operation of any part is varied in accordance with the requirements of the whole as a self-maintaining structure. A whole acts purposively in so far as its acts are determined by their own tendency to produce results affecting the whole.

On analysis, I think the second of these definitions will be found to resolve itself into a case either of the first or of the third. How does the "requirement" of the organism operate upon the part? It may be that the "requirement" is to be interpreted as a certain physical condition falling short of the normal (or exceeding it). *E.g.*, the blood is insufficiently oxidised. The lack of oxidation may then act as a stimulus on a certain tissue such as the respiratory centre in the medulla, exciting it to an enhanced activity which redresses the balance. This is at bottom a mechanical explanation, and if all the recuperative and regenerative processes of the body can be so explained, then they are ultimately mechanical. On the other hand, it may be that the requirement of more oxygen is itself the stimulus exerting the tissue to an effort to supply it, *i.e.*, the action of the tissue is determined by relation to its result. The difficulty in this interpretation is that it

seems to make the tissue a conscious being acting with a purpose. But it is clear from a review of actions that definite purpose is the most developed species of a genus called conation. In all conation the tendency of the act towards the result is a condition, but in the lowest forms of conation this tendency is obscurely reflected in consciousness and is indirect in action. In the lowest stages it is, perhaps, no more than a felt lack or uneasiness which stimulates whatever be the characteristic activity of an organism, or an organ, to a higher pitch. If this activity begins to give relief, it is maintained till relief is fully achieved, when the need vanishes and the effort with it. If it fails the activity is, perhaps, inhibited, giving place to another, or if there is no alternative, it is increased to a maximum fruitlessly till exhaustion ensues. All these modes of response are verifiable, as Jennings has shown, among the lowest known independent organisms, and it is conceivable that something like them, or possibly some still lower grade of conation, should be found in cells of the metazoon. I would suggest, though I must leave it to others with more knowledge to apply and test the suggestion, that so far as the operation of organic parts appears to be dominated by the requirements of the organism, the operation is either due to a subtle mechanism or to a low grade of conation. If it is such that what we call the requirement of the organism expresses itself as a force operating by push or pull on the molecules of the partial structure it is a mechanism. If it is such as to cause an uneasiness in the part, and this uneasiness sets up an activity tending to remove it and continued or varied until the removal is effected, then the system is conational.* I doubt

* Observe that there is at bottom no question of the part acting without a stimulus, even if you will a force, impressed on it. The question is whether the requirement of the organism or of another part is itself such a stimulus, or whether things are so arranged that the physical condition giving rise to that requirement normally conveys a stimulus. In the apparent result the second method may be brought to

if there is another alternative. We have seen that the purposive system is organic in that its parts are essentially related to the whole which depends upon them. I now suggest that the organic system is in a general sense purposive, *i.e.*, at least conational, becoming purposive at its higher removes. The purposive and the mechanical, on the other hand, remain fundamentally distinct categories.

Whether anything exists in correspondence with the purposive category is, of course, another, and it is a harder, question. There are real and unreal difficulties. The real difficulty is to get a definite external test of purposive determination. Machines are made by the human mind and hand to execute human purposes. Though each part of such machines acts independently, yet the machine may be so contrived, by taking thought for contingencies, as to vary its action suitably to the varying requirements of the purpose which the maker had in view. The limit of such variability is that, however much the machine process may change, it must still be change from one uniform type-process to another. An indefinite number of types of required action may be foreseen and provided for, but they must all be types. Purpose, on the other hand, being *bona fide* guided by the relation of each particular act to its particular end, may be wholly individual. On behalf of the mechanical view, the reply might be made that the distinction if clear in principle is not applicable without ambiguity to actual behaviour. May not the living being be a machine devised to meet a vastly greater number of contingencies than any inanimate machine, but so devised that each contingency just supplies the necessary stimulus to the necessary parts to act in such a way as is consonant with the maintenance of the organism? On behalf of this view, there would not be lacking evidence of blindness and mechanical

coincide with the first in proportion to the delicacy of the mechanism and the power of providing for all the contingencies of varying requirements.

tendency in human, as in other animate, behaviour. Two things, however, must be said :—

(a) There seems no theoretical limit to the plasticity of human purpose. No range is too vast, no consideration too remote, no correlation too complex to affect our action if occasion calls. We are nowhere finally stopped, and it is this, not the absence of continuity in character, which is what we really mean by freedom.

(b) If this freedom of range could in any way be supposed to rest on a pre-established structure, so formed as always to act suitably to the required effect, yet without being determined by the actual relation of the given act here and now to the effect, it would postulate the operation of a creative mind of infinite scope, capable of foreseeing and providing for every detail of our individual lives. That such a structure should be the product of heredity is wildly impossible. Our evolution is from simpler and more general to more highly organized and individualized activity, and can at best only supply a structure suited to respond uniformly to situations of a general character. The mechanical view must break with evolution and postulate a Calvinistic deity and a detailed predestination. The main objection to this view is that the world is not one which we can fit in with the possible plans of a mind unconfined by any limitations. There may be evidences of purpose in the world—personally I think there are—but not of unconstrained, undefeated purpose. They are of one or more purposes that are constantly broken, limited, incomplete. Nor is there any way of escape by supposing the infinite mind to be stupid or bad, for in the region of mind badness, stupidity and limitation are at bottom almost convertible terms. There are then strong reasons for rejecting predestination. Predestination—determination by an exterior purpose—seems the only alternative to the admission of determination by internal purpose.

The more unreal difficulty is that to which most weight

has been attached. It is supposed that the whole physical world moves mechanically. The living being is physical. Therefore, it moves mechanically. Either the major or the minor premiss really assumes the point in question. We may grant if we will that everything that is purely physical moves mechanically, but is the conscious living being purely physical? If the term "purely" is omitted, the major premiss becomes doubtful. We are not to suppose a physical body somewhere within which a soul is seated, acted on by the impact of molecules and reacting upon them. What we call the physical is just as much of reality as is known to us by the senses and various inferences which we draw by putting the reports of the senses together. We have not the smallest reason to assume that what we so get exhausts the nature of any real thing, unless we find that it explains the whole behaviour of that thing. Now, in the case of living beings, we find just the contrary and, moreover, of one of these living beings, every one of us has independent and first hand information showing that it contains elements that are not physical. What is the difficulty of supposing that these elements play their part in determining its behaviour, i.e., that the living being is a psychophysical whole in which the parts are held together and their action correlated by elements—forces if you will—which are determined in their direction by the results to which their actions tend as they affect the living whole? Objection is, perhaps, taken on the ground of a supposed breach of continuity, but none such exists, if body and soul instead of being regarded as separate entities are taken as names for distinguishable (and possibly incomplete) aspects of one real being. Or, is it alleged that we are postulating a motion or change in the direction of a motion without a force to cause it? If the term force is used, not for a rate of acceleration, but for a cause of motion, that is not the case. The conative condition is a force producing motion. The question is merely in what ways and in what directions

such a force acts, and the answer that it is directed towards results in no way affects its capacity to direct motion. Or, is it supposed that causation is denied, the truth being that the attempt is merely to discover what kind of cause purpose is? That the purpose as something found in you or me grows out of what we were before is not questioned. If the objection turns on none of these points, it comes simply to this, that all causation must be mechanical—which was to be proved, but is not.



XIX.—SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING ?

By BERNARD BOSANQUET, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, G. F. STOUT,
and Lord HALDANE.

I.—By BERNARD BOSANQUET.

1. IN considering some recent literature of this question,* I am strongly impressed with the result that there are two lines of argument to be regarded.†

i. The one set of arguments appeals to the fact of existence. It rests upon the proposition that finite individuals are individual existents. Using, then, the unrestricted premiss that all individual existents are ultimate subjects, it applies this conclusion to spiritual finite individuals, together with all existent "things," including things that are parts of things. I shall suggest that a proof depending on so wide a premiss is precluded from supporting, in a serious sense, the thesis that spiritual finite individuals possess substantive or substantival being.

* I note that Professor Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, uses indifferently the terms "substantive" and "substantival." "Substantive" (p. 272) I take to mean of the nature of a substance, and "substantival" (p. 282) of the nature of a noun substantive. This is not unimportant, as the meaning of "substance" is lowered by his argument, in agreement with others, almost to that of "noun substantive." It should be noted in advance that if the latter meaning were all that is in question, there could be no doubt that any object of thought could be subject (in the sense of having "substantival" being) and any could be predicate. Though not decisive, this fact is significant, and was, of course, fully recognised by Aristotle.

† A conceivable interpretation of one of these would remove the difference. I will refer again to this point (see p. 506).

ii. The other set of arguments appeals to the intentional character of spiritual finite beings as such—to their pretensions and their implications—a question of unity as an object or ideal rather than as a subject. It deals with such matters as the self in morality and religion, with its pretension to assert a unity which it does not find existent, to be free and responsible, to remain itself even in the social bond or in oneness with God. A conclusion from such considerations would be strictly applicable to the finite spiritual individual. But I shall urge that from such considerations the conclusion must be that which I advocate, and not that which is advanced against me. The spiritual individual has a solid claim to substantive being only indirectly, and through an admission and recognition that his immediate self is of a nature which, to speak in terms of the antithesis before us, cannot be called substantive, and must by preference be set down as adjectival.

2. I will begin by stating what I take to be the essence of the first set of arguments. They turn, not upon anything peculiar to a finite spirit, but upon the fact of thinghood. Aristotle's doctrine of substance seems to be typical of them, and is adopted by Professor Pringle-Pattison,* who at this point only, I think, strikes into this first line of argument. Indifferently, as I gather, the individual man and, for example, the stone in his signet ring, are taken to be substances, as subjects that cannot be predicates.† So, according to Professor Stout, following, as he rightly says, the popular opinion, is any existent thing or existent part of a thing, an orange,‡ or a dog's tail—it does not matter how subordinate to other individuals, or how far from such self-existence as belongs to the universe. It need merely have the independence of a substantive in relation with its adjectives.§ It must be a

* *The Idea of God*, p. 272.

† Cf. Joseph, *Introduct. to Logic*, p. 50, cf. 167.

‡ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1902-3, pp. 2, 22.

§ Stout, *loc. cit.*, cf. note *, p. 479, above.

concrete—that is, though its relatedness to other things may determine its special nature (no unrelated* nucleus, so far as I gather, is reserved in contrast with such relatedness), its particular existence must not be derivative from this. But, I suppose, it is only in its fully determined relatedness that we could think of it as substance or subject. In its existence behind or abstracted from this it would be empty, a *Ding an sich*.

The limits of the class of substances which are ultimate subjects are, as I said, taken to be those of thinghood.† Any “thing” is an ultimate subject, a substantive, and, I presume, a substance (Professor Stout does not use the latter term), and, *pro tanto*, self-existent. An abstract quality may be existent, but cannot be self-existent.‡

In Professor Laird’s most solid and instructive discussion we get the best that can be done on this method.§ The soul is a substance because it is an existent unity of existent experiences,—cognition, conation, and feeling,—each of which is such as to imply a unity of itself and the others. These experiences are substances, though not self-subsistent substances. They are parts of the soul-substance, and not merely qualities of it. They are “parts of its existence” in Professor Stout’s sense. The soul-substance *is* its acts in their continuity and unity, and not including their objects. But we can identify the acts and estimate their continuity—so I read the theory—only through their objects. The soul-substance’s continued identity, from beginning to end of its experienced life-course, is but little, fluctuating, and full of gaps, and I add, for my part, full of positive incoherence, self-rejection, and self-contradiction. And we are, according to Professor Laird,

* Such as, *e.g.*, Professor Parker assumes, *Self and Nature*, p. 247.

† This, as I understand, is Professor Laird’s view, *Problems of the Self*, pp. 348 and 354, and also Professor Parker’s, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

‡ Parker, *loc. cit.*

§ See especially the conclusion, p. 360 *ff.*, and *c.f.* p. 195.

not entitled to affirm its pre-existence nor its post-existence to the life we experience, though neither are we entitled to deny them. We are told, indeed, of a claim to freedom, independence, responsibility.* I cite a characteristic sentence. "We know what our souls are, we know the meaning of their identity, we know the sense in which they are distinct and independent in the world. Because we know these things we should hold fast to them," etc.

It is a great thing to find a clear issue. These words, taken in their context and supported as they are supported, precisely express what I am anxious to deny. They define, as I gather, the conclusions of that first line of argument to which I am referring, and the position they lay down exactly embodies the popular misconception which to me appears most at variance with fact.† For here, as I understand the issue, we can assert nothing without passing into argument of the second type. The proof of distinct existence is no basis for predicates such as those connected with freedom. That proof applies to all things and parts of things, and to all minds of brutes. And for these it clearly carries no such implications. Therefore, by itself, it cannot do so for other beings.

So far as the first line of argument has carried us, the distinction between substantive or substantival on the one hand, and predicative or adjectival on the other, amounts to nothing more than the distinction between a complex of predicates, presupposed as connected in a single focus of apprehension, and a predicate or predicates separately referred either to such a nexus, or to the one ultimate subject whatever that may be. There is no such thing as a predicate or adjective which is not referred to any subject at all. Now, we know

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 356, 366.

† Cf. Professor W. E. Hocking on "The Holt-Freudian Ethics," *Papers in Honour of Josiah Royce*, p. 270. "It is not by the possession of any soul-substance that I am defined a self, but it is 'by this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal'" (*cf.* p. 278).

that thinghood or existence gives no guarantee whatever for the relevance, either to each other, or to the propositions made about the existent, of the predicates presupposed to be connected in it. Locke's wonderful section* tells us that nothing can be guaranteed to exhibit within itself the conditions of the attributes we ascribe to it. In other words, the conception of any thing, as a unitary subject, though we assume that it has some degree of intrinsic connection, can have no definite limits assigned it. There is no proposition about it which can be known as strictly and adequately true. The familiar impossibility of determining what is and what is not so much as to be called a "thing," reinforces this argument.† There is no ultimate reason for taking one complex, at least below conscious individuals, as a single thing more than another. They include one another in innumerable subordinations, from the Sahara, for example, or any patch of it, down to any grain of sand in it. A thing, therefore, as an existence, can have no claim to be an ultimate subject. It is, as such, a provisional subject, and has, of course, a being and reality, and is necessary to the universe. But it is selected for convenience of special knowledge or practice, and justifies its selection in indefinitely varied degrees. This, we have seen, the argument before us admits.

It should be noted at this point that the phrase "ultimate subject" suggests a type of subjects to which subjects of all types are reducible. If we apply the words in this sense to finite individuals, then either the proposition which applies them is obviously false, or finite individuals must include, for example, such subjects as civilisation,‡ society, nature, propositions about which are certainly irreducible to propositions about persons or things. This result would destroy the

* Essay, IV, vi, 11.

† Laird, p. 353 ; *My Logic*, i, p. 129.

‡ Joseph, *Introd. to Logic*, p. 168 ; Laird, p. 339.

pre-eminence claimed for singular beings in the pluralistic sense. It would force us to recognise a series of subjects progressively nearer to being ultimate, up to the universe.

But can a thing, even considered as a provisional subject, ever be regarded as adjectival or as a predicate? Mr. Joseph* says very reasonably, in explaining the general view which I, for one, have adopted: "There is no desire to deny to individuals a relative independence, or to pretend that the relation of attributes or universals to the concrete individual is the same relation as that of an individual to the system of reality which includes him." And of course this is so, while we are in the attitude presupposed by the first line of argument. The whole point of this is that it forgets the abstraction under which it apprehends the structure of experience.

What follows, however, from the above explanation is this. The complex taken as one with some existent, and commonly accepted as a thing or solid starting point, substance or subject, *de novo*, is in truth, as we saw, a set of determinations which, with or without some pretence to system, are wholly inadequate and self-contradictory as a subject to the proposition in which they stand. Their real function and position, therefore, is like that of other adjectives or predicates which are identified with an existent as conditions explaining some of its characters, or as predicates explained by some. You cannot ascribe predicates truly to the existent as you apprehend it. You ascribe them to reality on conditions roughly indicated by the marks of that existent. "Reality as indicated by the characters of gold is heavy." "Reality as including certain aspects of the geological history of our globe is the Atlantic Ocean." In short, "Reality is such that at or in S it is P."

This is the formal account of the existential affirmation. Its essential truth seems to me obvious. Locke's section is enough to justify us in setting down most existents as subordinate to

* *Logic, loc. cit.* I do not mean that he adopts this view.

the universe in such a way as must surely be called adjectival. Adjectival does not mean abstract or in the air. The adjective "agrees with" its substantive. Its name implies at once attachment and detachment. Any point in the nature of a substantive can be taken apart and made an adjective of it. We do not, indeed, think of the features currently presupposed in the solid subject, the starting point of judgment, as adjectives. Yet the adjective, when distinguished, remains attached, and presupposes in its own nature the nature of its substantive.

When this is considered, we are driven to treat highly subordinate existences as adjectival to their superordinate existences. They are emphasized in detachment from them, but they qualify them, and lose either significance or, in some cases, the conditions of existence if viewed as detached from them. It is mere formalism, dependent upon a substantiation of provisional subjects, that hinders us from saying so. And we have seen that the formula which says otherwise—the current formula S is P —is false. R in S is P , or R as S is P , applicable to part as qualifying whole, is the formula which we want, and which we shall find expressing the spiritual truth in the second line of argument with precise fidelity. It leads us somewhat to extend the usage of the term "adjective," in proportion as we note the superficial and provisional nature of ordinary substantives. To take Professor Stout's homely instance, it is plain that the dog's tail qualifies the dog. It is among the first things you note as decisive of his kind or his beauty. When we are told it is a part of the dog's existence, and not of his nature, this is a plain overstatement. It is meant that it *also* attracts attention for its own sake, and is a "this thing" with a nature of its own presupposed in it. And you can try to look at it so; but you cannot really adhere to such a point of view. Neither existence nor nature belong to it by itself. The possessive genitive, which marks it as a part, and as having its value in being a part, marks it no less as being of

a predicative nature. You cannot think or speak of it without such a genitive. If you try to do so, you think or speak falsely, making an abstraction which you forget. If you remember the abstraction you are making, the term becomes predicative at once. The same applies to all parts of things. When we come to parts of spiritual wholes, the argument is at a different level, and yet more decisive. But there is still a word to be said to emphasize the predicative nature of parts in highly unified wholes, even on an existential basis.

You can predicate any part of a structure, of the whole as subject taken in a certain aspect. It is what, so considered, the whole becomes. It is no bar to such subordination that it may possess a particular structure which repeats that of other particulars, and so is distinct from them and side by side with them. Its particular structure, *e.g.*, as a unity of acts which imply each other,* is no bar to its taking on a special shape and character expressive of its subordination to and within an inclusive structural system. At this level, in the comparison with common thinghood, it is a fair parallel to point out that the unit divisions within the whorls which are irrecoverably merged into the single orchid blossom have, each within itself, overlaid by the inclusive structure, the whole leaf-nature with its appropriate equipment of spiral vessels. Our minds, if they could be visualised, although they repeat in each an analogous structure, would not look like self-contained shapes, each repeating the other side by side like our bodies set in a row. They would look like bits of machines or organs of organisms, fragmentary and incomprehensible till the whole were supplied to which they respectively belonged, each with its driving-bands or nerves or wireless aerials hanging loose around it, all senseless and self-contradictory apart from the inclusive structural system. This would be the case even if their internal structure were ultimate. It would be merged and

* Professor Laird's soul-substance.

overwhelmed as instrumental to a wider identity. It is so continually in the daily life of fully developed intelligences. But, further, the alleged internal structure is secondary.* We can have experience below any such structure, and we might have it above.

I note the common refuge of semi-pluralist reasonings in admitting that finite individuals are interrelated, but only *in some degree* determined by interrelatedness.† To me this seems an evasion. It is meant to suggest a crowd of co-ordinate individual reals, like Herbart's, entering into relations which are secondary to their private being.‡ But these co-ordinate reals are pure assumption. There is nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness: and the plain fact is that of super- and subordinate reals. You cannot possibly draw an absolute boundary line round any reals but spirits; and they, as we shall see, have power explicitly to negative the boundary which, in a sense, they suggest. When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival I do not merely deny non-relatedness:§ what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness. We are speaking of the typical relation of an individual to the universe. I am surprised that this should have been compared to the relation between a shoe and a foot, or a son and a father.

We shall see further reasons below for admitting that provisional subjects taken in their whole reality¶ are best considered as characters predicable of the universe. And the

* See Bradley, *Appearance*, p. 477.

† Stout, *loc. cit.*, p. 21; Pringle-Pattison, p. 274; Parker, p. 246 ff.

‡ It is most remarkable how Professor Parker favours such an assumption by instances naively taken from superficial wholes. The terms "pre-exist," "native," and "acquired," applied to the individual, betray this fallacy, pp. 246, 254, 271.

§ Pringle-Pattison, *loc. cit.*

¶ *Id. ib.*

¶ The soul-substance, as we shall see, is not the whole reality of the finite individual.

analysis of the judgment which I have suggested agrees fundamentally and especially with the nature which full experience demands for the finite individual spirit.

It is urged that individuals are none the less apprehended as they really are, if apprehended as distinct individuals in spite of belonging to a superior whole. Abstraction or analysis does not involve falsehood.* On this the comment indicated above seems to me simple and decisive. The question is whether, in considering the subordinate individual, the abstraction involved in attending to it *pur excellence* is forgotten or is remembered. In the popular attitude—the attitude to which pluralist or semi-pluralist reasonings appeal—it is forgotten. And the individual taken as real on that basis is, therefore, partly unreal, and its appearance is in some degree illusory. In the attitude to which we shall finally appeal, which regards the substantiality ascribed to the self as intentional, the abstraction involved in apprehending the subordinate individual is unforgotten. This means, in other words, that it is annulled, that the claim often made in argument† is really justified, and that the provisional individual is apprehended in its true place, and in unity with the superior whole. So far as it can be thus apprehended it is or would be real. Its appearance is so far not a “mere appearance,” and involves no element of illusion. So apprehended, as in the second line of argument which I shall consider, and not otherwise, it may fairly be called substantial. But this is not in its own right, for it is then revealed as an adjective at once attached to and detached from its substantive.

3. I now approach the second line of argument, and must address myself to Professor Pringle-Pattison’s position. In the main he and I are arguing on common ground, a ground much narrower than that on which my discussion has so far moved,

* Stout, *loc. cit.*, p. 23 ; Parker, pp. 257, 265.

† Stout, *loc. cit.* ; Parker, *loc. cit.*

though at one point, as it seemed to me, he retreats to that less relevant basis. For the most part, however, we are both reasoning about spiritual finite beings and on the basis of their claims and implications.

Our common ground, as stated by Professor Pringle-Pattison himself,* includes a negation and an assertion. We both *reject* "the old doctrine of the soul-substance as a kind of metaphysical atom." We both believe that the mere individual nowhere exists; "he is the creature of a theory." "Both his existence and his nature (his 'that' and his 'what') are derived. It is absurd to talk of him as self-subsistent or existing in his own right." I need not multiply citations. Again, we both *assert* that if we could possess ourselves entirely "we should be . . . either the Absolute *in propria persona*, or Browning's 'finite clod untroubled by a spark.'" "All this, then, is common ground."

The main difference between us is indicated in the sentence which forms the theme of this discussion. So far as the term substance is implied by Professor Pringle-Pattison, its meaning is lowered† to something like noun substantive, and expressly guarded against implying Spinozistic substance, or self-subsistence. It is expressly identified with Aristotelian substance, or the character of any and every subject which cannot be a predicate. The argument here drops down, as I said above, to the level of resting upon distinguishable existence or concrete thinghood, taking no account of what is special to a finite spiritual being. He would even admit that an individual might be adjectival, if that only meant interrelated with other reals. To me, as I said, the term would imply subordination in place of co-ordination—the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it. So far, our disagreement is marked. I should have

* *The Idea of God*, pp. 257-260.

† See notes, p. 479.

held, indeed, that our previously noted agreement covered this point, and required him to admit the finite being's intrinsic subordinateness. But he does not understand it so. All this, however, as we saw, amounts to little more than an argument from distinct existence.

Appealing, also, to a further line of argument, he has more important characteristics to insist upon. These may be fairly summarised under two heads. There is the topic of membership of the Absolute, and in connection with this, what I may coin a phrase to express as the teleological status of finite spirits in the universe. And there is the kindred problem of freedom and self-distinction in the great experiences of which love, social morality, and religion are typical examples.

I am criticised for rejecting the notion of the membership of finite spirits as such in the Absolute. I partly explained my position on this point in the *Mind* notice of Professor Pringle-Pattison's book, and I need not be lengthy here. I rejected the term membership, because I thought it would commit me to what we both repudiate,—eternal substances, differentiations of the absolute, identified with finite selves. Here I follow Dr. McTaggart's logic,* though not his opinion. In view of our imperfections there must be, he argues, a chasm either between the Absolute and the finite self as we experience it, or between the finite self as we experience it and its own reality. He accepts the latter alternative, I find myself driven to the former.† So far as this choice goes, I may claim my critic's assent. He rejects with me the pluralist's eternal substances. And I would call attention to the expression, which he cites with approval from Professor Laurie, that the predicates of the Absolute are

* *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, sect. 39.

† Unless in a further sense the Absolute were taken as the reality of all finite selves.

the worlds.* Something of this kind was also in my thoughts, both in conceiving finite individuals as predicative in character, and in holding at the same time that some more inclusive differentiations than finite selves would be more fittingly considered predicates of the whole.

It was a motive to this opinion that I could not bring myself to hold finite selves to be necessarily eternal or everlasting units. I cannot be sure whether this is intended to be a subject of complaint against me. My critic nowhere rejects my view, but he seems to find fault with my theory for implying it. And I do not say that transience is incompatible with membership in a non-transient whole. But obviously, taken along with the other imperfections of existent selves, it affects the kind of membership which can be ascribed to the transient. The analogy with the lower animal mind presses upon us here. Do I understand it to be argued that M. Arnold's Dachshund† *was* or *is* an individual member of the Absolute? If he was, I should hardly object to calling all finite spirits also members of it in at least a parallel sense. For he was individual, surely, rather for others than for himself; and this is very noticeably the line of the critic's argument at this point. If we rely on such superior insight into individuality, we abandon the position that the self has membership in the shape in which it experiences itself. If he was not an individual member, and I should have thought this the more appropriate language, I should urge that the high and unique value which my critic claims for that "little self" shows that what we really need for our estimate of finite beings can be satisfied without our taking upon us the hazard of asserting membership for every finite spirit as it stands and experiences itself, with all its imperfections on its head, and all its gamut of degrees.

Therefore, I think that my critic's teleological status of

* *The Idea of God*, p. 174.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

finite spirits*, though in the general line of my own convictions, is too rigid and exacting a view. He holds that the development into finite spirits—our spirits as we know them—must be the chief end and aim of the Absolute. I cannot escape Dr. McTaggart's argument. I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be. And I recur to my critic's own words. If I possessed myself entirely, I should be the Absolute, and, I continue, I should not be what I experience existentially as myself. Suppose the "worlds" to be realised were not you and I and the Dachshund, but beauty, truth, and love in different renderings through different "created" systems. We, perhaps, might be instrumental as trivial elements to one such world.

Membership in a sense, of course, there must be in the Absolute for all its elements. It is the form of membership, whether as we exist in experience or otherwise, that sets the problem. If reality is temporal, a transient existence as such can have but a very passing tenure of membership; and, surely, must possess some other form of reality than individual being as a member. If reality is timeless, the transient existence must symbolise some participation which is not confined to its passage in time. I will try to fill out these hints below.

I could have modelled my statement into an almost complete agreement with Professor Pringle-Pattison, for the explicit difference between us is one of proportion and degree. But as there underlies this a real contrast of tendency, which he has rightly felt, and as it depends on a point of view which I am exceedingly desirous to emphasise, I will express my position as uncompromisingly as possible. I was not asked to open this discussion in order to gloss over a radical discrepancy of feeling, but, I suppose, in order to make it explicit. And, therefore, I will state the rest of my argument in terms of the

distinction between the two attitudes to life, which, as I suggested at first, are respectively embodied in the two sets of arguments we are concerned with, and between which I am desirous to express my preference.

The remaining issues which I have to discuss with my critic amount to the problem of free self-determination on the part of the spiritual finite individual, and the conceivability of confluence between such individuals, or their transmutation and absorption in the Absolute. I believe that I can best sum up my own whole argument, and explain my position as to the points just mentioned, by trying to set out the two fundamental attitudes to which I have just referred. The distinction between them is founded on the idea that the truth of our apprehension of individuals within a whole—that is, the reality of the individuals so apprehended—is relative to the degree in which we have forgotten or have not forgotten—are unawake or awake to—the abstraction involved in apprehending them.

i. The popular attitude in considering finite individuals, whether things or persons, is frankly pluralist. Alike in contemplating the natural and the human world, it models itself on the apparent self-identity of the movable and self-coherent body. It is reinforced by the current conception, an alternative expression of itself, which confines identity to linear or successional continuity, the so-called existential or numerical identity of individual things. In one of the most recent and capable discussions of the self we have this assumption quite naively expressed. Identity is only within one thing. Between two things there can only be similarity.*

This attitude is further confirmed in the case of human beings by theories of the first look,† which deal with them as

* Parker, p. 42 ff. The assumption is most remarkable in view of the extended use of identity in difference which Professor Parker makes within the "numerical" individual.

† Cf. *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 80 ff.

members of a crowd. The apparent self-completeness of our bodies, and their external repetition of a single type, side by side, as free figures devoid of material co-adaptation or connection, occupy our vision, blinding us to the moral and spiritual structure which lies behind the visible scene.

And, once more, all this is emphasised as the very sign even of our spiritual lives by our religious individualism, which re-echoes the metaphysical doctrine of substance in a popular shape. We are brought up to identify our self and our destiny with the history of a substantial soul, by implication pre-existent to our experienced life, and certainly post-existent to it; continuous, therefore, throughout our passage in time, and concentrating our hopes and fears upon its particular development through life and beyond as the sum and climax of our value.

This attitude of mind, the outcome of a natural bias and prolonged tradition, is very far from giving way when the orthodox dogmatism which reinforced it has decayed. Our being and our destiny are still thought of in terms of a linear progression; and the inherent demand for self-completion is construed as a desire to "go on" and continue our achievement *in propria persona*. The reality of life's issues is made to depend upon their prolongation for each of us beyond the existence which we experience between birth and death. If we do not "go on" in person, so it is implied, our values lose their reality. The connection is expressed in the familiar rhyme:—

"Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
'Dust thou art, to dust returnest,'
Was not spoken to the soul."

We see here how naturally the reality of values seems to connect itself with the persistence of particular souls. For a younger generation, the vehicle of such an ideal is probably different, but the moral atmosphere, if I read our

literature right, remains for the most part the same. Hope, anxiety, and expectation fix themselves at every moment on the linear future, and if this basis is shaken, the substitute is not a wider outlook, but despair.

I do not see how it is possible to maintain that any attitude even remotely resembling that which I have indicated does not involve forgetting the abstraction by which we attend to finite individuals within the whole of experience. The doctrine that identity is exclusively numerical, or of existence, is enough by itself to determine this point of view, of which it is indeed a concise rendering. And the contention that a substantive character, or that of an ultimate subject, is coincident with thinghood exhibits at once the obviousness of the position and its untenability.

ii. I pass to the further attitude which comes to us partly through the experience of life, as in morality and religion,* partly through science and philosophy. Here we find that in various degrees we are becoming conscious of the abstraction, subject to which in every-day and practical life we conceive both the "thing" and the spiritual finite individual. In fact, we had already transcended it in the recognitions which morality and religion imply. But our power of abstaining from explicit reflection on what we have practically recognised is, as we all know, extraordinary. Thus, it is only in science and philosophy that the abstraction under which we currently conceive the thing and the person is at all completely undone "for us," as contrasted with "in us."

The case of the "thing" is simple: but, as the essence of the first attitude was to treat individuality on the basis of thinghood, it is well to recall, what was mentioned above, that there is really no standard of thinghood.† Distinct individuality, at any rate below the level of mind, is a question of degree:

* Which themselves exhibit different degrees of it. Morality is very far more "forgetful" than religion.

† See *ref.*, p. 483, *supra*.

and there is none such whose boundaries cannot be indefinitely extended into the natural world, whether in scientific or in æsthetic* experience.

Turning to the spiritual finite individual, we feel ourselves here at last attempting to deal with him in his proper character. We have no doubt of his unity, his freedom, his real and substantive being, which in principle and on the whole, though still subject to limitations springing from our impotence, yet reveals the individual in the general or typical light in which he must be taken as truly experienced within the universe.

I will recur to the two features† which I proposed to treat from the present point of view. I will try to explain, that is, how in this attitude we should approach the individual's claim to unity and to freedom.

We are confident of our individual unity. It is in our experience as existents continually interfered with and broken down, but all this failure we resent and repudiate. In existence, however, as we feel every day and every hour, it is not realised. The continuity of our whole succession of experiences amounts to little, and much which existentially attaches to it we reject and deny to be truly our belonging‡. None the less, it is our nature to be a single self. We claim it as a right, and accept it as a duty. Our very repudiation of elements within our existential complex means the rejection of what we cannot unify. We carry with us a pretension to be ourself, which includes less and more than we find in our existence. Our unity is a puzzle and an unrealised aspiration. It is demanded by thought and action, but we cannot find it in existence.

* As when a painter is said to paint on the whole of his canvas at once.

† Cf. p. 480, *supra*.

‡ If by a miracle a man of sixty could have himself, as a boy of ten, introduced to him and open to his insight, is there anything, apart from external history, or bodily marks, by which he could identify the boy with himself?

This, and not our experience of our acts, is the secret of our confidence that we are one. We are so, because to be a thinking being is to demand a unity, and every act of such a being is an attempt to realise it. But philosophy tells us, as we agreed, that if we possessed our unity, we should no longer be what we experience our existence as being. Here, then, is our substantive reality, in which we are not mere features, predicates, characters, but are seen, apart in principle from abstraction, as substantival solidly founded entities, possessed of an indefeasible unity.

Yet, what is the nature and structure of this reality? Is it the self as we experience it in detail? Surely not; or it is that self, but in an illumination more intense than the customary, and revealing a further structure. It is a substance and an ultimate subject, but not in its own right. Its existence, as an existence, bears the unmistakeable stamp of the fragmentary and the provisional. Can there be any one who does not feel it so in every act and every thought? But through all this, and operative in it, there shines the intentional unity. It is not my moon nor my star. It is the life which lives in me, but it is more of that life than I succeed in living. I *am* substantive and subject, then, but only so far as I recognise myself to be adjective and predicate. If, forgetting the abstraction, I set up to be in myself a self-centred real, I become *ipso facto* in the main a false appearance and all but worthless. This is when I come nearest to being a substantive in my own right, in error and in sin. How can I be a false appearance if I actually appear? Is not the answer very simple? I can mistake the character in which I appear. I seem to myself, perhaps, to be the King, and I am the fool. There is, then, just this much truth in me, that I am here upon the stage, thus much, and no more.

Then, let us think of freedom—man's character in morality and religion. The paradox of its nature is familiar, and needs only a few words to exhibit its connection with the present

argument. The attitude from which we started sees freedom wherever the objects of volition are selected by any response of the self. Thus, at every point, the linear self—that which lies in a serial continuity of acts—is accepted by this attitude as substantive and independent. And it is true, as I have argued throughout, that this self has existence, and a status which represents itself as independent on the basis and analogy of thinghood.

But on reflectively weighing the experience of religion and morality we necessarily supersede this attitude by that other of which we are speaking. We become aware of lateral, so to speak, as well as of linear, identity, and are forced to undo the abstraction under which we were judging. We find that we were like a horse in blinkers, blind to all that is not straight ahead. We begin to apprehend the individual as within the super-ordinate wholes to which he belongs, and so to estimate in their reality both him and them. For the individual, as we are accustomed to accept him, there could be, we begin to understand, no self, no will, no knowledge, no morality, no religion. Apart from the content of his centre there could be no feeling self; apart from their objects his acts are an empty form; and in all his objects there is no object that is not universal and derivative. His identity with the community, we observe, is not reducible to similarity between him and other individuals. It lies in the participation of moral substance, and in the reciprocal adaptation of structure, on the part of all apparent units, to identical and indivisible function.*

A man is free†—we now restrict the expression—in so far as he wills the universal object. The reason is obvious. It is only what is universal that is free from self-contradiction. It is only what is free from self-contradiction that can be willed

* See above, p. 486.

† It is a mis-take of fact to say that freedom is most strongly felt in mere choice, Parker, p. 296 : contrast Laird, p. 124.

without obstruction. Every contradiction in my world of experience obstructs my action and embarrasses my will; and every pain or defeat or confusion of which I am aware, in any subject or object apprehended by me, is a contradiction in my world. I am only free in such objects of volition as confront with adequate solutions the situations which I apprehend.

Thus, in accordance with a familiar paradox, it is only in a will above my own that I can find my own will and my freedom and independence. Here, again, it is only by acknowledging myself adjectival and under necessity that I can become substantive and free. Observation of life at its highest effectiveness fully harmonises with the analysis of the judgment suggested above. In all serious moral action, in all social volition or religious self-determination the form of experience is "Reality in S is P." The moral universe in me expresses itself thus. There is always an incoming wave of identical object-consciousness. Nothing can come of nothing; and by itself myself, consisting of its acts, is nothing.

I will speak of two special points that might cause a difficulty,—the question of initiative and the question of confluence.

If every community consists of individuals, and if the wills of all individuals are derivative, where is the source of derivation? Everything seems derivative from what is itself derivative, that is, from other individuals. The answer lies in the recognition of lateral as well as linear identity. The communal will, for example, though revealed in a number of individuals, is a single thing as much as external nature, which is revealed in the same way. Participation in its structure makes every particular unit an individual, that is, a particular, in which the universal or the identity assumes a special modification. His will is made out of the common substance, and, even when he rejects and reverses the form in which it is seen elsewhere, his volition is still dependent on it. The

relation is familiar to us in every structure of elements. If all the elements are gone, the structure is gone; but yet the functional character of the structure is not co-ordinate with all or any of the component elements as such. It is really in the universal function that they have even their structure.* It is this property of being a centre, in which the universal spirit applies itself to the concrete situation, which gives the spiritual individual just that note of independence which is claimed for him. If nothing beyond, so to speak, the local centre were in operation, there could not be the growing sense of necessity which is the mark of all serious will, and indicates the shaping of the common life to the special environment. Some compare the volition to the judgment. The comparison is illuminating for volition. The judgment is not the response of a punctual centre, but the self-shaping of a full world.

Then, again, is the confluence of selves conceivable, and is there any analogy or example in its favour? I might argue that the knot is cut by the admission that if we possessed our self we should be the absolute; for certainly we should then include or be blended with innumerable other selves. To explain further. What seems to me important is to set free the idea of the self; to recognise that the self is constituted just by what it is and what operates in it; and that its limits and distinctness flow from this, and not this from any given thing or being. Two theoretical points are here concerned. There is what I have called lateral identity—identity of co-existent being as contrasted with that of a thread continuous in succession. It seems to me all-important for a free and full understanding of the self to make at least as much of co-existent as of continuous identity. Otherwise, we unnaturally narrow down the basis of our self. And there is the emptiness of the ego, which it appears to me that Professor Pringle-Pattison and Mr. Balfour misconceive with really amazing perverseness.

* Haldane, *Organism and Environment*, Lect. IV.

The point, as I take it,* is that if the ego has a prior content, apart from what it unifies, unification becomes impossible. If the self is to be free and self-modelling, the ego must be a mere spirit of unity working in and throughout experiences. Otherwise, it must bring with it some character or nature which would be an antecedent condition biasing and restricting the development of the soul or self.

I am accused of not at all appreciating the idea of the self. I will try to summarise and distinguish precisely what seems to me right in the common view, what I should like to see recognised in addition, and what associations of the common doctrine I wish to repudiate.

1. I agree that the self has existence as a function which is a system of functions.† It is not a mere adjective in the sense in which P is so taken in the formula S is P.

2. But I think it should be recognised that—

i. Belonging to the self is a matter of degree, and all its belongings, including its not-self, are contributory to the being of a finite individual.

ii. The self and its not-self are concretely real only as identified by modifications of universal content‡ and by apprecipient systems.

iii. The existence of the self is not adequate to its implied unity, which is a pretension inherent in a thinking being.

3. Such an attitude to the soul as is expressed in Swinburne's very splendid lines, "Because man's soul is man's god still" (Prologue to *Songs before Saurice*), ought, as it seems to me, to be rejected.

In face of current commonplace assertions about the independence and initiative of the finite individual, or of the self, there are some undeniable, though hardly less commonplace

* See *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 325; *The Idea of God*, pp. 128-9.

† *My Logic*, I, p. 2.

‡ See Laird, pp. 199, 246.

observations, which should not be forgotten, and which I will summarise by way of recapitulation.

α. The self as defined in (1) above has no content and can originate nothing. The finite individual thing in nature has, so far as we know, no separately distinguishable nucleus. The spiritual individual is the utterance of his place and time—a sub-variant of the content of his age, and a derivative of his family stock like a bud on a plant.* And, if we abstract from these conditions, he is nothing.

β. Judgment is said to be my act, and is even compared with volition (not by me). But is it controllable by my self, whatever that can mean? It is, surely, the conclusion of my self-moulding whole of knowledge; and, if it is genuine, I, as my punctual self, cannot affect it at all. The world judges in me, though from my point of view. The analogy with volition would extend the application of this remark.

My love and hate are not controllable by others. True, but the remark is too narrow. For they are not controllable by me. No one, I think, has said that you can love and hate as you wish. How easy life would be, if you could! It is urged that in the "great experiences," say, love, social morality, and religion, you must yet remain distinct from other personalities; you must have "otherness."† But the remark appears to me to miss the point. Your regeneration in these experiences does not spring from anything which the other personalities previously contained. It is an introduction to a higher individuality, of which the plural persons are instruments like the carbons of an arc light. They are contacts which draw on the forces of the universe, not on themselves.

γ. The individual's expressive powers belong to his free communication with nature and the thought around him.

* Laird, p. 358.

† Pringle-Pattison, p. 289.

They may be impeded any day by obstructions to memory or apprehension, and he can do nothing to help it, but so far ceases to be.

8. A simple analogy from knowledge supports the conception that the perfection of the finite individual would imply a change in his identity, and possibly an absorption into another's. If my philosophy were made complete and self-consistent, I am sure my critics would admit, it could no longer be identified with that which I profess as mine; but would probably amalgamate with that of someone else, and in the end with that of all. I do not know why the same should not be the case with my self.

We must remember that the claim to have synthesised distinct personalities has actually been made,* and the stability alleged to have been gained by the process is in harmony with all probability. The difficulty of separate bodies was absent in the case alleged, but it seems as if this might be no more than a practical difficulty. Common language admits one self in different bodies, and the "general will" seems to be an indisputable fact.

All this is matter of degree, of which the extreme psychological curiosities are not the only or the more important cases. The illuminating comparison is between the extremes within our recognised, our normal self, and those "selves," whether vicious, morbid, or exceptionally great, which we feel unable to reckon as fully belonging to the former. Even the identity of selves which are *prima facie* external and side by side is none the less real for being mediated, and can become, as we know to be true of the reciprocal recognition of intelligent beings, all but immediate. Fully to "enjoy" the self, we want much more freedom in repudiating the self sequential upon us, and accepting that beside us. Our continued self-identity is apt to be a fetish which becomes a slavery. I may add as an illustration that

* In the Beauchamp case.

while no one feels the facts of moral responsibility more strongly than I do, it always strikes me as a grave injustice that a man should be severely punished for an offence of very old date; though, of course, it would not be practically permissible that intentional evasion should involve escape.

There is one more word to say. Our theme is not the soul or self, but the finite individual. And the reality of the finite individual is not confined to his temporal existence as a soul or self.* Where his action and influence extend, he is so far real, beyond his existence. Our failure to grasp the connection where it is remote seems simply to mean a want of apprehensive power on our part. It seems impossible to hold that men who have lived in the past are not real so far as their thoughts and characters are present and operative† to-day. They are not here in full personality, but their reality would be diminished if its activity of to-day were subtracted from it. It is often maintained that what is a fact once is a fact for ever. But this must not be taken to mean that the whole reality of the fact is compressed within its existence and eternally petrified. The reality of the battle of Waterloo is still liable to change and increase.

It seems to follow from this point of view that spiritual individuals must qualify the universe not merely as subordinate existents, which declare themselves adjectival in claiming attachment to their substance, but, more finally and completely, as predicates *pur sang*. The point becomes plainer and more urgent when we hold their existence as selves to be very transient. If the series of events is the reality, then a quality of individuals, outside their existence, is the chief way in which they are present in the reality. If reality is non-temporal, it is timelessly characterised through them by such a quality, reinforced by whatever character corresponds to a brief passage

* See p. 487, above.

† See Nettleship, cited *Value and Destiny*, p. 264.

in time. In any case, we have seen, this problem presents itself, on the current view, about the minds of brutes, on the unique value of each of which nevertheless so much has been said. The whole question is analogous to that which is now being raised about the localisation of objects in space. They are, it is suggested, wherever their very various appearances are operative or are perceived.*

Thus, individuals not merely exist for a brief space in the world, but characterise it as permanent qualifications. This is what the poets have said, and it seems to be true. I need not quote the Adonais, but I will cite some humbler verses of a recent writer:—

“Walking through trees to cool my heat and pain,
I know that David's here with me again.
All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
Caressingly I stroke
Rough bark of the friendly oak.
A brook goes babbling by; the voice is his.
Turf burns with pleasant smoke.
I laugh at chaffinch and at primroses.
All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
Over the whole wood in a little while
Breaks his slow smile.”†

We all, so far as we know, exist in the world for a very short time; of course, we make a difference in it, and are necessary to it. But this is only to say that we have existence, and there is no thing, nor part of a thing, of which so much cannot be said. It does not, therefore, seem to follow, from our existence only, that we are worlds into which the universe is primarily organised: and our transitoriness and imperfection are such that to draw a sharp line between ourselves and inferior existents on the ground of our given unity does not seem feasible: while, if we appeal to our intentional pretension to unity, the moral of this, as we saw, points in another direction.

It is more natural to suppose that our brief existence is the

* Parker, p. 69; Dr. Haldane, *loc. cit.*

† *Fairies and Fusiliers*, Robert Groves.

temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as, in any case, constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world. For what appears as a passage in time, the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units. And there are indications which point in this direction, and suggest in what kind of worlds, or higher complexes, we might find our completion. While we serve as units, to speak the language of appearance, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters,* which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe.

I reserved a conceivable interpretation for the primary attitude which I described, reinforced as it was by traditions from the metaphysic of substance. Suppose that this metaphysic or theology† dealt with substances eternal indeed but created; and that such creation ought to be understood, as Kant apparently must have understood it, though the fact is seldom noticed, to imply an underlying oneness with the creator.‡ Then, what the doctrine really signified for religious thought was a communicated and derived substantiality, founded on a sense of unity, whose ultimate meaning was unity with the creator—a unity not conditioned by time. Then, the conception of substance, whose withered husk has become the support of pluralism, and has been lowered to the level of thinghood and existence, would have meant essentially an attempt to insist on the eternity of all spirits in God. I presume that this was not so for Aristotle. But Aristotle did not speak the last word on the subject.

* I may refer to the paper, "Unvisited Tombs," in *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, 1918.

† I admit that my idea of it comes chiefly from Dante. For the point in question, see *Purg.*, 17, 109.

‡ Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 188, 196.

II.—By A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON.

The vital interest of this discussion centres in what Professor Bosanquet has aptly called "the teleological status of finite spirits in the universe"; and it is plain, as he says, that no settlement of the question whether such spirits are to be regarded as substance or adjective in the common or Aristotelian sense of these terms can determine that status, seeing that the term thing or substance is commonly applied to innumerable objects, animate and inanimate, to which we should never dream of attributing the status and destiny which have been claimed for the human individual. I do not mean, therefore, to dwell at any length on Professor Bosanquet's criticism of what he calls the first set of arguments: and it is the less necessary for me to do so, as he acknowledges that my own argument in *The Idea of God* depends, in the main, upon other considerations. I did, however, pointedly refer to the confusion introduced into the debate by the Spinozistic use of the term substance and the description of all "provisional subjects" (things or persons) as "predicates" or "adjectives" of "the one true individual Real." My conviction of the forced and misleading nature of such terminology was amply confirmed by the difficulty I had in persuading the compositors and readers of the Clarendon Press to accept the word "adjectival" in this connection at all; it evidently to them made nonsense of the sentence in which it occurred. I will try, therefore, to re-state my reasons for holding this use of terms to be radically misleading and a subtle pre-judgment of the whole question at issue.

"Reduced to plain prose and ordinary English usage," I said, "the adjectival theory of the finite is simply the denial of unrelated reals."* Professor Bosanquet says, in his present

* *The Idea of God*, p. 274.

paper, that it means for him more than this: "When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival, I do not merely deny unrelatedness; what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness," and, again, "To me the term would imply subordination in place of co-ordination—the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it." I do not think, however, that this distinction in itself points to any real difference between us. The word co-ordinate is not mine, but in my view reals which are inter-related with one another, and in that sense co-ordinate, will naturally be subordinate to the systematic whole in which they are included as parts. A difference would only exist if interrelation (to use my own word) is held to imply the doctrine of self-existent and initially unrelated reals. So, apparently, Professor Bosanquet interprets it; but, surely, the *prima facie* suggestion of the word is the precise negation of such an unmediated pluralism. In my book, at any rate, pluralism of this description is combated explicitly and implicitly at every point of my argument. Setting aside some metaphysicians of the pluralistic variety, therefore, I think the rest of mankind would readily agree that any individual thing "qualifies" and "characterises" by its existence and character the nature of the whole to which it belongs. The nature of the whole would be different if the individual in question did not exist, or if its individual character were other than it actually is. This would be true, e.g., of any material system and its parts, or of any social whole and its members. But when we transform this admission into the statement that the provisional subjects in question are "best considered as characters predicable of the universe," although there may seem to be only a verbal change in the form of expression, we have passed in reality, under cover of the verbal change, from the general relation of whole and part to the specific and quite different category of substance and accident, thing and quality, in the traditional and ordinary sense of these terms. We have committed ourselves, in short,

to the uncompromising doctrine of Professor Bosanquet's *Logic* that all finite individuals "are in ultimate analysis *connections of content* within the real individual to which they belong." The words which I have italicised contain the *crux* of the situation; and they reflect precisely the confusion which leads Spinoza to resolve all things and persons into modes of the attributes of God. For although Spinoza puts his own sense upon Substance, and treats it, like Professor Bosanquet's Reality, as the one all-inclusive individual, his conceptions of attribute and mode are entirely based upon the traditional contrast of substance and quality as applied in the Cartesian system to the two cases of mind and body. Hence, as a mode of the Divine attribute of thought, a human mind is simply a complex of ideas, as it were an objective ideal content, continuous with the rest of the system of ideas which together constitute the infinite intellect of God. Spinoza has no account to give of the unity which makes each individual mind a separate centre of thought and action; persons are merged in the ideal continuum of the infinite intellect, and the identity of the intellect and the will becomes the most characteristic doctrine of the system.

Professor Bosanquet's treatment of all finite individuals as merely "apparent," "superficial," and "provisional" subjects is entirely in line with Spinoza's account of them as substantiations due to "imagination," uncorrected by reason; and it leads him similarly to the conception of the universe as a continuum of interconnected content within, or referred to, the one ultimate subject. Hence, the stress laid on the doctrine that the true form of predication is not "S is P," but "Reality is such that at or in S it is P"—where the "at" or "in" is, I would point out, an inconsistent concession to the ordinary view, which substantiates S. What the judgment expresses, on Professor Bosanquet's principles, is, I take it, a connection of content, and the only proper formulation is, therefore, "Reality is such that S implies or is accompanied by P." This, if I am not mistaken, was the form in which the doctrine was first

propounded by Mr. Bradley, and it has the effect of abolishing the singular judgment altogether and reducing all propositions to hypotheticals or scientific universals of the type, "If S, then P." In other words, what the judgment immediately asserts is a connection of qualities, but in order that these universals may not be left hanging absolutely in the air, the predicative relation is restored by referring or attaching the qualities so connected, along with all similar connections of qualities, to R, the one ultimate subject. But, surely, this indiscriminate and unmediated reference to Reality is as unnatural as, *e.g.*, Berkeley's attempt to resolve all the things and happenings of the external world into the immediate acts of God. And, as I have urged in my book, and as I particularly desire to urge again in this more general reference, it ignores entirely the concrete texture of existence as distinguished from the abstractions of the intellect. For the existence of a world at all just means individuation. Every existent is a "this," a "one," a being in a strict sense unique, even although, in the case of inorganic objects, one may readily admit that the bounds of what we treat as an individual depend largely on our immediate interest or practical purpose. According to that interest or purpose, any part of a spatial or temporal whole may become in its turn a whole, but the point is that every part so attended to exhibits the same characteristic of concrete thisness. The relation of whole and part has, in short, nothing to do with the relation of substance and accident: and the much misunderstood idea of substance, as applied to every existent thing, and to any of the parts into which an existent thing may be subdivided, is at bottom simply an attempt to express the characteristic structure exhibited by concrete reality at any point, of being a "this" as well as a "what," a being possessing qualities and not a mere conflux of universals. or, in other words, a highly complex adjective. The uniqueness which comes from the occupation of different parts of space or moments of time is, of course, the lowest or most imperfect

form in which individuation manifests itself, and a merely inorganic view of the physical world may well be an abstract way of looking at the facts.* In any case, the physical world as a whole must be interpreted in the end as organic to the world of life and consciousness. It is in living and sentient beings that we seem first to meet the real individual, for in these the unity and centrality are in no wise imposed upon the facts by our way of regarding them. They are objective in the sense that they express the essential mode of the creature's existence. The organism in commerce with its environment as a responsive centre of feeling and action, and in all its activities a self-maintaining whole, thus becomes for us the clearest type of the process of rounding to a separate mind, in which, at a higher level, the creation of the self-conscious individual consists. The higher we go, the more clearly does individuation impress itself upon us as the very method of creation, or, to speak less theologically, as the central and most characteristic feature of the cosmic evolution. If, then, we follow out this indication, so far from being a vanishing and relatively unreal incident in the process, the finite spiritual individual, with all his potentialities, tends rather to appear (if one may speak teleologically at all in such a reference, as the only conceivable goal of the divine endeavour.

Such in outline was my argument, or at least my suggestion

* A biologically-inspired thinker like Dr. Haldane declares that "the idea of life is nearer to reality than the ideas of matter and energy, and, therefore, the presupposition of ideal biology is that inorganic can ultimately be resolved into organic phenomena." There being, as he forcibly argues, "not the remotest possibility of deriving the organic from the inorganic," he holds that, "in tracing life back and back to what appears at first to be the inorganic, we are not seeking to reduce the organic to the inorganic, but the inorganic to the organic. . . . What were at first taken for the origins of life from the inorganic have gradually turned out to be definite living organisms. But biology will not stop at these; she will gradually push her advance victoriously further and further into the domain of the apparently inorganic."—*Mechanism, Life and Personality*, pp. 100, 104.

by way of commentary on Professor Bosanquet's on the whole grudging and depreciatory treatment of the finite self. Yet, as I began by admitting, the status of finite spirits in the universe cannot be decided by proving that they are substances in the ordinary sense, for many such substances are at once insignificant and transient. Professor Bosanquet's attitude to the self seemed to me, however, to be the outcome, or at any rate the culminating instance, of a general refusal to recognise the significance of numerical identity as the basal characteristic of concrete existence. The very phrase seems to offend him: every reader will recall the scornful distaste with which it is handled from time to time in his pages. Doubtless, it is of no value in itself. It is no more than matter without form, the frame without the picture: and the significance of any individual lies in its content—in the values realised in its life. But Professor Bosanquet's exclusive preoccupation with content leads him to forget that content is equally an abstraction, if severed from the centres of experience—the beings—in which it is realised. Truth, beauty, love—all the great values—what meaning have they apart from their conscious realisation in a living individual, finite or infinite? Professor Bosanquet appears, however, to think of content as a self-existent continuum and of the conditions of individual existence as comparable to partitions introduced into this continuum (as we might let down vessels of different shape into a stream) by which one section or area is temporarily enclosed and, to its own misfortune, isolated from the rest. Hence, the removal of these arbitrary divisions leads naturally to the conception of the "confluence" of selves, the supplementation of one by another, and eventually to the confluence or fusion of all finite selves in the Absolute.

It was this conception of the confluence of selves and a similar expression about the "overlapping" of intelligences which led me to assert that, "if one were inclined to put it strongly, one might almost say that Professor Bosanquet's"

theory does not contain the idea of self at all; the world is dissolved into a collection of qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the Absolute. And again, just because of the failure to appreciate the meaning of finite selfhood, it is difficult to say whether even the Absolute is to be regarded as a self or not—that is to say, whether what is called the absolute experience possesses the centrality or focalised unity which is the essential characteristic of a self, and, in its degree, we may say, of everything that is real.”* A self may be largely identical in content with other selves, and in that sense we may intelligibly talk of “overlapping,” but to speak as if their common content affected in any way their existential distinctness is to use words to which I can attach no meaning. So, again, a self may cease to be, but it cannot coalesce with another self; for the very meaning of its existence is that it is a unique focalisation of the universe. And the same thing applies to the “transmutation and absorption” of finite selves in the Absolute: it is hardly disguised either by Professor Bosanquet or Mr. Bradley that such transmutation is equivalent to the disappearance of the individualities in question. Yet, Professor Bosanquet returns, I see, in his present paper to the ideas of confluence and absorption and supports them by “a simple analogy from knowledge.” Just as his philosophy might be improved (in the opinion of his critics) by incorporating elements of truth from other quarters, and might thus even become in the end a system of absolute truth, so he himself (the analogy runs) might amalgamate with other people and in the end attain perfection as the Absolute. I could not desire any better illustration of the confusion against which I am contending than this comparison between the piecing-out of an impersonal system of thought and the life-course of a moral personality which, however it may bud and blossom and ripen to maturity, must grow always from its own root

But it is time to turn from this general argument to the special considerations which must determine the survival or non-survival of human persons. These are discussed by Professor Bosanquet in the latter part of his paper, and although there is here a considerable extent of common ground, there is in the end, as he observes, "a real contrast of tendency" between us; he even speaks of "two attitudes to life" as embodied in our respective arguments. First, as regards the points of agreement: I do not hold, any more than Professor Bosanquet, that finite selves are "necessarily eternal or everlasting units;" or, in other words, that they possess an inherent and inalienable immortality. Such an indestructibility was supposed to be demonstrated by the old metaphysic on the ground that they are unitary and indiscerptible substances. This argument, if it had any vitality and convincing power before Kant, has certainly not survived his criticisms in the *Paralogisms*. I consider the traditional notion of the soul-substance a piece of covert materialism, and I have strongly repudiated the apparent revival of the doctrine in Dr. McTaggart's theory of eternal substances. I agree entirely with Lotze that "so far as and so long as the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, and is named, simply for that reason, substance. The attempt to find its capacity of thus knowing itself in the numerical unity of another underlying substance is not a process of reasoning which merely fails to reach an admissible aim; it has no aim at all. That which is not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes itself good as such, is, simply on that account, the truest and most indivisible unity there can be."* I would even emphasize the initial "so far as and so long as," for I consider the substantiality of the soul in this sense not as a gift from above, conferred once for all, but as a matter of achievement. What is given is simply the opportunity; the

* *Metaphysic*, Book III, c. 1, English translation, p. 430.

achievement is a question of degree, and is dependent moreover on resolute and continuous self-maintenance.* Consequently, I agree with Lotze further that, in regard to immortality, we can expect from philosophy no demonstration of the old pattern; we have no other principle for deciding the question beyond this general idealistic conviction, that every created thing will continue if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world.†

Again, while I think that the denial of human survival must profoundly affect our general view of the world, I cannot agree that the doctrine of immortality is, as some would make it, the cardinal article of a philosophic or religious creed. Professor Taylor, for example, following other defenders of the faith, recently declared that if "in this life only we have hope," pessimistic atheism seemed to him the only alternative to the Christian faith.‡ Surely this is an over-statement. I confess I never listen to the strange lapses in St. Paul's Resurrection argument without recalling Clifford's nobler conclusion: "Do I seem to say: 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' Far from it; on the contrary I say: 'Let us take hands and help, for this day we are alive together.'"§

A belief in personal survival may well make the difference between what might be called roughly the Christian and the Stoic view of the world. But Stoicism was a noble creed, which expressly inculcated a religious attitude to the universe, and it has been the nurse of noble characters. William James seems to state the case here fairly when, in one of his early papers on pragmatism, defining theism and materialism by their practical consequences, he finds the differentia of theism, as contrasted with the "utter final wreck and tragedy" of materialism, in its

* Cf. *The Idea of God*, p. 413.

† *Metaphysic*, p. 432.

‡ In a paper contributed to a volume of essays on *The Faith and the War*, p. 149.

§ *Lectures and Essays*, I, p. 226.

assertion of "an eternal moral order." "A world with a God in it to say the last word may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of Him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that where He is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things."*

"The Good, the True, the Pure, the Just,
Take the charm 'for ever' from them, and they crumble into dust."

The "for ever" in Tennyson's lines refers, of course, to his favourite theme, the immortality of the individual; but it is the permanence of our ideals themselves, as expressing the eternal foundations of the word, which is the irreducible minimum of a reasonable faith and the irreducible minimum of the moral demand we make upon the universe.

I expressed this view with some emphasis at the close of my second lecture in a passage which has been referred to with approval by Professor Bosanquet, Professor Mackenzie and others. But the passage was not introduced, nor did the context present it, as a considered judgment in a negative sense on the question of immortality itself. It was a protest, as I indicated, against the absence of a sense of proportion in the discussion, and also, I may say, against the vehemence with which immortality appeared to be asserted by some of the disputants as a personal claim. For I find myself much in agreement with Professor Bosanquet when he insists that, at the religious standpoint, we have left the world of claims and counter-claims far behind us. It is difficult to conceive of anyone claiming immortality as a right *for himself*, on purely personal grounds; indeed the idea of a "right" in such a reference is so incongruous that to make such a claim might almost be said to disqualify the claimant. And even on the sacred ground of the human affections, perhaps the ultimate attitude of the religious man would be that expressed

by Carlyle in one of the pathetic outbursts of his *Autobiography*: "Perhaps we *shall* all meet Yonder, and the tears be wiped from all eyes. One thing is no Perhaps; surely we *shall* all meet, *if* it be the will of the Maker of us. If it be not His will, then is it not better so?" It is certain, at all events, that our conclusions as to the value and destiny of the individual must ultimately depend upon our conception of God and of his relation to his creatures. If we can reach any positive convictions, they will be based not upon human claims but upon the perfection of God and his nature as Love. In the sequel of my argument this conception of the divine Life and its consequences were gradually developed, and the permanence of individual personality came accordingly to be more and more insisted on in opposition to the transient function assigned to it in Professor Bosanquet's theory.

I agree with him that it is desirable in the interests of this discussion not to gloss over any radical discrepancy of feeling or contrast of tendency in our respective views, and as he has re-stated his position "uncompromisingly" in the concluding pages of his paper, I will be as uncompromising in my reply. It seems a hard thing to say, but a reading of this re-statement confirms the suspicion already indicated that, in all his thinking, Professor Bosanquet completely fails to realise the elementary conditions of selfhood. In his theory there is no real self at all, either of God or man, but only a logical transparency called the Absolute. In speaking of finite selves he seems never to look at them from the inside, if I may so express myself, but always from the point of view of a spectator momentarily concentrating attention upon them in abstraction from the social whole which is their setting. He insists, quite rightly, that if our minds could be "visualised" in this way, "they would not look like self-contained shapes"; they would appear "fragmentary and incomprehensible . . . all senseless and self-contradictory apart from the inclusive structural system." But because a mind cannot be extracted

and exhibited as a self-contained whole apart from "the moral and spiritual structure" in which it is rooted, it does not follow that the mind or self is simply a punctual centre in which a system of moral and social relations reflects itself into unity as rays of light are concentrated in a focus.

The existence of the self for the self is an experienced certainty; it is, in a sense, the ground on which we stand. We must take up our stand accordingly *within* the self, and our philosophy must be able to account for, or at least to find room for, this mode of existence and the measure of freedom and independence which it involves. Now, conscious experience reveals itself in the triple character of knowledge, feeling and will, and every conscious fact exhibits these three aspects in an indissoluble unity. Although this is obscured in theories which lay exclusive stress on knowledge and, in their pre-occupation with the content known, forget the act of knowing and the feeling which is inseparable from it, experience proclaims itself everywhere, under proper analysis, as the experience of self-centred individuals. And, by common consent, it is the volitional aspect of that experience, the facts of will, culminating in deliberate moral choice, in which the consciousness of "authorship," as Professor Parker calls it,* is most indubitably present. The authorship of our own acts and our responsibility for them—this is the inmost meaning of our freedom and independence, and any theory is self-condemned which can find no room for this elementary certainty. Professor Bosanquet evades this issue when he talks disparagingly of "mere choice" and makes play with the familiar equivocation between freedom, meaning the capacity of choice between good and evil, and freedom in the sense of willing "the universal object," accepting "a will above my own," in a word, the achieved harmony of the perfect moral will. His references are to "all serious moral

action, all social volition or religious self-determination." "The moral universe in me expresses itself thus" is the proper formula, he tells us, for such experiences, just as he says elsewhere of the judgment—the "genuine" judgment—that it is not properly my act; "the world judges in me, though from my point of view." But what of judgment which is not genuine, what of volitions which run counter to the moral universe, volitions in which, in Professor Bosanquet's own words, "I set up to be in myself a self-centred real"? Professor Bosanquet edges away from the difficulty with the parting shot for his opponents that it would appear to be precisely "in error and in sin that I come nearest to being a substantive in my own right." There is, however, no question of being a substantive "in my own right," but only of the selfhood which is implied in having a will at all; and the fact remains that, on Professor Bosanquet's theory, error and sin are totally inexplicable. How can I take up this attitude of opposition if I have not some kind of existence over against the spirit of the whole, if there is not some otherness in the relation between us? And one becomes tired of pointing out that exactly the same is true when, in religion, we bow to a higher will and accept its purposes as our own; the surrender of the selfish will implies the power to assert it. Where is the merit or value in the self-surrender if the whole process is a make-believe on the part of the Absolute? If the Absolute is the only agent in the case, how can it will anything *but* the universal?

The truth is, Professor Bosanquet's general theory is of the type mentioned above, in which the logical analysis of knowledge is substituted for an account of living experience. The logical analysis of knowledge yields us no more than the Kantian unity of apperception, which, as such, is no real self (whether human or divine) but simply the ideal unity of systematised knowledge. Kant himself equates the subjective unity with the idea of Nature as a "Natureinheit," or

systematic unity. It is the idea of the unity of the universe as an intelligible system, an idea which Kant insists is a *necessary* idea, the necessary presupposition of any knowledge whatsoever. I am far from disparaging the importance of this conception in its proper reference—in logic or epistemology—but to treat the postulate of knowledge as itself a real being—the so-called universal consciousness—is, in effect, to hypostatise an abstraction. And if we restrict our attention to knowledge-content, there is no ground discernible for the distinction and multiplication of personalities. These are at best only different points of view—peepholes, so to speak—from which an identical content is contemplated. They are distinguishable, therefore, only by the greater range of content which they command and the greater coherence which they are consequently able to introduce into their world-scheme. The natural consummation of such limited points of view is to be pieced together and harmonised in the central or universal view-point from which, with all the facts before us, we should be able to see them all in their proper relations as a completely coherent system. The existence of finite centres at all is a superfluity for the theory, which accepts it (somewhat ungraciously) as a fact which cannot well be denied, but a distinction whose “precarious and superficial nature” it cannot sufficiently emphasise.*

It is noteworthy how Professor Bosanquet tends to preserve the same attitude even in the moral sphere, where volition is so fundamental, and the clash of wills so much the crux of the situation, that here one might have thought it would be impossible to ignore the individual selfhood involved. There is, first of all, the Spinozistic assimilation of volition to judgment. Then, as in the parallel case of knowing, we have attention directed from the act of will to the content willed; and, as it is

* Compare for this attitude Professor Bosanquet's second lecture in *Value and Destiny*. Cf. also *The Idea of God*, p. 276, and the passages there quoted from *Appearance and Reality*.

difficult (Professor Bosanquet tells us) to maintain that any action willed is intrinsically and absolutely bad, evil comes to be regarded as simply good in the wrong place. "It is the narrowness of man's mind which makes him do wrong. He desires more than he can deal with. What he can make his own, as a set of values which do not conflict, is but little. And of what is extruded something refuses to be suppressed and forms a nucleus of rebellion." But the constituents of this bad self are not bad in themselves. It is only that "good, being narrow," is "opposed by omitted elements in the character of evil"; and as "the antagonism which makes it evil depends on finiteness," it "must vanish if finiteness is transcended." In other, if cruder, words, our wills are evil because we cannot will everything at once. In the Absolute, where all possible objects (we may conceive) are willed together, all possible desires will be fulfilled. What was evil, or appeared so, will come to its rights as good: or, to speak more strictly, the contrast of good and evil will be transcended, the Absolute being "beyond good and evil" in the ethical sense. The preceding quotations are from a paper on the "Reality of Evil" in Professor Bosanquet's volume of essays just published,* but the same doctrine was expounded in the seventh Lecture in *Value and Destiny*.† "The stuff of which evil is made is one with the stuff of which good is made. No tendency or desire could be pointed out in the worst of lives or of actions which is incapable of being, with addition and readjustment, incorporated in a good self. The evil attitude is an incident of the good, asserting the same sort of aims and asserting them as good, and only asserting them against the acknowledged good system, because the acknowledged finite good and the finite creature are unable to adjust themselves to each other in an all-inclusive system." In such a system, "there is room for the character

* *Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 106-7, 115.

† Pp. 215-17.

of all evil, redistributed and resystematised, just as there is in truth for the elements of all error." And in this context occurs the famous passage in which A and B are shaken up in a bag together to make a perfect man, and the Absolute is described as a limiting case of such a process.

What are we to make of this attempt to present error as a species of truth, on the ground that it "is an arrangement in the same world as truth and deals with the same realities," and of the parallel proposal to treat evil as a kind of good because good and evil are made of the same "stuff," that is to say, are both judgments on human "tendencies and desires"? On me the suggestion makes much the same impression as the materialistic reduction of the universe to a problem in the re-distribution of matter and motion. There is a similar determination to reach a formal identity by abstracting from differences on which the very character of the universe as a spiritual cosmos depends. In the case of error, we are told, there is only a "confusion between realities," which can be got rid of by "re-arranging and re-adjusting the conditions of the statement," and a judgment of moral condemnation may pass [similarly] into one of approval if we sufficiently "redistribute and re-systematize" the elements of characters with which it deals. But such a statement as the last has no relevance whatever, for moral judgments are not passed upon particular tendencies and desires in the abstract. These may be said to belong to the pre-moral world of animal innocency. The moral judgment deals with the character of an individual agent as revealed by his action in a concrete situation. It was not my purpose, however, to discuss the nature of good and evil in all its bearings. I adduced Professor Bosanquet's treatment of the subject as the crowning instance of his tendency to disintegrate the individual personality and reassemble its abstract elements in the Absolute. The natural effect of this treatment of the lesser individuals is gravely to compromise the claim of this ultimate individual to be itself concrete, in the sense of

being a self-conscious experience or life. It tends to become merely the logical unity of an abstract or impersonal content. Or, if we do treat it as an agent, the agency is of the Brahmanic type, in which there is no real difference or "otherness" between the Absolute and its creatures. It feels and thinks and acts in them :

I am the doubter and the doubt
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

My position, on the contrary, is that belief in the relative independence of human personalities and belief in the existence of God as a living Being are bound up together. The reality of both God and man depends on the reality of the difference between them. Thus I interpret the meaning of creation. The process of the finite world is not a game of make-believe which the Absolute plays with itself;* it means the actual origination of new centres of life and agency, not created by a magical word of evocation, but given the opportunity to make themselves. Professor Bosanquet, in his chapters on the "Moulding of Souls,"† describes this process suggestively as one of "eliciting our own souls from their outsides"; but he admits later that "elicit," though a useful word, "covers an almost miraculous creation which it does not explain."‡ The chapter in which this remark occurs is headed, indeed, "The Miracle of Will," although in the sequel of the argument the author hardly lives up to his title. The process is in truth not simply "almost" but wholly miraculous, if by that is meant that, in the nature of the case, we, who are its products, cannot understand the method of our own creation any more than we can fully reconcile to ourselves the separateness and moral independence of the status achieved with the relation of

* As suggested, for example, in Emerson's lines :

"They know not well the subtle ways
I keep and pass and turn again."

† *Value and Destiny*, pp. 79, 97.

creaturely dependence which is involved from the beginning and persists to the end. But the process goes on daily before our eyes in every case of the growth of a mind, and we do well, with Lotze, to accept the miracle as an ultimate fact. And my contention is that it is to be accepted, not as an unexplained and puzzling exception to an otherwise intelligible scheme of things, but as itself the illuminative fact in which the meaning of the whole finite process may be read. What meaning or value can the process have, "from the side of the Absolute," save as mediating the existence of spiritual beings, objects of the divine care and love, and themselves capable of responsive love and fellowship?

Professor Bosanquet says, in his present paper, that "I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be." It is a becoming confession and one in which I hope we should all heartily join. But to put the case in that way is hardly to put it fairly. It is not I, "such as I experience myself to be," or, as he puts it in the previous page, the finite spirit "as it stands and experiences itself with all its imperfections on its head," which can be conceived as the end of the Absolute (and apparently the finished result of all its pains); it is the spirit as God knows it and intends it to become, the spirit with its infinite potentialities and aspirations and *the consciousness of its own imperfections*, which is the fulcrum of its advance and the guarantee of a nobler future. This is what Professor Bosanquet means by the "intentional," as opposed to the "given," unity of the self. Our unity, he says, is "a puzzle and an unsatisfied aspiration"—it is a "demand," a "pretension," which is never made good. And he takes the line of arguing that because the desire for immortality, so far as it is conceived in a religious spirit and deserves serious consideration, is not a desire for the perpetuation and stereotyping of my present self in all its poverty and meanness, but rather a desire to be fashioned more and more in

the likeness of a perfect humanity, therefore it is not a desire for personal continuance at all, but, strictly speaking, he seems to say, inconsistent with it. It is identification with perfection which we seek, in the sense of merging our own personality altogether in that of the perfect Being. As he puts it in his Gifford Lecture, it is not "our" personality but "a" personality, whose eternity the moral and religious consciousness demands, and so it is "no puzzle," he concludes, "no 'faith as vague as all unsweet,' to offer the eternal reality of the Absolute as that realisation of ourself which we instinctively demand and desire."* Surely, this is to misread the situation. Because I desire to be made more and more in the likeness of God, I do not therefore desire to *be* God. The development of a personality in knowledge and goodness does not take place through confluence with other personalities, nor is its goal and consummation to yield up its proper being and be "blended with innumerable other selves" in the Absolute.[†] As Socrates said on one occasion, "whatever else may be doubtful, this is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." In spite of Professor Bosanquet's fresh attempts at justification, and in spite of the ecstatic utterances of the mystics, I maintain that the idea of blending or absorption depends entirely on material analogies which can have no application in the case of selves. "I surrender my soul heartily to God," wrote Labadie, the French Pietist, in his last will and testament, "giving it back like a drop of water to its source, and rest confident in Him, praying God, my origin and ocean, that he will take me unto Himself and engulf me eternally in the divine abyss of His Being." The physical metaphor dominates the whole conception. But absorption or

* *Value and Destiny*, pp. 282, 288, Lecture IX, "On the Destiny of the Finite Self." As I am controverting the general conclusion, I specially desire to recognise the high and serious level, both of thought and feeling, at which the subject is discussed in this lecture.

† Cf. *supra*, p. 500.

"engulfment," in the case of a spiritual being, means only the extinction of one centre of intelligence and love, without any conceivable gain to other intelligences or to the content of the universe as a whole. Did Labadie suppose that he had not already his being in God, "without whom nothing can be or be conceived," or that a union founded in knowledge and love and conscious service is not closer and more intimate by far than any which can be represented by the fusion of material things? Did he suppose that the engulfment of his private being could in any way enrich the fontal Life from which it sprang? Surely, his value to God, or that of any other worshipping saint, must be held to lie in the personality of the worshipper. The existence of an individual centre of knowledge and feeling is, in itself, an enrichment of the universe; and the clearer and intenser the flame of the individual life, the greater proportionally the enrichment. To merge or blend such centres is simply to put out the lights one by one. In the society of such individuals, and in their communion with God, the supreme values of the universe emerge; and it is not personal vanity which suggests that for the Absolute such communion must possess a living value which no solitary perfection or contemplative felicity could yield.

This value, according to the view suggested, is not of the kind implied in Professor Bosanquet's usual type of statement *e.g.*, "the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units," "the Absolute lives in us a little and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasize."* In such statements we still have what I will call, for the sake of emphasizing the distinction, the pagan, egoistic or self-centred view of the Absolute, which conceives its life on the analogy of aesthetic enjoyment, the doings and sufferings of the subordinate units

* *Suyter*, p. 506.

contributing to this supreme experience the note of danger and tragedy, the sympathetic thrill of heroic daring, endurance or self-sacrifice, but all still conceived, in the main, as the dramatic interest and emotion of a spectator. And the emphasis on the contributory function of the units makes it seem as if the whole were but a play staged in order that the Absolute may enjoy those dramatic thrills. I do not say that such a description does full justice to Professor Bosanquet's conception, but such is the impression frequently conveyed by his statements; and it is the self-centredness of such a Being which I have impugned in my book as falling short of our highest standards of human excellence, and therefore *a fortiori* unworthy of the divine perfection. In the fine essay on "Unvisited Tombs," to which he has referred us, Professor Bosanquet quotes with effect a passage from a novel of the day, in which the ambitious aims of one of the characters are contrasted by the speaker with his own more modest outlook:—"For my part, I care infinitely more for the small things of life—love, friendship, sympathy." "The small things! Good Lord!" said the bishop, and his jaw dropped. He also dropped the subject." Professor Bosanquet's commentary is the same as the bishop's, "the greatest things of all no one can take away." Even "beauty and knowledge," he indicates, lofty and universal values though they are, do not stand beside them. And the saying of Pascal is well known:—*Tous les corps ensemble, et tous les esprits ensemble, et toutes leurs productions, ne valent pas le moindre mouvement de charité, car elle est d'un ordre infiniment plus élevé.* If Love, then, becomes the ultimate expression of the divine nature, as it is in the Christian conception, self-centredness must disappear; the divine life must be a life with and for others, and the otherness must be real and not only apparent.

But all this, it may be replied, does not guarantee the permanence of individual finite spirits, for the condition of otherness is equally satisfied by successive generations of conscious beings, each of which is transient and yields place to

another. Here, again, however, I would apply the idea of the divine perfection, appealing for the interpretation of the more and the less perfect, as we needs must, to our own experience. I remember many years ago reading a little book by one of our minor poets, in which he expounded with some complacency what he called "The Religion of a Literary Man." Among other serious topics which he handled was that of the Hereafter, in its bearing on friendship and the death of friends. We love our friends, he argued, not, as we often say, "for themselves," but for their possession of certain qualities—"for their good nature, their wit, their beauty, or whatever their qualities may be; and these qualities are to be met with over and over again, possibly in still more satisfying harmonies. Thus we have not to wait to meet our old friends again in heaven, we meet them again already on earth—in the new ones." The rest of the book I have quite forgotten, but this sentiment has remained in my memory as a signal instance of poverty of feeling and shallowness of nature. The application of the reminiscence is obvious. Are we to attribute to the divine Friend and Lover of men a levity of attitude which we find offensively untrue of our ordinary human fidelities? Are we to liken Him to a military commander, who is content, if fresh drafts are forthcoming, to fill his depleted battalions? To the military system, men are only so much human material, so many numerable units; but a chance encounter with one of the men in the flesh, a touch of human-heartedness, is sufficient to dissolve the abstraction which so regards them.

My references to the question of individual survival, both here and in my book, are of a general character. The considerations adduced represent, it might perhaps be said, an "attitude" towards the question rather than any determinate, far less any dogmatic, solution of the problem. Certainly, they need not be applied in any rigid or mechanical fashion—as if we should insist, for example, that everything born in human shape inherited thereby an indefeasible title to an eternal

destiny. Personality has to be won before there can be any question of its conservation.* Achievement, moreover, as we saw, is a matter of degree, and depends on continuous self-maintenance. There seems no reason for denying the possibility of "dissociation" or disintegration, caused either by acute disease, as in the morbid cases of which Professor Bosanquet cites a remarkable example, or due in other cases to more ordinary causes. Mere sloth and self-indulgence may induce a condition of moral flabbiness in which a man becomes little more than a loosely associated group of appetites and habits. Some persistent purpose, or rather some coherent system of aims and ideals, is required to constitute a real personality. If this is not present, or is not maintained, we lose hold of ourselves, as it were, and the body alone continues to confer a semblance of unity on this group of flickering impulses and animal, or semi-animal, satisfactions. When the bodily frame is dissolved, how should the self continue in being, seeing that it has already long ceased to exist as a moral unity? Must not the destiny of each spirit inevitably be confided in this sense to itself alone? As it is expressed in Matthew Arnold's sonnet.

"The energy of life may be
Kept on after the grave, but not begun :
And he who flagged not in the earthly strife,
From strength to strength advancing—only he,
His soul well-knit, and all his battles won,
Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life."

I cannot close without drawing attention to the enigmatic paragraph with which Professor Bosanquet concludes his paper. I should have thought that "the eternity of all spirits in God," spirits being taken as "substances eternal indeed but created," and creation being understood "to imply an underlying oneness with the creator," resembled very closely the doctrine which I have supported. But this runs so counter to the general tenor of his argument elsewhere that I am doubtful as to his precise

meaning. I confine myself, therefore, for the present to the expression of a hope that if he exercises the right of reply, he will amplify to some extent the very interesting but tantalising suggestions of these concluding sentences.

III.—*By G. F. STOUT.*

IN the present discussion, the topic formally proposed has been treated as subordinate to another problem, that of the "teleological status" of individual minds as bearing on the further question of their continued existence in a future life. What is the connexion of the two questions? If we agree that individual minds are subjects and not adjectives, this, of itself, helps us very little in determining their teleological status? On the other hand, if we agree that they are merely adjectives, this may make a great deal of difference to our view of their relative value. At any rate, for Professor Bosanquet, the question of the teleological status of finite individuals is inextricably bound up with his view that they are adjectives and not ultimate subjects; and this, again, follows immediately from his general theory of predication.

I shall, therefore, begin by examining this logical doctrine. I shall then consider his view of the value of finite individuals as determined by his logical theory. In conclusion, I shall discuss the value of the finite individual, independently.

I.

To determine precisely what Professor Bosanquet intends to assert in his theory of predication, we may start from the following passage (p. 487) in which he tells us what he means to deny. "When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival, I do not mean merely to deny non-relatedness; what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness." From this it follows, on the negative side, that no relatedness of one part

of any kind of whole to other parts is a relation of subject and adjective. Positively, it follows that every relation of a whole to a part or partial feature of it, considered as such, is a relation in which the whole is subject and the part its adjective. The universe, therefore, as all-inclusive, must be the only subject, and whatever has a limited being must be merely an adjective of the universal reality. The logical basis of the theory which regards the universe as the sole subject of all adjectives is the identification of the relation of subject to adjective with that of whole to part—of the “superordinate” to the “subordinate.” We must then begin by examining this general logical theory.

In the first place, what, precisely, does the theory mean? Clearly, we are not here confronted merely with a proposal to extend the application of the words “subject” and “adjective.” What is meant is that the dog’s tail, inasmuch as it is a living part of the living animal, is an adjective of the dog in the same sense as its colour, shape, barking, and eating.

In justifying this position, Dr. Bosanquet uses one main line of argument. He attempts to show that adjectives which characterise a part as such always characterise the whole as such. If one end of a stick is in contact with the ground, the whole stick is in contact with the ground at that end. If my hand grasps a tea-cup by its handle, I grasp the tea-cup with my hand, and the tea-cup, as a whole, is grasped by the handle. Inasmuch as one end of the rainbow is violet, the rainbow is violet at this end. Inasmuch as the mainspring of a watch is elastic, the watch is elastic in this part or as regards this part. Verbal statement of the equivalence may not be always so easy or natural as in these examples. But the principle holds universally. What is a character of a part, as such, is *eo ipso* and *pro tanto* a character of the whole.

But this is not what requires to be proved. The original thesis was not merely that all adjectives of the part are adjectives of the whole, but that the part itself is an adjective.

Professor Bosanquet seems to take it as evident that the second of these propositions follows from the first. He does not consider the possible alternative that the same characters may belong to two subjects ultimately distinct from each other, *e.g.*, the tail and the dog. If the alternative appears paradoxical, it should be remembered that we are here moving in a region of apparent paradox. It can, I think, be excluded only if we make a further assumption which would not be accepted by everybody, though I am not myself prepared to deny it. It must be assumed that a subject is not something distinct from all its adjectives, definable only as that to which they belong; but rather that it is nothing but the complex unity including all its adjectives. On this view, "snow is white" means that whiteness is one among other adjectives contained in the unity of a single complex which is identical with what we call snow. The identity of the subject is the identity of the one complex which includes what we call its adjectives. This being understood, it does seem to follow that if all the adjectives of the part are adjectives of the whole the part itself is an adjective of the whole. For this merely means that the adjectival complex which is the whole contains the adjectival complex which is the part. The tail is thus an adjective of the dog in essentially the same sense as sweetness is an adjective of sugar. One consequence which is directly implied in this position is that the whole, as subject, is identical with each of its parts; and that each of its parts, as subject, is identical with it and with every other part. Each part is distinct from the whole only as a partial complex of adjectives contained in the comprehensive unity of the whole; and one part is distinguished from another only as an adjective of the same whole,—only as the colour of the dog is distinguished from its shape. Regarded as subjects of adjectives, the dog *is* its tail, the dog's tail is the dog, and the dog's tail *is* also its stomach. It is, therefore, perhaps, futile to urge against the general theory that whole and part must ultimately be qualified by distinct adjectives, inasmuch as

the whole includes but is not included in the part, whereas the part is included in the whole but does not include it. To say this is to meet the theory by a blank denial instead of criticism. For precisely what is maintained is that the whole as subject is included in the part, as the sugar that is sweet is included in the sugar that is white.

Thus, the unity of the universe as all-inclusive is identified with the unity of substance as including its adjective. If there is any other relation except that of subject and adjective, it must be a relation between adjectives, not between subjects, and it must be one of part to part, not of whole to part.

I have now given an account of what I take to be Dr. Bosanquet's position, and of the reasoning on which it is based. If I have stated it wrongly, I have, I think, been sufficiently definite to make it easy for him to point out precisely where I have misunderstood him. I must now show why I cannot accept his position. In his reasoning, if its premisses are granted, I find no flaw. Given that a subject is merely the unity including all its adjectives, and given that every adjective of the part as such is an adjective and the very same adjective of the whole, it does seem to follow inevitably that the part itself as such is an adjective, and that there can be no subject but universal reality, seeing that all other wholes are parts of this. What is really doubtful, and, as I hold, false, is the proposition that the adjectives of the part are *co ipso* adjectives of the whole.

Let us examine a simple example which may be regarded as typical. Consider the proposition: "This stick is dipped in water." As it stands the statement is ambiguous. It leaves room for the question: "Is the stick wholly immersed or only a part of it, and, if so, which part?" Different answers ascribe different adjectives to the stick as subject. Now, if we say that part is immersed, we can also assert of the stick as a whole that it is immersed, or, at any rate, dipped, in the water. Is it, then, the self-same adjective which qualifies both

the stick and its part? Obviously not. There is a certain correspondence but not identity. The part is entirely under water, the whole is not. It is so partly and partly it is not so. What we mean by saying that the stick is partly immersed is simply that it includes a part which is totally immersed, usually with the further implication that this makes a more or less important difference to the whole.* Now, the vital point is this. We may regard as an adjective of the whole its inclusion of a certain part. Yet, just because this inclusion is itself an adjective, it cannot be identified with the relatedness of the subject to its adjective any more than sweetness can be identified with the fact that it belongs to sugar. Being an adjective, it is one term in the relation of subject and predicate; and must, therefore, be distinct from the relatedness of either term to the other. On the same principle, the equality of one line to another cannot be either of the lines, and the similarity of one colour to another cannot be either of the colours. It follows that the relation of whole to part cannot be the relation of subject to adjective, except in the special case in which the whole is simply a complex of adjectives. Except in this case, the relatedness of whole to part is itself an adjective; and is, therefore, ultimately distinct from its own relation to its substantive. Now, where from the adjective of a part we pass to a corresponding adjective of the whole, this always presupposes the relation of whole and part as ultimately distinct from that of subject and adjective. The adjective of the part is not an adjective of the whole; still less is the part itself an adjective of the whole. What *is* an adjective of the whole is that it includes a part which is qualified by a certain adjective. "The dog moves in or at or as regards his tail" means that the "dog has a tail which moves." The motion of the tail both conditions and is conditioned by the state of the dog as a whole. But the state of the dog as a whole is not the

* For instance, we may be able to propel a boat when the oar is partly under water.

same as the state of its tail. It is the state of all its parts in their unity. What holds for the dog holds also for the universe. "Reality as including certain aspects of the geological history of our globe is the Atlantic Ocean," means "Reality includes a geological system which includes a part that is identical with the Atlantic Ocean."

I say is "identical with," and not merely "is," in order that I may steer clear of an ambiguity in the use of verb "to be" as copula. Its meaning is radically different when it couples substantive with substantive and when it couples substantive with adjective. When I say "this horse is black," I do not mean that the horse is identical with "black" or "blackness." What I mean is that the blackness* belongs to the horse as an adjective. But when I say "this horse is an animal," I do mean that it is identical with some animal or other—some member of the class "animals." I do not mean that any animal belongs to the horse as an adjective.† Now, if the verb "to be" coupling substantives signifies identity, and if the whole is identical, as Professor Bosanquet holds, with its part, why should it sound so absurd to assert that the dog is its tail or that the universe is the dog? It sounds absurd because it is absurd. The dog cannot be identical with its tail, and the universe cannot be identical with the dog, and, in general, the whole cannot be identical with its part. This remains impossible, even if we suppose that the part is not a distinct subject, but only a minor complex of adjectives within the wider complex which is the whole. It is, of course, the same comprehensive complex to which this partial adjective, and also other partial adjectives, belong, just as it is the same

* Or, rather, I should hold a particular instance of blackness. Blackness is a class-term and means "all 'blacks.'"

† There is a similar ambiguity in the word not. When B is a substantive "A is not B" means "A is other than B." Where B is an adjective it means "A has some adjective or other incompatible with B." See Johnson, *Mind*, N.S., vol. xxvii, 1918, p. 148.

sugar which is both sweet and white. Yet, the whiteness is not identical with the sweetness; and, therefore, the whole complex, which includes both whiteness and sweetness, cannot be identical with either of them. This would be possible only if the relation of subject and adjective was that of identity. But it is not. When identity is asserted of a subject, it is itself a relational adjective, not the relation of the subject to its adjective.

There is yet another aspect of Professor Bosanquet's doctrine which must be dealt with before we can leave this general discussion. He regards it as essential to his position that the nature of everything except the universe shall be entirely determined by its relatedness to other things. In particular, the nature of the parts of a whole as such must be entirely determined by their inter-relatedness within the whole. "I note," he says, "the common refuge of semi-pluralistic reasonings in admitting that finite individuals are related, but only in *some degree* determined by inter-relatedness. To me this seems an evasion" (p. 487). The reason why he regards it as an evasion is that "there is nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness." It thus appears that for him the alleged evasion is to be found in the doctrine that part of the nature of things may be determined by relatedness and part be independent and isolated. Now, at least so far as I am concerned, this is a misunderstanding. I am not attempting to draw a line between relatedness and non-relatedness. I am not denying that the nature of a thing is "nothing" apart from relatedness. My point is that the inverse is equally true and important. The relatedness of a thing is "nothing" apart from its nature. Admitting, at least for the sake of argument, that the nature of a thing can be nothing apart from relatedness, I deny the totally different proposition that the nature of a thing is *nothing but* its relatedness. If this were so, there would be nothing to be related. If, then, two or more

terms are related, there is always the question, What are they? It is never a complete answer to this question to say that each of the terms is merely *that which* is related to the other and that otherwise it is nothing or a mere instance of being in general. Here, at any rate, it would seem that the Hegelian dictum virtually holds good and being in general is equivalent to nothing at all. There must ultimately be a qualitative element in the nature of related terms which makes it possible or necessary for them to be related as they are. This seems to me to hold good ultimately for all relations. But, for our present purpose, it is sufficient that it holds good, at least, for some of them. Take, for instance, likeness and unlikeness. Purple as a sense-datum is in one way like blue and in another like red. These relations are, as Locke would say, founded in the ideas related. They involve the intrinsic nature of red, blue, and purple. It is true that the intrinsic nature cannot exist or be possible without the relations. It is, however, equally true that the relations cannot exist or be possible without the intrinsic nature of the terms related. Consider next that relatedness to an object which consists in being pleased with it or the reverse. Here we have a relatedness which would be impossible if it were mere relatedness and nothing more. What gives its specific character to the relation itself is the intrinsic quality in which pleasant feeling differs from painful feeling, and this, certainly, cannot be resolved into mere relatedness.

A thing may exist and possess qualities essential to its function as part of a certain whole even when it has severed or before it has acquired its connection with the whole. Elasticity is essential to the function of a mainspring in the mechanism of a watch. But the mainspring may remain elastic when it is removed from the watch and inserted in some other piece of mechanism. Its nature, therefore, as part of the watch does not merely consist in its relatedness to other parts. This cannot, of course, apply directly to the universe as the all-

inclusive whole. The point, however, is that within the universe there are parts of such a nature that they can be related in a variety of alternative ways. Their whole being, therefore, can hardly consist in their relatedness.

Before leaving this somewhat arid logical discussion, I have yet to notice two special arguments against the view that finite beings can be ultimate subjects.

One of these is that "nothing can be guaranteed to exhibit within itself the conditions of the attributes we assign to it." This seems an *ignoratio elenchi*. What has to be shown is that nothing can really possess the attributes we ascribe to it. The proposition that it does or can possess within itself all the conditions on which those attributes depend is *prima facie* quite different. It is for Professor Bosanquet to show that it is none the less really the same. But he cannot do this except by begging the question at issue. He cannot do it except by assuming that the relation of condition and conditioned is the same as that of subject and adjective. Until this is clearly and cogently established, I shall continue to regard the question, "Is this sweet?" as distinct from, and logically prior to, the question "What makes it sweet?" The other argument is based on the alleged impossibility of determining what is a "single thing." Things "include one another in innumerable subordinations, from the Sahara, for example, or any patch of it, down to any grain of sand in it. A thing, therefore, as an existent can have no claim to be an ultimate subject" (p. 483). How is the conclusion supposed to follow? It can only follow if we supply the additional premiss that there is no difference between the relation of part and whole whatever the whole may be, and the relation of subject and adjective. Yet, this is precisely what has to be shown. Granting that everything except the universe is part of a wider whole, both it and the whole to which it belongs may, none the less, be ultimate subjects of adjectives. If I can select for special consideration as ultimate subject, either the desert of Sahara or a grain of sand in it, this is because they

both really are ultimate subjects. The grain of sand is included in the desert of Sahara, but it is not, to use Professor Bosanquet's bewildering metaphor, "merged and overwhelmed" by it (pp. 486-7). If it were merged and overwhelmed it could not be included. If the items of my bill were merged and overwhelmed by the sum total, what should I have to pay? How could I check the account? I find myself unable to attach meaning to such a word as "overwhelming" when applied to the universe. It stands for a process in time which is itself included in the universe, and the universe can include it only if it includes what is overwhelmed, what overwhelms and the process of overwhelming, in their distinction from each other.

II.

If an individual mind is a mere adjective it can have only the value of an adjective; if it is identical with the universe, and with other parts of it, it cannot make a distinct contribution to the value of the whole. If every item of a bill is identical with the sum-total and with every other item, it cannot make a distinct contribution to the sum-total. In no intelligible sense can it be said to be included or contained in the sum.

Dr. Bosanquet's view of the teleological status of finite minds is largely, if not entirely, based on his theory of predication. We must therefore examine his special application of the theory to finite minds. On p. 497, we find a typical deliverance. "I am substantive and subject, but only so far as I recognise myself as adjective and predicate." What is the precise meaning of this? We might suppose the point to be that a mere adjective, which recognises itself as such, cannot be a mere adjective. But this would imply that in recognising itself as a mere adjective, it makes a mistake; and this is just what Dr. Bosanquet does not mean to assert. I take it that his real drift is as follows: In recognising myself as adjective, I recognise that I qualify a substantive, and this, in accordance with the general theory of predication, can only be universal

reality. If, now, I am permitted to apply to universal reality such words as "I" and "myself," then I can truly assert that "I myself" am "substantive and subject." Surely, this is a lame and impotent conclusion. Given that I may call chalk cheese, I can truly assert that chalk is edible. None the less, chalk is not edible. To escape such futility, we must assume not only that a part as such is an adjective of the whole, but also that an adjective is identical with its subject. If, then, I am an adjective of the universe, it follows that I am the universe, and that I may legitimately mean the universe when I use the words "I" and "myself." Yet, this assumed identity of adjective and substantive has not been made out, and seems untenable. The sweetness of sugar is not the sugar itself, and the loudness of a sound is not the sound itself. It is, indeed, the same sugar that includes within its complex unity both sweetness and whiteness, and it is the same sense-datum that includes both loudness and pitch. This, however, is quite another story.

We find Professor Bosanquet insisting on the derivative being of the finite self; and he seems to take for granted that what is derived can have no being and nature of its own distinct from the factors which meet within it. Does this follow? Is it not, on the contrary, plain that what is derived must always be distinct in existence and nature from the conditions which are combined in it? A mighty river is derived from a multitude of tiny rills. It is nothing apart from its tributary waters. But it is certainly something more and other than these, and in some ways much more important. I am here treating derivation as a co-ordinate relatedness. If, on the other hand, we permit ourselves to speak of the part as derived from the whole, then, inasmuch as the whole includes the part, the part is derived from itself, and this can only mean that, *pro tanto*, it is not derived at all. I cannot, therefore, admit that the distinct being and nature of the individual is at all affected by what Professor Bosanquet says concerning the derivative

character of the factors which enter into his complex unity. His distinct and exclusive individuality remains untouched even if we grant that "apart from the content of his centre there could be no feeling self," that "apart from their objects his acts are an empty form"; and that "in all his objects there is no object that is not universal and derivative." For all these factors as they meet in his being acquire a character which is inseparable from the unique unity and distinctness of his own individual existence. It is only in him that feeling becomes interest in objects, enjoyment, regret, hope, etc. Apart from his "acts" his objects are not objects at all. Yet, it is only so far forth as they are objects that they can be intelligibly regarded as entering into his being, and that his interest can be directed to them. One way of putting this is to say that only the knowing or thinking of things, not the things themselves, enters into the constitution of the individual. Now, I see no satisfactory distinction between the knowing or thinking of a thing and the thing itself as known or thought of. The pretended analysis which distinguishes in knowledge, abstractly considered, (1) a knower, (2) what is known, and (3) a relation between them, seems to me to be merely an arbitrary fiction. The knower is simply the complex unity which includes things as known and the various modes of being interested in them. I do not, therefore, quarrel with Dr. Bosanquet, when he takes for granted that objects as such enter into the constitution of the individual mind. All the same, I must insist that this holds only for objects *as such*. They are included in the complex unity of the self only in what the schoolmen called their "intentional," or objective, not in their "formal" being. When two individuals, A and B, both know or think of the same thing, its being known or thought of by or in A is normally a quite distinct fact from its being known or thought of by or in B. Intentional existence is two-fold, whereas formal existence is undivided. *A fortiori*, the interest which A takes in it is quite distinct from the interest which B takes in it. For this interest

involves feelings which are quite distinct in A and B, however they may resemble each other or condition each other.

It is from this point of view that we have to consider Dr. Bosanquet's distinction between the lateral and the linear identity of the self. If taken in its obvious sense, this distinction is valid. "One crowded hour of glorious life 'may be' worth an age without a name." We have to take account not only of the serial succession, but of the range, variety, and unity of knowledge and interest within each successive phase of our life-history. But it is important to note that the distinction is not between two identities, one lateral and the other linear. There is only one identity of the undivided self which includes these two aspects in inseparable unity. The present moment of conscious life is only a phase in its successive development. This, however, is not what Dr. Bosanquet means by lateral identity. He seems rather to mean a unity which comprehends parts of the universe that fall outside the life-history of the individual as a successive development. These parts of the universe are regarded by him as parts of the self. The main example and illustration of such lateral identity is supposed to be found in the social system. The community is regarded as a single mind, and its members as partial phases or modes of it, having no distinct unity and identity of their own. "The communal will . . . is a single thing. . . . Participation in its structure makes every particular unit an individual, that is a particular in which the universal or the identity assumes a special modification. His will is made out of the common substance" (p. 499). Now, it is plain enough that this doctrine follows directly from Dr. Bosanquet's theory of predication. Society is a whole of which its individual members are parts. If, then, the parts of any whole as such are adjectives or modes of that whole, the individual members of society are modes or adjectives of the social system; and, if we consider them as subjects, they are identical with that system.

and with each other. Having seen reason for rejecting the general theory of predication, we are in no way bound to accept this application of it. We have rather to test Dr. Bosanquet's view of the relation of the individual to the community by a direct appeal to the relevant facts. We admit at once that the life of a community is a single thing with a unity and identity of its own. Yet, this unity and identity is essentially distinct from that of a single mind. It is simply contrary to fact to say that, in so far as I am a member of society, my mental processes are connected with those of other members of the same society in a way at all analogous to that in which the various phases and constituents of my own being are connected in the unity of my conscious life. If A knows that one side of a shield is black and B knows that the other side is white, they do not, therefore, either severally or both together, know that the shield is black on one side and white on the other. Unity of apperception is absent. A may, indeed, communicate to B what B does not know. But this merely means that A uses means whereby B is enabled to know for himself the same fact which is already known to A. When it is known to both, its being known to A is distinct from its being known to B, and A's knowledge that B knows it is not the knowledge that he knows it himself. Social inter-relations consist in the mutual knowledge of each other and mutual interest in each other of distinct minds, and in their co-operation in thinking and willing. The essential presupposition is that the mutually co-operating minds are distinct individuals, and not merely parts or phases of one mind. There is nothing in the social system which thinks, feels, or wills, except its individual members taken severally. This is the indispensable condition of their social unity. If the whole system is, in any sense, higher or more valuable than its individual members, it is because it includes these without in any way impairing or diminishing their distinct individuality. If and so far as two minds become

confluent in a single mind, they can no longer be in social relation to each other; if the single mind is to enter into social relations, it must be with other minds. This being so, the lateral identity of the self, as conceived by Dr. Bosanquet, is, strictly speaking, a figment. My knowledge of other minds, and interest in them and in their relation to me and to each other, does, indeed, constitute part of my own being. But the other minds do not, therefore, enter into my being in any other way or respect. The whole being of a member of society cannot consist in the knowledge which others have of him and the interest which others take in him.

III.

I have so far considered the subject-predicate theory of the universe both as a general doctrine and in its special bearing on individual minds. I now pass to the problem of the teleological status of finite spirits as an independent question to be determined apart from logical or metaphysical preconceptions and, in particular, apart from the preconception that they are merely "adjectives."

There are two main issues which I intend to raise. The first is whether the worth of the individual, as such, is ultimate and irreplaceable by anything else; or whether, on the contrary, it can be regarded as merely a means or stage leading to a higher good in which it is conserved without final loss or sacrifice. The second is whether we have any right to assume the possibility of a good which is both higher than that of finite individuals and does not by its intrinsic nature presuppose that of finite individuals as ultimately distinct from itself. How far my answer to these inquiries may supply ground for believing in a future life I shall not directly attempt to decide. But I shall add a few concluding words on the nature of the question at issue so as to define what we ought to mean by a "future life" whether we believe in it or not.

In discussing the value of the finite individual as such, what

logical relevance has the admitted imperfection of the individuals known to us? Professor Bosanquet dwells on this imperfection as if it were decisive in his favour, and it is of the utmost importance to define the exact nature of his argument. It might seem, at first sight, as if he were guilty of a rather obvious fallacy. Granting that my "continued identity from beginning to end of my experienced life-course is but little, fluctuating and full of gaps," what follows is merely that I am a very defective specimen of individual unity and identity, and that, to this extent, I imperfectly exemplify the kind of value which belongs to an individual mind. In considering the nature of this value, I ought to take account of individual unity and identity so far as it is present and not so far as it is absent.

But Mr. Bosanquet is not really guilty of this *ignoratio elenchii*. He distinguishes between the individuality of the finite individual and his finitude. So far as unity and identity are realised in the life-history of the finite individual, the more individual he is: but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, in precisely the same degree he transcends his own finitude. Inversely, the more defective is his unity and identity, the less individual he is; but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, this is merely to say that he is more finite. On this view, the individuality of the finite individual and his finitude are mutually exclusive opposites; the more of the one means the less of the other. Thus, whatever value may belong to the finite individual belongs to him as an individual but not as finite. If he were completely individual he would not be finite at all. There would be no distinction between him and the absolute whole of being.

Now, on this fundamental question, I am unable to accept Mr. Bosanquet's position or his grounds for maintaining it. One of his grounds for maintaining it is to be found in his conception of the "lateral" as distinguished from the "linear" identity of the self. If the development of the individual in the range and depth of his knowledge and interest means that he includes within his own individual identity what he comes

to know and to be interested in, it is plain that in this process he comes to embrace within his own being more and more of the universe, so that in the limit all distinction between the universe and himself would cease. I have already dealt with this question and I need not recur to it here. But I must examine another fundamental assumption which underlies Mr. Bosanquet's whole treatment of the finite individual.

Mr. Bosanquet seems always to take for granted that nothing can belong to the distinctive nature of the finite individual except his finitude. Whatever is positive in his being is regarded as apart from and independent of his limitation. He is distinguished from other beings and from the all-inclusive universe, not by what he is but merely by what he is not. It is this presupposition alone which gives point to Mr. Bosanquet's denial of the worth of the finite individual *qua* finite. What he is constantly maintaining is that finitude is mere defect or privation; and that, therefore, what is finite cannot have value *in so far* as it is finite.

It is plain that this argument loses its force, if there are characteristics of the finite individual which, though they are themselves positive and of positive value, none the less presuppose his limitation, so that they could not belong to a being which was not finite. But there are such characteristics. For instance, the social relations of human beings and all the positive activities which they alone make possible presuppose the mutual distinctness and mutual exclusiveness of individual minds. What is called the common will could not exist unless each individual member of the community had a will of his own. This, however, is a fact with which I have already dealt. What I now wish to lay stress on is the positive character of the process by which the finite individual gradually transcends his own defects and privations so as to be and to have what he was not or had not before. It is no sufficient analysis of what takes place merely to say that first there is a stage of relative defect or privation, and that this is succeeded by a stage in

which the defect or privation is removed. We have also to consider the nature of the transition from one stage to the other. It is plain there can be no such transition in a being who is supposed to be without any kind of imperfection, so that he already is and has all that he is capable of being and having. The process belongs distinctively to the nature of finite beings as such. The only questions that remain are (1) whether it is positive or itself merely an imperfection, and (2) how far it has positive value. Considered merely as a transition in time, Mr. Bosanquet would, no doubt, regard it merely as a form of defect or negation. But my point is that the specific form taken by the time process in the development of individual minds is no mere defect or negation. It is positive, inasmuch as it is self-development or self-realisation. It is positive, inasmuch as it involves the active process in which wants, needs, desires, purposes, aspirations, work through trial and failure towards their own fulfilment: and, at the same time, become themselves progressively more differentiated, more comprehensive, and more perfectly organised in systematic unity with each other. Each stage in this process exists only as a step towards greater advance. Out of relative fulfilment new wants and aspirations arise: and there is, as Hobbes says, "no satisfaction except in proceeding. To rest finally on what has already been achieved means stagnation and decay." Such self-development is plainly possible only for a finite being as such. It presupposes the limitations which it transcends. Hence, it cannot be ascribed to a being supposed to be perfect in the sense that there is nothing left for it to seek or aim at. The supposed perfection would, in this respect, be an imperfection—a privation.

We may go further and affirm that the privation would consist in the absence of something positively valuable. It is hardly too much to say that all value *for* the finite individual, and that the whole value *of* the finite individual both for himself and for others, is inseparable from the process of conative

self-development. What is good for me remains only potentially good for me so long as I am irresponsive to it,—so long as I merely ought to feel the want of it but do not actually feel the want of it. Any attainment which does not come to me as the satisfaction of my own felt needs or aspirations is *pro tanto* of no value to me: it is of no value to me because it forms no part of my own self-development. On the other hand, there is for me no positive evil which does not partake of the nature of failure, defeat or repression; it is no positive evil to a cow that it does not understand Hegel's Logic.

I may illustrate my result by what Dr. Bosanquet says about the "demand for unity" (p. 497). "We carry with us a pretension to be ourself, which includes less and more than we find in our existence. Our unity is a puzzle and an unrealised aspiration." We are confident that we are one, "because to be a thinking being is to demand a unity, and every act of such a being is an attempt to realise it. But philosophy tells us . . . that if we possessed our unity we should no longer be what we experience our existence as being." Dr. Bosanquet would not, of course, deny that the pursuit of our own unity presupposes that we are already in some measure one. What we strive after is the maintenance and further development of the imperfect unity which is already present in each stage of our existence. If, now, I am right in my main contention, it is precisely this conative process, with its various phases of trial and failure, success and defeat, which is essential to good and evil for finite individuals. It is a mistake to look for the value of the finite individual in a supposed ultimate achievement considered in detachment from the process of its attainment. There may be no conceivable ultimate achievement, the series need not be convergent. But, even if we suppose that there is such a terminus, it will have value only as the ultimate success or satisfaction of the conative process which constitutes the self-development of the finite individual. It will, therefore, be experienced as the unity of just this finite individual who has successfully striven after it.

We are now in a position to answer the question whether the finite individual as such has a value of his own which is ultimate and irreplaceable by anything else. Inasmuch as he has a value which is inseparable from the process of his own self-development, he has, *quâ* finite, a value for which nothing else can be so substituted as to justify us in asserting that nothing is lost. If his life-history is cut short for ever, so as to leave his actual aspirations after good unfulfilled, possible aspirations not yet developed, and the evil which is in him and around him not yet condemned, rejected, and vanquished, there is something wanting which cannot be replaced by anything else. There may, perhaps, be a greater good to which the finite individual is instrumental, but this is not and cannot in any way include what is valuable in his own self-development.

This brings us to our second question. Have we any right to assume the possibility of a good which is both higher than that of finite individuals, and does not presuppose that of finite individuals as ultimately distinct "from itself"? Conceive an individual so self-complete and self-contained as to want or require or demand absolutely nothing either for itself or for others. Are we to regard such perfection as involving perfect goodness or supreme value? I do not deny that this may be so. But I can discern no reasons to compel me to assert that it must be so. Further, I find no ground in our experience of the nature and condition of value which would lead me to hold even as a probable hypothesis that it is so. On the contrary, if I am to follow the clues supplied by experience, I must regard all value as essentially relative to conative process. It does not, however, follow that it can exist only for finite individuals. For the conception of God put forward by Professor Pringle-Pattison is free from this difficulty. An individual may have no defect in himself, so that for himself he wants or requires nothing, and yet he may be interested in finite individuals, and may find a field for his

activity in making possible and promoting their self-development. It seems to me a misuse of language to call such an individual finite or imperfect, merely because there are other individuals distinct from himself. If there were no other individuals, his being would be impoverished and his power less.

Before concluding, I have yet to say something about the problem of a future life. What I have already said concerning the value of finite individuals has no bearing on this question, unless we make a further assumption, which is by no means generally accepted, and which I cannot here discuss. We have to assume that there is a teleological order of the universe directed to the fulfilment of values. On this understanding, we have good reason for holding that our lives are not ultimately cut short by death: we have reason for regarding our life-history on earth as only a partial and passing phase of our whole life-history—partaking, perhaps, more or less of the nature of a dream, and for some of us a bad dream. If we accept this position, we must, however, be very careful not to commit ourselves to any special view of the nature and conditions of a future life. All that our general position entitles us to maintain is that in some way or other the life-history of the individual will be continued so long and in such a way as to make its continuance worth while to that individual. But to make it worth while may well tax the boundless resources of the universe. It may involve a complex adjustment of conditions beside which that required for the origin and development of animated organisms on earth, and of the minds associated with these organisms, is as nothing. This being so, it ought not to count as a serious objection that the various special ways of imagining our continued existence, which have been current in the past or which we can now devise, are utterly unconvincing, and, when closely examined, incredible. When I give the reins to my fancy, I can imagine many possibilities which are not usually considered. For example, it seems to

me arbitrary to assume that a future life means the continuance of the stream of individual consciousness without a break, after the death of the body. On the contrary, it may well be that, when my body dies, I also cease to exist as a conscious being. Countless ages may have to elapse before the conditions are ripe for my continued self-development. The interim would, of course, be nothing to me, as I should have no experience of it. Again, it seems to me to be very rash to take for granted that the self-development of the individual excludes confluence with other individuals.* The confluence need not involve loss of individual identity on the part of either. Each in blending with the other may find his own distinct being enlarged and enriched. The "I" before coalescence may be recognisable as the same with the "I" after coalescence. Or, if and so far as there is loss of identity, the loss may be only transitory, to be recovered with usury at a later stage. Similarly, the dissociation of personality may be a preparatory process leading to a higher and richer identity in which none of the dissociated identities are ultimately lost. For aught I can see, the scheme of a future life may involve endless confluences and dissociations.

These are possibilities which occur to me, and no doubt there are many others of which I have no inkling. We are moving about in "worlds not realised."† The two points on which I am here insisting are:—(1) that we must carefully avoid confusing the general conception of the future life with special views of its nature and conditions; (2) that we are justified in believing in the future life, only if and so far as we are justified in believing that the universe has a teleological order directed to the fulfilment of values. This last is the really vital question.

* I have argued that such confluence is not exemplified by *social union*. But this supplies no reason for denying that it takes place at all.

† And it is quite possible that our present life may be, in large measure, "a sleep and a forgetting."

IV.—*By* Lord HALDANE.*

The question under discussion is far from being one of mere logical precision. It raises a cardinal point in metaphysical inquiry. For Professor Bosanquet the finite individual is a construction of reflection. As the relational thought which is our human instrument is not the highest conceivable form of knowledge, its constructions represent, relatively to the highest knowledge, appearance only and not final reality. Our experience to become perfect would have to be transformed at a level at which feeling and thought, the unmediated and the mediated moments in that experience, while preserved in a new entirety were yet transcended in it. So only can reality be reached. It follows that for him the finite individual of our experience, being a construction by judgments in which subject and predicate never adequately unite, is not an ultimate reality, but is adjectival in its true nature.

For Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the other hand, even finite individual personality, although a creation of God, has the metaphysical character of uniqueness and finality, whether or not it is immortal in time. Its function is, accordingly, not the transient one which Professor Bosanquet assigns to it as a vehicle of the Absolute. It is a real self, and not an appearance only. It is more than a "Kantian unity of apperception," which is only "the ideal unity of systematised knowledge." It is a true "focalisation of the universe," and the notion of its transmutation in an Absolute, "the idea of blending or absorption, depends entirely on material analogies which can have no application in the case of selves."

In the case of Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison alike, the doctrines of their respective papers are

* The only papers before me, at the time of writing what follows, were those of Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison. I have since read that of Professor Stout. In essentials I do not know that what I imply differs much from what he writes in his Parts i and ii.

pointed applications of metaphysical principles which they have developed in concrete application to the current problems of life in well known volumes. I propose, therefore, to inquire, first of all, what light the context of their other utterances casts, in the instances of the two writers, on the apparently sharp antitheses of their present papers. The genesis of the divergence appears to me, I may say at once, to be traceable in the case of Professor Bosanquet mainly to the extreme to which he has pushed criticism of that finite knowledge which is not less his instrument in the investigation of reality than it is and must be the instrument of all of us. The observation on which I shall venture in the case of Professor Pringle-Pattison is not wholly dissimilar. I think that he has shied unduly at the sight of the Kantian unity of apperception to which he has so often referred. I agree with him that, as Kant conceives it, this doctrine presents an alarming spectacle. But then in Kant's hands the unity of mind had been reduced to the condition of a corpse by the defective treatment of itself which resulted when knowledge sought to lay itself out on the dissecting table, to be operated on with "judgments of the understanding," and a restricted supply of categories drawn from the Aristotelian logic. A better method might well have been to let nature make her own diagnosis and work out her own cure. Yet, the gruesome spectacle of the result of Kant's critical method has been, I think, in Professor Pringle-Pattison's case, to make him avert his face, and to interpose something which is not in truth very unlike the mantle of the category of substance, between himself and those who, like Kant and Professor Bosanquet, treat knowledge as what can itself be subjected to a critical process that may be fatal to it. In saying this, I am not overlooking the disclaimer by Professor Pringle-Pattison of the application of the category of substance to the self, which occurs comparatively early in his paper, in a passage where he accepts a similar disclaimer by Lotze.

Both writers have obviously been much influenced by the objective type of idealism which is commonly called Hegelian. But they diverge in the application of common principles, and the divergence is accentuated by metaphors to which they are driven, as, indeed, all metaphysicians are bound to be in some degree.

The real difficulty seems to me to arise largely out of the metaphors used. Professor Bosanquet, in his paper in the present discussion, speaks of "our brief existence as the temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as in any case constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world."* We are "very subordinate units," which the Absolute needs for its expression through us in what appears as a passage in time. "While we serve as units, to speak the language of experience, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands an existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe."

I think I see what Professor Bosanquet aims at indicating by these words. No one who has read the second volume of his *Gifford Lectures*, admirable alike in theoretical grasp and in largeness of ethical outlook, can doubt what is his main purpose. But the metaphors leave me uncomfortable. I have the doubt whether what has to be said can be said safely, excepting in more strictly guarded and abstract language. The difficulty is not unlike that which arises when people speak of real or transfinite number. It is quite right to use the word number, if, but only if, we have carefully redefined it. And I have to bear in mind writings in which Professor Bosanquet has developed other aspects of his doctrine. For him the finite self is, as I interpret him, a

* *Supra*, p. 505.

construction based on a centre of feeling, and the unity of such "centres," and of the systems of experience built up along with them, is to be sought only in a form of reality of a kind different from that of the self as it appears to us. He seems to me to accept the position that our reflection, which is based on relational thought, is not capable of disclosing the actual character of this further form of reality, because all relational thought in the end distorts and deflects from truth. In the result what it gives us is appearance only, and from appearance we have to look for reality in another region,—that of an Absolute in which the breaches in the integrity of immediate experience made by relational thought are restored, and knowledge is transformed into knowledge that must be immediate, but which is of a kind we cannot image in our minds, although we must assume its possibility as foundational to reality.

I take this to be the view of the Absolute which Professor Bosanquet has worked out on lines parallel to those on which Mr. Bradley has proceeded. I will only observe that my difficulty about the general doctrine, great as has always been my admiration for the mode in which both of these thinkers have worked out and expressed it, is that it produces in my mind a sense of intellectual insecurity. How do they get even negatively at the character of the absolute experience? If the only way of thinking be relational, and this way cannot be that of truth, what other path to the Absolute can there be? It is the old difficulty which arises when men begin by criticising the instrument of knowledge, and so discredit it and their own criticism along with it. The outcome is not new knowledge but a scepticism which bids us cease endeavour. Faith in the possibility of knowing even so much about the Absolute as is permitted in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* and more recent *Essays on Truth and Reality*, or in Professor Bosanquet's *Gifford Lectures* or his well-known eighth chapter in the second volume of the last edition of his *Logic*, becomes difficult when abstract thought has been to

so great an extent deposed from being a guide to truth, and possibly from being even aware that it is no guide.

In Chapter XV of his *Appearance and Reality* Mr. Bradley himself deals with the question which thus arises in a fashion which shows that he is fully conscious of the difficulties attending the solution he offers. He starts with this, that the subject is always beyond the predicated content. The fact, for instance, of sensible experience cannot be exhibited as an element in a system of thought-content. Thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide, and yet, if it remains this, how does it contain immediate presentation? In order to do so "it must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth." It desires to reach a whole which can contain every aspect within it, but if it does, all that divides it from feeling and will must be absorbed, and so thought will have changed its nature. In a mode of apprehension which is identical with reality, "predicate and subject and subject and object, and in short the whole relational form, must be merged." This is Mr. Bradley's argument, but he holds that it does not really lead to scepticism. For, although an Other than relational thought is required, this Other is not inconceivable for thought. Its otherness will lose the character which gives rise to difficulty if the ideal content of the predicate is made consistent with immediate individuality. Were it possible for thought to attain its ideal by taking up reality in a form adequate to its nature, that nature would no longer appear as an Other. Now, the content of the thought which desires to include all the features of that nature has them in an incomplete form, inasmuch as it desires their completion. There is thus no gulf, no inconsistency, in the faith that thought can look for the Other, for which it is in search, in the Absolute. There we reach the identity of idea and reality, "not too poor, but too rich for division of its elements." Such an experience "we cannot possibly construe," or "imagine how in detail its outline is filled up."

My difficulty in connection with this argument arises, as I have already said, from the impression that on Mr. Bradley's premises I cannot see how it is to be justified. The difficulty might not arise at all if thought could be taken in a fuller sense than Mr. Bradley appears to take it. What is often called the "logic of the understanding," which sets subject and predicate in isolation, seems to me to have unduly influenced his argument: and to have led him to do less than justice to the view that judgment is only a fragmentary aspect of the activity of mind,—an activity which in fact always proceeds beyond isolation and tends to exhibit subject and predicate as aspects in an entirety which is their truth. In the final chapter, entitled "Ultimate Doubts," he seems to me to express himself in language which carries further than in the passages I have indicated, and to go a good way towards restoring the claims of the larger view of thought which has been called that of reason as distinguished from understanding. "There is no reality at all," he says, "anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality. This nature cannot be exhausted, but it can be known in abstract." A little earlier, in the chapter on "The Absolute and its Appearances," after saying that for metaphysics all appearances have degrees of reality, and that metaphysics can assign a meaning to perfection and progress, he declares that "if it were to accept from the sciences the various kinds of natural phenomena, if it were to set out these kinds in an order of merit and rank, if it could point out how within each higher grade the defects of the lower are made good, and how the principle of the lower grade is carried out in the higher, metaphysics surely would have contributed to the interpretation of nature."* And a little later, "In a complete philosophy the

* The suggestion here made by Mr. Bradley about evolution in thought, and the lower categories as intelligible only through the higher, is of real importance as a corrective to the different and too abstract view of those men of science who try to base their procedure on

whole world of appearance would be set out as progress. It would show a development of principle, though not a succession in time. Every sphere of experience would be measured by the absolute standard, and would be given a rank answering to its own relative merits and defects. On this scale pure spirit would mark the extreme most removed from lifeless nature. And, at each rising degree of this scale, we should find more of the first character with less of the second. The ideal of spirit, we may say, is directly opposed to mechanism. Spirit is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. The universal here is immanent in the parts, and its system does not lie somewhere outside and in the relations between them. It is above the relational form and has absorbed it in a higher unity, a whole in which there is no division between elements and laws. The sphere of dead mechanism is set apart by an act of abstraction, and in that abstraction alone it essentially consists. And, on the other hand, pure spirit is not realised except in the Absolute."

Now, what does this mean if it be not the restoration of even relational thought to the throne from which it had been previously deposed? Here Mr. Bradley lays emphasis on the principle that philosophy has not to explain genetic evolution in time, but has to explain degrees of completeness in thought. His position seems very near to that of Hegel in the *Phenomenology*. But Hegel insists that thought develops and completes itself; and is, therefore, not hindered by limitations on its capacity such as Mr. Bradley assigns to it in the earlier passages I have referred

mechanical and chemical conceptions alone. It is in the light of what is logically higher that what is lower becomes for the first time really intelligible. We seem, as matter of fact, to work downwards in analysing experience for the purposes of physical and natural science, from the higher and more concrete experiences to the lower and more abstract. The bearing of this corrective consideration on the general doctrine of evolution in its cruder forms is considerable. In a recent book, *Organism and Environment*, Dr. J. S. Haldane expresses better than I can myself do the result on this point.

to. The "absolute knowledge" to which Hegel leads up at the end of the *Phenomenology* is not, as I read him, knowledge as it would be for an Absolute Mind, but finite human knowledge which has by its own efforts so freed itself from abstractions which have stood in the way of its self-completion that even for such knowledge free mind discloses itself as the foundation of experience in all its stages and phases.

In the second series of his *Gifford Lectures*, Professor Bosanquet seems to me at times to approach very near to this Hegelian conclusion. The finite individual is more than merely finite, and has a capacity in thinking which goes beyond what is finite. "It is freely admitted," he says, early in his second Lecture of this series, "that in cognition the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being, and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding it ceases to be a self-contained and repellent unit." He does not find the distinctness of finite centres a difficulty. For "the pure privacy and incommunicability of feeling as such is superseded in all possible degrees by the self-transcendence and universality of the contents with which it is unified." These contents are "organs of self-transcendence." Feeling, "in order to be capable of utterance in determinate form, must take on an objective character. It must cease to be a blank intensity; it must gather substance from ideas." And in so doing it "must change its reference to self, or modify the self to which it refers." Different persons are "organisations of content which a difference of quality, generally, though not strictly, dependent on belonging to different bodies, prevents from being wholly blended." "We do not experience ourselves as we really are."

But this opinion does not prevent Professor Bosanquet from coming to the conclusion, expressed at p. 504 of his paper, that "spiritual individuals must qualify the universe, not merely as subordinate existents which declare themselves adjectival in claiming attachment to their substance, but, more finally and

completely, as predicates *pur sang*." He remarks that, even if a series of events is the reality, then a quality of individuals, outside their existence, is the chief way in which they are present in the reality. The Absolute of which they are in final analysis predicates is an Other. It does not, as I read his paper, appear to him safe to seek it even in the subject aspect of a knowledge which is that of a finite individual. The Absolute is Other because it is apprehended, so far as it is apprehended at all, by a mode of knowledge different in kind from the mode of ordinary knowledge. It seems, therefore, to be for reflection an object distinct from the finite self.

No doubt, as Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet have shown in their investigations into the theory of judgment, thinking presents itself to itself under a relational aspect. But it presents this aspect just so far as it throws its own activity into this form for its own purposes. Its limitations are self-created, and it is in its completeness foundational to them. It is only as completed that it can accordingly come to rest with itself.

Professor Pringle-Pattison is dissatisfied, not only with Professor Bosanquet's view of the finite self, but with another view which, by looking for the reality of the self in thought, is also antithetical to his own conclusions. He objects to "the theorem of an All-thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought."* The formal ego is of no real account. "It was the substantiation of the logical form of consciousness which led to the theory of the universal Self, as an identical Subject which thinks in all thinkers."† The finite individual is itself a subject. But it is a subject exclusive of other subjects. "Finite centres may 'overlap' indefinitely in content, but, *ex vi termini*, they cannot overlap at all in existence; their very *raison d'être* is to be distinct and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focalisations of a

* *The Idea of God*, p. 199.

† *Ibid.*, p. 389.

common universe."* The self or subject, as we have already said, is not to be conceived as an entity over and above the content, or as a point of existence to which the content is, as it were, attached, or even as an eye placed in position over and against its objects, to pass them in review. The unity of the subject, we may agree, simply expresses this peculiar organisation or systematisation of the content. Yet, it is not simply the unity which a systematic whole of content might possess as an object, or for a spectator. "Its content, in Professor Bosanquet's phrase, has 'come alive': it has become a unity for itself, a subject. This is, in very general terms, what we mean by a finite centre, a soul, or, in its highest form, a self."†

Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison are both idealists of the objective type, but they differ in their tendencies. The former lays stress on the characteristics of the subject as such in the self, but these characteristics are for him not final. Experience has a larger meaning in which they are transformed, and in some sort exist transformed in the Absolute. The first form, therefore, does not represent the full or actual reality. It appears as it does because of the operation of a thinking which is ever establishing relations which are themselves not finally real, and the self is a construction through such relations, and as such is adjectival.

For Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the other hand, finite personality is no mere construction of thought. It is a self-sufficing entity which can never properly be a predicate of anything else. How it is related to the Absolute he will not try to say. The problem is inscrutable for human thought. The relation of the finite self to an Absolute God (for the theory of a finite God has no place in his book) impresses me as one of the most obscure points in his theme. As I have already said, it is for him of the essence of the self to be exclusive of other selves; and, although he admits that this

* *Ibid.*, p. 264.

† *Ibid.*, p. 285.

cannot be so in the same fashion in the relation of man to God, how it can be otherwise is one of the things which he declares cannot be explained, and which remains a mystery. Here his doctrine seems to me to be at a disadvantage compared with that of Professor Bosanquet. The latter can accept as intelligible the principle that underlying all knowledge there is one absolute subject which manifests itself in finite selves, if not in a form which is free from appearance or represents final reality. But the former holds the self to be an exclusive unit, subject somehow to an exception, which cannot be formulated even abstractly, in the relation of man to God. For Professor Pringle-Pattison each finite self is unique, and is "the apex of the principle of individuation by which the world exists."* In this fashion the self is for him impervious, not indeed to all the influences of the universe, but to other selves, "impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue. In other words, to suppose a coincidence or literal identification of several selves, as the doctrine of the Universal self demands, is even more transparently contradictory than that two bodies should occupy the same space." The unification of consciousness in a single self is thus fatal, in his opinion, to the real selfhood either of God or man. But he goes on to point out that we are equally substantiating a formal unity if we cut loose the individual selves from the common content of the world, and treat them as self-existent and mutually independent units. "We are then obliged to proceed to represent the universal Life in which they share as another unit of the same type, and difficulties immediately arise as to the relation between the great Self and its minor prototypes. Thought sways between a Pluralism, disguised or undisguised, and a Pantheism which obliterates all real individuality. But by the existence of the personality of God we do not mean the existence of a self-consciousness so conceived. We mean that the

* *Ibid.*, p. 390.

† *Ibid.*, p. 390.

universe is to be thought of, in the last resort, as an Experience and not as an abstract content,—an experience not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary glimpses of this and the other finite consciousness, but resuming the whole life of the world in a fashion which is necessarily incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself. Equally incomprehensible from the finite standpoint must it be, how the measure of individual independence and initiative which we enjoy is compatible with the creative function or the all-pervasive activity of the divine. But in whatever sense or in whatever way our thoughts and actions form part of the divine experience, we know that it is a sense which does not prevent them from being ours."

I have quoted these words from the *Gifford Lectures on The Idea of God*, because they appear to me to present the crucial difficulty of the author's position. The book is a striking contribution to philosophy, not merely because of its delicacy and precision in expression, but because of the accuracy with which the critic "winds himself" into the realisation of the inmost difficulties of those whom he is criticising. Still, in the passage just cited, Professor Pringle-Pattison is not less candid about his own difficulties. "Necessarily incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself." Surely, this is to despair of knowledge, and so to come very near to the precipice of scepticism. Now, human capacity in knowledge is, of course, limited. Its limits become progressively apparent when we remain with what is given us directly by sense, or attempt no more than to image or visualise. But the inherent quality of the thinking which proceeds by means of concepts, in mathematics, in physical science, in philosophy alike, is that it carries us beyond the confines of the immediate, the character of which is that it starts as in contact, direct or indirect, with our individual organism. Indeed, it is only for thinking that such a contact and the resulting limits have any meaning at all. In so far as we state a problem, we define it and are above it. We cannot see God. From the days of Moses of old, people have

suspected this. Yet, the power of abstract thought knows no such barriers as are presented by the restrictions on the imaginable present. There is no region, not even the region of the Absolute, which it cannot survey conceptually. In thinking we never stand still, we are always enlarging and developing the field of our progress. To deny this is to deny the foundation, not merely of certainty, but of doubt itself, resting, as doubt always does, on reflection. And on this account, while recognising the great contribution which I think Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet have made to philosophy, I, for one, have never been able to follow the invitation to contemplate the Absolute as unintelligible to what is the only kind of thinking by which I can make any progress at all, or to which I can attach meaning. No doubt it is true that not every form of reflection is adequate to metaphysical problems. What is called "the logic of the understanding" is indispensable for the purposes of everyday life, setting its objects, as it does, in hard distinction from each other. It calls, however, for the recognition at every step of the explanation of the self-imposed inadequacy of its abstractions from context to grasp reality in a more complete form.—the reality which, for example, perplexes the logic of the understanding when physical or chemical conceptions are used for the explanation of a living organism. The conceptions which relate to life are beyond the modes of reflection which belong to a lower and more abstract stage. Life is intelligible only in terms of the concepts of life, just as mind is intelligible only under conceptions which carry us beyond life into a spiritual region which belongs to mind itself, and to mind alone. While, therefore, I am deeply conscious of the splendid thoroughness with which Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet alike have sought to subject knowledge to sceptical scrutiny, I think that their efforts fall short in attainment, just as in another form did those of Kant before them. Knowledge appears to me itself to be the source of all of its own apparent

limitations. As it imposes them on itself so it delivers itself from them. The explanation is that in its essence it is never static. It is a self-development, a process of self-completion within which all distinctions fall. What is called relational thought is for me little more than a series of illustrations of the "logic of the understanding" in various forms; thought is capable here, as everywhere, of correcting and rising above its self-imposed fragmentation.

If this be so nothing can, so far as the power of conceptual thought is concerned, be legitimately pronounced to be, to use Professor Pringle-Pattison's phrase, "incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself." If such incomprehensibility confronts us it is because the categories and resulting metaphors we have employed have not been adequate to their subject matter. And this makes me say that I doubt whether Professor Pringle-Pattison is free from much the same reproach under this head as in another way extends to Professor Bosanquet. I mean that both writers in particular seem at points to have yielded in their metaphors to the blandishments, so perilous for the metaphysician, of the category of substance. Now, this category, when it tempts those to whom it offers its blandishments, rarely appears without decorations which disguise it. It is only when it is following its legitimate avocations, avocations which in other aspects of science are very numerous, that it does not seek to conceal its nakedness. When it appears in the region of mind it assumes such titles as "unit," or "imperviousness," or "otherness," titles which may be legitimate but which require much qualification when assumed in this connection. To set up the Absolute as what is impenetrable to thought, as in different fashions both Professor Pringle-Pattison and Professor Bosanquet seem, at times at least, to do, is very like attributing to it the exclusive nature which is characteristic of a substance or a thing as we speak of it popularly. And the same observation applies to current language about the finite self. Is such language adequate,

and can it be used in philosophical discussion without danger of misleading?

I will take the everyday relationship to each other of finite selves. We all of us, unless our minds have been "debauched with philosophy," assume that we have the same world before us,—a world the identity of which lies in the correspondence of its aspects for all of us. We instinctively rule out the claims of the subjective idealist. It is not a set of distinct and independent experiences that we severally have, but one and the same experience in corresponding forms. That experience is relative to the position of each of us in the world, but none the less we think that it is the same sun and moon and stars that we all see, and the same earth that we feel beneath our feet. Varying as are the aspects of experience to our particular selves, that experience is dominated by correspondence in thought in the relations it contains, relations which are logically antecedent to distinctions of time and space. The same thing is true even of the succession and variety of our own private experiences. They may be treated analytically as manifold. But not the less the experiences so distinguished are regarded as falling within the single experience of one individual, however, as in madness or other afflictions, we may to external appearance, and even for ourselves, change from time to time. And when, as under abnormal psychical conditions, the phenomenon of the double self emerges, this still remains true, although the self presents a distorted form.

How is identity in knowledge possible? Surely, only if there is real identity in what is at the foundation of all knowledge. When we turn to what, for want of a better name, I will call the "subject" moment in self-consciousness, I think that we find identity which is true reality and no mere appearance. The unity of knowledge in myself appears to lie in the activity of my thinking in the organised system of categories or ground-conceptions through which I lay hold on what I see and feel, and so find in it a real experience,

objectified in the Kantian sense. Nor is the activity of my thinking a subjective operation in the sense it was for Kant. In my object world of reality I recognise as actually there substances and causes and life as genuinely as there are actually in my mind the conceptions under which these appear. So far the New Realists are right, I think. But then are not these relations there simply because there is no factual separateness of subject from object, of mental from non-mental world? They may be separated as universals for logic in reflection, but only in reflection. Reality, taking this to include the totality of experience, the subject moment of activity in judgment not less than the object as fixed and distinguished from it by abstraction, appears to imply as *foundational* in it a systematic activity of mind which, while taken by itself in isolation it is a mere abstraction, is not the less an essential moment in the entirety of the fact of actual experience. The "that" in experience we cannot deduce. Our immediate existence as selves is within and conditioned by it. Its logical side is only one aspect in it. There is another aspect which confronts us in imagination as incapable of deduction from the first; and is, just for this very reason, required for the explanation of the "that," the externality and irreducibility with which sense perception appears as confronted in its every movement. And yet this appears on scrutiny to be itself but a moment in the entirety, a moment which is no more, taken by itself, adequate to the explanation of reality than is the other moment of abstract thought. What we come back to in our logical analysis of the object world before us is always, when we go far enough, the activity of the subject. In such activity substance is only one among its many conceptual modes, and is by itself an abstraction inadequate to express the full nature of reality. The idea of God as another substance, or even as another and different subject, appears to be radically imperfect.

How, then, do we come to speak of finite centres, and to

recognise them as possessing in some degree at least the quality of reality? Speaking for myself, I do not think that the answer to this question is obscure. We start in our experience from the fact of the natural world in which we live, and we find that our minds, while transcending the relationships of externality, affirm them *sub modo* in their application, and so remain possessed by them. The living organism transcends the relation of mechanism, and is yet not free from its laws. So the finite self appears in experience under the aspect of a living organism which is yet much more than a living organism. John Smith my friend, when I meet him in the street and recognise him as the comrade whose personality is intimately known to me, is none the less an organism with a life-history. He is primarily for me in this connection a person, subject just as I am subject, but he may, from a lower point of view, which is not concerned with his higher values, be described as occupying so much space and as weighing so much of carbon and other chemical compounds, and with what must be thought of as a definite quantity of potential energy stored up in him for conversion into kinetic. But these aspects, although true at their own stage in knowledge, fall far short at the stage of reality at which he is John Smith for me. They may after his death interest the anatomist and the undertaker, but rarely does his friend who greets him think of them. What binds him and me together is that he is a person with a distinct individuality, depending in part on conditions of space and time, but certainly not less on what belongs to regions of experience, intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic. The conceptions which his recognition implies, and the relations, intelligible only as expressed in them, which bind him to me, belong to these higher phases in an experience which includes many lower ones. From the other phases, which belong to physical and animal existence, I cannot wholly abstract. If I could I should not meet or recognise the finite individual, John Smith. What I do meet and recognise is none the less no

merely physical or animal structure. I find myself face to face with a person, who has sensations and emotions which my mind interprets as possessing a meaning resembling that of my own. Yet, more than this is necessary to draw us together. These sensations and emotions are for him set in thoughts which correspond with mine, and are present to my consciousness as identical in their foundation with my own way of thinking. Indeed, it is only so that they are present to my consciousness, or that I can reach them. Looks and words are external signs, and signs which are unimportant and of no account except as the embodiment of meaning. In their significance I recognise my own mind; I find myself again. Not perfectly, for John Smith and his looks and words are in one aspect part of the external world which confronts me. But it is an external world which has, by its meaning in my mind, in this fashion become my own world, in which in what corresponds and is identical with myself I have found myself *pro tanto*. I am subject-object and he is object-subject. In the subject moment lies the identity of man and fellow-man. The separation of our finite centres thus lies in externality, but in an externality which is preserved while it is transcended by the recognition of mind as what is identical in him and me. The identity is in the subject aspect, which admits of differentiation only when its activity fixes it as itself an object in self-distinction from other objects. The tendency of thought is to seek for identity, and difficulty in finding it becomes the less as the standpoint becomes progressively more and more the standpoint of thinking. It seeks such identity when it recognises life, the whole which, superseding the causal standpoint of physics, is present in every part of the organism in the form of quasi-purposive action. It seeks such identity, and finds in it a higher form in instinct and in the subsequent stages in the development of the unity of animal life, and still more in conscious purpose, manifesting itself in the deliberately chosen self-organisation of human beings in

social units, self-fashioned to fulfil consciously pursued ethical ends.

The important point is that the distinction of finite centres from each other possesses one significance when we look to their physical aspects, another significance when we find them as organisms obeying the impulses of the species, and a still different meaning when we find them as conscious intelligences co-operating in social wholes. As we reach the highest regions of mind, in art, in religion, in thought, the distinctness of the finite centres still remains. But it remains for purposes which, at this stage, though real, are subordinate. The transition has been to new conceptions, a change which is more than what can be expressed as one in time. It is a transition within mind to higher standpoints and degrees of reality, in which the higher supersede and yet preserve as logical moments those that they transcend. An ideal and perfect universe would be one in which the recognition of all these degrees of reality, these stages in the logic of comprehension, took their places in a mind recognised as completely at one with its object, and containing its world in that completeness as a moment in its own creative activity, a self-creation in which end and means were not finally divorced by the time process. Such a universe neither John Smith nor I can present to our consciousness as an image. We can think of it as an ideal, for in science thought, if it abstracts sufficiently from images and proceeds by concepts, is confronted by limits only to find that it can get beyond what it turns out itself to have fashioned. Yet, the daily experience and the ordinary standpoint in reflection of my friend and myself cannot be maintained at this level. Mind and body are not separate existences. They are higher and lower aspects of a reality in which experience is not properly separable from experiencing. Thus, intelligence is conditioned not the less that its reach through such abstract methods as those of mathematics or philosophy has no limit; and, from the nature

of reality as dependent on mind, can have none. It is conditioned because the brain is the organ through which it has in fact to operate. It is not the less intelligence because it has aspects in which it is presented in space and time abstractly as a mere object apprehended. For the individual man, notwithstanding that he is also the subject in knowledge, cannot escape from the fact that the knowledge is *his* knowledge, the mental activity of a particular individual, whom, if we abstract from what is indeed of the essence of his personality, we must regard as an organism, or even as a thing with properties. It is thus that the category of substance introduces itself. In finite knowledge, that is to say, knowledge which operates under conditions like ours, this will always be so. For we start in time from what we feel, from what our organism brings to consciousness, and the process of our knowledge is one which develops the implications of what seems to come to us from without through the channels of the senses. But, in developing these implications, we are not extracting externalities out of externalities. We are rather bringing to light principles which are implicit, as foundational, in even the simplest experience, and among them the moment of the subject. In the feeling of organisms lower than man, if we can speak of such feeling at all as analogous to our feeling, such a moment may not be implicit in the same fashion. It belongs to the stage where personality is attained. For, apart from personality, and except as present to it, there is no world such as exists for me. Even for the dog that approaches to being intelligent, my own world does not exist. This war as such has no meaning for his mind, and it could not be for him a full experience.

When it is said that reality means nothing and is nothing except in so far as it is "experience," there is an ambiguity to be guarded against to which I have already referred. The word "experience" suggests what is experienced in abstraction from the act of experiencing it. It suggests the activity of some particular finite individual, whose experience may

present itself as from a different standpoint, or a different position in space and time, from that of others. But such distinctions and differences really fall within knowledge and its terms. By knowledge I mean the entirety of the concrete activity of mind, which may take the aspect of feeling, as much as of the abstract thought from which feeling is inseparable, and which is itself inseparable, save by abstraction, from feeling. And I mean also the entirety of mental content, which extends, not only to being known, but to knowing what is known. Now, beyond this I cannot get, for nothing outside it has or can have any significance for me. There is and can be nothing outside it. It is quite true that if, when we speak of mind, we intend only a finite individual, a particular intelligent organism, the Berkeleian argument either leads us to solipsism, or, as Mr. Montagu has pointed out in his essay in the volume called *The New Realism*, and published by six American writers on philosophy, is a fallacy arising out of using the middle term "idea" ambiguously, so as to denote in one premise the act of perceiving and in the other premise what is perceived.

But the fallacy arises only if we intend by the ego a finite individual confronted by an object world to which it stands as a separate object. Only if perception is regarded as a causal operation of one of these objects on the other is there a final distinction between being perceived and the act of perceiving, and therefore an ambiguous middle term. No doubt, common sense tells us that the object exists independently of any particular self which it happens to confront. Yet, the whole process and the distinctions which are made in it not the less arise only through and for mind. We must not surreptitiously assume the notion of "things with properties" as what we are here considering. Outside knowledge, actual or potential, in the larger sense, nothing has any meaning for us, and not only things and their relations, but objects with their relations to subjects, derive their significance and their reality from distinctions that fall within knowledge because

made in it. The self-consciousness of an Absolute can be no more and no less than an Absolute which knows itself as itself, and is real in the process of its self-differentiation as difference showing in identity and identity showing in difference. Whether such expressions as "self" and "personality," suggesting as they inevitably do the finite, and space and time as not merely *for* mind but as regions which it inhabits and which confine it, are adequate here, is a legitimate question which has been often put. At least it seems as though we must attribute to such an Absolute all that is adequate in the ideals essayed in these expressions, and possibly more. The point is that with such a self or personality, if adequately developed by thought, we are not in the "ego-centric predicament" of subjective idealism, the extreme from which "New Realism" leaps to another extreme, again dependent on knowledge being no more than a causal relation between objects in knowledge.

Where I find myself in sympathy with the New Realists is in their desire to set up in its fullness what they, wrongly as I think, call the non-mental world, and to believe in its reality as it seems to plain people. Why should we try to break up its simple self-existence into some other kind of existence? The "New Realism" tends to abolish the supposed gap between the real and the ideal; and, with this gap, I think tends also to abolish itself, by pouring everything into a region which it has, by a set of abstractions, distinguished as non-mental. Idealism of the objective order tends not less on its part to do away with the implications suggested by its name. For it the universe is just there as it appears, as real as in the other view. Within mind as our medium we, and all the particular selves into which intelligence particularises itself, live and move and have our being. There is no question about the existence of mind. The only question is what in this wide significance it imports and implies, and in what systematic form we can express its implication. For it is the foundation on which rests

and out of which emerges every distinction between known and knowing, between felt and feeling, between object and subject, between non-mental and mental. No wonder that the stand-points of realism and idealism seem to converge the more closely we scrutinise them. The controversy arises from reflections which are unduly abstract. Not only can we not deduce the fact of the universe from anything else, or resolve it into logical concepts, but we are not called on to do so. There is no problem excepting that of making explicit what is implicit before us. The meaning of the great fact is the only legitimate question. The world is there as it seems to me. Its "that" is foundational and is experience. Its "what" is the problem of philosophy. By foundational I mean what I assume and imply as the basis and presupposition on which we know and raise even our merest questions.

If this be so, then one of the things that confronts us among the facts is that to which Professor Bosanquet devotes the second volume of his *Gifford Lectures*, a volume which I hold in high admiration not the less because of my doubts about certain points which he and Mr. Bradley both seem to me to press unduly. "The finite-infinite creature," as he says,* "is always in a condition of self-transcendence. This is the same as saying that he is always endeavouring to pass beyond himself in achievement. He is always a fragmentary being, inspired by an infinite whole, which he is for ever striving to express in terms of his limited range of externality." I cordially agree, excepting that the metaphors are a little dubious. We have to think largely in names, and images and metaphors we cannot wholly avoid. The criticism which I make on the modes of expression to which I have been referring is a criticism to which I am well aware that my own language is open. I wish it were otherwise, and that a strict terminology, akin to that of the mathematician, was in use by metaphysicians. But even

Hegel himself, who aimed at such a terminology, was a great sinner in this respect.

I have found it hard to follow Professor Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley in assigning to feeling regarded *per se* the place in reality and in the highest knowledge which they seem to me to attribute to it. If knowledge is an abstraction apart from feeling, so does feeling seem to me unreal when relational thought is excluded from it. I find it difficult to interpret the highest and most direct form of knowledge as akin to unmediated feeling. Experience is one, although it has many aspects and degrees towards perfection. It is surely always mediated by thought. In the subject moment of our everyday self-consciousness it seems to me that the highest point which is attainable by us is reached, inasmuch as there we find freedom from the limits imposed by the organism, and deliverance from time and space, and consequently from the externality and otherness of the object *over* which thought always reaches. The non-mental world can hardly be with truth set over against the mental as an existence which confronts it. To do what the New Realists do seems to me to amount to resting their science upon an inadequate category, that of substance. But in truth even for the New Realists there is no world to which they can legitimately apply the description "non-mental." They reproduce in what they name as "non-mental" the universals which their critics put on the other side of an imaginary line, a line between thought and things. Now, it is not clear why such a line should be laid down at all, except in the sense that experience discloses many grades of reality, many forms of which the higher are not reducible to the lower. How are what we speak of as values to be passed over to a region that is non-mental, and how is our consciousness of their reality to be regarded as the effect of a mechanical activity of what is looked upon as merely a different substance, the nervous system? Surely, the facts tell us that, to quote a very recent utterance of Professor Bosanquet, "our being is not

restricted to our physical self, but enters into the unity of spirits."*

Experience of this self seems to disclose an entirety, a spiritual entirety, within which its not-self is distinguished as only one moment of the whole from its own activity as subject. The individual self comes before us as our object with other selves in a world which is characterised by the separateness in space and time of physical organisms. Of these self-conscious activity is the interpretation and completion. And the self is subject and always more than substance. It is not as God, for its natural origin and conditions limit its activity and mark it as finite. Yet, on the subject side we meet with what holds its various experiences in one entirety, and enables it, not only to transcend the limited range of its direct experiences, but to survey and pass beyond these limits by the power of thought. It is in thought, the very essence of the subject, that we find an aspect in which the separateness of selves is transcended. When we say "I" we speak in the language of the universals of thought. But even when we thus say "I" we are speaking abstractly. "I" is only my point of departure. "I," in my full self-development, takes me far beyond the merely formal self, to which Professor Pringle-Pattison has demurred as on the face of it quite inadequate, and which is really no more than a first phase in reflection, a partially conceived object set before itself by thought as a counter object to what confronts it as an external world. Knowledge has not done its work until, proceeding beyond the formal synthetic unity of Kant, it has grasped the process of its self-development, which alone discloses the full meaning of such distinctions made in the self-creative universe within which fall both thought and its object. There seems to be a single subject of knowledge which we may call so truly, if we remember the limitations of language and the danger of categories that are inadequate

* *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 150.

outside their appropriate fields. It is in the identity of selves on the subject side that we can seek an immanent God that is truly an Absolute God, and not One set over against the self as an Other.

If it be right to regard knowledge in its full meaning, not as a property or instrument imperfect in its very nature, but as the fact which is presupposed as the foundation of all reality, then the bond between the finite individuals emerging in the processes of nature must be this, that when they know, their thinking is not to be looked on merely as an occurrence in space and time, nor as a property existent in the sense in which the properties of individual substances are distinguished as existing. Whether the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles is an expression adequate to what identity means when applied in this connection to the self I am not at all sure. For we pass at the standpoint of the self from the region of differences arising within the object world into a higher region of self-differentiation.

To bring the points in controversy to their focus, it seems to me that the question raised in this discussion ought to be answered along the following lines:—

Neither of the terms substantive or adjectival is adequate as scientifically descriptive of the mode of being of finite individuals. These terms suggest the relation of a thing and its properties, while what we are dealing with belongs to a different region in knowledge and to a higher stage in the hierarchy of reality. Selves are mutually exclusive of each other in those aspects, actual but not their only aspects, in which they belong to nature as souls completing the significance of organisms which, by abstraction, may be looked on just as organisms, although they have as intelligent a higher significance. It is thus that we find in experience exclusion of each other by individuals. Such exclusion is a fact, but it is not the whole truth. For, in so far as these individuals are apprehended by mind as subject in knowledge, their activity is

identical in difference, in the full sense in which the activity of mind is identical in difference. In this sense it is right to say, if the meaning of the language used be carefully guarded, that there is no numerical diversity of minds, inasmuch as mind is essentially subject activity, and is no property of a substance but an intellectual activity that differentiates itself in the experience of individual selves, and yet remains, as it is the nature of mind adequately conceived to do, identical in the differences which it creates, and returning into itself from them. Of the process we can frame no imaginative picture, because such pictures can only be made out of the particular material furnished through our organs. But we can conceive it in thought. It is not in principle more beyond the grasp of thought than is what we mean when we speak of the real or the transfinite numbers already cited as examples. Moreover, we must assume thought to be adequate to such a task, because otherwise no step of any genuine kind can be taken in philosophical analysis, nor can thought itself be relied on even to demonstrate its own inadequate character.

There seems to be apparent a common tendency in different schools of philosophy to converge. The "New Realism" itself, as I have already said, suggests a revised form of what is called objective idealism. If it were to give up as not essential to the reality of its non-mental world the view of knowledge as a causal mode of external action of one substance on another, the environment on the nervous system, and were it simply to ask for the rejection of the ego-centric claim, and for a recognition of the world as comprising within its reality every kind of quality and value and there as it seems, the "New Realism" would have got near to a point on which, from another side, the idealist movement appears to be converging. What is necessary is surely to eliminate the obsession that the conception of things as in mutual exclusion confronting things is more than a useful working conception, requisite at certain stages in the development of knowledge. It remains true that progress

depends on the extent to which we can, as we proceed, *ex animo* substitute for the conception of our universe as substance the conception of it as subject. Even, however, when we employ the expression subject, the employment is apt to prove lip service. Because all categories are essential in an entirety of knowledge which in its only adequate form consists in recognition of higher forms as preserving, even in their supersession of them, the substance of lower conceptions, we are apt to lapse back into those lower forms to the exclusion of others beyond them. Employed in judgments of the understanding that are of high value in everyday life, they yet entangle us in contradictions if taken as more than merely partial results reached on the way to the full truth. Especially in psychology is one struck with this feature. There is an enormous amount of detailed work of a high order which has of late been accomplished in psychology. Yet, the science remains a collection of fragments, and something more is needed to complete it. Because mind, even when it seems to be conditioned, is still mind, it can pass in thought beyond what, under the aspect of organism, it feels around it, and can find itself in what has seemed foreign only because of the abstractions which it has itself made. As individual selves, whose factual state is one of existence in space and time, we cannot experience directly the whole of a process which for us must remain unending. But because, although finite, we have not the less on that account mind as the foundation of our existence, we are also infinite and capable of passing in reflection beyond the limits of our individuality, and of contemplating the self *sub specie aternitatis*.

If this be so, then the expression "finite" imparts something more than a mere spatial metaphor. It means that mind, making use of the lower categories, differentiates itself, as part of the process of its own activity and in fulfilment of an end, into selves which imply only a certain stage or degree of reality. That stage is *de facto* ours, it is the plane at which we exist and reflect; it gives us our "that," a world of fact which is a centre

of gravity, as it were, even for our highest aspirations, and in which we cannot gainsay that a world confronts us in which we are ourselves included, yet from which in other aspects of our nature we distinguish ourselves as free and as including it. For reflection there emerges the conception of a higher unity, a unity which the very conditions of our immersion in nature prevent us from envisaging, but which we can reach by conceptual thought, and of which in art and religion we have in some measure a revelation less mediated by abstraction than that which metaphysics affords.

Art, religion and philosophy alike appear to point to the same conclusion. The further upwards we proceed along the stages by which the self manifests its reality the less do we encounter of that hard and fast distinction of selves which confronts us most of all in the anthropological relations where the separateness of organisms is everywhere a cardinal fact. The more complete our progress from substance to subject, and the stages of this progress are manifold, the nearer do we appear to come to the conception of selves as dependent on fundamental unity of intelligence,—a unity which, appearing last, discloses itself to analysis as foundational, and therefore first. Such a feature of identity in all self-consciousness is inadequately characterised as an absolute subject or self. The expression misleads, for it suggests that we are taking greater liberties with notions which belong partially to lower stages than they will bear. We suffer from the greatest of all difficulties, even in the thinking that is most guarded, the suggestions which arise from our inadequate metaphors. No image drawn from our experience under conditions of externality in space and time is adequate to express what we can only present to our minds conceptually. If our medium in conceptual presentation is feeling, as in art and religion is largely the case, the fact is emphasised that in their final forms feeling and thinking are not so sharply separated as they seem to be in lower forms of experience. Yet, even these feelings ;

must be mediated by thinking. The modern realists are surely right in their refusal to treat the so-called non-mental world as excluding from direct experience all that is of a universal character. Matter and mind fall together, but the conception of an experience in which they so fall together is not to be looked upon as one in which either the mental or the non-mental, themselves the results only of a distinction within mind, can be regarded as self-subsisting entities. The larger entirety must include both. But not as an unintelligible Absolute different from an actual experience interpreted by philosophy. Nor yet as though it were some superior monad existing apart from all finite monads and related to them in a fashion which reflection itself cannot interpret. It is rather just in those higher aspects of self-consciousness in which the knowledge and volition of selves display more and more of identity and less and less of the difference which is characteristic of the external world, that the search for the foundation of finite selfhood seems fruitful. It is from above that we must start again, and work backwards from the end to what appears its beginning, if we would understand the beginning of knowledge itself. And when we do examine, steadily and critically, our modes of expression and seek to eliminate from them suggestions of relations which belong to the external world, especially relations such as those of things and their properties, it does not seem difficult to conclude that the question whether finite selves are substantive or adjectival raises a dilemma which has no exhaustive application to the problem before us. If philosophy can reach this point it will have got some way towards redeeming itself from the reproach that it seems to deny realities which plain men insist on, by seeking to dissolve them into what seem to these plain men to be unreal abstractions.

XX.—SHORT COMMUNICATIONS.

1.—THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE
VERB "TO BE."

By L. SUSAN STEBBING.

"The invention of the verb *to be* is one of the conquests of the logical spirit."—COUTURAT.

THE above remark may well be true, but we must add that the precise signification of the verb *to be* remains to-day one of the most difficult and most important of philosophical questions. I wish now to call attention to one aspect only of the problems which arise, namely, to the most fundamental divisions that must be recognised in *Being*, that is, to the grades or levels of Being that must be philosophically distinguished. At the outset, we find the distinction between *real* and *unreal*, between *real* and *existent*, and between *existent* and *subsistent*, and we find endless confusion between these terms. There is a tendency to speak of everything that can be named as *being real*, and hence to empty the *unreal* of all significance. Now, it is obvious that everything that can be named, or thought of, *is*, *i.e.*, has being of some sort; nevertheless, some things can be significantly described as *real*, others as *unreal*, and it is important not to adopt a usage which would deprive the latter term of all meaning. The meaning which it obviously carries is the denial of realness to that which is characterised by it.

The status of the *unreal*, however, is a matter of considerable doubt, and philosophers tend to obscure the problem when they assert that *true* and *false* are equivalent respectively to *real* and

unreal.* It is an equally disastrous mistake to make the *real* equivalent to the *existent*, and this again to *being*. It is with this identification that I am now concerned. Dr. Moore's recent subtle argument with regard to the unreality of unicorns shows that there is a serious misuse of terms. He asserts with regard to the statement "I am thinking of a unicorn" that "it is certainly not necessary for its truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should *in any sense whatever* be a unicorn" (p. 119), and again he says, "the fact that we can think of unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there *are* any unicorns." These assertions seem to me based upon a serious mistake, viz., upon *the identification of reality with existence*, an identification which it is quite obvious Dr. Moore deliberately makes. Moreover, for Dr. Moore, "to be in any sense whatever" appears to be equivalent to "being *real*," hence it follows what is not real cannot be in *any sense whatever*. But since unicorns do not exist *in rerum natura*, they are not, do not exist, are not real, cannot be said to be in any sense whatever. There is here an obvious fallacy of the accident, the remedy for which is a more adequate treatment of the levels of being. Again, Dr. Moore ranges three pairs of propositions in opposition:—

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| (1) "Unicorns are thought of." | (1) "Lions are hunted." |
| (2) "I am thinking of a unicorn." | (2) "I am hunting a lion." |
| (3) "Unicorns are objects of thought." | (3) "Lions are objects of chase." |

and asserts that the left-hand set are of a different *form* from the right-hand set; and he maintains "it is perfectly obvious that if I say 'I am thinking of a unicorn,' I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of it, although, if I say 'I am hunting a lion,' I am saying both that there is a lion and that I am hunting it. In the former case I am *not*

* As for example, Professor Montague in *The New Realism*, p. 252 *seq.* This whole essay involves a serious burking of the fundamental problems.

asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and being thought of by me both belong to one and the same *thing*, whereas, in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a lion and being hunted by me *do* belong to one and the same thing." Now, it seems to me, so far is this from being obviously true, that it is obviously false. The *form* of the proposition—as distinct from its verbal expression—gives, and can give, no such indication of a fundamental difference at all. The difference in implication arises from the difference of the object. Only existent objects are *hunted*, but non-existent objects may be *thought* of. We may reverse and say—"lions are thought of," "unicorns are hunted," and in both cases equally the subject of the proposition *is in some sense*. It is an utter mistake to suppose that the *form* of the proposition can throw any light upon the *nature* of the *being* which appertains to the subject.* The sole reason why I cannot say "unicorns are hunted" is that hunting is an activity confined to existent men in an existent physical world, in which only existent objects can be hunted. But the impropriety of the proposition is not shown by its form; rather the impropriety of the *form* (of the proposition) to its subject-matter is known only when the subject is *first* known not to be an existent in the physical world. If, therefore, "I am hunting a lion" implies that there is a physically existent lion, this implication is contained in "hunting." Yet, I could quite well say "Don Quixote is hunting a unicorn," and *nothing* in the form of the proposition shows the absurdity of the statement. Again, "I am thinking of a

* Dr. Moore is certainly right in saying that "Lions are real" is a proposition of different form from "Lions are mammalian," as is shown, *e.g.*, from a consideration of the Latin, which would require no attribute in the first case, and the proposition would be *Leones sunt*. But we could get parallel propositions for unicorns, viz., "Unicorns are unreal" (*non sunt*), and "Unicorns are ruminants," and thus the difference in form proves nothing as to the ontological status of lions and unicorns.


lion" and "I am thinking of a unicorn" are formally on precisely the same level of ontological implication.

I would suggest that *real-unreal* is a subdivision of the *existent*, and that the *subsistent* is neither real nor unreal, but is a logical form of being. The subdivisions of the latter will, therefore, be founded upon *logical* differentia. Any attempt to classify kinds of being will show that a much more thoroughgoing distinction than is usually made must be recognised between the existent and the subsistent, and that the various levels in each case are much more complicated in their inter-relations than has been supposed. I subjoin a table, the purpose of which is to indicate as briefly as possible the most important of the distinctions to be made.

Mr. Russell's distinction between the *existent* and the *subsistent* gives us the dichotomous distinction that was called into being by the needs of mathematics. But it is inadequate to the needs of metaphysics. I call attention to the following points, every one of which requires a more detailed discussion than space permits at present.

(1) The *real* is to be defined in terms of *causal efficacy*. That is real which is a unit in a completely causal system. This accounts for the popular use of the term *real* and the importance of the characteristic "reality" as applied to God, the persistence of the soul, and so forth; that is, for example, the question of God's "existence" resolves itself into the question—"Has God causal efficacy in any given system?" The failure to answer this question leaves such a treatment as Hegel's without importance for theology.

(2) Within the *real* we distinguish spatial-temporal causal units, and the non-physical units which have the marks of subjectivity such as images. There has been much discussion as to whether an image is mental or physical. The discussion appears to me to have been fruitless, since each side is able to disprove the contention of the other simply because an image is neither mental nor physical. The belief that mental and



physical are logical contradictories has led to much mistaken philosophy, and even those who admit that *ideas* are neither the one nor the other have been loth to admit that even *within the realm of existence* there is a class of entities that are non-mental and non-physical. As briefly as possible I want to indicate what I take the status of an image to be. It is not possible to assert that the image, *e.g.*, of a horse, is present *before* the act of imaging, in *any* sense in which the physical object may be said to be present before it is perceived. And yet, again, quite clearly the image is an *external* object *upon* which the act of perceiving is directed. There is no doubt that my *image* of a horse is a constituent of the actual world, but it is not a *public* object in the same sense as a physical horse is, and hence it is not, I think, physical. I should say that nothing is physical which does not act and react with other physical objects, and which is incapable of alteration, and hence does not exist in time or occupy space. Now, it seems to me that these characteristics can be summed up by saying that physical objects are *units in a spatial-causal system*. But my image of a horse is not a unit in a causal system of this kind, for it neither attracts nor is attracted by objects in some sense contemporaneous with it—*e.g.*, this paper, my pen, and so on. That is, my image is not a unit in *the* causal system in which my physical body is a unit. On the other hand, it is clearly not mental. This is evident so soon as we reflect that visual images are not acts, and are extended, hence are definitely spatial. Nevertheless, an image is an *existent*: it does not share the timeless reality of a universal: it is a particular, having existence in time and in space of some kind, although I do not think that my *image* of a horse is localised in a space continuous with my perceived space.* Hence we need some word to describe a

* I do not think images are in physical space at all, nor in what Mr. Russell describes as my "private space," but in another kind of space. I am aware that this needs fuller discussion.

particular existent that is neither mental nor physical, and I would suggest "material," were it not that this term seems bound up with such physical *laws* as *gravitation*. It seems to me important to find a term. I should like just to point out here that reflections, *e.g.* of a clock in a mirror, are not *images* in the psychological sense at all; they are undoubtedly physical existents, *i.e.* they are causal units. Of course, the mirrored clock does not attract the chandelier—and so on—but that is because it is the colour only that is mirrored. The same analysis applies to the *visual* appearance of a bent stick, which I think is certainly independent of any percipient, hence is not mental; it is on precisely the same level as the mirrored clock.

(3) The term *unreal* is definitely assigned to that which is not an effective unit in a causal system. This is to narrow the use of the term, but I believe this limitation is in the interest of clearness. The differentia between real and unreal is to be found in causal efficacy, and it is this which lies at the basis of the popular distinction between real and unreal. The comparative unreality of images arises from the fact that they fall within an incompletely causal system.

(4) It will be seen that the distinction between the subsistent and the existent is co-extensive with the distinction between universals and particulars. There seems to me to be here, as Mr. Russell has pointed out, an ultimate dualism.

(5) The *fundamentum divisionis* of the subsistent is the presence or absence of consistency. I will note two points only: (1) Geometrical absurdities of the *round-square* type, as well as such entities as $\sqrt{-9}$, fall within this division, whereas the *gold mountain* falls within the unreal existent; (2) exploded hypotheses are of the same logical form as mathematical absurdities.

(6) "Objectives" have the same ontological status as ideals and universals. This requires an analysis of *fact* which I have not space to pursue now.

(7) An important consequence follows: the existent is not seen to be necessarily in conformity with logical principle, but only if it *is* so can it be known, because to know is to reduce to logically coherent system. The universe, therefore, if alogical is unknowable.

2.—ON THE SUMMATION OF PLEASURES.

By DOROTHY WRINCH.

ANY discussion of the question of pleasure seems to be beset with difficulties. But there is one very interesting point which I hope I may be allowed to touch on, without entering into the intricate and pressing problems ordinarily discussed. I refer to the summation of pleasures. It is possible that the considerations to be urged in this paper apply to other kinds of value; but it seemed best to take pleasure only. I will assume that pleasures can be arranged in serial order, and I will pass over entirely the complicated questions which are involved in any attempt to justify such an assumption. This assumption is, of course, not so large as the assumption that pleasure is quantitative. Pleasures can be arranged in serial order if there is a relation "less than" which subsists between different pleasures, such that (1) a pleasure cannot be less than itself, (2) any pleasure less than a pleasure, itself less than a third pleasure, is less than the third pleasure, (3) of any two unequal pleasures, one is less than the other.

Now, the question I wish to discuss is this: *Can the pleasure of several experiences together be expressed in all cases in terms of the pleasure of the experiences separately?* In his *Principia Ethica*, Dr. G. E. Moore asserts that in some kinds of wholes the value of a whole "bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts" (p. 27). He points out (p. 28) that "it is certain that a whole formed of a good thing and

an indifferent thing may have immensely greater value than that good thing itself possesses. It is certain that two bad things or a bad thing and an indifferent thing may form a whole much worse than the sum of badness of its parts. And it seems as if indifferent things may also be the sole constituents of a whole which has great value either positive or negative However we may decide particular questions, the principle is clear. *The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.*" Then Rashdall, in *The Theory of Good and Evil*, says: "It is true, of course, that the hedonistic value of a pleasure in combination with others may be something quite different from its value when taken by itself. . . . The values that we sum are altered by the summing, or rather by the combination." But, unfortunately, Rashdall goes on to say: "And this objection may be treated as fatal to the whole idea of a 'sum of pleasures.'" I do not think that this is the case. The objection is only fatal to the crude idea of the value of a set of good or bad things together being equal or directly proportional to the sum of the values of the things separately; or,—as we are concerned now with the particular case of pleasure—to the crude idea of the pleasure of a set of experiences, together, being equal or directly proportional to the sum of the pleasures of the experiences separately. There is, I think, a possibility of working out functional relations between the pleasure of experiences together and the pleasure of experiences separately.

It is perfectly easy to see that the difficulty brought forward by the writers we have quoted is a genuine one. Experiences taken together do not, in general, give the same amount of pleasure as the experiences taken separately. Suppose I go to the opera and see a friend there. It may be the case that the fact that he is there heightens my pleasure in the opera. Further, the fact that I am at the opera may alter the amount of my pleasure at seeing him and may heighten it. Again,

suppose p is an experience of very intense pleasure, and q is a trivial pleasure such as eating chocolates. Then, the pleasure of q given p is, perhaps, very much greater than the pleasure of eating chocolates under ordinary circumstances. On the other hand, the pleasure of p is so intense that q cannot change it. Since p modifies the pleasure of q , the pleasure of p and q together is not equal to the sum of the pleasures of p and q . In both the cases we have considered the pleasure of the two experiences together is greater than the sum of the pleasures separately. Now, in order to get a functional relation between the pleasure of p and q together and the pleasure of p and q separately, we will introduce the notion of the influence of one experience on the pleasure of another.

The *influence* of an experience q on the pleasure of another experience p is the pleasure of p given q less the pleasure of p . In the case of seeing my friend at the opera, the influence of each experience on the pleasure of the other is positive. Now, in estimating the pleasure of hearing the opera and seeing my friend together, besides the pleasure of these experiences separately, the influence of each on the pleasure of the other must be taken into account. Again, in the case of the intense pleasure and the pleasure of eating chocolates, not only the pleasure of each of these experiences separately, but also the influence on each on the pleasure of the other, must be considered.

Now, let us consider the possibility of expressing the pleasure of p and q together in terms of the pleasure of p and q separately in the following way. *The pleasure of p and q together is equal to the pleasure of p and q separately, together with the influence of p on the pleasure of q and the influence of q on the pleasure of p .* Using such an expression, it will appear that in the case of two experiences p and q , which are pleasant, the pleasure of p and q together may exceed or fall short of the pleasure of p and q separately, according as the sum of the influence of p on the pleasure of q and the influence of q

on the pleasure of p is positive or negative. In the two cases we have considered, the sum of the influences was positive, and consequently the pleasure of the experiences together was in each case greater than the pleasure of the experiences separately. The expression suggested allows in the particular case of pleasure the possibility, brought forward by Moore, of a good thing and an indifferent thing together having a greater value than that good thing itself possesses. This would only mean that, though the value of q (say) is zero, the influence of p on the value of q is more than large enough to compensate for the influence of q on the value of p if this happened to be negative, so that the sum of the influences is positive and the pleasure of p and q together consequently greater than the sum of the pleasures. Again, the expression allows, in the case of pleasures, the possibility suggested by Moore of two bad things forming a whole much worse than the sum of badness of its parts; and, also, of indifferent things together having great value positive or negative. One further point may be urged in favour of the expression suggested. If the pleasures of p and q are independent of each other, if, that is to say (*e.g.*), it is just as pleasant to go to the opera whether my friend is there or not, and just as pleasant to see him at the opera as on any other occasion, then we should expect and require the pleasure of p and q together to be equal to the pleasure of p and q separately. And in this case the influence of p on the pleasure of q and the influence of q on the pleasure of p are both zero, and the formula reduces as required to the pleasure of p and q together being equal to the pleasure of p and q separately.

And all that has been said applies to the summation of the pleasure of any number of things, not merely to the case of two. We may extend the notion of the influence of an experience q on the pleasure of p to the influence of a set of experiences q, r, s, \dots , on the pleasure of p , defining it as the pleasure of p given $q, r, s \dots$, less the pleasure of p , and introduce the formula *the pleasure of $p, q, r, s \dots$ together is equal to the*

pleasure of p, q, r, s, \dots , separately, together with the influence on the pleasure of each experience of all the other experiences. To take an example, where there are three experiences. Consider the experiences of going to the play (p), of seeing a friend (q), and of eating chocolates (r). We wish to estimate the pleasure of p, q , and r together in terms of the pleasures of p, q , and r separately. Now, suppose it is more pleasant to go to the play when I see my friend and have chocolates to eat than otherwise. Suppose, further, that it is not less pleasant to see my friend when I am at the play and am eating chocolates, than under other circumstances. Suppose, finally, that it is more pleasant to eat chocolates when I am at the play and my friend is there than otherwise. The influence of q, r on the pleasure of p is positive; the influence of p, r on the pleasure of q is positive or zero; the influence of q, p on the pleasure of r is positive. The sum of the influences is therefore positive and the pleasure of p, q , and r together, in consequence, greater than the pleasure of p, q , and r separately. Again, we can see that it is possible with this formula to have a set of experiences p, q, r, \dots such that p has a positive amount of pleasure and the rest no pleasure, positive or negative, and yet p, q, r, \dots together have more pleasure than p itself possesses. And unpleasant things, with this formula, may very well together give a larger amount of unpleasantness than they yield separately. Finally, if the pleasure of each experience is independent of the others, the formula reduces, as we should require, to the pleasure of the experiences together being equal to the pleasure of the experiences separately.

To make a calculus of pleasures work on the lines which we have indicated, it would be necessary to introduce various other axioms. Many interesting problems which would then be capable of treatment suggest themselves—as, *e.g.*, to find which combination of n experiences chosen from m experiences gives the greatest amount of pleasure, given certain of the mutual influences of the experiences,—and as a particular case, we would have the problem of finding the greatest amount of

pleasure obtainable when from a set of experiences p_1, p_2, \dots, p_r , either p_1 or the contradictory of p_1 , and either p_2 or the contradictory of $p_2 \dots$, and either p_r or the contradictory of p_r , have to be chosen.

To discuss further the details of the axiom of summation which has been suggested would be to become involved in a mass of technicalities. As stated, it gives good promise of yielding elegant and interesting results in a calculus of pleasures. But very many interesting and difficult points remain to be discussed. I would like to add a few remarks about the nature of the *influences* which we have made use of in this paper. The influence of p, q, r on the pleasure of s , the influence of p, r, s on the pleasure of q , and so on, may be regarded as *coefficients* of the system p, q, r , and s . And the system p, q, r , and s will not be sufficiently defined to enable us to estimate the pleasure of p, q, r , and s together unless certain of these coefficients are known as well as the pleasure of p, q, r , and s separately. A particular set of experiences possesses these coefficients, just as a particular metal possesses a particular coefficient of expansion. The notion of such coefficients is, of course, very familiar in mathematics and physics, and it appears to be fruitful in such problems as the estimate of values in combination. It has been applied with very interesting results to the case of probabilities by Mr. W. E. Johnson, and it is his use of a coefficient of dependence between two events, which has reference to the probabilities of the events, that has suggested the introduction of the notion of the influence of experiences on the pleasure of another experience.

3.—ASSOCIATION.

By ARTHUR LYNCH.

WHEN association is recognised as one of the fundamental processes of the mind the question becomes lifted into a new plane; we gain a clearer view not only of the association of

ideas, but of the association of ideas, emotions, passions, each with the others; and finally we see that the interest of successive ideas, the depth and intensity of the impressions made, depend on the entire style and temperament of the subject, ultimately on the complex of the physical qualities which influence the constitution of the mind. I have elsewhere* summed up these considerations in the aphorism, "the whole man thinks"; and, in my *Psychology: A New System*, I have submitted the matter to a detailed examination.

The following is a more general enunciation of the position: Given a system—as, for instance, a human being—composed of certain elements, physical and mental (and these in the final result of our analysis are not regarded as independent of mutual reactions), given also the power of interpreting the reactions of forces, physical and mental, within the system, we can then determine the movements of that system in a given milieu. This is theoretical in a sense similar to that in which we say that the movement of a projectile would be capable of definition from the consideration of the movements of each of its atoms and the forces brought to play on them: the powers of calculation would certainly be in default, but in certain cases it is possible to obtain guidance as to how all these forces and movements sum up in resultants. So it is with the human system in regard to association: we cannot trace out the actions of the myriad forces involved though conceiving them as being determinate, but we can ascertain in broad outlines certain of their resultants.

In order to make the matter more graphic, consider a limited field of experience formed in main part by a succession of sensations of colour. Now consider another experience differing from the first only in the nature of the colours. There is a similarity of the movements of the mind in the two cases. The form of those movements I indicate as the schema of the

* In *Human Documents*.

experience. I now enlarge the field, and I say that we can have cases of complicated experiences differing from each other in regard to the quality of the elements of sense which go to form the experiences, but such that the schemata in these cases are similar. Further, seeing the fundamental processes are the elements from which all mental activity is composed, it must follow that differences of experience depend on differences of the combination of these processes—forming the different schemata—taken together with the different characters, referred ultimately, for instance, to diverse qualities of sensation, of the actual objects of these experiences. Hence in various forms of mental experience, apparently quite remote from each other, we may discover analogies.

To give an example, I have found an exercise in psychology in tracing out homologous forms that exist between the mental acts of a mathematician seeking the solution of a problem and those of a cabman finding his way about London. In this respect I remember a saying of Sir William Gowers, the famous neurologist, with whom I studied for a time; he told me that part of his system of diagnosis reminded him of a clerk's book-keeping. He mentioned this, not as the result of a consideration of the general psychological question, but as a suggestion which had occurred to him in the course of practice. The current metaphors which form the base of language arise in simpler phases of the same kind of experiences, and the study is seen to develop in a variety of directions.

But I further note this. Seeing that the character of experience is determined on the one hand by the total make-up of the subject, and on the other by the nature of the milieu in which the subject is placed, and considering that the careers of men are directed often by accidental causes, we should expect to find evidence of the style and temperament of a thinker, or of a man of action, in the manner in which he addresses himself to his work and presents his achievements. Here, again, we arrive at an interesting and fertile field of study. I have traced out, for

instance, the influence of the temperaments of great philosophers on the character of their ethical systems. Also, in a more curious way still, I find that in a study so recondite and impersonal as mathematics the temperament of a man of genius makes itself evident. One notices in Descartes the satisfaction with the clear apprehension of essential principles, as contrasted with the elaborate thoroughness of Plücker, or the meticulous circumspection of Hamilton. In Abel we have the sentiment of intention and tireless energy. To read Lagrange after reading Laplace is to talk to an artist after working with a carpenter.*

Again, in another field, contrast the methods of Davy and Faraday, both men of great achievement though so different in manner. Davy has the temperament of a cavalry officer, and this style is imprinted on his work. The scrupulous Faraday was captivated by Davy's flashes of genius, but shocked by the irregularity of his methods. In another region, take the works of Rabelais, Pascal, Sir Thomas More, and Calderon, and study these from the one point of view of their efforts for the moral uplifting of the people; one sees the analogies which the essential schemata present amid the extraordinary diversities of the matter. In still another field, works so diverse as *Paradise Lost*, *Don Juan*, *Sartor Resartus*, and *Endymion*, will be found to have a deeply based analogy. They are the spiritual biographies of Milton, Byron, Carlyle, and Keats; it would be possible not merely to exhibit this aspect of the matter but also to show how the temperament, the character of experience, the relative strength and limitations of thought in various directions, led each in turn to the form of his work.

Out of the multitude of problems that occur in developing

* Jean Bernoulli, on receiving an unsigned solution of a problem, said, "I know the Lion by its claws"—he meant Newton. Felix Klein, in discoursing on the work of Riemann, refers to the influence of individuality even in the realm of abstract thoughts.

this theme, there is one which has especial interest in the history of literature, viz., that of gaining some light on the character of Shakespeare from a study of his works. It is evident from what has been already said that no one could have written so much as Shakespeare, however "objective" his view of life may have been, without leaving unmistakably on his works deep traces of his own personality. These would be discoverable in the very choice of subjects, and in the mode of their treatment, allowing, of course, for the influence of the taste of the public and the requirements of the theatre.

The personal factor becomes revealed in repetitions of ideas, in reiterations of words, and particularly in the intrusion of suggestions that do not arise naturally out of the scene, or that introduce any kind of incongruity: and, in this regard, it must be noted that omissions may be also of importance. A concordance already gives a rough indication, even if no more discrimination be used than in assigning weight to ideas on the mechanical ground of the number of words expressing such ideas. Take, for instance, the words *woman* and *love* on the one hand, and *cross* and *redemption* on the other, and note with what relative frequency they are employed by Shakespeare and Calderon. To put the question is already to point out the drift of the answer, and to affirm the value of the method.

A complete study of any work of literature, with the view of reconstituting the character of the author, would require a systematic examination, or, rather, successive examinations, set up in turn to find the answer to questions such as those which follow: What evidences exist of the degree of education, or of special training? What is the character of the knowledge displayed? Does it show any notable acquaintance with the science of the time? Is it strong in history? How does the technical skill exhibited, for example, in versification or in stagecraft, compare with that of contemporaries? In all this, what conception arises of the development of the

mind? How is the bent of the mind shown in the oft-recurring words, in ideas brought into unusual association, in sportive moods, in unseasonable expressions? What is the attitude towards great striking facts of the time, either of politics or of religion? Where is admiration particularly displayed? What is the character of passages that break forth most naturally, spontaneously, with enthusiasm, with warmth of language, with wealth of associations, with an air of freedom and familiarity, with imagery inspired, or with surprise of happy touches?

In order to verify certain of these principles, I have looked at Shakespeare's sonnets in a new light, and I believe that I have found in them dominant trends of thought more or less loosely consecutive; and by close attention to certain peculiarities of language in Sonnet LXXVI—the sonnet beginning: "Why is my verse so barren of new pride?"—I have come upon a discovery of the secret concealed in the dedication of these poems. The exercise here involved is of unusual interest, and with the hint given I leave to the reader this study in association.



XXI.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUS.

By A. E. TAYLOR.

WE have seen in recent years a remarkable awakening of intelligent interest in the Neo-Platonist philosophy which our grandfathers and their fathers were content to deride without understanding. We have learned that the Neo-Platonists were neither magicians nor emotionalist *schöne Seelen*, but systematic philosophers addressing themselves to the philosopher's task of understanding the world in which he lives as seriously as Aristotle or Descartes or Kant. No one writing to-day on the history of Greek thought about God, man and nature would be likely to mistake so great a metaphysician as Plotinus for an apologist of polytheism or a New England *littérateur* born out of due season. Still the rehabilitation of the Neo-Platonists has hardly so far led to an adequate appreciation of Proclus, by far the most important member of the school after its great founder, though an honourable step has been taken in this direction by Mr. Whittaker.

This neglect of Proclus is unfortunate in more ways than one. For the historian of thought his significance is hardly second to that of Plotinus himself. It is in the main from him that Christianity received the Neo-Platonic impress still distinguishable in orthodox theology under all the disguise of a formal Aristotelianism. It is true, that before the date of Proclus, Christianity had been deeply influenced by Neo-Platonic ideas derived from Plotinus through such intermediaries as St. Augustine. But the main sources of the unmistakable Neo-Platonism of the great scholastic philosophers are two,—the writings of the so-called Dionysius, themselves the work of some Christianized follower of Proclus, and the work *de Causis*, supposed by St. Thomas and his contemporaries to be Aristotelian, though it is really a Latin rendering through the

Arabic of a part of the very treatise of Proclus to which I shall directly invite your attention.* It was from these sources that the schoolmen of the golden thirteenth century derived the peculiar theory of causality upon which their conception of the universe rests, and it is most instructive, as an illustration of the impossibility of drawing any real dividing line between ancient and modern thought, to find Descartes, in the very act of professing to construct a new way in philosophy, assuming as his fundamental principle and treating as evident "by the natural light" of the understanding just this same theory. Proclus, again, is the author of the only work that has come down to us in which the attempt is made to exhibit the main principles of the Neo-Platonic doctrine, in the strict order of their logical connexion as a well-articulated whole. In many ways a student of Neo-Platonism would be well-advised to begin his reading with the brief but pregnant *στοιχείωσις θεολογική* or *Elements of Neo-Platonism* of which I am to speak this evening. He will find there, brought together in a compact form and expressed with a special view to logical precision, just the leading positions he requires to understand in order to find his way in the multitude of occasional essays we call the *Enneads* of Plotinus. He will also find that the style of the author presents far fewer difficulties. Proclus has, indeed, none of the splendid bursts of spiritual eloquence which at times carry the reader of Plotinus off his feet. His is emphatically the *sermo pedestes*. Yet, by way of compensation, he makes no such demands on his reader as Plotinus in his uninspired moments. He neither defies the rules of grammar nor perplexes his sentences by Plotinus' trick of incessantly interweaving with his own words imperfectly quoted phrases from Plato. If you approach him with a decent working knowledge of Greek, you will find his style on the whole less difficult and less

* I observe that even in Dr. Norman Smith's very recent *Commentary on Kant's Critique* the *De Causis* is referred to as a "mystical" work of Arabian origin.

encumbered with technicalities than Aristotle's, and not more arid than, say, that of John Stuart Mill in English. If he is dry to the taste of many readers, it is only for the same reason that Mill's *Logic* is dry to readers of the same class; the nature of his subject requires him to pursue a train of close argumentation to its logical issue, and affords no scope for the eloquence which appeals to the imagination.

The one real difficulty which besets the student of the *στοιχείωσις* is the wretched condition of the text. As regards this, in many ways his most important book, Proclus has been most unfortunate in his editors. To the schoolmen, as I have said, only part of the work was known in the Latin version of William of Morbeke. Since the invention of printing, so far as I am aware, only two texts have been published. The Greek was first printed in 1618 by Aemilius Portus at the end of his folio edition of the much longer but infinitely less valuable *Six Books on the Theology of Plato*. Of Portus it is hard to speak worse than he deserved. His Greek text was made from bad manuscripts and swarms with errors equally fatal to grammar and to sense. The Latin version which accompanies it proves that he was quite incapable of translating even an uncorrupt and simple Greek original with any fidelity. The worst stumbling block is created, however, by his wholly senseless method of punctuation. On the whole, Portus seems to have a preference for placing a full stop or even beginning a new paragraph in the middle of a sentence. The first translation into English was made from this execrable text in 1816 by that curious eccentric, Thomas Taylor, "the Platonist," and, so far as I know, there has never been a second until the praiseworthy enterprise of Mr. Ionides.* Taylor deserves great respect for his real devotion to Platonic studies, but as a translator he was badly handicapped by the hopeless badness of his text, and in an only less degree by his own want of Greek.

* Unfortunately, Mr. Ionides also appears to have mistaken the nonsense of Portus for the genuine text of Proclus.

His book is now very rare, and probably most of you may never have seen it.

In 1832 the *Elements* obtained a second editor, the notorious Friedrich Creuzer, better known as responsible for the wholly incompetent but typographically beautiful Plotinus of the Oxford University Press.* Creuzer was one of the mystagogues of Schelling's coterie, who professed to find the key to all philosophies in Orphic, Eleusinian and Samothracian *orgia* of which these authors knew nothing and no one else much. He also stood in relations with Hegel, whose adulatory letters to him suggest some unpleasant doubt of that philosopher's competence to act as an expositor of things Hellenic. The whole brood of quacks to which Creuzer belonged, as I may remind you, was finally blown into the air by the scathing exposure of Lobeck's immortal *Aglaophamus*. Creuzer, had he been less incompetent, might perhaps have produced a final text of the *Elements*, as he received from Schweighäuser the readings of a manuscript then at Strassburg which corrects most of the worst faults and fills up many of the lacunæ of the inferior MSS. on which Portus had relied. Unfortunately, Creuzer knew very little Greek, and thought he knew a good deal. Hence, though he inevitably made a great advance on Portus by adopting many of the readings furnished by Schweighäuser, he rejected to his notes scores of others which should have been adopted. A conscientious editor would, of course, have made or caused to be made a complete collation of Schweighäuser's MS., but it is not clear from Creuzer's prefatory account of his own proceedings whether he did more than record such readings as he thought fit. What is worse, he retained the sense-destroying paragraphing and punctuation of his predecessor: and, though he professed to have revised the Latin version of the Greek, very little examination shows that, while removing some bad

* Creuzer's text forms the third volume of a work, of which the first and second volumes contain the commentaries of Olympiodorus and Proclus on the *First Alcibiades*.

errors, he introduced a goodly number on his own account, so that his rendering is often a mere trap for the confiding and unwary. The text has not been edited since Creuzer, and I do not know where the Strassburg MS.—if it has survived, which is perhaps unlikely—may be now. At the present moment, any reader who is to understand his author requires to construct a working text for himself by the aid of such light as Creuzer's records of the readings of the Strassburg MS. afford. Fortunately, the *usus et norma loquendi* of the author enable this to be done with a reasonable approach to certainty in all matters of moment.

I propose in the following pages to give some general account of the method and contents of Proclus' work, leaving the task of criticism to others. It should, of course, be remembered that the doctrine expounded is not, except on one or two points, peculiar to the author. His object is to give a compendious summary of the principles of the whole Neo-Platonic school; and, in the main, the doctrines expounded are those which were held in common by all the thinkers who looked back to Plotinus as the restorer of what they took to be the philosophy of Plato. There are perhaps only two points on which Proclus diverges from Plotinus, both duly recorded by Mr. Whittaker. Like most of the later members of the school, Proclus rejects the possibility, admitted by Plotinus, that the soul may lead a double life, lapsing, as the phrase was, from eternity into time and mutability only in her least worthy elements, while her higher and nobler activities remain in the purely spiritual world "unfallen." Proclus, like nearly all the Neo-Platonists from the time of Iamblichus, maintains in the last proposition of his book that the soul, when she "falls," falls wholly and in every part. This modification of the doctrine of Plotinus, as Mr. Whittaker has said, seems to have been due, at any rate in part, to reaction against what was felt as an over-strained idealism. Even to his devotees Plotinus seemed to be preaching an other-worldliness which

was not quite wholesome. It is the same feeling which comes out in the commentary on the *Republic*, where Proclus makes a vigorous defence of the Homeric stories and the tragic drama against the censures of Plato's Socrates. But there was also a sound logical reason for the revision of the older view; the theory of Plotinus was felt to be inconsistent with the unity of human personality. It involved something like what our Anglo-Hegelians call a "faculty psychology," and it is on this ground that Proclus rejects it in the *Elements*. You cannot reconcile the unity of our mental life with the distinction between a "fallen" and an "unfallen" part in the soul. More important, and much more difficult to interpret, is a doctrine which appears in the very middle of the book, and affects the whole subsequent exposition, the doctrine of the divine Henads or Unities which Proclus identifies with the "gods many" of Hellenic religion. On the probable meaning of this doctrine—which appears to be peculiar to Proclus—and the reasons for insisting upon it, I hope to offer a suggestion in the right place. For the moment, I must be content to introduce my digest of Proclus' metaphysics by some general remarks on the method and arrangement of his manual.

Perhaps, I need hardly say that Proclus will wholly disappoint a reader who comes to him eager to hear about ecstasies and other abnormal psychological wonders. These things belong to the personal religious life, not to philosophy. Even in Plotinus, for all his personal saintliness, the passages where the mystical "rapt" is dwelt on are few and far between, and there is no suggestion that it is attended with any of the abnormal psychological excitements on which the adepts and theurgists lay stress: and, in a logical exposition of the metaphysical doctrine of the school, there is no occasion to mention ecstasy at all. In *philosophy*, as Mr. Whittaker has rightly said, the Neo-Platonists are from first to last rationalists. Like Descartes, they believe themselves to have found a strictly logical and coherent theory of God, Man, and Nature, and they

are as ready as any other philosophers who have ever lived to expound their reasons for their convictions. The manner and method of Proclus are, in fact, much those of the great rationalists of the seventeenth century from Descartes to Leibniz and Locke. In method, in particular, he recalls at once two famous names in modern philosophy, Spinoza and Hegel. Of Spinoza, he reminds us by the care with which his method is based on that of Euclid and the geometers, of Hegel by his insistence upon the grouping of notions in triads. These resemblances, however, must not blind us to equally important differences. As far as regards the use of the "geometric method" goes, its employment is, of course, not peculiar to Spinoza; nor is there really anything peculiarly geometrical about it. It is merely the method known to the ancient mathematicians as *synthesis*, the systematic exhibition of a body of truths in the order of increasing logical complexity, the simplest being placed first, and the more complex exhibited as a series of successive deductions from them. It is, thus, the natural method of any thinker who has to expound a system of true propositions, and is concerned not with the historical problem of showing how they were originally discovered, but with the purely logical problem of indicating the implications which hold between them. It used at one time to be thought that there was some special connection between the matter of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and the method adopted for exhibiting it. This is, of course, a mere misapprehension. Any body of demonstrable propositions can be thrown into the form of the "geometrical method." Spinoza had been preceded in its use by Descartes, who gave, in the *Answers* to the objections against his *Meditations*, a formal geometrical proof of the real distinction between body and mind, and Spinoza's own first use of the method was to employ it in an exposition of Cartesian doctrine with which, as he candidly avowed, he did not himself wholly agree.* Proclus uses it, of course, precisely because it is

* This has absurdly been made a ground of reproach against Spinoza's moral character. What it really proves is simply that Spinoza correctly

the method now called the "hypothetical-deductive," originated by Zeno and explained at length by Socrates in the *Phædo* of Plato. It consists simply in putting forward a theory or "hypothesis," or set of postulates, as the explanation of a group of "appearances."

The consequences of the "hypothesis" are deduced at length, for the purpose of seeing whether they accord with the "appearances." If they do, the appearances are said to be "saved"; if they do not, some other hypothesis must be discovered which will save them. In the case of Proclus, the appearances to be "saved" are just the whole body of all that we know, or think we know, about the things in the universe, and the justification of his philosophical postulates is that these known truths about minds, souls, and bodies are "saved" in their entirety by the postulates of Neo-Platonism. (There is, of course, no question of dismissing the "appearances" as illusions or transmuting and transforming them into something other than what they are. We are throughout kept faithful to the principle enunciated by Butler in what is perhaps the most weighty single sentence ever uttered by any philosopher: "Everything is what it is and not another thing.") Proclus believes that his postulates do in fact "save" all the appearances and are therefore true, but there is no miraculous virtue about the mere use of the method. If you start with false premisses, it will not prevent you from drawing conclusions which are also false. Spinoza, too, understood this quite well, as is shown by his use of the method in an exposition of Descartes where it brings out results which are false in Spinoza's opinion precisely because it has relied on false premisses. As a point of history, it was of course the geometers of the Alexandrian age who took over the synthetic method with much else from the philosophy of Plato, not the philosophers who borrowed it from the mathematicians.

regarded the method as strictly "dialectical," and as no guarantee for the truth of its initial postulates.

As to the parallel with Hegel, again, it is instructive to observe precisely how far it holds. Proclus, like Hegel, believes that the triadic arrangement reproduces in thought the order of the links by which the richest of realities, the *ens realissimum*, is connected with the poorest and meanest. Only, in spite of appearances, he really begins at the end of the ladder where Hegel left off. Hegel, you will remember, opens his *Logic* with the notion of *Being*, on the ground that it is the most empty, abstract, and insignificant of all concepts, and works up gradually through increasingly fully determined concepts to the Absolute Spirit, the most significant of all. Proclus, on the other hand, begins with an even simpler concept than Being, Unity, or the One—precisely because he believes it to be, like God in the philosophy of the Christian schools, the richest and fullest of all concepts, and works downwards from it through the successive series of minds, souls, and bodies to what he regards as the poorest. Again, the method by which successive triads are found is widely different from Hegel's:—to my own thinking, not for the worse. Hegel's method, as we know, was first to take a concept, next to discover a contradictory opposite for it, and then to look for a third which could be plausibly represented as contradicting the contradiction. The procedure of Proclus is less heroic, but more readily intelligible. He usually arrives at a triad by first calling attention to two members A and B, which are doubly disjunct. A, that is, has the characters *x* and *y*, B those of not-*x* and not-*y*. He then argues that if A and B are both found as terms of a serial order of connected concepts, they cannot be in immediate juxtaposition. There must be an intermediary which resembles A, let us say, in having the character *y* and B in having the character not-*x*. The full reason for insisting on this necessity of an intermediate link between two doubly disjunct terms will only appear as we come to speak of the logically most important thing in the system, the Neo-Platonic doctrine of causality. The importance of this theory can hardly be exaggerated.

though it is one of the pleasant ironies of history that Proclus' exposition of it should have provided the Christian religion, which he so heartily disliked, with just the instrument it needed for the elaboration of its doctrine of God, and should a second time have given Descartes the basis of the argument for the existence of God without which he could not take the first step beyond the mere affirmation of his own existence.

It has been truly said by Mr. Whittaker that the general theory of the world which Proclus elicits from his initial postulates forms something like a *via media* between Leibniz and Spinoza. We have a monism with an Absolute as the logical and causal *prius* of everything but itself, yet just because Proclus goes farther back than Spinoza in his quest for a simple first principle, the Absolute is a theistic Absolute, a transcendent Deity who is the source alike of existents, their characters and the relations between them.

We meet with *causa sui* and *substantia* (if we may take the latter as a rendering of the Greek *οὐσία*), but they are not the Absolute; their place is a secondary one. There are also monads of various orders, but, since the Neo-Platonist theory of causality makes all causality transitive—even in the case of the *causa sui*—the monads are not “windowless,” and we escape all the paradoxes connected with the Pre-Established Harmony and its ambiguous relation to God's “choice of the best.” For the same reasons, we are left free to accept at their full value all the familiar facts which tell so powerfully in favour of an interactionist theory of the relation of mind and body. Moreover, the very insistence on the transcendent character of the Deity and the transitive-ness of causality make it possible, against Spinoza, to assert the permanent reality of individual souls; and, against Leibniz, the genuine reality of brute inanimate matter. The Neo-Platonist philosophy, thus, aims at uniting coherently the strongest points in what are commonly thought the incompatible doctrines of monism and monadism. As the choice

seems to lie between monism and monadism for all of us who can find no refuge either in Kantian agnosticism or in some pure materialism, the type of view represented by the epitome of Proclus may perhaps fairly claim to have more than a merely antiquarian interest.

I shall probably succeed best in the attempt to give an account of the Neo-Platonist metaphysics at once concise and reasonably intelligible to students of philosophy who have no previous acquaintance with Neo-Platonist literature by allowing myself to sit rather loose to the actual terminology and order of the propositions of Proclus, and to deal only with the central concepts of the system. It will be found that the notions of chief importance in the development of the system are those of the transcendent character of the One, the ultimate source of the universe, and its identity with the Good which, as Plato had taught, is at once the motive power throughout the life-history of the universe and the goal or aim of all processes, the causal relation which connects the One with the various stages of its evolution, and every stage with every other, the principal stages of this evolution, or, as the Neo-Platonists call it, "progression," and the process of "reversion" or "reflection" which is always found associated with progression and serves to make the whole formed by the One and its manifestations into a complete and harmonious whole. If we take our main topics in this order, the One, Causality, Progression, Reversion, we shall not indeed be following the order of Proclus quite exactly, but we shall not depart very far from the main structural outlines of his work.

He begins then, as was natural to a Platonist who had the *Philebus* well-nigh by heart and had commented at enormous length on the *Parmenides*, with the earliest and most stubbornly persistent of all philosophical antitheses, that of the One and the Many, which had, in fact, dominated all Greek thought from the time that it was first insisted upon by Parmenides and Zeno. The two conceptions of unity and plurality are

not, strictly speaking, co-ordinate. Logically, and, therefore, ontologically also, the One is antecedent to the Many because it is involved in the very conception of a Many or Aggregate or Assemblage (*πλῆθος*) that it is, to use the old Pythagorean and Euclidean definition *πλῆθος μονάδων*, an assemblage of units.* It is the same thought which leads Leibniz to begin his *Monadology* with the proposition that the complex presupposes the simple. A modern mathematical logician would hardly be satisfied with the form of Proclus's proof, which, as is common with him, is a *reductio ad absurdum* based on the alleged impossibility of an infinite regress. The real point is, however, independent of this assumption, and amounts to the contention that a well-ordered series must at least have a first term, though it need have no other; or, again, that all complexes, even if their degree of complexity be infinite, must, as Leibniz said, be complexes of individuals; or, to take other illustrations of the same principle, if logical classes are to "exist," there must be at least one thing which is not a class but an individual, if "classes of classes" are to "exist" there must be at least one class which is a class not of classes but of individuals; if propositions of what Mr. Russell calls the "first order" are to be possible, there must be at least one thing which is not a proposition but an individual about which a proposition can be made, if there are to be propositions of the second order, there must be at least one proposition of the first order, and so on *in indefinitum*.

The propositions which follow furnish the basis for a philosophy of transcendence as opposed to all "immanence doctrines" of the *ἐν καὶ πάν* type. Whatever "partakes of the one," i.e., whatever can have oneness predicated about it, is in a sense "one thing," but in a sense also not-one or many. As our Anglo-Hegelians say, it is one in virtue of being a *whole* of parts,

* This is the standing definition of *ἀριθμός* in Greek philosophy, and Aristotle's sharpest criticisms of Plato are based on the very fact that Plato included among "numbers" quadratic and cubic surds, which are not "assemblages of units."

not-one or many in virtue of being a whole of *parts*. It is a unity but it is not Unity. The oneness we ascribe to such wholes must be something other than any of them. This is why Plato and the Platonists say that they *are* not "one" but "partake of" the One. What follows prepares the way for the enunciation of the theory of causality. Whatever produces anything other than itself (*i.e.*, is the source of its existence) is superior in kind to that which is produced. This is the principle implied in the characteristic Platonic conception of evolution as "progression" or "emanation" (a word, by the way, which is not with Plotinus and Proclus a technicality but an illustrative metaphor). It is also the principle denied by every philosophy which treats *epigenesis* as the final word in evolutionary theory. The proof of this proposition is interesting, and depends on the implied assumption that causality is a transitive relation and that its terms are substantival entities, not events. Either the entity produced by a causal agent is itself capable of producing something further, or it is not. If it is not, this very fact establishes its inferiority to its own cause. If it is, its effects are either superior to, equal to, or inferior to itself. The second possibility may be excluded as it leads to the conclusion that there is no hierarchy of better and worse, no difference in levels of value, among things, and this is assumed to be plainly at variance with the "appearances." The third possibility is that evolution is a steady process of epigenesis by which the inferior gives rise to the superior. But this, too, is unthinkable. For if an agent could bestow certain perfections on that on which he acts, he could equally have produced at least as much perfection in himself, since, *ex hypothesi*, he had sufficient power, and his failure cannot be due to lack of will, since by a universal law all things tend to attain the Good as far as their powers reach. (This, it will be recollected, is the reason given by Descartes for holding that he is not himself the perfect being.) Universally, then, the cause from which anything derives at once its being and its specific character is higher in the scale of goodness than its effects.

Further, from the Platonic principle that all beings seek for the Good, and their whole life is determined by the pursuit of it along the lines possible to them in virtue of their various specific constitutions, it follows that the Supreme Good, the first term in an ordered hierarchy of goods, cannot itself be one of these beings or the totality of them. Just because it is what all beings strive to obtain, it must be beyond them all. It must be, as Plato had put it in the famous passage of the *Republic*, ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, "on the other side of Being." It cannot be a "good something" but must be just "the Good," that whose whole character is goodness and nothing else. Good is not a predicate of it; Good *is* it. It needs only the further step of identification of the Good, thus conceived, with the One, that is the identification of the Universal End with the Universal Source, to convert the logic of Proclus into a theistic theology agreeing with that of the Christian Church, in looking on God as a transcendent being distinct from the universe or whole of creatures and internally simple, not like an Herbartian "real" or the "bare monad" from the poverty of His nature, but just because all the perfections which are found in diffusion among His creatures are wholly concentrated and interpenetrant in their source. This is, in fact, what the schoolmen mean when they tell us that *Deus est sumum esse*, and again that each "attribute" of God is God Himself. We are specially warned against confusing the Good with the "self-sufficing." A self-sufficing being can, indeed, meet all its needs out of the plenitude of its internal resources; it can live, so to say, by the consumption of its own fat. But the very statement implies that such a being *has* needs, though it can always meet them. The Good, being "good" *simpliciter*, has no needs to meet. We must not mistake it for a magnified Stoic Cato. We may not even say of it that it is "filled with good." It is Good, and therefore must be called, as Proclus more than once calls it, "more than full," ὑπερπλήρες. The epithet seems meant to indicate the Neo-Platonist answer to the obvious

question why there should be a universe at all. Why should the Good not be alone to all eternity in a state of single and perfect blessedness? How comes there to be a world of creatures who aspire to it? The Neo-Platonist explanation is that which Plato had long before put into the mouth of Timaeus. Goodness is, of its very nature, a self-imparting or self-communicating activity. It cannot keep itself to itself, but *must* overflow, much as Christians have said the same thing of love. Unlike Christian theologians, Plotinus and Proclus do not represent the creative activity in which Goodness finds its outlet as one of "free choice." To them this would have implied that Goodness might conceivably not have imparted itself to anything; and, therefore, might not have been wholly good. Finally, they agree with Spinoza that God acts *ex legibus suae naturae*, though, unlike him, they are stout assertors of Providence and final or intentional causality, and are careful to treat Free Will (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) as a reality. The difference between them and Spinoza is really much greater than their divergence from the thought of Christian scholastics. Indeed, this latter divergence is much reduced when we recollect that, according to the schools, neither free choice nor anything else can be *univocally* asserted of God and of any creature. The difference from Spinoza goes deeper. For Proclus would understand by the "laws of God's nature," the law of *Goodness*, whereas in Spinoza it is no part of the nature of *Deus-substantia* to be good, and even the distinction between good and bad in human character and conduct comes perilously near being dismissed as an illusion in the famous appendix to the first book of the *Ethics*.

The formal identification of the One with the Good—derived, of course, from Plato himself—which turns Proclus' "First Cause" into God is effected by the help of the famous definition of Eudoxus, "the good is that at which all things aim." Such a good or end of appetite is manifestly a principle of unification and co-operation. Health, for instance,

is the body's good,* and health is just the harmonious "temperature" of all the constituents and members of the body. *Salus populi* is the good of a society of men, and it is realised in virtue of the *conatus* or *nisus*, conscious or otherwise, of each member of the body politic after it. Wherever you find good you find it as the common object of appetite to the members of a *πλήθος*, and it is this *nisus* after one and the same end which makes the *πλήθος* a unity-in-multitude.† So, if the creatures really form a universe—and it is the presumption involved alike in thought and action that they do—it is because all of them are striving up to "the measure of the light vouchsafed" towards a common principle or Good which is beyond and above them all. It sounds a paradox, but it is thus the fact, that the One is the unifying principle in the universe just because it is itself not "in" the universe but "beyond" it. The general line of thought is thus very similar to that which is followed by Professor Varisco in the last chapter of his *Massimi Problemi*, where he sets himself to argue that the question whether the universe as a whole has value (is good) or not depends upon the prior question whether, as he phrases it, "Being has other determinations than the concretes, in which case the traditional conception of Being is transformed into the Christian conception of God." Proclus answers this question affirmatively; it is a matter of terminology that what Professor Varisco speaks of as "determinations of Being other than the concretes," are called by Proclus *ὑπερούσια*, the things "above" Being.

At this point, it will be convenient for a moment to desert the actual order of our author's exposition, which is designed with a view to preparing for the distinctions to be drawn between minds, souls, and bodies, and anticipate a little by explaining the doctrine of causality upon which his further

* Or, more exactly, health is the good aimed at by medicine, *ιατρική*.

† Hobbes's "*Leviathan*" is just a mythological personification of such a principle of unity.

account of the universe depends. Causality, as I said before, is always, to the Neo-Platonists, a transitive relation. It implies two related terms, the producer (*τὸ παράγων*) and the produced (*τὸ παραγόμενον*), and these are never events.

The cause or producer is always an agent or the activity of an agent; the effect produced may be the existence of an individual or a quality of an individual, or both. As the relation is not one between events, it is not necessary that it should involve temporal sequence, and the Neo-Platonists were thus free to maintain with Aristotle that the historical succession of events has no beginning. That the Good is the Great First Cause, means with them simply that everything depends, both for its existence and its special character, on the Good; but for the Good there would be nothing. It does not mean that there was a time when the Good was not "overflowing," and there was no world of creatures. Further, the way in which the agent or cause works is by imparting its *own* characteristics to that of which it is the cause. This is, of course, because *operari sequitur esse*, and it is in virtue of being what it is, that a cause causes just such effects as it does and no others. The effect is thus "like" its cause, or an "image" of it, but since, as we have already seen, it is a cardinal point in the system that what is produced is always an inferior and imperfect image of what produces it, the causal relation is asymmetrical, and Proclus thus agrees with Mr. Russell on the fundamental importance of asymmetrical relations. As Proclus and Plotinus are fond of putting it, the cause is imperfectly "mirrored" in its effects. It irradiates them, but they are at best broken lights of it. The Neo-Platonists would have been only in imperfect sympathy with the numerous modern philosophers who have maintained that the relation of cause and effect is really identical with the logical relation of antecedent and consequent. They would have agreed that the cause is always the "reason why," since, in their view, the causal relation is always a case of "participation"; the effect is

what it is because the cause is what *it* is. But they would never have admitted either that temporal sequence is an illusion or that to complete insight it would be possible to reason from effect to cause with the same certainty as to effect from cause, precisely because they hold that the effect is not the cause but only "participates" in it, and, therefore, only mirrors it partially. On their view there is always more in the cause than is ever reflected in the effect. It is notable that Proclus is careful to warn us that the transitivity of the relation is not done away with, even in the case of things which may be said to be "self-caused" (*αὐθοπόστατα*), because they contain in themselves the source of their own motions. As we know from Plato, this is the case with all souls, and it is the defining *proprium* of a soul, in contradistinction from all other existents, that it has "its principle of movement within itself," or is "that which can move *itself*." Even here, the Neo-Platonists, following the lead of Aristotle, say that though the terms of the causal relation are identical, it is still a dyadic relation and transitive. For this reason *causa sui* cannot, as with Spinoza, be identified with the "great first cause." The One, because its Oneness is itself, is not *causa sui*. It is simply uncaused.

Strictly speaking, the phrases self-moving or self-caused (*αὐτοκίνητος*) must not even be used of Intelligence or Mind, for Intelligence or Mind is (as Aristotle had held) something which remains itself unmoved or unchanged, but gives rise to an internally initiated change in the soul. Hence, by putting the *causa sui* at the head of his hierarchy, Spinoza is, from the point of view of Proclus, opening his account of things in the middle. He can only take into his reckoning souls and the bodies which are moved by those souls. He has left out of consideration all that is really of highest moment in the universal order.

The change is, in fact, *ᾠρεσις*, appetitive, and *ᾠρεγόμεθα διότι δοκεῖ*.

A last point of fundamental importance in this doctrine of causality is that, as Proclus is careful to state, the higher up in the hierarchy a cause is the lower down the scale are its effects felt. The reason is that what comes nearer to the Absolute One in the scale is, being a truer reflection of the One, a unifying principle of higher order than what is more remote. Hence, the unifying power of the One or Good extends to the whole Universe. Everything in the Universe, down to the mere unformed matter which is the ideal lower limit of dispersion and lack of organisation, derives its being from the One or Good. As Socrates said, everything is, and is what it is, because it is best that it should be so. The activity of Mind does not reach so far down, precisely because Mind is not itself the supreme or divine principle, but merely its most immediate reflection. We can, indeed, satisfy ourselves of this by the simple consideration that Mind does not make matter. It is true that order and structure are everywhere put into matter, even into inanimate matter, by Mind. For Divine Providence extends to the inorganic as well as to the organic world, and again human intelligence, which within its own limits mirrors Providence, shows itself constantly at work shaping inorganic matter by the introduction of form. But matter is not existentially dependent on mind; it is something which from the point of view of Mind is *vorgefunden* as an instrument of expression, not created by Mind itself. There is no ultimate dualism in the system, since minds and all the things which are existents are alike existentially dependent on the transcendent One or Good: but if you forget the One, and start with Mind as your *ens realissimum*, you will be led to such a dualism, just because Mind is found everywhere correlated with an object, not Mind, to which it is related alike as knower and as organising principle. It is just by not accepting idealism in the modern sense, by not equating the *ens realissimum* with Mind, that the Neo-Platonists avoid dualism. Again, the soul is a less adequate mirroring of the

One than its Mind or Intelligence. In fact, the soul directly mirrors Mind or Intelligence, and reflects the One only at second-hand. And, again, we see that the causal activity of the soul ceases to show itself before that of Mind. The activity of the soul consists, in fact, precisely in communicating to another its own *proprium*, life. It is just the principle of life, and what it does to things is to bestow life on them, to endow them with the special kind of unity and organisation characteristic of organisms. Now, not all bodies are capable of receiving this kind of unity and structure, but only some. There is organic matter, but there is also inorganic matter, and on dead or "inorganic" matter the soul can exercise no influence. It can mould to its own ends the protoplasm of which our bodies are formed; it cannot dwell in or "inform" stocks and stones. But Mind, as we have seen, can give form to inorganic matter. A cabinet-maker or a statuary can not merely beget sons and daughters, but he can also, because he is not only an animal but an intelligent one, fashion cabinets or statues out of boards and stones. So universally, the higher the rank of a causal agent the more far-reaching are its effects, and, in particular, we may say of the Good which stands outside the whole series of existents and is above "being" that there is a sense in which *its* effects extend beyond the realm of existents and affect what is "below" being. For, as we have seen, inorganic bodies fill the lowest place in the system of existents. The "bare matter" which we are constrained to think of as that which is common to them all is never found actually existing. It is like the limit of an infinite absolutely convergent series, to which each successive term makes a closer approximation, though it never appears itself as a term of the series, or, to be more precise, it is like the limit of an infinite series whose terms, though all positive, tend to zero.

Thus, as Aristotle had held, such mere matter may be called $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$ "the non-existent," and can only be conceived by way of

negation. Just as God is implicitly thought of by Neo-Platonists and Christian schoolmen as a simple being, who is at the same time the subject of all positive predicates, "bare matter" is a simple being which is the subject of no positive predicates. Yet the One stands in causal relation even with this mere negation. It is because of the presence of the One that what exists is not this bare potentiality of being something, in other words, that there really is something and not nothing. The idealist of the modern type is naturally tempted to call this shadowy universal "substrate" or "first matter," which is nothing in particular, a "creation" or "fiction" of our minds, but the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought seems to me the truer. Of course, we only arrive at the notion by a process of comparison and abstraction, but comparison, if we consider it rightly, only discovers, it never creates. That there is something common to the most elementary existents, which is never found itself actually existing, is a discovery. If the "something common" were not really there, no process of comparison would ever conduct us to it; comparison would be, as the Anglo-Hegelians say abstraction is, always falsification.

It is a corollary of this conception of causality that a predicate may be said to be contained in its subject in any one of three ways. Since a cause is mirrored in its effect, *i.e.*, its activity consists in imparting its own character, so far as that is possible, to the effect, whatever is characteristic of the effect may already be said to be contained in the cause. It is not there exactly as it is in the effect, since the effect is an imperfect image of the cause. In the cause the character of the effect is present "in a more perfect manner," in intimate conjunction with other characters which do not appear in that particular effect, but only in other effects of the same cause. To borrow Leibniz's metaphor, the effects of a cause are perspectives, each reproducing the cause from one special point of view. In the effect itself the character in question is said to exist *καθ' ὑπαρξιν*—*i.e.*, it is strictly only of the effect that we can *predi-*

cate the character in question. (The expression καθ' ὑπαρξιν is obviously coined by analogy with the use of the verb ὑπάρχειν in Aristotelian logic, where $A \text{ ὑπάρχει τῷ } B$ is the standing way of saying B is an A , or A is predicable of B .) In the effects of the effect, the same character again will be found imperfectly mirrored or represented, or, as Proclus says, "by participation." In scholastic Latin these distinctions are carefully kept up. The characters of an effect are said to be "formally" in itself, but "eminently" in its cause; Descartes' familiar assertion that what is thus "formally" in the object of an idea is "objectively" in the idea itself is a simple special case of the presence of a character "by participation" in the effects of the cause which has the character "formally," since the idea is held by Descartes to be caused by its object. The special Cartesian proof of the existence of God from my possession of the idea of God thus is proved by its very terminology to be a simple reproduction of Neo-Platonism as put into technical form by Proclus. Presumably all this Neo-Platonism reached Descartes through the medium of Thomistic philosophy in his early days at Rennes, and this is why he supposed what he had been taught as a schoolboy to be so evident by the natural light of the understanding.

We can now formulate very briefly the general Neo-Platonic conception of the world of existents and its relation to its single, internally simple, transcendent cause, or source, the Good. It is of the nature of the Good to overflow its own banks, to bestow itself on something else, and this is the real answer to the questions, why there are existents at all, and why they form an ordered and connected universe. The overflow is by way of representation; the Good gives rise to a system of existents which imperfectly mirror or image its own goodness, and they in turn to "appearances" which imperfectly mirror them. It is to be noted that the imperfection of the mirroring, as Proclus tells us, is due to the inevitable defects of the mirror. If the actual world is not perfect, this is not due to

any withholding of perfection from it by the Good. The Good is present to all things in its super-plenitude, but they cannot receive all that it has to give. They receive "according to their own constitution." It is with perfection as the Scottish divine admired by Johnson and Boswell said that it is with happiness: the quart pot and the pint pot are both full, but they do not contain the same measure; each is as full as *it* can hold. This is, of course, an inevitable inference from the general conception of causation as a process of imaging, or, what is the same thing, the principle that there is always greater excellence in the cause than its effect. (Fully thought out, of course, the principle would have led Christian theologians who accepted Neo-Platonism as their philosophic basis to an Arian doctrine of the Trinity. The Son, being the "image of the Father," would have been "inferior to the Father" not only "as touching His manhood" but also "as touching His godhead.") The doctrine of Plotinus had been that the immediate "image" of the Good is Mind (*νοῦς*), and the immediate image of Mind is Soul (*ψυχή*), and that Mind is thus the highest member of the chain of actual existents. *I.e.*, Mind is the highest kind of individuality which we find as an actual existent. Mere Soul, as we know it, *e.g.*, in ourselves when we are at the mercy of irrational passion or impulse, or again in the immature who have not yet "found themselves," or still more as we discern it in the lower animals, is still less of a real complete and stable unity. The triad thus formed by the One, Mind and Soul is the only example of a triad in the *Enneads*. One must note carefully also that Mind and the objects of its thought (the world as apprehended by science) together make up the whole of what can be properly called (*ὅντα*) real existents, and that Mind and its objects are inseparable. "The objects of Mind (*τὰ νοητά*) do not subsist outside Mind" was the doctrine thought by Porphyry to be peculiarly characteristic of Plotinus, and it was precisely his stubborn doubts about this tenet which

delayed his entrance into the school of Plotinus until he had written a criticism which was in turn refuted to his own satisfaction by an earlier disciple. By this doctrine it is not meant that the objects known by Mind are themselves mental in the sense that they are made of "mental states" or "processes." What is meant is that the distinction between the epistemological subject and the epistemological object is not regarded as characteristic of the interior life—if we may call it so—of the Absolute One. It emerges first in the first image of that life, which is the life of Mind. The life of Mind is always a knower's attitude towards a known; the concept and the thinker of the concept are inseparable, not—to borrow a distinction familiar to readers of Professor Ward—in a psychological, but in an epistemological sense. Actual existence then consists of Mind and what Mind knows. When we come to the life of the mere soul, not as yet rationalized, we are at a lower level. It is, compared with the waking vision of science, a sort of confused dream. Like the dreamer, the soul, as mere soul, is itself perplexed and confused, and there is the same confusion in the object of its cognition and striving. It is a thing itself not realised moving about in a world unrealised. It belongs and its world belongs to "becoming"—the region where everything is perpetually battling us by proving not to be what it seemed to be—not to "being."

Proclus refines somewhat on the original statement of the doctrine. Within the primary triad itself we have to distinguish a subordinate triad. On inspection, Being, which Plotinus had treated as equivalent to Mind, breaks up into the triad of Being, Life and Mind. For many things are, which are lifeless; and, again, many living things are not minds. But of this, as of the other triadic constructions which figure in rather confusing multitude in the elaborate *Six Books on the Theology of Plato*, it is not necessary to say much in a mere brief sketch like the present. Roughly, the successive more

and more imperfect reflections or images of the Good may be said to be, in order of increasing imperfection, Mind, and Soul (the former being eternal both in its nature and its activity, the latter eternal in nature but temporal in its activity, and both together making up "what is"), and finally Body—temporal at once in nature and in its activities, which is what "seems," though we must remember that what "seems" really does "seem." Body as such has its place in the system; it has not to be "transmuted" or "absorbed" into something else, as a condition of recognition.

Further, we must add that, as Proclus conceives the world, each member of this series gives rise to something other than itself in two different ways or along two different lines. The source of this conception is manifest. There are many individual minds, souls and bodies in the universe, and it does not occur to the Neo-Platonists to explain away this plurality of individuals of different types as an illusion. It is a fact which must take its place as a fact in an adequate philosophy. Hence, Proclus conceives of Mind and Soul, not merely as units each of which can be "imaged" by a unit of a lower type, Mind by Soul and Soul by Body, but as first terms of series. His doctrine is that in each such series the first member generates a series of beings of the same type as itself, though each, according to its distance in serial order from the first term, is a less adequate representative of the type. There are thus, at the level of Mind, a whole series of more or less exalted minds, and similarly, at the lower levels, a whole series of souls and a whole series of bodies of greater or less worth and dignity. The first member of each such series is called *ἀμέθεκτος*, imparticipable, that is unpredicable, because it is in the strictest sense only capable of appearing in a proposition as subject and can never be predicate. (Even Descartes at the stage of reflection reached by examination of the *cogito* can only say I am a mind, not I am Mind.) The rest of the series are the "participated" minds or "souls." Thus, in the case of minds, the first member of the

series is Mind with the capital M, the other are *the* minds of the various beings who are said each to "have" a mind.

This theory is obviously applicable to the Good or One, no less than to Mind or Soul. If Mind gives rise not only to Soul, but to a plurality of minds, the Supreme One or Absolute Good must be thought of likewise as giving rise to a series of Ones, which Proclus calls the "divine" Henads, or Unities, and also simply "the Gods." As the Good is God, so in his system the Henads are "Gods" in the plural, related to God as the minds of you and me are related to the entity we call Mind. This doctrine is, as I have said, the peculiar property of Proclus and its interpretation has caused some trouble. It has sometimes been spoken of as a mere device for saving the face of dying Hellenic polytheism. This, however, is not to my thinking its real *raison d'être*, though Proclus has filled many weary pages of his *Theology of Plato* and commentary on the *Parmenides* with ingenious attempts to identify and classify the Henads and to show that with some forcing they may be read into the traditional theology. I think the origin of the theory more likely to be what I have indicated already. Some explanation had to be found for the existence of individual minds and souls, some reason why this plurality should be real and why there is not just one Mind, one Soul and one Body. The doctrine of the series of minds and souls is already suggested by Plotinus, who always treats individual human souls as existing, so to say, with the same right, and on the same level, as the *Anima Mundi*. It originates in the justified refusal of the Neo-Platonists to treat personal individuality as a kind of illusion and reduce human persons to the status of "modes" of a single *Deus-subsstantia*. When the theory had been thus thought out for the case of Mind and Soul, it was a mere exigence of logic to extend it to the first member of the supreme triad. It is thus, as it seems to me, the logical completion of a line of thought inherited by the whole school from Plotinus. It is a rather more difficult thing to feel sure of the interpretation to be placed on the

doctrine. Mr. Whittaker suggests the highly ingenious comparison with the modern conception of the stars as centres of planetary systems, but avoids committing himself to an opinion about Proclus' own intention. I think one may venture at any rate on a tentative suggestion. Just as the Imparticipable One is identified with the Good, Proclus tells us that the various divine Henads or Gods are *ἀγαθότητες*, "goodnesses," and that each of these "goodnesses," which are all comprised *eminenter*—or, as his own phrase is, *κατ' αἰτίαν*—in the One, forms one of the Henads or Gods. He also connects the doctrine with the well-known passage in the *Phaedrus* where Socrates speaks of different classes of men, statesmen, warriors, poets, as under the protection of a particular deity. The real meaning of this, according to Proclus, is that each different type of individual mind is linked to the One in a two-fold way; it is a member of the series of minds, and the first term of this series, Mind, is derived from the One; also this special mind is a mirroring or image of a special Henad in the series of "divine numbers," and this Henad belongs to the series headed by the One.

On the strength of such passages, I should suggest that what Proclus has in his mind is a doctrine of the attributes of God like that of Philo, or, again, of the great scholastics. The scholastics speak of a plurality of these attributes,—goodness, wisdom, power,—and say of each that God's wisdom is God, God's power is God, and the like, as may be read at length in the first book of St. Thomas's *Summa contra gentiles*. This, I believe, is how we ought to understand what Proclus says about the gods or Henads and their relation to the One God. They are, I take it, the "perfections" or "excellences" which in God exist, according to scholastic philosophy, in a way compatible with God's absolute simplicity, but in His works are found displayed to a great extent separately, some of the works revealing more particularly the wisdom, others the power, and yet others the goodness of their author. The notion must, of

course, be carefully distinguished from Spinoza's theory in which just what is characteristic of each attribute is that you cannot say "God's extension is God" or "God's thought is God," and cannot conceive God as really simple at all.

Thus finally, including the Henads which are "above being" and bodies which are properly speaking "below" it, we may say that the One or Good appears as the source of four orders, gods, minds, souls, bodies, and that as the four orders form a hierarchy of "images" or "reflections" of the *ens realissimum*, so each order itself is a hierarchy of "reflections" of its own initial member. The whole system is, in modern language, a well-ordered series of well-ordered series.

There remains, however, yet another fundamental doctrine on which I have not yet touched—the theory of *ἐπιστροφή* or reflection backwards. "Reflection" has commonly been used in English to translate the word, but with us the expression is ambiguous and I have already been obliged to employ it to illustrate what Proclus means by the progression of Henads, Minds, and the rest from the One. "Inversion," especially for some of its mathematical associations, would really be a better word. We have already seen that the One is thought of as being at once the source of all existence and the end or goal which all existents tend towards by the law of their being.

Once more, we may remind ourselves that the thought is derived directly from the definition given by Eudoxus, the astronomer, and adopted by Aristotle, that the good is that *ὃ πάντα ἐφίεται*, that which all things "go for." And the "all things" do not mean simply the "sentient creation." The thought is that in everything, sentient or insentient, animate or inanimate, there is a real *nisus* towards systematic organisation or unity. You see this *nisus*, a Neo-Platonist would have said, at different levels in the cohesion of the particles of a homogeneous body, in chemical affinities, in the attraction of the plant for the insect, in the sexual life of the animal kingdom, the family and social aspirations of man, the lifelong

struggle of the thinker after an organised and coherent body of knowledge, or of the saint after the disciplined life of holiness. In all these instances, what we discern is marked by two characteristics. The *nisus* is not, as Spinoza, being a mere naturalist, supposed, towards *self-preservation*, but, to use Dr. Ward's expression, towards *betterment* of some kind, attainment of a good which is the specific good of the creature exhibiting the *nisus*. Dr. Ward's remark that a creature which, as we commonly say, cats to fill its skin gets as a consequence a better skin to fill, exactly hits off this aspect of the Neo-Platonist view of the fundamental conatus or "will to be" in things. Again—and Proclus would say that this is an immediate consequence of the identity of the transcendent One with the Good,—the *nisus*, because it is always a turning back or inversion of the process by which a thing is derived from its cause, is always a movement towards simplification. It is always a tendency towards the assertion of unity and individuality. A vertebrate is more truly *one* creature than a sponge or a starfish, the inner state of cognition in a man of science or of feeling and will in a saint is one of simplicity as compared with the state of a man whose mind is a medley of confused and unsystematised beliefs or the battle-ground for perplexed and divided counsels or passions. This is the ultimate source of the mediæval conception of growth in grace as a steady "reduction of the soul to its *ground*." Unless we have the theory of *ἐπιστροφή* or *inversion* well in mind we are bound to go astray when we try to understand what a writer like Dante or a Kempis really means by extolling *sancta simplicitas* as the highest and best state for a Christian. I suppose we can all feel the beauty of such a line as that famous one about the *anima simplicetia che sa nulla*, or the tenderness of a nameless English mystic's adjuration never to try to melt the "cloud of unknowing that is between thee and thy God," or of Ruysbroeck's description of the "noughting" of the soul, but, apart from Neo-Platonism, we cannot really understand what all this meant.

Two points are specially important in connection with this conception of *ἐπιστροφή*: (1) The fundamental *conatus* of everything is the *nisus* to reverse the process of its production—to return to its immediate source. Macaulay quotes, as typical of the nonsense of "Satan" Montgomery, a badly expressed line, to the effect that "the soul aspiring seeks its source to mount." To Macaulay this seemed unmeaning, but it is only what Donne or Vaughan would have said better about the soul and about everything else. But there is a vital distinction between two classes of things, those which in being reflected back upon their source are also reflected upon themselves, and those which are incapable of reflection or inversion into themselves. This distinction is as fundamental for Neo-Platonic philosophy as the distinction (on which the difference between infinite and finite assemblages depends) between series which can be "mirrored" within themselves and series which cannot is for modern mathematics. The point is that some things contain the principle from which they proceed within themselves in a way in which others do not. "Soul," for example, is thus related to its principle, Mind or Intelligence. As Plato had said in the *Sophistes* and *Timæus* *vous* always exists in *ψυχή*. Of course it might be said that, on the other hand, there are many *ψυχαι*, those of animals, for example, which do not think. I suppose the rejoinder would be that even animal instinct, as Professor Stott has argued at great length, not only produces results which are justified at the bar of reason, but is found everywhere working under intelligent guidance, as we see from the regular adaptation of instinctive trains of action to the special requirements of the individual situation and the modifiability of instinct by experience. There is intelligence involved in a cat's pursuit of a mouse, though we might hesitate to say that the intelligence belongs to the cat in the same way as my intelligence belongs to me. When, however, you come to deal with bodies the case is altered. Bodies, it is held, are the "images" of souls; and, as Plato had argued, all bodily

movement is produced directly or indirectly by the prior "motions" of a soul. And bodies share in the universal tendency to reflection back into their proximate cause. Body is only seen at its fullest and completest when it is an *animate* body. From the standpoint of ancient physics, it would seem natural and right to look upon inanimate bodies as having the function of feeding and sustaining plant-life, and plants that of providing sustenance for animals, who in their turn minister to the needs of man. And the Platonist view was, of course, that the prime elements of all bodies, animate or inanimate, are the same. A living body does not differ from a lifeless one by being made of ultimately different stuff, but simply by being organic to a soul—by being the body of that soul. So that the general facts about the so-called "three kingdoms" of the popular natural histories would be just an example of the process of *ἐπιστροφή* on a grand scale.

But bodies, in being reflected back into their cause, are not reflected back into *themselves*. Self-reflection, inversion into self, is characteristic only of what is bodiless. Proclus offers a curious formal proof of this. The argument is that reflection, or inversion into self, is a relation of a whole to itself as a whole. Whatever is thus inverted, he says, must be in contact as a whole with itself as a whole, that is, it must be directly existentially present as a whole to itself. Yet, this relation cannot hold between wholes which are aggregates of distinct parts. In them, each part is present to itself in a direct way in which no two non-identical parts are present to each other. It is this relation, only possible to wholes which are simple units, in the sense that they are not made of separable parts, which constitutes knowledge. Hence, in being "inverted" into Mind, a soul not only knows Mind, but knows itself. And Mind similarly, when in contemplation it is turned back upon the One or God, is in the very same act reflected into itself and knows itself. Bodies, because they cannot be thus directly present to themselves, know neither

themselves nor their causes. The analogy between this doctrine and Leibniz's distinction between "bare" monads and souls strongly suggests that the one has been modelled on the other. From the same source, I venture to think, comes Locke's well-known language about "ideas of reflection." According to Locke, these are ideas of the mind's own activities got by the mind in taking note of our own "operations about our ideas." That the mind has this power of inversion, by which its own activities become objects for its contemplation, Locke assumes as something which no one will deny. I suggest that both the assumption and the name "*ideas of reflection*" are due to the same cause which produced the polemic of the first Book of the *Essay* against innate principles,—the general and wide-spread influence of Neo-Platonism on the English philosophical writers contemporary with Cudworth and Henry More. The eighteenth century saw the gradual decrease of this influence; in its latter third, writers like Gibbon had lost all sense of the meaning of Neo-Platonic language, and we thus find the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* treating as gibberish doctrines which are referred to, for example, by Bacon as perfectly familiar and intelligible.

One should note that, easy as it would have been to treat the doctrine of *ἐπιστροφή* as the basis of an anti-rational mysticism—and this, I would suggest, is very much what M. Bergson does in his doctrine of the *élan vital*—it does not occur to the Neo-Platonists to do so. In spite of the familiarity of the school with the psychological facts about "raptures" and "ecstasies," no Neo-Platonist ever regarded these states as revealing philosophical truths. Plotinus expressly compares the state of the ecstatic with the position of a priest who has passed the veil that screens the holy of holies and left all the images of the temple behind him, and dwells on the point that it leaves behind it no memory of what it was. And when Proclus speaks of Mind as reverting in self-contemplation to its principle the One, he is not referring to "raptures" at all.

There is an agnostic side to his doctrine which re-appears in the orthodox schoolmen. Nothing, he says, is *ἄπειρον*, indeterminate, in itself, but everything is *ἄπειρον*, not fully determinable or fathomable, by anything that stands lower in the universal hierarchy than itself. The higher, though more rational in its own constitution, is something of a mystery to the lower, much, we might say, as a man must be a mystery to his dog. Thus, in a sense, the One is unknowable; but this only means that since it is something more than Mind, Mind can only know it by the reflection of itself it has stamped on Mind. The One is, he says, in itself *ἐναιῶς* "after the fashion of unity," but in Mind only *νοεπῶς*, "after the fashion of Mind." That is, I take it, Mind is not the highest and most perfect type of individuality.

The utter individuality of God, the source alike of Mind and everything else, is proper to God: but Mind, since we have minds, is the most truly individual thing *we* can understand. We can see that God is something even more individual—a more perfectly articulated and yet absolutely individual being—than Mind itself, but *what* it is like to be something more than Mind, we, not having the experience of it in ourselves, cannot say. In general, the higher is only known to the lower by its effects on the lower itself, because it is in self-knowledge that we have to come to the knowledge of what is higher than self. The "negative theology" or "way of negation"—so salutary a protection against the extravagances of ignorant imagination to those who understand its real meaning, so utter a puzzle to moderns like William James and the Pragmatists, who have criticized it without knowledge of its history,—is all contained in this doctrine of the necessary limitations of our knowledge. It is the real defence of sober thought against that "wild licence of affirmation about God," with which Matthew Arnold, in reckless defiance of facts, charged mediæval theologians, and with which we may more reasonably charge a good many of our popular scientific writers who would

refuse to call their ultimate reality by so old-fashioned a name as "God."

(2) The other point on which there may be room for a word or two is also an example of Neo-Platonic sobriety. The doctrine of *ἐπιστροφή* must not be interpreted in the light of modern theories of the *Deus-substantia* type about the unreality of finite selves and finite things in general. The existence of a plurality of finite individuals of different types is to the Neo-Platonists, as to Plato himself, an ultimate premiss. Each individual has his good or end and "reverts" to it, but the process is conditioned throughout by the specific nature of the individual. He "reverts," or unites himself with his Good, in the way *his* nature permits. The bonds of individuality are not burst in the process. Bodies, in the process of inversion, do not cease to be bodies or souls to be souls. So with Mind; Mind in attaining full knowledge of itself also discerns its immediate source, God, the One,—but it does not become God or a God. "Every thing is what it is and not another thing," and in the process of *ἐπιστροφή* it does not cease to be what it is, though no doubt it may discover that it is much more than it had at first supposed. The reversion or inversion of Mind into the One does not mean that Mind *becomes* God, but that in self-contemplation it learns to *know* God, so far as God is comprehensible to any of His creatures. There is no question of an Absolute in which finite individuality of any kind is transmuted and transformed into the irreconizable. Proclus, in fact—though limits of time will not permit me to follow him—professes to be able to prove the everlastingness, both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, of every individual capable of self-inversion, that is of every individual which is not a body. The demonstration follows the usual lines of the old rational psychology, attacked by Kant, and need not delay us. What interests me more personally is a reflection suggested by the Neo-Platonic insistence on transitive causality.

It is frequently said now-a-days that the fault of the old

orthodox theology lay in its devotion to a "transcendent" deity. To be in earnest with transcendence, we are commonly told, means to exclude all possibility of any real relation between God—or whatever else a man likes to call the Supreme—and other beings. Religion, as a personal matter, because it means intimate personal relation with the Supreme, requires a doctrine of "immanence." Against this fashionable view, I wish to suggest that it is, in point of fact, just the "immanence" philosophies which have always found it impossible to have any theory of the relation of their *ἐν καὶ πᾶσι* with the individuals we know. Either the *Deus-Substantia* has to become an empty name for a mere aggregate, without any individuality of its own, or the individuals have, by elaborate logical sophisms, to be made into mere illusions.

It is palpable, as it seems to me, that this inability to recognise the reality of individuals other than the *ens summum* is certain to be fatal to the philosophies of Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet as they stand. I do not, of course, mean that these philosophies ought to be rejected or will be rejected because we do not like their reduction of our own individuality to an illusion. I mean rather that on careful scrutiny the arguments of these distinguished philosophers reveal themselves as variations of one single contention which turns out, on close examination, to be a *petitio principii*. My own growing feeling is—and I believe it is by no means peculiar to myself—that if Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet discover their own individuality to be unreal, the reason is that they set out from the start with a *parti pris*. Naturally they do not find what they are unconsciously determined not to see. To myself it seems obvious that if there is a real supreme *principium individuationis*, it must be, as the Neo-Platonists held, an end as well as a source, and must, therefore, of course, stand "outside the Universe," and that it is just because it is "outside" that direct and intimate personal relations with it are possible to all of us, if indeed

they are possible. This means, of course, that I feel bound to hold as a point of general theory that transitive causality and transitive asymmetrical relations are ultimate in logic. I can see no vestige of ground in logic for the assumption, tacitly or expressly made in so much of the thinking of the generation before my own, that there are no relations of one-sided dependence. Herbart's protest against Kant's assumption about the ubiquity in the universe of "reciprocal action" seems to me as unanswerable as it has remained unanswered. To be more precise, the particular doctrine about which I feel the greatest difficulty in Professor Bosanquet's system of thought is his theory of causality. What gravels me is not so much his assertion that the relation of cause and effect is at bottom identical with that of antecedent and consequent. The ancients, who called both cause and reason why *αἰτίον*, in a sense accepted this, and I could make shift myself, perhaps, to regard causality as a special case of the more general relation. My difficulty is with the further assertion that in a really true hypothetical proposition antecedent and consequent are simply convertible. This, of course, means that there are no ultimate and unanalysable relations of one-sided dependence. But why should there not be?

So, again, the assertion that *time* is not real is, I suppose, a consequence of the same view, since, if time is real (unless it can be shown that events recur in cycles) the relation before-after is transitive and asymmetrical, as all relations which generate series appear to be. This is why I feel that, if we are not to declare ourselves frank irrationalists, we must hold that a philosophy of the general type of Neo-Platonism is at least nearer the truth than Spinozism or those versions of Hegelianism which have had the widest currency in our Universities for the last generation.

**ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
THIRTY-NINTH SESSION.**

November 5th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—The President delivered the Inaugural Address of the Session on "The Interaction of Mind and Body." The Chair was afterwards taken by Prof. Hicks, who opened a discussion, in which the following also took part:—Lord Haldane, Prof. Whitehead, Prof. Norman Smith, Dr. Leslie Mackenzie, Prof. Nunn, Miss Edgell, and others. The President replied to the criticisms that had been made.

November 19th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—The President referred to the loss sustained by workers in philosophy through the death of M. Durkheim. A paper was read by Mrs. Karin Stephen on "Thought and Intuition." The discussion was opened by Mr. Bertrand Russell, and there took part in it the Chairman, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Strachey, Mr. Joad, Mr. Mead, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Prof. Hicks, Miss Stebbing, and Mrs. Duddington. Mrs. Stephen replied.

December 3rd, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—A paper was read by Mr. F. C. Bartlett on "The Development of Criticism." The Chairman opened the discussion, in which the following members took part:—Prof. Hicks, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Miss Edgell, Mr. Urwick, Mr. Hooper, and others. Mr. Bartlett replied to the criticisms that had been made.

December 17th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—A paper was read by Dr. G. E. Moore on "The Conception of Reality." The discussion was opened by the Chairman. He was followed by Prof. J. A. Smith, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Burns, Miss Edgell, Prof. Hicks, Miss Wrinch, and others. Dr. Moore replied.

January 7th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.

—Prof. J. A. Smith read a paper on the subject, "Is there a Mathematics of Intensity?" The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and there took part in it Prof. Whitehead, Mr. Mead, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Miss Wrinch, Prof. Hicks, Mr. Worsley, and others. Prof. Smith replied.

January 21st, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.

—A paper was read by Dr. F. W. Thomas on "Indian Ideas of Action and their Interest for Modern Thinking." The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and there took part in it Mr. Mead, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Ainslie, Mrs. Duddington, Mr. Worsley, Mr. Pitt-Rivers, and Mr. Rolleston. Dr. Thomas replied.

February 4th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.

—A paper was contributed by Dr. C. F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Down, on "The Theory of a Limited Deity." Dr. D'Arcy being unable to be present on account of the difficulties involved in crossing from Ireland, his paper was read by the Rev. W. R. Matthews. A discussion was opened by the Chairman, and there took part in it Prof. Hicks, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Ionides, Mr. Shaw-Stewart, Mr. Joad, Mr. Mead, Mr. Davies, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, and Dr. Leslie Mackenzie. Mr. Matthews replied.

March 4th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

Prof. J. B. Baillie spoke on the subject of his paper entitled "Anthropomorphism and Truth." The Chairman opened the discussion. The following also spoke :—Prof. Hicks, Mr. Prichard, Mr. Ainslie, Miss Oakeley, Mr. Mead, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Pitt-Rivers, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, and Miss Stebbing. Prof. Baillie replied.

March 18th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

Mr. J. W. Scott spoke on the subject of his paper "Realism and Politics." The Chairman opened the discussion, in which the following took part :—Miss Oakeley, Miss Stebbing, Col. Bethell, Mrs. Duddington, Mr. Joad, Mr. Mead, Mr. Ainslie, Miss Edgell, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, Mr. Shaw-Stewart, Mr. Demos, and Prof. Hicks. Mr. Scott replied.

April 8th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller spoke on the subject of his paper entitled "Omnipotence," and replied to various questions. The discussion was opened by the Chairman, who was followed by Col. Bethell, Mr. Shaw-Stewart, Mr. Ionides, Mr. Cock, Miss Stebbing, Mr. Joad, Mr. Shelton, Mr. Demos, Miss Wrinch, Miss Spanton, Prof. Norman Smith, and Prof. Hicks. Dr. Schiller dealt with the criticisms that had been made.

April 22nd, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

A paper was read by Prof. Arthur Robinson on "Behaviour as a Psychological Concept." The Chairman opened the discussion, and there took part in it Dr. Nunn, Miss Edgell, Mr. Coddington, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Bartlett, Miss Hazlitt, and Prof. Hicks. Prof. Robinson dealt with the points raised.

April 29th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

Prof. H. J. W. Hetherington spoke on the subject of his paper, "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order." The discussion was opened by Mr. Cole, and there took part in it Mr. Delisle Burns, Mr. Hobson, Prof. Lovejoy, Mr. Shelton, Prof. Norman Smith, and the Chairman. Prof. Hetherington replied.

May 6th, 1918. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

A paper on "Practical Dualism" was read by Miss E. E. Constance Jones. The Chairman opened the discussion and it was continued by Miss Stebbing, Prof. Hicks, Miss Edgell, Mr. Mead, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Ainslie, Dr. Brough, Dr. Thomas, Mr. Bartlett, and Dr. Nunn. Miss Jones replied.

May 27th, 1918. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

Resolved: "That this meeting of the Aristotelian Society desires to express its deep regret at the loss of Mr. Sidney Ball, for many years a Member of the Society, and to convey to Mrs. Ball and the other members of the family respectful sympathy in their bereavement." A paper was read by Prof. G. Dawes Hicks on "The 'Modes' of Spinoza and the 'Monads' of Leibniz." The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and there took part in it Prof. J. A. Smith, Dr. Thomas, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Sekyi, Prof. Nunn, and others. Prof. Hicks replied.

June 10th, 1918. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

A paper was read by Mr. A. A. Cock on "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God." The Chairman opened the discussion, and there took part in it Prof. Hicks, the Dean of St. Paul's, Mr. Davies, Mr. Shelton, Mr. Ionides, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Coddington, Dr. Thomas, and Prof. Nunn. Mr. Cock replied.

June 24th, 1918. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

A paper was read by Mr. W. R. Matthews on "The Moral Argument for Theism." The discussion was opened by the Chairman. There took part in it Prof. Hicks, Mrs. Duddington, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Davies, Miss Stebbing, and others. Mr. Matthews replied.

July 8th, 1918. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.—

The Secretary read the Report of the Council on the work of the Session, and it was adopted. Owing to the illness of the Treasurer, the presentation of the Financial Statement was deferred. An alteration in Rule vii, namely, after the word "Treasurer" to insert the words "the Editor, the Librarian," was agreed to. The following nominations of Officers for the next Session by the Council were approved:—President, Dr. G. E. Moore; Honorary Treasurer, Prof. T. Percy Nunn; Editor, Prof. H. Wildon Carr; Librarian, Miss L. S. Stebbing; Honorary Secretary, Prof. G. Dawes Hicks. The following Members who had been duly nominated were elected to serve on the Executive Committee:—Dr. J. Brough, Mr. C. Delisle Burns, Mrs. N. A. Duddington, Miss Edgell, Mrs. Adrian Stephen, and Prof. A. N. Whitehead. Dr. G. F. Goldsbrough and Miss M. Punnett were re-appointed Auditors. A paper was read by Prof. A. E. Taylor on "The Philosophy of Proclus." The Dean of St. Paul's opened the discussion, and there took part in it Mr. Mead, Mr. Dale, Prof. Hicks, and Prof. Robinson. Prof. Taylor replied.

**ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE JOINT SESSION OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MIND
ASSOCIATION.**

July 5th, 1918. At University College, at 5 p.m. Annual Meeting of the Mind Association, Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, President, in the Chair. The Financial Statement was presented, and the difficulties arising from the increased expense of printing discussed. A communication from the Editor was read. It was resolved to hold the next meeting in London.

At the University of London Club. Forty members of the Joint Societies dined together under the Presidency of Lord Haldane, at 6.30 p.m.

Meeting at 8.30 p.m. Lord Haldane in the Chair. About eighty members of the three Societies and visitors were present. Prof. S. Alexander gave an address on his theory of "Space-Time." Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison opened the discussion. Prof. Whitehead also spoke, and Prof. Alexander replied.

July 6th, 1918. At the University of London Club, at 10 a.m. Prof. H. Wildon Carr in the Chair. Between seventy and eighty members of the Societies and visitors were present. A symposium was held on the question: "Are Physical, Biological and Psychological Categories irreducible?" Dr. J. S. Haldane and Prof. D'Arcy W. Thompson spoke on the subject-matter of the papers they had contributed. There took part in the discussion Dr. Schiller, Prof. Whitehead, Prof. Nicholson, Dr. Leslie Mackenzie, Lord Haldane, Dr. Goldsborough, Mr. Brierley, and Prof. Carr. Prof. D'Arcy Thompson and Dr. J. S. Haldane replied.

At 2.30 p.m. Lt.-Col. C. S. Myers, in the Chair. Eighty members of the Societies and visitors were present. A symposium on the question: "Why is the 'Unconscious' Unconscious?" was taken as read. Captain Maurice Nicoll, Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, and Dr. Ernest Jones spoke on the subject-matter of their papers. The discussion was opened

by the Chairman. There took part in it Mr. Fox-Pitt, Dr. Mitchell, Dr. McDougall, Dr. Crichton Miller, Dr. Constance Long, Mr. Flügel, Dr. Goldsbrough, and Prof. Carr. Dr. Ernest Jones, Dr. Rivers, and Captain Nicoll replied.

July 7th, 1918. At the University of London Club. Fifty members of the Societies lunched together at 1.30 p.m., under the Presidency of the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Meeting at 2.30 p.m. Right Hon. A. J. Balfour in the Chair. Between ninety and hundred members of the Societies and visitors were present. A symposium on the question: "Do Finite Individuals possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" was taken as read. The subject was introduced by the writers of the papers, Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, Prof. Pringle-Pattison, and Lord Haldane. A discussion followed, in which Mr. Thorburn, Prof. Carr, Dr. Schiller, Prof. Alexander, Prof. Whitehead, and the Chairman took part, and Lord Haldane, Prof. Pringle-Pattison, and Dr. Bosanquet replied to the points raised.

July 8th, 1918. At the University of London Club, at 2.30 p.m. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, in the Chair. Thirty members and visitors were present. Miss L. S. Stebbing spoke on the subject of her communication on "The Philosophical Importance of the Verb 'to be.'" There took part in the discussion Prof. Hicks, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mrs. Stephen, Prof. Robinson, Mr. Demos, Dr. Leslie Mackenzie, Mrs. Duddington, Mr. Hooper, and Prof. Alexander. Miss Stebbing replied. Miss Dorothy Wrinch spoke on the subject of her communication "On the Summation of Pleasures." There took part in the discussion, the Chairman, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Prof. Alexander, Mr. Demos, Mr. Jeffreys, and Prof. Hicks. Miss Wrinch replied.



REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE THIRTY-NINTH SESSION, 1917—18.

The thirty-ninth Session of the Society has been carried on under the peculiar difficulties occasioned by the war. It has been, nevertheless, a highly successful Session, and a larger number of meetings have been held than in any previous year. These meetings have been uniformly well attended, and the discussions have been of great interest and value. The subjects dealt with have ranged over most of the fields of philosophy; but the largest number of papers have been concerned with the philosophy of religion.

Prof. H. Wildon Carr opened the Session with a Presidential Address on November 5th, 1917, and there have been, in addition, seventeen papers contributed, together with three symposia. All these will be included in vol. xviii of the *Proceedings*, with the exception of the symposium on the question: "Why is the 'Unconscious' unconscious?" which will appear in *The British Journal of Psychology*. The special meetings, held in conjunction with the Mind Association and the British Psychological Society, awakened widespread attention; and were, perhaps, especially noteworthy on account of the considerable number of leading experts in various branches of natural science who took part in the discussions. The Society is greatly indebted to Mr. A. J. Balfour and Lord Haldane for their kindness in presiding at two of the gatherings, despite the heavy burden of parliamentary and other work falling upon them in these days of national anxiety.

Twenty-seven new Members have joined the Society, and it is gratifying to record that many of them belong to the younger generation of philosophical workers. One of the chief aims of the Society is to afford a means for those who are beginning their labours in philosophical research to meet and discuss with one another the problems upon which they are engaged. There have been two withdrawals.

The Society has to lament the death of Mr. Sidney Ball, for many years one of its Members, and a man deeply beloved and respected by a wide circle of friends, whose loss is keenly felt in

the University of Oxford, of which he was a distinguished teacher. And, just as the Session is closing, there comes the news of the death of Prof. A. Senier, who, in the early years of the Society's history, was one of its most active Members and its first Secretary.

The Council has had to consider seriously the financial position of the Society, in view of the large addition to the expenditure, owing mainly to the very considerable increase in the cost of printing. For the present, it is not proposed to suggest any alteration in the amount of the annual subscription, and it is hoped there will be no necessity for taking this step. But it is felt that, should an increase in the subscription be inevitable, the Members would prefer it to any detrimental curtailment of the Society's activities.

Attention is once more directed to the institution of a library in connexion with the Society. Members of the Society are asked to aid, in the ways suggested in the last Report, the effort to make the library really valuable and useful to students of philosophy throughout the country. The object is gradually to build up a library that will contain everything of importance in philosophical literature.

Mention should be made of the fact that a special fund has been set on foot for defraying the travelling expenses of those who accept invitations to read papers and who have to make special journeys for the purpose. The fund has been started by a donation of £50.

The Membership of the Society now consists of 178 Ordinary, 4 Honorary, and 10 Corresponding Members.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT—39TH SESSION, 1917-1918.

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1. Ordinary Account.

| RECEIPTS. | | | EXPENDITURE. | | |
|--|-----|-------|---|------------------|-------|
| | £ | s. d. | | £ | s. d. |
| Cash balance from last Session | .. | .. | Royal Asiatic Society, for use of rooms | .. | .. |
| Members' subscriptions— | | | Harrison and Sons for printing— | .. | .. |
| Current Session | 144 | 18 0 | Proofs of Papers sent out, Notices of | | |
| Arrears.. | 21 | 0 0 | Meetings, etc. | .. | .. |
| In advance | 2 | 2 0 | Advertisements | .. | .. |
| | | | Income tax | .. | .. |
| Sales of <i>Proceedings</i> (nett) to June 30th, 1917 | 168 | 0 0 | Gratuities | .. | .. |
| Interest on War Loan Investments | 36 | 11 11 | Losses on Scotch and Irish cheques | .. | .. |
| Proceeds of sale of stock (transferred from Investments Account) | 7 | 7 4 | Treasurer's postage and stationery | .. | .. |
| | 4 | 14 5 | Cheque book | .. | .. |
| | | | Balance in hand | .. | .. |
| | | | | 0 12 1 | |
| | | | | 252 8 8 | |
| | | | | <u>£330 7 10</u> | |

2. Travelling Expenses Account.

| | £ | s. d. | | £ | s. d. |
|----------|----|-------|--|----------------|-------|
| Donation | .. | .. | Travelling expenses of readers of papers | .. | .. |
| | 50 | 0 0 | Balance in hand | .. | .. |
| | | | | 43 | 0 0 |
| | | | | <u>£50 0 0</u> | |

3. *Investments Account.*

| Invested in 1915-16 in 4½ per cent. War Stock | | £ s. d. | |
|---|----|---------|------|
| Per Post Office Savings Bank | .. | 44 | 14 0 |
| Per Joint Stock Bank | .. | 99 | 9 4 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | 144 | 3 4 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | £144 | 3 4 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | £ s. d. | |
| | | 4 | 14 5 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | 137 | 1 0 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | 2 | 7 11 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | £144 | 3 4 |
| | | <hr/> | |

£ s. d. |
 Proceeds of stock sold on conversion to 5 per cent.
 War Stock (transferred to ordinary account) ..
 Value of £147 7s. 4d. Stock held (at 93 per cent.) on
 June 30th, 1918 (carried forward to 1918-19) ..

Balance

Examined and found correct, July 1st, 1918.—

(Signed) T. PERCY NUNN, *Treasurer.*

(Signed) GILES F. GOLDSBROUGH } *Auditors.*
 MARGARET PUNNETT }

RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY,” or, for a short title, “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.”

OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, an Editor, a Librarian, a Secretary, and Members. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President. The business of the Society shall be managed by an Executive Committee consisting of the President, the Treasurer, the Editor, the Librarian, the Secretary, and six members elected in accordance with Rule VIII.

SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall admit the candidate to membership.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The Committee shall nominate the President, the Treasurer, the Editor, the Librarian, and the Secretary for the ensuing session, and shall, at the Annual Meeting, submit the nominations for the approval of the Society.

ELECTION OF COMMITTEE.

VIII.—At the same meeting the six members to constitute with the officers the Executive Committee shall be elected by ballot. Nominations, which must be signed by two members of the Society, must reach the Secretary fourteen days before the meeting, and a balloting paper shall be sent to all members. Members may return their balloting papers by post before the meeting or hand them in at the meeting.

Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Committee may co-opt a member to serve for the remainder of the Session.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

IX.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

X.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

XI.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

PROCEEDINGS.

XII.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XIII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

VISITORS.

XIV.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

AMENDMENTS.

XV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and, notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE FORTIETH SESSION, 1918-1919.

THE COUNCIL.

PRESIDENT.

G. E. MOORE, Sc.D., F.B.A.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1894-1898).

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1899-1904).

VERY REV. DEAN HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A. (President, 1904-1907).

RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A. (President, 1907-1908).

S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1908-1911).

HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S. (President, 1911-1913).

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D. (President, 1913-1914).

RIGHT HON. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S. (President, 1914-1915).

H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt. (President, 1915-1918).

TREASURER.

PROF. T. PERCY NUNN, M.A., D.Sc.

EDITOR.

PROF. H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt.

LIBRARIAN.

MISS L. S. STEBBING, M.A.

HONORARY SECRETARY.

PROF. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

DR. J. BROUGH.

MR. C. DELISLE BURNS.

MRS. N. A. DUDINGTON.

MISS BEATRICE EDGEELL.

MRS. ADRIAN STEPHEN.

PROF. A. N. WHITEHEAD.

HONORARY MEMBERS.

F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., LL.D., Merton College, Oxford.

Prof. W. R. DUNSTAN, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., 38, Cranley Gardens, S.W.

Prof. Sir HENRY JONES, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., The University, Glasgow.

Prof. JAMES WARD, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., 6, Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

- Prof. J. MARK BALDWIN, c/o Harris Forbes & Co., 56, William Street
New York.
- Prof. HENRI BERGSON, 31, Rue d'Erlanger, Paris.
- Prof. ÉMILE BOUTROUX, 5, Rond-Point Bugeaud, Paris.
- Prof. J. M. CATTELL, Garrison, New York.
- Senatore BENEDETTO CROCE, Trinità Maggiore 12, Naples.
- Prof. JOHN DEWEY, Columbia University, New York City.
- M. H. DZIEWICKI, 11, Szczępańska, Cracow, Austria.
- Prof. HARALD HÖFFDING, Carlsberg, Copenhagen.
- Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
- Prof. WM. WUNDT, Leipzig.

MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885. Prof. S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 24, Brunswick Road, Withington, Manchester.
1915. DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A., Athenæum Club, S.W. 1.
1899. Sir ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES, M.D., 8, Bramham Gardens, S.W. 8.
1913. Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D., Ph.D., University College, Gower Street, W.C. 1.
1916. Prof. J. B. BAILLIE, M.A., D.Phil., 16, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.
1908. Right Hon. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S., *Vice-President*, 4, Carlton Gardens, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1912. Prof. SURENDRA NATH BANERJEE, M.A., 16, Incognito Gade, Christiania, Norway.
1915. Miss B. C. BARFIELD, Bicknell, Athenæum Road, Whetstone, N. 20.
1918. C. J. BARKER, Fir Lodge, Rose Walk, Purley, Surrey.
1915. F. C. BARTLETT, B.A., St. John's College, Cambridge.
1907. Mrs. MARGRIETA BEER, M.A., Writers' Club, 10, Norfolk Street, Strand, W.C. 2.
1893. E. C. BENECKE, 182, Denmark Hill, S.E. 5.
1913. Col. E. H. BETHELL, 18, Hyde Park Square, W. 2.
1886. H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
1913. Prof. A. BONUCCI, Perugia.
1886. Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., D.C.L., *Vice-President*, The Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey.
1890. A. BOTTWOOD, Bledlow, Bucks.
1914. C. D. BROAD, M.A., The University, St. Andrews.
1889. Prof. J. BROUGH, LL.D., Hampden Club, N.W. 1.
1917. Miss ELSIE M. BRYANT, B.A., c/o Mrs. Cole, Silely Road, Barrow-on-Soar, Leicestershire.
1913. C. DELISLE BURNS, M.A., 26, Springfield Road, St. John's Wood, N.W. 8.

Elected.

1906. Rev. A. CALDECOTT, M.A., D.D., D.Lit., Great Oakley Rectory, Harwich.
1916. W. A. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE, M.A., 4, St. George's Mansions, Oxford.
1918. Prof. E. T. CAMPAGNAC, M.A., Green Gate, Dingle Lane, Liverpool.
1881. Prof. H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt., *Vice-President and Editor*, 107, Church Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1916. Miss CHATTOPADHYAY, Hyderabad, Deccan, India.
1908. E. C. CHILDS, M.A.
1912. ALBERT A. COCK, B.A., King's College, Strand, W.C. 2.
1907. J. F. O. CODDINGTON, M.A., LL.M., 42, Bank Street, Sheffield.
1895. STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W. 7.
1913. G. D. H. COLE, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
1911. F. H. B. DALK, M.A., C.B., 33, Clarendon Road, Holland Park, W. 11.
1917. Right Rev. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Lord Bishop of Down, Culloolen, Craignavad, Co. Down, Ireland.
1912. Prof. WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., 8, Queen's Gardens, Aberdeen.
1916. Rev. A. E. DAVIES, M.A., 48, Blenheim Gardens, Cricklewood, N.W. 2.
1896. E. T. DIXON, M.A., Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
1912. Miss L. DOUGALL, Cutts End, Cumnor, Oxford.
1918. Rev. JOHN DRAKE, M.A., B.D., Serampore College, Serampore, Bengal, India.
1899. J. A. J. DREWITT, M.A., Wadham College, Oxford.
1911. Mrs. N. A. DUNDINGTON, M.A., 13, Carlton Terrace, Child's Hill, N.W. 2.
1910. Miss BEATRICE EDGEELL, M.A., Ph.D., 15, Lyon Road, Harrow.
1916. E. J. R. EDWARDS, M.A., 20, Christchurch Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
1917. Rev. A. E. ELDER, 10, York Place, South Ealing, W. 5.
1915. T. STRAENS ELIOT, M.A., 18, Crawford Mansions, Crawford Street, W. 1
1893. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.
1914. ERIC FAEMER, Trinity College, Cambridge.
1912. G. C. FIELD, M.A., D.Sc., The University, Manchester.
1914. Miss MARY FLETCHER, Newnham College, Cambridge.
1918. Miss MADGE FULLER, 39, Norland Square, W. 11.
1914. Miss MARJORIE GABAIN, The Manor House, Bushey, Herts.
1916. Miss H. GAVIN, 46, Belsize Park, N.W. 3.
1897. Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., Lichfield, Wallace Avenue, Torrak, Melbourne.
1911. Prof. C. M. GILLESPIE, M.A., The University, Leeds.
1913. MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., 360950, Prisoner of War Section, Le Havre, France.
1900. G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., 125, Herne Hill, S.E. 24.
1915. Mrs. M. GOODYER, Sneinton, Nottingham.
1912. Prof. FRANK GRANGER, D.Litt., 37, Lucknow Drive, Nottingham.
1918. ALBERT GRESSWELL, M.A., M.D., Louth, Lincolnshire.

Elected.

1912. J. C. HAGUE, M.A., London Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C. 1.
1883. Right Hon. Viscount HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 28, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W. 1.
1917. J. S. HALDANE, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Cherwell, Oxford.
1915. Miss S. ELIZABETH HALL, Lyceum Club, 128, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1913. E. P. HARDIE, M.A., 13, Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.
1918. Miss VICTORIA HAZLITT, M.A., 3, Park Mansions, St. John's Wood, N.W. 8.
1918. A. E. HEATH, M.A., The Flat, Steep, Petersfield.
1915. Prof. H. J. W. HETHERINGTON, M.A., The Spinney, Llanishen, nr. Cardiff.
1890. Prof. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., *Vice-President* and *Hon. Sec.*, 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
1912. Prof. R. F. A. HOERNLÉ, M.A., B.Sc., 2, Shady Hill Square, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
1918. MICHEL G. HOLBAN, 6, Pengwern Road, Earl's Court, S.W.
1916. Rev. S. K. HOOPER, M.A., Lakefield, 148, Kingston Road, Wimbledon, S.W. 19.
1916. Very Rev. Dean W. R. INGE, D.D., The Deanery, St. Paul's, E.C. 4.
1913. ALEXANDER C. IONIDES, jun., 34, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1911. Principal J. P. JACKS, M.A., LL.D., D.D., Shotover Edge, Headington, Oxford.
1918. Rev. J. G. JAMES, M.A., D.Lit., Brynhyfryd, Andover Road, Southsea.
1904. Principal F. B. JEVONS, M.A., D.Litt., Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.
1915. C. E. M. JOAD, M.A., 34, Well Walk, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
1918. C. B. JOHNSON, M.A., Oak Lodge, Addlestone, Surrey.
1892. Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, D.Litt., Meldon House, Weston-super-Mare, Somerset.
1911. Rev. TUDOR JONES, Ph.D., 14, Clifton Park, Bristol.
1912. Miss E. F. JOURDAIN, D. ès L., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.
1912. J. N. KEYNES, D.Sc., 6, Harvey Road, Cambridge.
1916. Prof. J. LAIRD, M.A., 4, Cranmer Gardens, Belfast, Ireland.
1881. A. F. LAKE, Wraggaton, Sundridge Avenue, Bromley.
1911. Prof. GEO. H. LANGLEY, M.A., Dacca College, Bengal, India.
1898. Prof. ROBERT LATTI, M.A., D.Phil., 4, The College, Glasgow.
1915. Miss MARJORIE LEBUS, B.A., 3, Bernard Mansions, Bernard Street, Russell Square, W.C. 1.
1918. Captain A. E. I. LEGGE, Athenæum Club, S.W. 1.
1908. A. D. LINDSAY, M.A., 2, Fyfield Road, Oxford.
1897. Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Annie's Lodge, by Irvine, Ayrshire.
1912. THOMAS LOVEDAY, M.A., 1, Grosvenor Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
1900. ARTHUR LYNCH, M.P., M.A., 80, Antrim Mansions, Haverstock Hill, N.W. 3.

Elected.

1911. WM. MACDOUGALL, M.A., F.R.S., 89, Banbury Road, Oxford.
1916. C. A. MACE, B.A., Ivy Lodge, Dereham Road, Norwich.
1918. Miss MARGARET MCFARLANE, B.A., The Training College Hostel, 71, Clarendon Road, Leeds.
1918. Miss E. M. MACKAY, Skucritten House, Oban, Scotland.
1916. Prof. J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., 56, Bassett Road, N. Kensington, W. 10.
1910. W. LESLIE MACKENZIE, M.A., M.D., 4, Clarendon Crescent, Edinburgh.
1917. ABDUL MAJID, Gola Grinj, Lucknow, India.
1916. Rev. W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., B.D., King's College, Strand, W.C. 2.
1899. J. LEWIS MCINTYRE, D.Sc., Abbotsville, Culps, N.B.
1912. R. M. McIVER, M.A., The University, Toronto.
1914. G. R. S. MEAD, B.A., 47, Campden Hill Road, W. 8.
1915. F. V. MERRIMAN, B.A.
1915. P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, M.A., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Zoological Society, Regent's Park, N.W. 8.
1889. R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., 46, Ladbroke Square, W. 11.
1896. G. E. MOORE, Sc.D., F.B.A., *President*, 17, Magdalene Street, Cambridge.
1915. Mrs. G. E. MOORE, 17, Magdalene Street, Cambridge.
1912. DAVID MORRISON, M.A., 23, South Street, St. Andrews, Scotland.
1910. Prof. C. LLOYD MORGAN, LL.D., F.R.S., 5, Kensington Place, Clifton, Bristol.
1918. K. C. MUCKHERJEE, B.A., Jesus College, Oxford.
1913. J. MURRAY, M.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
1912. C. S. MYERS, M.D., Sc.D., F.R.S., Highfield Park, Hemel Hempstead, Herts.
1904. Prof. T. PERCY NUNN, M.A., D.Sc., *Treasurer*, London Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C. 1.
1908. Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., Passmore Edwards Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C. 1.
1918. Captain HERBERT J. PAGE, 12, Hyde Park Chambers, Knightsbridge.
1918. Mrs. HERBERT J. PAGE, 12, Hyde Park Chambers, Knightsbridge.
1903. Miss E. A. PEARSON, 52, Westminster Mansions, S.W. 1.
1916. ST. GEORGE LANK FOX PITT, Travellers Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1917. Miss ELEANOR M. PLUMER, M.A., Passmore Edwards Settlement, Tavistock Place, W.C. 1.
1913. Prof. A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A., 16, Church Hill, Edinburgh.
1916. Miss M. PUNNETT, London Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C. 1.
1914. ADAM RANKINE, Newstead, Monkham's Avenue, Woodford Green, Essex.
1889. Very Rev. Dean HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 18, Longwall, Oxford.
1918. Captain GEORGE PITT-RIVERS, Rushmore, Salisbury.

Elected.

1918. M. W. ROBINSON, M.A., 4, Elmwood Avenue, Belfast.
1895. Prof. ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., D.C.L., Observatory House, Durham.
1908. G. R. T. ROSS, D.Phil., Rangoon College, Burma.
1912. Prof. SATIS CHANDRA ROY, B.A., Dyal Singh College, Lahore, Punjab, India.
1896. Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S., *Vice-President*, 57, Gordon Square, W.C. 1.
1905. F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc., Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
1912. J. W. SCOTT, M.A., Acre Cottage, Clynder, Dumbartonshire.
1918. W. E. G. SEKYI, M.A., 8, Commercial Road, Cape Coast, Gold Coast, West Africa.
1892. ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W. 8.
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
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